To sum up, then, in a single sentence, the error which appears to me to have originated from a neglect of the lesson which the Old Testament may supply: the doctrine that final salvation is represented in Scripture as resting solely on the arbitrary appointment of God, is deduced from two premises; 1st, that Election infallibly implies salvation; and, 2dly, that Election is entirely arbitrary; whence it follows, certainly, that final salvation is arbitrary. Now many of the opponents of this conclusion are accustomed to deny the true premise, and admit the false one; acknowledging that Election

stood the foregoing argument to be merely a repetition of Bishop Sumner's, in his valuable work on "Apostolical Preaching." Such a misapprehension is, I trust, less likely to take place in the closet; but to guard against the possibility of it, it may be worth while here to remark, that though I coincide with Bishop S. in his conclusion, the arguments by which we, respectively, arrive at it, are different. The distinction which he dwells on, is that, between national, and individual election; that on which I have insisted, is, the distinction between election to certain privileges, and to final reward; he, in short, considers principally the parties chosen; whether Bodies of men, or particular persons: I, the things to which they are chosen; whether to a blessing, absolutely, or to the offer of one, conditionally.

necessarily implies ultimate salvation, but contending that it is not arbitrary, but depends on foreseen faith and obedience; a position which gives their opponents a decided advantage over them, and which the analogy of the old dispensation to the new may convince us is untenable; whereas, in denying that Election does necessarily imply salvation they would find the whole analogy of the Old Testament, and the general tenour of the Apostle Paul's admonitions, so completely in their favour, that the offensive conclusions would be, as far as Scripture testimony goes, irrecoverably overthrown and it would be seen that the abstract metaphysical questions respecting Fate and Free-will, are left by the Bible exactly where it finds them, undecided and untouched.

$ 4. Without entering at large on the metaphysical questions just alluded to, one remark respecting them will not be irrelevant, as it may throw light on the subject more particularly before us. I mean that the difficulty and confusion in which such questions have been involved, have, in a great degree, arisen from

inattention to the ambiguity of one particular class of words-"possible "i and "impossible,"

necessary," "certain," "contingent," and many others of corresponding significations to these; which have, by their undetected ambiguity, bewildered in a maze of fruitless logomachy most of those who have treated of the subject. "Certainty," for instance, and "uncertainty," which in the primary sense, denote the state of our own mind, have thence been transferred to the facts and events respecting which we are certain or uncertain; and ultimately, have come to be considered as indicating an intrinsic quality in the events themselves, and not merely the relation in which they stand to our knowledge or ignorance of them; and "necessity," as well as other words allied to it, whose signification sometimes refers to coercion, or absence of power, sometimes again merely to undoubting and complete knowledge, have led to endless fallacies and perplexities, when this distinction has been overlooked.

i See "Logic," Appendix, article "Possible." See also Appendix, No. I. to Archbp. King's Discourse on Predestination.

Thus, the "necessity" (i. e. the absence of freedom) of human actions, has by many been inferred from God's certain foreknowledge of them. And to this it is not, I think, altogether a satisfactory reply (which is often made), that the divine prescience does not fetter or control men's actions, nor in any way operate upon them, any more than our knowledge of any fact is the cause of its being such; for though this is undeniably true, it hardly meets the difficulty; since it is not meant, I apprehend, that the divine foreknowledge makes actions necessary, but that it implies that they are so; just as any one's seeing some object before him, implies the real present existence of that object; though no one supposes that his seeing it is, in any respect, the cause of its existence.

But the chief source of this perplexity is the equivocal employment of the word "necessity;" which, in one sense, relates to knowledge alone, and, therefore, is, of course, implied by prescience; but in another sense, relates to compulsion, or want of power, which prescience does by no means imply. When we speak,

k See Tucker's Light of Nature, Chap. 26.

for instance, of the "necessity" of mathematical truths, we mean merely that they admit of no doubt. And again, when we say that a man pining in captivity cannot but eagerly embrace the offer of freedom, and restoration to his country, we mean not that he is thus placed under compulsion, but that we are well-assured and have no doubt he will do so. On the other hand, when we say that, while in captivity, he cannot but submit to the will of his master, we mean that he wants power to resist, and liberty to escape; and when we speak of the necessity. of death, we mean that mortals are unable to avoid it. If this distinction had been duly attended to, it would hardly, I think, have been contended that that necessity of our actions, which the divine prescience implies, is at all incompatible with our freedom and power to act otherwise. Whether our conduct be, in fact, under any restraint or not, at least no restraint is implied by the mere foreknowledge of it. Let it be supposed (and the case is at least conceivable) that you were fully and accurately acquainted with all the inclinations of some man who was left at perfect liberty to follow them;