Imágenes de página
PDF
ePub

natural history of the several groups of passions, in which much insight and acute thinking are displayed.

His usual method of explanation is to fix upon one or two generic passions, and then, by a vigorous process of argument and reasoning, mainly of a deductive form, to show their nature, their relation to other passions, and their modes of manifestation and influence. I can only afford space for a short specimen of his manner of exposition. in this department, taken from the section on property and riches:"For the same reason that riches cause pleasure and pride, and poverty excites uneasiness and humility, power must produce the former emotions, and slavery the latter. Power, or an authority over others, makes us capable of satisfying all our desires; as slavery, by subjecting us to the will of others, exposes us to a thousand wants and mortifications.

"It is here worth observing that the vanity of power, or shame of slavery, are much augmented by the consideration of the persons over whom we exercise our authority, or who exercise it over us. For supposing it possible to frame statutes of such an admirable mechanism that they could move and act in obedience to the will, it is evident the possession of them would give pleasure and pride, but not to such a degree as the same authority, when exercised over sensible and rational creatures, whose condition, being compared to our own, makes it seem more agreeable and honourable. Comparison is in every case a sure method of augmenting our esteem of anything. A rich man feels the felicity of his condition better by opposing it to that of the beggar. But there is a peculiar advantage in power, by the contrast which is, in a manner, presented to us between ourselves and the person we command. The comparison is obvious and natural. The imagination finds in it the very subject. The passage of the thought to its conception is smooth and easy. And that this circumstance has a considerable effect in augmenting its influence, will appear afterwards in examining the nature of malice and envy." 15

He treats on the will at length, and maintains that it is controlled by the strongest motive; and he emphatically asserts that reason alone can never afford a motive to any action of the will, nor oppose passion in the direction of the will. "Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them." Reason operates without

15 Book II., Part I., sect. 10.

producing any sensible emotion, and, except in the more sublime disquisitions of philosophy, scarcely ever gives any pleasure or uneasiness.

But it is evident that there are certain calm desires and tendencies, which, though they are real passions, produce little emotion in the mind, and are more known by their effects than by the immediate feeling. These desires are either (1) certain instincts originally implanted in our nature, such as benevolence and resentment, the love of life, and kindness to children; or (2) the general appetite to good and aversion to evil. 16 Besides these calm passions there are other violent emotions which have a great influence on the will, such as impending evils which raise our fears and aversions, and produce a sensible emotion. The common error of philosophers has been to ascribe the direction of the will to one of these principles, and in supposing the other to have no influence. Men often act knowingly contrary to their interest; for this reason the view of the greatest possible good does not always influence them. Men often counteract a strong passion in the pursuit of their interests and designs. "It is not therefore the present uneasiness alone which determines them. In general we may observe, that both these principles operate on the will; and, where they are contrary, that either of them prevails, according to the general character or present disposition of the person. What we call strength of mind, implies the prevalence of the calm passions above the violent; though we may easily observe there is no man so constantly possessed of this virtue as never on any occasion to yield to the solicitations of passion and desire." 17

In the Third Book, Hume explains his moral views as originally advanced in the Treatise of Human Nature; and in an advertisement

16 Touching this distinction of the calm passions and desires, and the function assigned to them, Hume so far seems to follow Hutcheson.

17 Book II., Part III., sect. 3. Locke had stated that the strongest immediate desire, or, as he sometimes phrased it, "the present uneasiness," determines the will to action; in effect his theory was that the will is always determined by the strongest motive, but the theory is better stated by Hume.

Hume, however, did not thoroughly develop the relation between belief and will. He merely says, what I have already indicated in a preceding page, "that belief is nothing but a lively idea related to a present impression. This vivacity is a requisite circumstance to the exciting of all our passions, the calm as well as the violent." But he gives no satisfactory exposition of belief in its relation to the will, although he touches on it in his later work-An Inquiry concerning Human Understanding, sect. 5.

to it he expresses a hope that it may be understood by ordinary readers, with as little attention as is usually accorded to books of reasoning. As we have already seen, he maintains that reason alone can never be a motive of action, or impulse of the will; accordingly, he insists that moral distinctions are not derived from reason, but from a moral sense. What constitutes this moral sense, however, he failed to render explicit and there is a lack of precision on the moral faculty, in the original development of his system. He recognises sympathy as the chief source of moral distinctions, which, along with utility, seems to form the foundation of his ethical views. The following is the clearest expression of his moral doctrines which I have found in the Treatise of Human Nature :—

"Most people will readily allow that the useful qualities of the mind are virtuous, because of their utility. This way of thinking is so natural, and occurs on so many occasions, that few will make any scruple of admitting it. Now, this being once admitted, the force of sympathy must necessarily be acknowledged. Virtue is considered as means to an end. Means to an end are only valued so far as the end is valued. But the happiness of strangers affects us by sympathy alone. To that principle, therefore, we must ascribe the sentiment of approbation, which arises from the survey of all those virtues that are useful to society or to the person possessed of them. These form the most considerable part of morality." 18

In his attempts to account for the origin of society, and of property, he adopts the deductive method. He usually states certain propositions, and then proceeds to adduce arguments in support of the conclusions which he intends to establish; still his treatment of these subjects is always interesting and often ingenious, although quite unhistorical and imaginary. His conception of the problem of the origin of government resembles that advanced by Hobbes, only it is not so violent; as Hume had more polish than the sage of Malmesbury.

Having now completed my account of Hume's system as it was originally conceived and advanced; but seeing that he himself averred that his matured ethical views were embodied in his later work, An Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, I shall briefly summarise his moral principles from this famed production.

18 Book III., Part III., sect. 6. It may be observed that the influence of the current moral theories are visible in the views of Hume.

It consists of nine sections, which treat the following topics :"The general principles of Morals; Benevolence; Justice; Political Society; Why Utility pleases; Qualities useful to ourselves; Qualities immediately agreeable to ourselves; Qualities immediately agreeable to others; Conclusion." In an appendix, the points of "moral sentiment, self-love, justice, and verbal disputes" are treated. If we were only to look at the conception, the execution, and the limits of this treatise, it might be pronounced an admirable production. The main difference between it and the corresponding part in the Treatise of Human Nature, lies in the greater importance ascribed to utility in the later work.

1. As in it utility or a reference to the happiness of mankind is the standard of right and wrong, and also the ground and motive of moral approbation. 2. While the moral faculty itself assumes the form of a compound of reason and generous sentiment. 3. He insists warmly on the existence and importance of the sentiment of benevolence, but hardly recognises it as leading to any uncompensated self-sacrifice. 4. Touching the varied and great constituents of human happiness, he is meagre and defective. 5. He accepts the prevailing moral code of the society of his day. 6. According to his view, the inducements to virtue are, on the one side, our humane sentiments, and on the other, our self-love; the two classes of motives concurring to promote both our own good and the good of mankind. 7. The connection of ethics with politics is not developed; he does not distinguish the legal sanction of morality from the popular sanction; he draws no line between duty and merit. 8. He recognises no connection between ethics and religion. Such then are the leading principles of this remarkable treatise, which for long served as a text-book to utilitarian moralists.

Touching Hume's other writings, I must be brief. His essay on Miracles is exceedingly well worked out. His argumentation is entirely founded on the principle that experience is our only guide in estimating and appreciating the force and the value of evidence; but he also strengthens this position by a free use of every available weapon, that is, every passion, sentiment, feeling, and weakness of the human mind, were called into requisition as elements of the problem, and all employed with great sagacity and ingenuity. A short quotation will confirm this, and indicate his method.

"With what greediness are the miraculous accounts of travellers received their descriptions of sea and land monsters, their relations

of wonderful adventures, strange men, and uncouth manners? But if the spirit of religion join itself to the love of wonder, there is an end of common sense, and human testimony, in these circumstances, loses all pretension to authority. A religionist may be an enthusiast, and imagine he sees what has no reality. He may know his narrative to be false, and yet persevere in it, with the best intentions in the world, for the sake of promoting so holy a cause. Or even where this delusion has not place, vanity, excited by so strong a temptation, operates on him more powerfully than on the rest of mankind in any circumstances, and self-interest with equal force. His auditors may not have, and commonly have not, sufficient judgment to canvass his evidence. What judgment they have, they renounce by principle, in these sublime and mysterious subjects. Or if they were ever so willing to employ it, passion and a heated imagination disturb the regularity of its operations. Their credulity increases his impudence, and his impudence overpowers their credulity."

He observes that records of miracles are found to abound most among ignorant and barbarous communities, and that when they are found among civilised nations, they are merely transmitted from the former. He also notices that the earliest annals of all nations are full of prodigies, omens, oracles, and judgments, which almost hide the few natural facts that are mixed with them; but, as we advance nearer to the enlightened ages, these mysterious and irregular phenomena become less and less prominent, though never entirely extirpated from human nature.

His ultimate conclusion was this:-"That no human testimony can have such force as to prove a miracle and make it a just foundation for any system of religion. I beg the limitations here made may be remarked, when I say, that a miracle can never be proved, so as to be the foundation of a system of religion. For I own that otherwise there may possibly be miracles, or violations of the ordinary course of nature, of such a kind as to admit of proof from human testimony; though, perhaps, it will be impossible to find any such in all the records of history." 19

19 Inquiry concerning Human Understanding, sect. 10. Hume's own opinion of his main argument was this :-" I flatter myself, that I have discovered an argument which, if just, will, with the wise and learned, be an everlasting check to all kinds of superstitious delusion, and consequently will be useful as long as the world endures. For so long, I suppose, will the accounts of miracles and prodigies be found in all history, sacred and profane."

« AnteriorContinuar »