and taxes, must be loaded with the heavy charge of perpetually supporting a numerous standing army, and remain for ever exposed to the danger of having its liberties and privileges trampled upon by any future King or Ministry, who shall take it in their heads to do so, and shall take a proper care to model the army for that purpose.

CHAP. IX.

Sir John St. Aubin's Speech for repealing the Septennial Act.

MR. SPEAKER,

THE subject matter of this debate is of such

importance, that I should be ashamed to return to my electors, without endeavouring in the best manner I am able, to declare publickly the reasons which induced me to give my most ready assent to this question.

The people have an unquestionable right to frequent new parliaments by ancient usage; and this usage has been confirmed by several laws, which have been progressively made by our ancestors, as often as they found it necessary to insist on this essential privilege.

Parliaments were generally annual, but never continued longer than three years, till the remarkable reign of Henry VIII. He, Sir, was a prince of unruly apperites, and of an arbitrary will; he was impatient of every restraint; the laws of God and man fell equally a sacrifice as they stood in the way of his avarice, or disappointed his ambition: he therefore introduced long Parliaments, because he very well knew, that they would become the proper

2

2

instruments of both; and what a slavish obedience they paid to all his measures is sufficiently known.

If we come to the reign of King Charles the First, we must acknowledge him to be a prince of a contrary temper; he had certainly an innate love for religion and virtue. But here lay the misfortune-- he was led from his natural disposition by sycophants and flatterers; they advised him to neglect the calling of frequent new parliaments, and therefore, by not taking the constant sense of his people in what he did, he was worked up into so high a notion of prerogative, that the commons (in order to restrain it obtained that independent fatal power, which at last unhappily brought him to his most tragical end, and at the same time subverted the whole constitution. And I hope we shall learn this lesson from it, never to compliment the crown with any new or extravagant powers, nor to deny the people those rights, which by ancient usage they are entitled to; but to preserve the just and equal balance, from which they will both derive mutual security, and which, if duly observed, will render our constitution the envy and admiration of all the world.

King Charles the Second naturally took a surfeit of Parliaments in his father's time, and was therefore extremely desirous to lay them aside. But this was a scheme impracticable. However, in effect, he did so: for he obtained a Parliament, which, by its long duration like an army of veterans, became so exactly disciplined to his own measures, that they knew no other command but from that person who gave them their pay.

This was a safe and most ingenious way of enslaving a nation. It was very well known, that arbitrary power, if it was open and avow ed, would never prevail here. The people were therefore amused with the specious form of their ancient constitution: it existed, indeed in their fancy; but, like a mere phantom, had no substance nor reality in it; for the power, the authority, the dignity of Parliaments were wholly lost. This was that remarkable Parliament which so justly obtained the opprobrious name of the Pension Parliament; and was the model from which, I believe, some later Parlia ments have been exactly copied.

At the time of the Revolution, the people made a fresh claim of their ancient privileges; and as they had so lately experienced the misfortune of long and servile Parliaments, it was then declared, that they should be held frequently. But it seems, their full meaning was not understood by this declaration: and therefore, as in every new settlement the intention of all parties should be specifically manifested, the Parliament never ceased struggling with the crown, till the triennial law was obtained: the preamble of it is extremely full and strong; and in the body of the bill you will find the word declared before enacted, by which I apprehend, that though this law did not take place immediately at the time of the Revolution, it was certainly intended as declaratory of their first meaning, and therefore stands a part of that original contract under which the constitution was then settled. His Majesty's title to the crown is primarily derived from that contract; and if, upon a review, there shall appear to be any deviations from it, we ought to treat them as so many injuries done

to that title. And I dare say, that this house, which has gone through so long a series of services to his Majesty, will at last he willing to revert to those original stated measures of government, to renew and strengthen that title.

But, Sir, I think the manner in which the septennial law was first introduced, is a very strong reason why it should be repealed. People, in their fears, have very often recourse to desperate expedients, which if not cancelled in season, will themselves prove fatal to that constitution, which they were meant to secure. Such is the nature of the septennial law; it was intended only as a preservative against a temporary inconvenience: the inconvenience is removed, but the mischievous effects still continue; for it not only altered the constitution of Parliaments, but it extended that same Parliament beyond its natural duration and therefore carries this most unjust implication with it, that you may at any time usurp the most indubitable, the most essential privilege of the people-- I mean that of chusing their own representatives. A precedent of such a dangerous consequence, of so fatal a tendency, that I think it would be a reproach to our statute-book, if that law was any longer to subsist, which might record it to posterity.

This is a season of virtue and public spirit. Let us take advantage of it to repeal those laws which infringe our liberties, and introduce such as may restore the vigour of our ancient constitution.

Human nature is so very corrupt, that all obligations lose their force, unless they are frequently renewed. --Long Parliaments become therefore independent of the people, and when

they do so, there always happens a most dangerous dependence elsewhere.

Long Parliaments give the minister an oppor tunity of getting acquaintance with members, of practising his several arts to win them into. his schemes.--This must be the work of time.. --Corruption is of so base a nature, that at first. sight it is extremely shocking.--Hardly any one. has submitted to it all at once--His disposition must be previously understood, the particular bait must be found out with which he is to be allured, and after all, it is not without many. struggles that he surrenders his virtue--Indeed, there are some, who will at once plunge themselves into any base action, but the, generality of mankind are of a more cautious nature, and will proceed only by leisurely degrees.--One or two perhaps have deserted their colours the. first campaign, some have done it a second.-But a great many, who have not that eager disposition to vice, will wait till a third.

For this reason, short Parliaments have been less corrupt than long ones; they are observed, like streams of water, always to grow more. impure the greater distance they run from the fountain-head.

I am aware, it may be said, that frequent, new Parliaments will produce frequent new. expences, but I think quite the contrary; I am. really of opinion, that it will be a proper remedy against the evil of bribery at elections, especially as you have provided so wholesome a law to cooperate upon these occasions.

Bribery at elections, whence did it arise? Not from country gentlemen, for they are sure of being chosen without it.; it was, Sir, the invention of wicked and corrupt ministers, who