THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTIONHarvard University Press, 30 jun 2009 - 198 páginas This book develops an original theory of group and organizational behavior that cuts across disciplinary lines and illustrates the theory with empirical and historical studies of particular organizations. Applying economic analysis to the subjects of the political scientist, sociologist, and economist, Mancur Olson examines the extent to which individuals who share a common interest find it in their individual interest to bear the costs of the organizational effort. |
Índice
Introduction | 1 |
I A Theory of Groups and Organizations | 5 |
II Group Size and Group Behavior | 53 |
III The Labor Union and Economic Freedom | 66 |
IV Orthodox Theories of State and Class | 98 |
V Orthodox Theories of Pressure Groups | 111 |
VI The ByProduct and Special Interest Theories | 132 |
Appendix | 169 |
| 179 | |
Otras ediciones - Ver todo
The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups ... Mancur OLSON Vista previa restringida - 2009 |
The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups Mancur Olson Vista previa restringida - 1971 |
The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, With ... Mancur Olson Vista de fragmentos - 1965 |
Términos y frases comunes
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