411 CHAPTER XI. THE BIBLICAL DOCTRINE ON THE ORIGIN OF EVIL AMONG the other assaults made by Modern Infidelity against the teachings of the Bible, one has been directed against its account of the origin of evil, or the mode of the entrance of sin into the world. It has been urged, that, according to the biblical account, God is the author of evil, inasmuch as he created a world in which sin was produced, and where he knew sin would exist; and man is represented as suffering the punishment of an act which was absolutely foreknown and hence wholly unavoidable. We grant that this is a subject of great difficulty. Philosophers and divines of every age have speculated in reference to it. They have endeavored to answer two questions: What is evil, and Whence is it? The believer in the Bible may indeed affirm, that man was the agent in the introduction of sin into the world; and that, as existing here, it is the violation of God's promulgated law. But though this answer is very good and true as to history, it is very inconclusive as to philosophy. For an objector may justly answer, that as Christians we believe in the supreme sovereignty of God, and believe that nothing transpires in the world without his direct or permissive agency. Hence God must have at least permitted the existence of sin, which, had he chosen to exert his almighty power, he might have wholly prevented. Hence also, in one sense, he is the author of sin, having indirectly assented to its entrance; besides creating such a world, and race of beings, the operation of which he foreknew would result in sin. In truth the Sacred Volume simply states an historical fact; it affirms that man's trangression was the immediate cause of evil in the world; and does not design to go back to the distant starting point of the inquiry, and ascertain who was the remote and original cause of those principles and combinations of things which eventually resulted in the existence and introduction of evil in the universe. The considerations which we propose now to offer, are designed to vindicate the reasonableness and justice of the simple facts which are stated in Scripture in reference to this subject. What is evil? The answer to this question we suppose is, that evil is a negative quality or moral element, giving character to certain persons and principles, in consequence of the absence or want of another opposite quality called good. Thus, in the material world, cold is not any positive quality or element, but it is the state produced by the absence of heat, which only is a quality possessing certain attributes which can be examined and analyzed. Darkness is no positive quality, but is a state produced by the absence of light. White cannot properly be called a color, because it is produced by the reflection of all the rays of light which fall upon an object, and the absorption of none of them; which rays, under different circumstances, produce all the other colors. So the absence of holiness, the absence of purity, the want of obedience, and of conformity to what the infinitely perfect will and law of God require, constitute the opposite quality to all these, and give existence and character to evil. The passive neglect of any duty immediately produces and is sin, without any further agency. But it is more difficult to reconcile the existence of evil in the world, with all the conceded attributes of the Divine character; especially when we remember how abhorrent sin must ever be to the nature of God, as well as when we remember the dreadful consequences produced in the world through its agency; all which consequences were clearly foreseen by the omniscient eye of God. The various hypotheses which have been suggested on this subject have sometimes served to throw light upon it, and have sometimes only involved it in greater darkness. The scholastic theologians of the middle ages expended much of their gigantic power upon it. One of the chief inquiries which engaged their attention for several ages was the nature and origin of evil. The brightest luminary of those dark ages, St. Thomas Aquinas, expounds the subject in the following terms. He inquires whether the highest good which is God, can be the cause of evil. "An objector will say he can, for it is written, shall there be evil in the city and the Lord hath not done it? Again, the effect of a second cause is to be reduced to its first cause; as is proved above. If then God is the cause of all good, it follows that all evil comes from God. Besides, Aristotle says (Phys. ii.) that the cause of the safety and the danger of a ship is the same. But God is the cause of the safety of all things, hence also of their injury." "But I answer, on the contrary, as Augustine says, that God is not the author of evil, because he tempts no one to evil. I conclude, therefore, that as God is himself the highest good, he cannot be the cause of evil except by accident. For as I showed before, evil which consists in the fault of an action, is always produced by the imperfection of the agent. But in God there is no defect, but the greatest perfection. Hence evil, which consists in the defect of an action, or which is produced by the imperfection of the agent, cannot be ascribed to God as its cause. But evil which consists in the corruption of other things may be ascribed to God as its cause. And this may be proved by natural as well as by spiritual things. For it has been proved that any agent, who has, by his own excellence, produced a certain form, which is followed by corruption and defect, causes also by his own virtue that corruption and defect. But it is plain, that the end chiefly contemplated by God, in the creation, was the good of the whole universe. But evil having followed that good, God is in one sense its cause. Hence he may be said to be the cause of evil as a punishment, but not as a fault. So, too, the shipwreck of a vessel may be attributed to a sailor as its cause, as the one who has not done what the safety of the vessel required. But God cannot be wanting in what is necessary to safety-hence cannot be the author of sin."* Here is a condensed view of the wisdom of the great Doctor of the middle ages on this subject. He discussed besides several related points; whether good can in any sense be the cause of evil; whether there is any one greatest evil which is the cause of all other evils; whether evil can exist in things; whether good can be the subject of evil; and whether evil corrupts the whole of good. Whether the scholastics cast much light upon these abstruse themes, may appear to some extent from the choice morceau which we have here translated from Aquinas. For our part we can find but little to enlighten and instruct in * Respondeo dicendum, quod sicut ex dictis supra patet, malum quod in defectu actionis consistit semper causatur ex defectu agentis. In deo autem nullus defectus est, sed summa perfectio-Dictum est enim, quod aliquod agens inquantum sua virtute producit aliquam formam ad quam sequitur corruptio et defectus, causat sua virtute, illam corruptionem et defectum, etc. Summa Theol., Pars I. Quæs. XLIX. Art. II., Ed. Paris. their lengthy discussions; and are persuaded that they only make the previous darkness more clearly visible. Our first position is, that the existing universe is the wisest and best which could possibly have been created. Every possible form of a world was doubtless present to the all-seeing eye of God. That there are other kinds of worlds which might have been created, is plain; because the existing one being the best, the power which created this one could more easily have created others less elaborate and perfect. Now the infinite wisdom of God would be able to discover what form of the universe was the most perfect; he would see it at a glance, and could make no mistake in reference to it. The infinite benevolence of God would induce him to choose the best form of the universe; because thereby he would gratify his own nature by promoting the highest welfare of his creatures. The infinite power of God would enable him to create such a universe; and however intricate or elaborate the best form of the universe might be, his ability to realize it in an actual and real world would be amply adequate to the task. By the active operation of these harmonious attributes in the Divine character, we must infer with absolute certainty, that the best possible form of the universe would not only be chosen and realized by God, if he created any world at all, but that he most certainly would create such a world, and mould it in the noblest and most perfect form which was possible. This most perfect form of the universe involved, among other things, the existence of a free agent. We suppose that the creation of a free agent is in itself an exploit in the highest degree difficult; for it involves the gift of faculties and powers of the most exalted description. But we see that God has actually placed in the world this free agent, possessed of this important faculty. He is here, |