that remains for the tribunal to do is to return home. The Washington treaty expressly states in regard to the tribunal that they settle all claims, and supports the American position. Why England acts thus we do not see. Probably she thinks the tribunal is about to give judgment against her.-Vienna Neue Freie Presse.

England knew that demands were made not only for the acts of the vessels, but also for indirect loss. One treaty, as she knew, had been rejected because it had no provision as to this. If the joint commissioners had meant to exclude these claims they might have used language clearly stating it, but on the contrary, the language is such as to include them.-Deutsch-Amerikanischer Economist.

The general European tone is one of warning to England not to break the treaty What if America has let the affair slumber until Russia declared itself ready. Cannot the people on the Thames see how strong the bonds between America and Russia must be when the insult to the Russian Minister not only has not broken but has not even loosened these ties. If this is behind the Alabama question, the government at the Foreign Office must bestir itself.-Neue Badische Lands-Zeitung.

The moment England admits the discussion before the tribunal of arbitration of the claims growing out of the acts of the Alabama and other corsairs, she recognizes the right of the United States to make, by reason of the acts of these corsairs, all possible demands of damages, direct or indirect. She authorizes, in one word, the list of injuries, and the formidable account upon which the arbitrators will pronounce, but which it is difficult to avoid by the preliminary question.-Le Soir.

This declaration of Mr. Gladstone, although contained in a letter of an entirely private character, addressed to the correspondent of the New York World in London, deserves attention. It proves that the English government has not formed the design of cutting short all discussion, and that they consider the subject as still open for debate.

It is important that these intentions should be understood and thoroughly appreciated, and that, on both sides, men with moderate views may strive to effect a reconciliation so much desired. It appears that an effort in that direction has already been made in England. Thus a part of the press of that country, the Pall Mall Gazette for example, suggests the idea of referring to a new arbitration the disputed question of the interpretation of the treaty. The Mémorial Diplomatique recalls, in relation to this proposition, a precedent which it will be possible to invoke. It is that of a treaty which has been executed, of June 15, 1846, growing out of the dispute between England and the United States, in regard to the frontiers of their respective possessions in the northwestern part of the New World. Now this treaty contained, as does the Washington treaty, a real mistake, and it is for that reason that, at this very moment, it is submitted to the arbitration of the Emperor of Germany. Could not as much be done for the convention of May 8, 1871, to determine what interpretation it ought to receive by means of a distinct arbitration ?-Journal des Débats.

Can any one to-day go ask the tribunal to suspend its work until the extent of its jurisdiction shall be determined by a third party? Would it not find itself greatly prejudiced by such a decision intervening at so late a period? Finally, is it not fair to believe that the tribunal is itself the best judge of the extent of its powers?

These are considerations of a delicate nature, which the English government ought carefully to weigh before making a decision which might perhaps alienate the arbitrators, and which would, after all, only defer the solution of the matter without lessening its gravity.

We persist in believing that the wisest policy, and that most in conformity with the true interests of England, and of Europe, would be to let the affair take its course, to leave it entirely to the enlightened and impartial decision which the five eminent statesmen, who have been intrusted with the high mission of solving the dispute, will surely render.-Mémorial Diplomatique.

Since it became known that the North American cabinet had brought forward claims for indirect damages for the consideration of the Geneva tribunal, a panic has arisen in England, and now they wish to have nothing further to do with this tribunal. It cannot be shown that the United States have broken the treaty. The wording of the treaty does not prevent her in any manner from bringing forward claims for indirect as well as direct damages. Therefore the English statesmen have been able to find no escape except that of an appeal to their personal interpretation of the treaty.—Frankfurter Zeitung.

The demands of America were known to England from the first, and her representa- ¡ tives did not object. They contented themselves by indicating that England could not be held liable for damage done the United States by cruisers of the Confederate States. as proper diligence had been exercised to prevent their being armed and fitted out in English ports, and these representatives simply referred all the claims of North America, having the action of these cruisers for a basis, to a tribunal of arbitration. Article I of the treaty of Washington distinctly declares: "Now, in order to remove and adjust all complaints and claims on the part of the United States, and to provide for the speedy settlement of such claims which are not admitted by Her Britannic Majesty's government, the high contracting parties agree that all the said claims growing out of acts committed by the aforesaid vessels, and generically known as the ‘Alabama claims,' shall be referred to a tribunal of arbitration."-Der Bund.

"One sees," continues the writer, "that the whole thing is aimed at the tribunal more than at the other party, for the latter is willing to leave to the tribunal of arbitration the question of its own jurisdiction, while England denies its right to decide upon its own powers a question which every court of justice maintains as a preliminary. In England the right is assumed to withdraw from a treaty as soon as it appears that there is a difference of opinion with regard to its construction. According to this, the treaty must fall through, for to insure its fulfillment, or the fulfillment of an eventual sentence of the arbitrators, there is but the compulsion of national honor, or of war."-Neue Züriche Times.

The Washington treaty plainly indicates that all the losses growing out of the acts committed by the aforesaid vessels are to be submitted to the tribunal of Geneva, which will be called upon to prove whether England violated the rules prescribed by the treaty for the government of neutrals, and, if so, what sum she must pay to the United States in compensation for the injuries inflicted. He demonstrates that the British case admits the submission of direct as well as indirect claims, and that it denies all liability, claiming that England fulfilled all its duties as a neutral, and that the idea of calling in question the submission of indirect claims to the Geneva tribunal. only arose when "on the eve of the opening of Parliament the tories assumed a threatening position, and the nonconformists began to hold indignation meetings.”—Fienna Neue Fremden Blatt.

Gladstone may assert a hundred times that the grammar as well as the spirit of the treaty admits but one meaning, and that of the English; he will not entice the Americans from their position. His countrymen, and the papers most devoted to him, must confess that the wording of the treaty allows of the American as well as of the English interpretation, that the construction is vague and loose. On the other side is the intention of the framers of the treaty. Both must be considered. And appeal to the preamble and protocol is not sufficient to clear up the mistakes. A refreshing result may be obtained from this war of words. Long and tedious interchanges of dispatches must be expected; perhaps, after all, the annulling of the treaty with all the fair hopes attached to it. We shall hope that no war will grow out of it, however, in consequence of the still pending San Juan boundary and fishing questions.—Vienna Nene Freie Presse.

Our London correspondent writes us: "The Atlantic cable works merrily to bring us the utterances of the New York Herald, as to the Alabama quarrel, which has arisen with new power. The New York Herald sounds the war trumpet, some small followers

second it; the more intelligent portion of the press, however, which preserves a moderate attitude, maintains not less the view that the American Government cannot withdraw her claims already presented, because it belongs to the Geneva tribunal alone, and not to England, to decide upon their submission. The view of the press is, after all, as was well known, that of the American Government, and thereby the fatal point of the situation is well indicated. Gladstone's expressed hope that his demonstration would convert the Americans to the English view, would hardly mislead any one. One may discuss the right or wrong on either side as one pleases, the one fact cannot be denied, that in the wording of the Washington treaty the indirect claims of the American Government, if not expressly agreed upon, are not expressly excluded. The Americans do not offend against the wording of the treaty, therefore, whereas they submit them to the tribunal of arbitration. Whoever denies this assumes an untenable position, and in beginning this monstrous piece of awkwardness Gladstone has prepared not only for himself, but for England, many sad hours. He must hear to-day from his old admirers in Parliament and in the press the bitter truth, repeated on all sides, that the means he has selected for his own defense are the most unfortunate, the most untenable, and the most wanting in tact of all others. For through his assertion of the absolute clearness of the treaty in every respect, he shuts the door against further friendly explanations; he tacitly accuses the American Government of having intentionally given a wrong meaning to something that was perfectly unequivocal, and thereby makes, in the highest degree, difficult any friendly yielding on the part of that Government. After he had ventured so far there remained for the Washington Government, which has also its own position to defend, only this answer: Will you, if every interpretation but yours is absolutely impossible, leave the decision in security with the tribunal? Since you are so firmly convinced, you have nothing to risk by so doing.

"And how could Gladstone reply? Either by a categorical No, which would expose him to ridicule, and must lead to the breaking off of all further negotiations; or by a Yes, in which case he would confess the truth of that which until now England has always declared to be untrue.”—Kölnischer Zeitung.

From whatever point of view the subject be considered, there exists no justification for England to withdraw from the treaty concluded at Washington. Be the demands of America ever so extravagant, there is yet nothing in the treaty itself, and nothing in the general principles of international law, to justify the withdrawal of the decision on those demands from the tribunal of arbitration. It would, in fact, be deeply to be regretted if the Geneva court of arbitration, the establishment of which is undoubtedly to be regarded as an essential progress in the life of international law, should not reach the normal development of its activity. We rather on this occasion give expression to the most earnest wish that this procedure may lead to a further development of international law.-Neue Preussische Zeitung.

It must be acknowledged, on an impartial review of the dispute, that these demands, however extravagant they may be, are by no means new; and when Gladstone and Granville maintain that the protocols of the commission show that only those losses directly derived from the capture of American ships were spoken of, every one can convince himself from the protocols of the contrary. America had made these indirect claims not only in dispatches and occasional declarations; the treaty of January 19, 1869, was, on Sumner's report, rejected, because it offered no assurance of indemnification for the indirect injury suffered by America through the cruisers. With these antecedents, the greatest caution was in any case prescribed to the English negotiations, but their instruction referred them, in regard to the Alabama claims, almost solely to the diplomatic correspondence about them.

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*

But not a word in the instruction says that only direct claims shall be admitted to discussion, and just as little does the cited treaty of 1869 contain anything about them; that treaty speaks of "all claims, including the so-called Alabama claims." If we look at the protocols of the joint high commission, we find on the first page that the Americans enumerate in their fullest extent the claims now raised in the complaint, and then declare that in the hope of an amicable settlement, no estimate was made of indirect losses, without prejudice, however, to the right to indemnification on their account, in the event of no such settlement being made. As such a settlement they then propose to agree upon a sum in gross, which England shall pay with interest to America in satisfaction of all claims.

The English commissioners declined this proposal, because they could not admit that England had failed to discharge toward the United States the duties imposed on

her by the rules of international law, and proposed the principle of arbitration. With this refusal of the American proposal of an agreement on a sum in gross for all claims, the liberty was given back to the Americans, which they had expressly reserved. The Americans then on their side accepted the court of arbitration, on the condition that certain rules be given to it for the consideration of the facts to be brought forward. England yielded and the articles of the treaty were adopted. In the first article, it is stated that "the differences growing out of the acts committed by the several vessels which have given rise to the claims generically known as the 'Alabama claims,' shall be referred to a tribunal of arbitration."-Hamburgisher Correspondent.

The safest as well as the most dignified course is, therefore, to stand upon what we conceive to be sound, legal principles, and to demur to any such claims for indirect damage.-London Times, January 2, 1872.

It is easy What that full extent may be we are not expressly told; in fact, the computations of the United States Goverument itself have not yet reached the mighty sum. to see, however, that upon the principles put forward by the United States Government, the total might easily be carried to an amount as startling as that of the French indemnity. The American Government ask that a gross sum may be awarded it, and that to the amount thus given may be added interest at the rate of 7 per cent. from the 1st day of July, 1863. Happily claims such as these are no longer matter of controversy between England and the United States. Confident in our own rectitude, and in the substantial justice of our cause, we have consented to refer it to a tribunal so constituted as to secure the confidence of the world.-The London Daily News, January 3, 1872.

It may be that an agency is for the first time tried in Geneva which will do much to arrest that class of wars, by no means co-extensive with all wars, which arrise from definite grievances, rather than from dynastic or national passions. It may also be, that litigant nations, when they are unsucessful, will refuse to submit to an authority which has no power to coerce them, and that an arbitration is no more than a useless postponement of recourse to older and more familiar methods of decision. The issue may well be awaited with the keenest interest and even anxiety; but there is no solid ground for the anticipations of disaster which have been abroad for the last day or two.-London Pall Mall Gazette, January 4.

It is scarcely necessary to say that our liability would only extend to the direct consequences of our own acts. If, for example, it were held that it was through our fault that the Alabama went to sea, we would be justly held responsible for the depredations which she committed. But there, in accordance with every principle, not only of international but of municipal law, our liability should end. That the agent of the Government of the United States should contend, in the case he has presented, that we should also be responsible for the expenditure occasioned in the pursuit of the cruisers, for the loss by the transfer of the American commercial marine to the British flag, the increased rates of insurance, and even for the prolongation of the war, is not surprising, since he speaks as an advocate. But no judges could for an instant entertain such claims.-London Morning Post, January 4, 1872.

If they did so couch their demands we should not think of re-echoing the absurd alarms of some writers here at the exorbitant character of the new Alabama claim. It must be borne in mind that President Grant seeks re-election, and that it would be very unfortunate for him if his Summerite or other foes could say, with any "He has injured our case against the Britishers by not asking appearance of truth, enough." Therefore he has resolved to work the statesmanlike treaty in a popular way, and to cover the act of submitting the affair to arbitration by Yankee flourishes of the most extravagant kind. If it amuses his countrymen it may serve him; it certainly does not hurt us.-London Telegraph, January 6.

"What shall we do?

Our first duty, both to the United States and to ourselves, is to demur to the consideration of the claim for indirect damages put forward in the case submitted by them, and to crave a decision upon our protest by the tribunal of arbitration before consenting to carry the reference to subsequent stages. We gave great confidence that our view would be approved, but, however painful it might be, we ought not to hesitate to retire altogether from the case if the tribunal did not hold itself free to reject the consideration of indirect claims."-London Times, January 29.

VI.

Extract from the Journal des Débats, Paris, June 6, 1872.

Les réclamations pour "dommages indirects" que les États-Unis voulaient soumettre au tribunal arbitral de Genève seront probablement écartées. Les États-Unis semblent avoir enfin cédé sur ce point important, et cependant, à considérer l'affaire au point de vue des principes du droit et en laissant de côté les grosses exagérations de leur mémoire, ils soutenaient une thèse juste, ils étaient dans le vrai sous le rapport juridique. De quoi s'agit-il en effet? Quelle accusation élèvent-ils contre l'Angleterre ? Ils l'accusent, eu premier lieu, de n'avoir pas empêché ses armateurs de fournir aux confédérés des navires de guerre; en second lieu, d'avoir par malice ou négligence permis aux corsaires confédérés de se servir de ses ports et de ses eaux comme d'une base d'opérations ou de ravitaillement. Par le fait de ce manquement aux obligations de la neutralité, ajoutent-ils, qu'est-il arrivé? C'est d'abord que les confédérés ont armé un plus grand nombre de corsaires qu'ils n'auraient pu le faire si l'Angleterre avait strictement observé ses obligations de puissance neutre; c'est ensuite que les corsaires confédérés, trouvant des refuges et des points de ravitaillement dans les ports et les eaux britanniques, ont pu multiplier leurs déprédations en raison de ce concours qui leur était indûment accordé. Or n'est-il pas juste que l'Angleterre soit rendue responsable des dommages causés aux intérêts américains par ces deux sortes de manquement à ses devoirs de neutre en admettant, bien entendu que les griefs formulés contre sa connivence ou sa négligence soient fondés?

Cette argumentation est irréprochable, et l'Angleterre l'a reconnu, tout en se défendant d'avoir failli à ses obligations dans les différents cas qui font l'objet des réclamations américaines; elle est tombée d'accord avec les États-Unis qu'elle pourrait leur devoir des dommages-intérêts, et elle s'est résignée à accepter sur ce point la décision d'un tribunal d'arbitres dont la mission consistera 1o à constater si l'Angleterre a manqué, dans la guerre de la sécession, à ses obligations de puissance neutre, et dans quelle mesure; 2o à reconnaître et à évaluer les dommages causés par le fait de ce manquement et à fixer le chiffre du dédommagement. Seulement après s'en être remise entièrement au tribunal pour résoudre la première question, l'Angleterre semble avoir craint de se mettre à sa discrétion pour la seconde; elle a imposé des limites à sa compétence, en établissant une distinction entre les "dommages directs," qu'elle reconnaît, et les "dommages indirects" qu'elle ne reconnaît pas. Cette distinction est-elle fondée en droit ou en raison?

Consultons, à cet égard, les faits, et voyons ce qui ressort de l'examen et de l'analyse du cas en litige. Les corsaires confédérés ont donné la chasse aux navires de commerce américains; ils en ont capturé un certain nombre, confisquant ou détruisant vaisseaux et cargaisons. Voilà une première catégorie de dommages directs. Il y en a une seconde: "Les états du Nord ont été obligés de surveiller et de poursuivre les corsaires du Sud; ils ont employé à cette destination une partie de leur flotte de guerre, d'où un double dommage consistant: 1o dans les frais occasionnés par la pourSuite des corsaires; 2 dans la privation subie par les États-Unis d'une partie de leur flotte qui aurait pu leur rendre d'autres services. Est-ce tout? Non. La seule annonce de l'apparition des corsaires du Sud a suffi pour créer un "risque de guerre" qui est venu immédiatement s'ajouter aux risques maritimes ordinaires. Ce risque extraordinaire n'a pu être couvert que par une prime correspondante et dont le taux s'est élevé avec ini. On a donc vu s'établir une différence entre les primes d'assurance des navires et cargaisons américains et celle des neutres. Les armateurs et les négociants qui ont payé cette différence on ce supplément de prime n'ont-ils pas subi un dommage aussi réel que ceux dont les navires et les marchandises ont été capturés? La perte a été, sans doute, infiniment moindre pour chacun; en revanche, cette perte no s'est-elle pas multipliée par le nombre des navires composant la marine marchande américaine? Puis, qu'est-il arrivé? C'est que l'existence de ce risque particulier et l'obligation de le couvrir par une prime supplémentaire ont fait abandonner les navires américains pour les nentres, anglais, hollandais, danois, etc. Nouveau dommage auquel les armateurs américains n'ont pa se soustraire qu'en faisant passer d'une manière réelle ou fictive, mais en tous cas non sans frais, leurs navires sous pavillon étranger