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the minds of the people, in order to give them a bad impression of, and to raise discontents against, those that have the management of the public affairs for the time; and these discontents often break out into seditions and insurrections. This, Sir, would, in my opinion be our misfortune, if our parliaments were either annual or triennial by such frequent elections, there would be so much power thrown into the hands of the people, as would destroy that equal mixture, which is the beauty of our constitution in short, our government would really become a democratical government, and might from thence very probably diverge into a tyrannicalone. Therefore, in order to preserve our constitution, in order to prevent our falling under tyranny and arbitrary power, we ought to preserve that law, which I really think has brought our constitution to a more equal mixture, and consequently to greater perfection than it was ever in, before that law took place.

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As to bribery and corruption, Sir, if it were possible to influence, by such base 'means, the majority of the electors of Great Britain, to choose such men as would probably give up their liberties; if it were possible to influence by such means a majority of the members of this house, to consent to the establishment of arbitrary power, I would readily allow, that the calculation made by the gentlemen of the other side were just, and their inference true; but I am persuaded that neither of these is possible. As the members of this house generally are, and must always be gentlemen of fortune and figure in their country; is it possible to suppose, that any of them could, by a pension, or a post, be

influenced to consent to the overthrow of our constitution; by which the enjoyment, not only of what he got, but of what he before had, would be rendered altogether precarious? I will allow, Sir, that with respect to bribery, the price must be higher or lower, generally in proportion to the virtue of the man who is to be bribed; but it must likewise be granted, that the humour he happens to be in at the time, the spirit he happens to be endowed with, adds a great deal to his virtue. When no encroachments are made upon the rights of the people, when the people do not think themseves in any danger, there may be many of the electors, who by a bribe of ten guineas, might be induced to vote for one candidate rather than another; but if the court were making any encroachments upon the rights of the people, a proper spirit would without doubt, arise in the nation; and in such a case, I am persuaded, that none, or very few, even of such electors could be induced to vote for a court candidate; no, not for ten times the sum.

There may, Sir, be some bribery and corruption in the nation; I am afraid there will always be some but it is no proof of it, that strangers are sometimes chosen; for a gentleman may have so much natural influence over a borough in his neighbourhood, as to be able to prevail with them to choose any person he pleases to recommend; and if upon such recommendation they choose one or two of his friends, who are perhaps strangers to them, it is not from thence to be inferred, that the two strangers were chosen their representatives by the means of bribery and corruption.

To insinuate, Sir, that money may be issued.

is

from the public treasury for bribing elections, really something very extraordinary, especially in those gentlemen who know how many checks are upon every shilling that can be issued from thence; and how regularly the money granted in one year for the public service of the nation, must always be accounted for, the very next session, in this house and likewise in the other, if they have a mind to call for any such account, And as to the gentlemen in offices, if they have an advantage over country gentlemen, in having something else to depend on besides their own private fortunes, they have likewise many disadvantages they are obliged to live at London with their families, by which they are put to a much greater expence, than gentlemen of equal fortunes, who live in the country this lays them under a very great disadvantage, with respect to the supporting their interest in the country. The country gentleman, by living among the electors, and purchasing the necessaries for his family from them, keeps up an acquaintance and correspondance with them without putting himself to any extraordinary charge; whereas a gentleman who lives in London, has no other way of keeping up an cquaintance or correspondence among his riends in the country, but by going down. once or twice a year at a very extraordinary charge, and often without any other busiless; so that we may conclude, a gentleman n office cannot, even in seven years save much or distributing in ready money at the time of in election; and I really believe, if the fact were arrowly enquired into, it would appear, that he gentlemen in office are as little guilty of ribing their electors with ready money, as any ther set of gentlemen in the kingdom.

That there are ferments often raising among the people without any just cause, is what I am surprised to hear controverted, since very late experience may convince us of the contrary. Do we not know what a ferment was raised in the nation, towards the latter end of the late Queen's reign? And it is well known, what a fatal change in the affairs of this nation was introduced, or at least confirmed, by an election's coming on while the nation was in that ferment. Do not we know what a ferment was raised in the nation, soon after his late Majesty's accession? And if an election had then been allowed to come on, while the nation was in that ferment, it might perhaps have had as fatal effects as the former; but, thank God, this was wisely provided against by the very law which is now wanted to be repealed.

As such ferments may hereafter often happen, I must think that frequent elections will always be dangerous; for which reason, as far as I can see at present, I shall I believe at all times, think it a very dangerous experiment to repeal the septennial act.

CHA P. X I.

Lord Lyttleton's Speech on the repeal of the Act called the Jew Bill, in the year 1753.

I

MR. SPEAKER,

SEE no occasion to enter at present into the merits of the bill we passed the last session for the naturalization of Jews; because I am convinced, that in the present temper of the nation, not a single foreign Jew will think it:

expedient to take any benefit of that act; and therefore, the repealing of it is giving up nothing. I assented to it last year in hopes it might induce some wealthy Jews to come and settle among us: in that light I saw enough of utility in it, to make me incline rather to approve than dislike it; but, that any man alive could be zealous, either for or against it, I confess I had no idea. What effects our religion is indeed of the higest and most serious importance. God forbid we should be ever indifferent about that! but, I thought this had no more to do with religion than any turnpike act we past in that session; and after all the divinity that has been preached on the subject, I think so still.

Resolution and steadiness are excellent qualities; but, it is the application of them upon which their value depends. A wise government, Mr. Speaker, will know where to yield, as well as where to resist; and there is no surer mark of littleness of mind in an administration, than obstinacy in trifles. Public wisdom on some occasions, must condescend to give way to popular folly, especially in a free country, where the humour of the people must be considered as attentively as the humour of a king in an absolute monarchy. Under both forms of government a. prudent and honest ministry will indulge a small folly, and will resist a great one. Not to vouchsafe now and then a kind indulgence to the former, would discover an ignorance of human nature; not to resist the latter at all times, would be meanness and servility.

Sir, I look on the bill we are at present debating, not as a sacrifice made to popularity (for it sacrifices nothing) but as a prudent regard to some consequences arising from the na