of power. But this power may receive an oblique direction, from ignorance, folly, and vice, and judicial determinations, whilft under fuch malignant influence, muft neceffarily be uncertain, partial, and capricious. In a democracy, even if you fuppofe the body of the people to be virtuous and well difpofed, yet a controuling power is wanting to give a steadiness to their proceedings; and it has been frequently obferved, that their decifions are generally marked by cruelty, injuftice, and ingratitude: for the leading principle of that form of government is an extreme jealoufy of an invafion of their liberty; a paffion that, above all others, blinds the understanding, and fteels the heart against every fentiment of compaffion and juftice. To be fatisfied of this truth, we have only to peruse the history of the Republics of Greece and Rome. Orators and hiftorians, in their declamatory difcourfes, have reprefented tyrants as enemies to virtue in their fubjects; but not one of those monsters, raised by the blind. nefs of fortune to abfolute power, whofe crimes we now contemplate with horror, ever treated the benefactors of their country with fuch cruelty and injuftice, as Athens did her most renowned citizens.

it

The Republic of Rome is justly chargeable with the fame folly and ingratitude; and if it was not guilty in the fame degree, it is to be afcribed to its having a larger portion of aristocracy in the conftitu. tion of its government, which, in fome measure, counteracted the madness of the people. From every light we can derive from hiftory, appears that fecurity of perfon and property is better maintained under an abfolute monarchy than a democracy; for the foily and caprice of the people, when vefted with fovereign power, are more extenfive in their influence, and more fatal in their effects, than the vices of the most defpotic tyrant. Of an oligargical form of government I fhall fay little, fince of all tyrannies it is allowed to be the most griev ous; and in a pure ariftocracy, the ftate is divided into two parties, which agree in nothing but in neglecting the public good. We may, therefore, fafely affirm, that this union of power and virtue, which we deem effential for the fteady and impartial administration of justice, is alone to be found in a limited monarchy: and of all limited monar chies, we may, without being accused of any unreasonable partiality, pronounce the government of Great Britain to be the beft; for by its happy conftitution, the crown poffeffes a controuling power, which is conftantly exerted for the good, and can never be mifapplied to the prejudice of the fubject: and the other branches of the Legislature, though vefted with feparate privileges, fufficient to fecure their independence, yet can make no law which is binding on the community but by their joint confent; and for the juft execution of the laws, we have every fecurity that the most confummate wifdom could devife. Our judges are not only fuperior, by their rank and fortune, to every fufpicion of corruption, but are never raifed to that exalted station till after many years experience and daily practice in the profeffion of the law; fo that we have as little to fear from their ignorance, as from their want of integrity. But to guard against even the poffibility of an abuse of power on the part of the judges, the final decifion of every cause, civil

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and criminal, is referred to a jury of the vicinage, chofen under fuch circumftances, and fubject to fuch reftrictions, as to prevent any collufion or undue influence. Such is the conftitution which

our reformers are defirous to fubyert.

The infamous regicides of the laft century established it as a fundamental principle, that the people are the origin of power. This is the bafis of Locke's fanciful fyftem, and adopted by the profeffors of the new philofophy as the first article of their political creed, The inference they draw from this pofition is, that every power with which the civil magiftrate is vefted, is delegated by the people, for whofe good alone it must be exercised, and in whom refides the fovereignty inherent and unalienable; and that the people have a right to refume the powers which they granted, not only when they are abused, or are found to be unequal to the attainment of the purpose for which they were intended, but merely from whim, caprice, or the uncertain profpect of bettering their condition. Yet plaufible as this reafoning may appear, the principle on which it is founded may be queftioned. Certain it is, that the fuppofition of that compact between the people and the prince, which many political writers have confidered as the origin of civil fociety, is attended with many difficulties. It is fcarcely to be conceived, that in an affembly of this fort, the whole body of the people could be unanimous; and if there were diffentient voices, what .but force could make the minority yield to the majority; which force, in every queftion refpecting civil rights, ought to be excluded? It seems more confonant to reafon, to regard a private family as containing in it the first feeds of political government: for furely mankind would fubmit with the leaft reluctance to that power to which they had been, early accuftomed, and which Nature feemed to authorife. It is, therefore, probable, that the first governments were patriarchal. Afterwards dominion was established by various means. Superior talents, either in the works of war, or the arts of peace, muft give fome men a great afcendancy over their affociates, and thefe favourites of nature might not always ufe their power with the moderation that could be wifhed.. This will account for the origin of tyrannies, which, if any credit is to be given to ancient hiftory, were prior to laws either traditionary or written. But it is eafy to conceive that the will of the prince, which at first was the only law, might require fome reftraint; and that the people might be taught, by their fufferings, to infift on a more permanent fecurity for their perfonal fafety and protection, than the wifdom and goodness of any one individual, however diftinguished for ability and virtue: and this may be fuppofed to give rife to law, in the conftitution of which, all governments have fhewn an extent of comprehenfion joined to a provident circumfpection, which nothing but long experience could teach. It therefore seems abfurd to imagine, that mankind, on their first entering into civil fociety, fhould not only have forefeen, but provided, for every contingency, which, in this fanciful compact on which our theorists build their fyftem, might alife from the abufe of power, or the perverfity of

human

human paffion; and it is to be feared, that if they confult antiquity, they will find little to favour their pretenfions; for the advocates for tyranny might fay, that the rights of the people, as they are termed, are encroachments on the regal power. And men of a more liberal caft of mind, although they would regard the greater part of the privileges they enjoy as the happy effects of a more enlightened policy, would be cautious of afferting them to be inherent rights; much less would they admit of a fovereignty, which inwolves in it a folecifm. For the power that governs, and the subject that is governed, can never exift in the fame perfons. Yet this abfurdity is overlooked, or difregarded, by thofe who talk of the fovereignty of the people; and for which it is difficult to account, unless we fuppofe that they confound the ideas of power and right. For no one will deny that the people may, by an act of violence, overturn the best established government in the world, and relapse into barbarifm. But this power is not unlike that of committing fuicide, which every man poffeffes; but few, except Rouffeau, would claim it as an unalienable right. It is a favourite doctrine in our new fyftems of politics, that all rebellions, feditions, and difcontents, originate in the pride, oppreffion, and injustice of the rulers; for that the people, if the government is well adminiftered, are always easy and satisfied. But philofophers have said, that to be grateful for the bleffings we enjoy, is an argument of no fmall proficiency in wifdom and virtue; fuch as cannot, with truth, be afcribed to the majority of our fpecies; or, if it could, their might be fome partiality, if not injuftice, in giving the exclufive poffeffion of this valuable quality to the people, while the magiftrates and governors are fuppofed to be under the influence of the moft malignant and degrading paffions. But if we confult hiftory, we fhall find that it is not impoffible but the people may be diffatisfied with the mildeft governments, and revolt against the best Kings. Agis of Lacedemon, Charles I. of England, and Lewis XVI. of France perished by the hands of their fubjects; not in the frenzy of a popular tumalt, not by the dark defigns of an affaflin, but in the face of day, and under the form of a judicial trial. The first of these princes is marked with the moft illuftrious names of antiquity; the fecond, in the eloquent and characteristic language of the noble hiftorian, “ was the worthieft gentleman, the best master, the best friend, the best husband, the beft father, and the beft Chriftian, that the age in which he lived produced," and of the third, it may be said, in the words of the acute hiftorian of Rome, "Alii diutius imperium tenuerunt, nemo tam fortiter reliquit." Tacit. Hift. Lib. I. that no Sovereign ever exceeded him in the love he bore his fubjects; and the gentleness and clemency of his nature appeared in every act of his life. It might likewife be obferved that the people, who on fome occafions, refufe to fubmit to legal and neceffary reftraints, at other times have been fubject to the most crnel oppreffions, which they have borne without a murmur or complaint. So uncertain and capricious is that judg ment which we are taught to regard as infallible. The truth is,"

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that

that the rulers and the people, the governors and the governed, as they are partakers of one common nature, fo are they alike fubject to the fame infirmities and paffions, the fame blindness of underftanding, and perverfity of will; and civil contents may arise as much from the fault of one, as of the other. The abolition of rank and titles is a favourite object of our reformers, and they fupport their opinion by faying, that there is no real diftinction between one man and another, but what arifes from fuperior talents and virtue; and that the fituation of every man in fociety ought to be proportionate to his merit. This doctrine, it must be confeffed, is very alluring; for few men fuppofe themselves to be deficient either in ability or honefly, and in a competition for honours and dignities, the vain and ambitious are apt to indulge flattering expectations of fuccefs: but the extinction of rank and titles might not be attended with the advantages they imagine. Wealth, which is frequently acquired by the exertion of talents, neither fplendid or eftimable, muft bring with it an acceffion of power, and this power must neceffarily fecure a certain degree of refpect: and, perhaps, in no governinent that ever exifted, has merit, in every cafe, met with its due reward, even during the days of its greateft prof perity and virtue; and in the worst of times it has not been wholly difregarded. The caufe may be difcovered in the conftitution of the human mind, which, although it approves of what is right, yet is liable to be misled by paffion and prejudice; and the bulk of mankind may want difcernment to appreciate and generofity to reward, real virtue, and yet may not be wholly infenfible of its influence; at leaft they may entertain a juft abhorrence of vice. This we muft acknowledge to be an evil; but, like many other evils, we conceive it to be infeperable from our nature. Certain we are, that thofe who expect a more just estimate of talents and virtue in civil commotions, than under a regular and established government, will find themselves mistaken. The qualifications, which are neceffary to form a leader of a faction, are fuch as no good man will envy. A daring and ferocious courage, a dexterous management of the tempers and difpofition of mankind, an unremitted attention to the object of purfuit, whether of intereft or ambition, unchecked by principle, and unmoved by any of the gentle affections, with a large portion of perfidy and hypocrify, form the ftriking features in the characters of thofe fuccefsful ufurpers, who, under the pretence of refcuing their fellow fubjects from imaginary evils, have established the most cruel and oppreffive tyranny. We might likewise suppose, that the corruption of manners, which is always the confequence of a civil war, would deter every man who was not loft to all fenfe of virtue, from exciting a disturbance in the ftate, or even giving countenance to opinions, which, pursued through all their confequences, have a tendency to fubvert that order and regular fubordination, by which governments are fupported. The opinions we have hitherto examined, though propagated with great infolence, and pushed to a very dangerous and alarming excefs, are not wholly new; but have been adopted in part by the rebellious and feditious

of former times. But it was furely left for the enlightened philofophers of the prefent age to discover, that it required only a moderate fhare of intel ect to guide and direct the vast machine of government. Yet Xenophon conceived the art of government to be extremely difficult and intricate, and only to be acquired in its full eft extent by a few favourites of Heaven, who to tranfcendant talents united a large portion of virtue and indefatigable industry: and fuch is the model of a perfect prince, which he has given in the character of Cyruss; and experience, which is a higher authority than even Xenophon himself has fhewn, that the inceffant labours of moralifts and legislators, even with the aid of religion, have fometimes proved ineffectual in checking the importunate appetites and irregular paffions of mankind. It has been observed, by a great writer, that in contemplating a curious piece of mechanifm, it requires no great kill to discover an imperfection, though none butthofe acquainted with the principles of mechanics, can fully comprehend its various motions, or the full extent of its powers. Such is the cafe of our modern philofophers, who find it much easier to cenfure imaginary defects, than to understand the nature of govern ment, with the duties of princes and the obligations of fubjects. After this new method of fimplifying the science of politics, we hear, without furprize, that the crimes of mankind are occafioned not by their corrupt nature, but by the reftraints of government; and that religion, morals, and government, fo far from being serviceable, are really prejudicial to the happiness of mankind. As the only answer that ought to be given to this opipion, teeming with abfurdity and impiety, we fhould recommend its advocates to contemplate the fituation of France, where the experiment has been made, and where we have seen the most flagitious crimes committed, not only with impunity, but applause; and the human mind funk to a state of degradation and mifery, perhaps unparalleled in the biftory of the world. Yet the revolution which gave birth to all this mischief, was, in its commencement, applauded by a numerous party in England, as a great and noble atchievement. It ought not to be concealed, that many of these patriots pretend to be fhocked at the enormities which have fince been committed. But they might have forefeen, had their dif cernment and honefty been equal to their zeal, that the mifery and confufion they now deplore were the certain confequences of the principles on which the revolution was founded. But nothing that I can advance againft innovation, fedition, and impiety, or in favour of order, government, and religion, can be fo ferviceable to my countrymen, as the re-publication of the celebrated treatise of Sir John Fortescue in praife of the laws of England; a work written by a man eminently killed in the laws and conftitution of this country, and converfant in every kind of learning, of fingular integrity and difcernment in the difcharge of his duty as Chief Juftice of the Court of King's Bench, amiable from the mildness and gentleness of his nature, estimable from the steadiness of his attachment and unshaken loyalty to his Sovereign in the moft trying

viciffitude