Nuclear Shadowboxing: Legacies and ChallengesDeVolpi, Inc., 2005 |
Dentro del libro
Resultados 1-5 de 53
Página V-74
... IAEA inspectors.) Because reactor-degraded plutonium is so hard to work with and to fashion into a usable bomb, spent fuel from civilian power reactors would not be — and never has been — a source of plutonium for either terrorists or ...
... IAEA inspectors.) Because reactor-degraded plutonium is so hard to work with and to fashion into a usable bomb, spent fuel from civilian power reactors would not be — and never has been — a source of plutonium for either terrorists or ...
Página V-76
... IAEA. While safeguards systems distinguish between grades of fissile uranium (HEU vs. LEU), virtually all grades of plutonium are subject to the same safeguards, regardless of suitability for explosive or weapons use. The Canberra ...
... IAEA. While safeguards systems distinguish between grades of fissile uranium (HEU vs. LEU), virtually all grades of plutonium are subject to the same safeguards, regardless of suitability for explosive or weapons use. The Canberra ...
Página 3
... IAEA .... VI - 83 Reactors VI - 112 Domestic Safeguards . VI - 83 ISTC / IPP VI - 113 Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy VI - 84 Residual Fears ( Minkov ) VI - 113 Nuclear Export Controls VI - 84 Nuclear Cities Initiative VI - 113 Update ...
... IAEA .... VI - 83 Reactors VI - 112 Domestic Safeguards . VI - 83 ISTC / IPP VI - 113 Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy VI - 84 Residual Fears ( Minkov ) VI - 113 Nuclear Export Controls VI - 84 Nuclear Cities Initiative VI - 113 Update ...
Página 33
Ha alcanzado el límite de visualización de este libro.
Ha alcanzado el límite de visualización de este libro.
Página 41
Ha alcanzado el límite de visualización de este libro.
Ha alcanzado el límite de visualización de este libro.
Índice
V-3 | |
VOLUME 2 | D-17 |
Chapter and Section Headings Chapter and Section Headings | D-28 |
INTRODUCTION | D-39 |
COLD WAR NATIONAL SECURITY List of Appendices for Volume 2 | VA-2 |
Nuclear Arms Control Treaties and Agreements | VA-5 |
Appendix | VA-19 |
Improvised Fission Fusion and Radiological Devices | VA-41 |
NAS Reports | VA-79 |
U S Doctrine for Nuclear Operations | VA-87 |
The Nuclear Tipping Point | VA-93 |
Humanitarian Intervention | VA-99 |
Mutual Defense Against Ballistic Missiles | VA-105 |
NUCLEAR LESSONS Appendices | 1 |
Index of Volume 1 | 17 |
E Cold War Leadership Deteriorating? | 39 |
Biological Warfare and Terrorism | VA-51 |
Weaponizability of Fissile Materials | VA-59 |
Do We Learn? D Mutual Security Arrangements | 47 |
Términos y frases comunes
ABM Treaty accident agreement American Appendix Arms Control Today Atomic Scientists attack ballistic missiles ballistic-missile billion biological bomb cancer capability Chapter chemical Chicago Tribune civilian Cold Cold War conventional CTBT demilitarization deployed deployment destruction detection deterrence dirty bomb disarmament dismantlement doses effects energy exposure facilities fissile materials fission G.W. Bush administration human Human Radiation Experiments IAEA ICBMs inspections Iraq isotopic kilotons launch military missile defense monitoring national missile defense national security negotiated nonproliferation North Korea nuclear arms nuclear arsenals nuclear explosive nuclear forces nuclear materials nuclear power nuclear testing nuclear warheads nuclear weapons officials operational plants political potential President production proliferation radiation radioactive radiophobia reduce reprocessing risk Russia safeguards secrecy Soviet Union START II stockpile storage strategic submarines targets technical terrorism terrorist threat tritium U.S. nuclear underground United uranium verification waste weapons labs weapons plutonium
Pasajes populares
Página VA-105 - Defense, because their history with respect to human subjects research policy is less well known than that of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (now the Department of Health and Human Services).
Página 86 - Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material...
Página 10 - Court cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake; . . . F.
Página 19 - Ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade. • Expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy.
Página V-10 - Commission recommends a system of dose limitation, the main features of which are as follows: (a) no practice shall be adopted unless its introduction produces a positive net benefit; (b) all exposures shall be kept as low as reasonably achievable, economic and social factors being taken into account...
Página 19 - The US national security strategy will be based on a distinctly American internationalism that reflects the union of our values and our national interests. The aim of this strategy is to help make the world not just safer but better. Our goals on the path to progress are clear: political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other states, and respect for human dignity.
Página V-49 - I believe your conduct in putting into the hands of the Russians the A-bomb years before our best scientists predicted Russia would perfect the bomb has already caused, in my opinion, the Communist aggression in Korea, with the resultant casualties exceeding 50,000 and who knows but that millions more of innocent people may pay the price of your treason.
Página V-10 - Taking into account the state of technology, the economics of improvements in relation to benefits to the public health and safety, and other societal and socioeconomic considerations, and (3) In relation to utilization of nuclear energy in the public interest.