is all. The act is open to great suspicions and abuse, and the line may often be scarcely traceable; yet the principle is clear enough. Is the intent one to prepare an article of contraband merchandise, to be sent to the market of a belligerent, subject to the chances of capture and of the market? Or, on the other hand, is it to fit out a vessel which shall leave our port to cruise, immediately or ultimately, against the commerce of a friendly nation? The latter we are bound to prevent; the former the belligerent must prevent. Professor Gola, of Parma, in a recent work, observes: Lo stesso dicasi ove si trattasse di costruzioni di navi: l'atto lede la neutralità, ove l'impresa si eseguisca dal governo, è invece un' opera d'industria ove si compia da privati imprenditori nei loro cantieri. Opinion of M. Or M. Ortolan, who had made no such distinction in the former edition of his work, "Sur la diplomatie de la mer," in the last edition of that work has, with reference to this subject, the fol- tolan. lowing, I cannot help thinking, somewhat extraordinary doctrine: Si l'on suppose un navire construit sur le territoire neutre, non pas sur commande d'un belligérant ou par suite d'un traité ostensible ou dissimulé avec ce belligérant, mais en vue d'un dessein quelconque, soit de navigation commerciale, soit tout autre, et que ce navire, déjà par lui-même propre à la guerre ou de nature à être converti à cet usage, une fois sorti des ports de la nation neutre, soit vendu, dans le cours de sa navigation, occasionnellement, à l'un des belligérants, et se mette à naviguer en destination directe pour ce belligérant : un tel navire dans de telles circonstances tombe uniquement sous le coup des règles relatives à la contrebande de guerre. Il est sujet à être arrêté et confisqué par l'ennemi qui pourra s'en emparer, mais sans qu'aucun grief de violation des devoirs de la neutralité puisse sortir de ce fait contre l'état neutre pour n'avoir pas défendu à ses nationaux de telles ventes ou ne les avoir pas réprimées. C'est une opération de trafic qui a eu lieu, trafic de contrebande de guerre, dont aucune circonstance particulière n'est venue changer le caractère. Tel fut, en l'année 1800, le cas du navire américain le Brutus, capturé par les Anglais et jugé de bonne prise par la cour d'amirauté d'Halifax. * Mais la situation change; la contrebande de guerre n'est plus la question principale; d'antres règles du droit des gens interviennent et modifient profondément la solution, si l'on suppose qu'il s'agisse de bâtiments de guerre construits, armés ou équipés sur un territoire neutre pour le compte d'un belligérant, parsuite d'arrangement pris à l'avance avec lui, sous la forme d'un contrat commercial quelconque: vente, commission, louage d'industrie ou de travail; que les arrangements aient été pris ostensiblement, ou qu'ils le soient d'une manière secrète ou déguisée; car la loyanté est une condition essentielle dans la solution des difficultés internationales, et sous le couvert des fausses apparences il faut toujours aller au fond des choses. Il y a ici, incontestablement, une seconde hypothèse qu'il importe de distinguer soigneusement de la précédente. Nous nous rattacherons, pour résoudre en droit des gens les difficultés que présente cette nouvelle situation, à un principe universellement établi, qui se formule en ce peu de mots: "Inviolabilité du territoire neutre." Cette inviolabilité est un droit pour l'état neutre, dont le territoire ne doit pas être atteint par les faits de guerre, mais elle impose aussi à ce même état neutre une étroite obligation, celle de ne pas permettre, celle d'empêcher activement, au besoin, l'emploi de ce territoire par l'une des parties ou au profit de l'une des parties belligérantes, dans un but hostile à l'autre partie. Les publicistes en crédit ne font aucun doute pour ce qui concerne l'arinement et l'équipement dans un port neutre de bâtiments de guerre destinés à accroître les forces des belligérants. Ils s'accordent pour reconnaitre l'illégalité de ces armements ou équipements, comme une infraction de la part de l'état neutre qui les tolèrerait aux devoirs de la neutralité. N'est-il pas évident qu'il en doit être de même, a fortiori, de la construction de pareils bâtiments, lorsque cette construction a lieu dans les conditions prévues en notre seconde hypothese? So that, according to M. Ortolan, if a ship happens to be ready made. and armed, she may be lawfully sold to a foreign belligerent, though with a full knowledge on the part of the seller of the purpose to which she is to be applied; but, if she is made to order, the transaction assumes the opposite character, and is a breach of neutrality. With all 1United States Documents, vol. vii, p. 36. respect for the authority of this distinguished writer, I must decline to adopt a doctrine which rests on so shadowy a distinction. Professor Bluntschli, undertaking to pronounce a judgment on the Op non of Profes. Subject-matter of this dispute, as it were er cathedra, in an article in the "Revue de Droit International" of 1870, lays down the following doctrine: L'état neutre qui veut garantir sa neutralité doit s'abstenir d'aider aucune des parties belligérantes dans ses opérations de guerre. Il ne peut prêter son territoire pour perettre à l'une des parties d'organiser en lien sûr des entreprises militaires. Il est obligé de veiller fidèlement à ce que des particuliers n'arment point sur son territoire des vaisseaux de guerre, destinés à être livrés à une des parties belligérantes. (Bluntschli, Modernes Völkerrecht, section 763.) Ce devoir est proclamé par la science, et il dérive tant de l'idée de neutralité que des égards auxquels tout état est nécessairement tenu envers les autres états avec lesquels il vit en paix et amitié. La neutralité est la non-participation à la guerre. Lorsque l'état neutre soutient un des belligérants, il prend part à la guerre en faveur de celui qu'il soutient, et dès lors il cesse d'étre neutre. L'adversaire est autorisé à voir dans cette participation un acte d'hostilité. Et cela n'est pas seulement vrai quand l'état neutre livre lui-même des troupes ou des vaisseaux de guerre, mais aussi lorsqu'il prête à un des belligérants un appui médiat en permittant, tandis qu'il pourrait l'empêcher, que, de son territoire neutre on envoie des troupes ou des navires de guerre. Partout où le droit de neutralité étend le cercle de son application, il restreint les limites de la guerre et de ses désastreuses conséquences, et il garantit les bienfaits de la paix. Les devoirs de l'état neutre envers les belligérants sont en substance les mêmes que ceux de l'état ami, en temps de paix, vis-à-vis des autres états. Aucun état ne peut non plus, en temps de paix, permettre que l'on organise sur son territoire des agressions contre un état ami. Tous sont obligés de veiller à ce que leur sol ne devienne pas le point de départ d'entreprises militaires, dirigées contre des états avec lesquels ils sont en paix. I entirely agree in all that is thus said by this able jurist-that is, if I properly apprehend his language, and am right in understanding it to apply not to the sale of ships of war, simpliciter, but to the sending out of troops and armed ships for the purpose of what the learned professor terms "military enterprises," and to the "organizing of aggressions against a friendly state." Another eminent jurist, who has espoused the cause of the United Opinion of M. Ro- States, in a very able review of the work of Professor MounIn Jacquemyns. tague Bernard, and whose opinion is referred to by the United States as an authority in their favor, M. Rolin Jacquemyns, does not, so far as I collect, deny the legality of the sale of ships of war, but rests his opinion on the general circumstances connected with the construction and escape of the Alabama. But the spirit in which this author writes will be seen from the following passage: Il eût dans tous les cas été digne d'un jurisconsulte de la valeur de M. Bernard de ne pas se borner à examiner cette grave question des devoirs de la neutralité au point de vue du droit positif existant. C'est par l'opinion hautement émise de savants comme lui que les idées générales en matière de droit sont appelées à se rectifier et à se compléter. Or, s'il y a une chose que chaque guerre nouvelledémontre, c'est le caractère, non-seulement insuffisant, mais fallacieux de la vieille définition: neutrarum partiura. Si au début de cette dernière et épouvantable guerre de 1870, l'Angleterre, au lieu d'être obstinément neutrarum partium, avait clairement désapprouvé l'offensive inique de la France, est-ce que les intérêts de la justice et de la paix n'auraient pas été mieux servis ? L'idéal du personnage neutrarum partium, c'est le jugeq ui, dans l'apologue de l'huitre et des plaideurs, avale le contenu du mollusque et adjuge les écailles aux deux_belligérants. Il n'est d'aucun parti, mais il s'engraisse scrupuleusement aux dépens de tous deux. Une telle conduite de la part d'un grand peuple peut être aussi conforme aux précédents que celle du vénérable magistrat dont parle la fable. Mais quand elle se fonde sur une loi positive, sur une règle admisc, c'est une preuve que cette loi ou cette règle est mauvaise, comine contraire à la science, à la dignité et à la solidarité humaine.1 "Revue de droit international et de législation comparée," 1871, p. 125. This reasoning may be very well deserving of attention for the future; but, for the present purpose, when the authority of M. Rolin Jacquemyns as to the culpability of Great Britain is cited, I must protest against the question being determined not according to "existing positive law," but to the opinion of "savants" as to what the law should have been, or should now be made. The tribunal cannot, I apprehend, adopt such a principle informing its judgment. Its functions are not to make the law, but to decide according to the rules of the treaty, with the light which the acknowledged principles of international jurisprudence and the established usages of nations may afford for its assistance. The occasion may be a tempting one for giving effect to speculative opinions or individual theories. But a decision founded on such a prinple would not insure the approbation of wise and judicious minds, or command the respect of those who might suffer from a judgment which would be at variance with the first principles of equity and justice. Let us see what has been the practical view taken of the subject in England or America. As far back as the year 1721, ships Opinion of the of war having been built in England, and sold to the Czar judges of England. of Russia, then at war with Sweden, and complaint having been made. by the Swedish minister, the judges were summoned to the House of Lords, and their opinion was asked, whether by law the King of England had the power to prohibit the building of ships of war, or of great force for foreigners, in any of His Majesty's dominions. And the judges, with the exception of one, who had formed no opinion, answered that the King had no such power. It is plain that, if the sale of such vessels had been an offense against international law, the King would have had power to prevent it by the prosecution of the parties building and selling such ships, as offenders against the municipal law, as the offense would have been a misdemeanor at the common law. It appears that Chief Justice Trevor, and Parker, afterwards Lord Chancellor, had given the like opinion seven years before.1 Case of the Sants The judgment of Judge Story in the well-known case of the Santissima Trinidad, shows that the sale of armed ships of war has never been held to be contrary to law in America. In that sima Trinidad. case a vessel called the Independencia, equipped for war and armed with twelve guns, had been sent out from the American port of Baltimore, upon a pretended voyage to the northwest coast, but in reality to Buenos Ayres, then at war with Spain, with instructions to the supercargo to sell her to the Buenos Ayres government if he could obtain a certain price. She was sold to that government accordingly, and, having been commissioned, was sent to sea and made prizes. She afterward put into an American port, and having there received an augmentation of her force, again put to sea and captured a prize. The validity of this prize was questioned in the suit on two grounds: 1st. That the sale of the vessel to a foreign government by American citizens, for the purpose of being used in war against a belligerent with whom the United States were at peace, was a violation of neutrality and illegal; 2d. Because the capture had been made after an augmentation of the force of the vessel in a port of the United States. The capture was held invalid on the latter ground. Upon the first, the judge delivered judgment as follows: The question as to the original illegal armament and outfit of the Independencia may be dismissed in a few words. It is apparent, that though equipped as a vessel of war, she was sent to Buenos Ayres on a commercial adventure, contraband, indeed, but in no shape violating our laws or our 16 Fortescue's Reports," p. 388. 2 Wheaton, p. 283. Judgment of Mr. Justice Story. national neutrality. If captured by a Spanish ship of war during the voyage, she would have been justly condeinned as good prize for being engaged in a traffic prohibited by the law of nations. But there is nothing in our laws, or in the law of nations, that forbids our citizens from sending armed vessels, as well as munitions of war, to foreign ports for sale. It is a commercial adventure which no nation is bound to prohibit, and which only exposes the person engaged in it to the penalty of confiscation. Supposing, therefore, the voyage to have been for commercial purposes, and the sale at Buenos Ayres to have been a bona fide sale, (and there is nothing in the evidence before us to contradict it,) there is no preten se to say that the original outfit on the voyage was illegal, or that a capture made after the sale was, for that cause alone, invalid. It is now sought to shake the authority of this judgment by saying that it was unnecessary to the decision of the cause, as the prize was held to be invalid on the other ground; but it was, nevertheless, a solemn judgment upon a point properly arising in the cause, and, so far as I am aware, it has never been questioned. Case of the Gran Para. It is indeed alleged (but for the first time) in the American case that the authority of this decision is to be looked upon as overruled or controlled by a judgment given by the same court in the case of the Gran Para. Now, the latter judgment was a judg ment of the same court, (of which, therefore, Mr. Justice Story was himself a member,) and was pronounced on the very next day. We are told in the case of the United States, that the cases were argued, the one on the 20th, the other on the 28th of February, 1822; that the judgment in the case of the Santissima Trinidad was pronounced on the 12th of March, that in the case of the Gran Para on the ensuing day, the 13th. It is said, and truly, that "there can be no doubt they were considered together in the consultation-room," and lawyers are gravely asked to believe that it was intended by the second judgment to overrule or qualify the doctrine involved in the first. No English or American lawyer could entertain the notion for a moment that, if the same court had intended to overrule, or even to qualify, the judgment given immediately before, it would not have referred to it in terms and given its reasons for so sudden a change in its views of the law. But the truth is-and I am at a loss to understand how the American Counsel can have failed to overlook this, or to call attention to it when citing the decision, that so far from overruling or affecting the judgment in the Santissima Trinidad, the case of the Gran Para had nothing in common with it beyond that of being a suit for the restitution of prize. It was not the case of the sale of a ship to a foreign government at all. It was simply the case of an American privateer armed in defiance of American law, and cruising under a fictitious commission, the property in her still remaining unchanged in the American citizen by whom she had been fitted out. The great importance of this distinction will be seen in another part of this case. In a learned and able article in the well-known publication, the "American Law Review" of January, 1871, the writer, after American Review. referring to the case of the Santissima Trinidad as "a famous and leading case," states the law as follows: It may be declared as indubitable that the pure unalloyed bargain and sale of a ship even a ship of war, to a belligerent is legal by the rules of international law; that such a ship is, however, contraband of war, and if captured after sale on her way toward delivery, or before sale on her way toward a market where she is intended to be sold to a belligerent, she will be properly condemned. Neutrality acts have not been intended to change this state of the law, but only to furnish sufficient means for preventing its abuse. Our original proposition that the doctrine of contraband of war does not operate as a restriction upon trade, upon dealings which are purely commercial, remains correct, even in this matter of war vessels. In this view of the law I am glad to have the concurrence of our dis tinguished colleague, Mr. Adams, who, writing to Earl Opinion of Mr. Russell on the 6th of April, 1863, states, with reference to Adams. certain American authorities which Lord Russell had appealed to: The sale and transfer by a neutral of arms, of munitions of war, and even of ressels of war, to a belligerent country, not subject to blockade at the time, as a purely commercial transaction, is decided by these authorities not to be unlawful. They go not a step further; and precisely to that extent I have myself taken no exception to the doctrine.1 This being the present state of international law on this subject, if it is desirable to introduce new rules, it must be done by the common consent of nations, not by the speculative doctrines prohibition of sale of of theorists, however distinguished. Question as to articles contraband of war. But is it desirable that it should be altered, and that obstacles to the industry and trade of neutral nations should be created? Azuni observes: Une grande partie du commerce de quelques nations européennes, telles que les Suédois, les Norvégiens, et les Russes, consiste en marchandises nécessaires pour la guerre maritime, pour la construction et pour l'équipement d'une flotte; elles vendent en temps de paix, à quiconque en a besoin, du fer, du cuivre, des mâts, des bois, du goudron, de la poix, et des canons, enfin des navires de guerre entiers. Quelles raisons pourrait-il y avoir de priver ces nations de leur commerce et de leur manière de subsister, à l'occasion d'une guerre à laquelle ils ne prennent aucune part? Il n'y a dans le code de la justice et de l'équité rien en faveur d'une telle protection. Il est donc nécessaire d'établir, comme maxime fondamentale de tout droit, que, les peuples neutres devant et pouvant licitement continuer le commerce qu'ils font en temps de paix, on ne doit faire aucune distinction de denrées, de marchandises, et de manufactures, quoique propres à la guerre, et que, par cette raison, la vente et le transport aux parties belligérantes en sont permis, si le commerce actif et passif était établi en temps de paix, saus qu'on puisse prétendre, en aucune manière, que la neutralité soit violée, pourvu que cela se fasse sans animosité, sans préférence et sans partialité. I cannot but feel the force and justice of these observations. I ask in like manner, 66 Why-unless, indeed, on account of reasons of state affecting the interests of the neutral state itself, in which case private. interests must give way to those of the public-are the armorers of Birmingham or Liege, or the shipbuilders of London or Liverpool, to have their business put a stop to because one of their customers happens to be engaged in war with another state? It is not enough to say that but for the war the demand for the articles in question would not have arisen. From whatever cause it may proceed, increased demand is the legitimate advantage of the producer or the merchant, and it is by the advantage which periods of increased and more active demand bring with them that the loss arising from occasional periods of stagnation is balanced and made good. The authors who desire to put further restraints on the free commerce of neutrals than international law has hitherto done, appear to me to think too much of the interests of belligerents, who are the disturbers of the world's peace, and to be too unmindful of the interests of neutral nations, who are simply seeking occupation for their industry and commerce, indifferent by whom they are employed. They seem to think that the belligerent is granting an indulgence or conferring a favor on the neutral in allowing him to remain stranger to the war, which the grateful neutral should be too glad to purchase by the sacrifice of all rights at all incompatible with the convenience of the bellig. erent. M. Hautefeuille, indeed, invokes humanity, and would prohibit the sale of articles of warlike use in order to prevent and put an end to war. But if considerations of humanity are to be taken into account, it is obvious that the sale of such things should be prohibited in time of 1 United States Documents, vol. ii, p. 591. |