drawing to a close and theConfederates were retiring. Consequently, Virginia's and the Southern Confederacy's efforts west of the Alleghanies in this State were defeated in the fall of 1861.

General Reynolds sent a regiment to Elkwater, and soon afterwards occupied Cheat Mountain. This point was the highest camp occupied by soldiers during the war. The celebrated "Battle Above the Clouds," on Lookout Mountain, was not one-half so high. The whole region, including parts of Pocahontas, Pendleton and Randolph Counties, has an elevation above three thousand feet, while the summits of the knobs and ridges rise to heights of more than four thousand, and some nearly five thousand feet. General Reynolds fortified his two advanced positions, Elkwater and Cheat Mountain. They were seven miles apart, connected by only a bridle path, but a circuitous wagon road, eighteen miles long, led from one to the other, passing around in the direction of Huttonsville. No sooner had the United States troops established themselves at Elkwater and Cheat Mountain than General Lee advanced, and skirmishing began. The Confederates threw a force between Elkwater and Cheat Mountain, and posted another force on the road in the direction of Huttonsville. They were attacked, and for three days there was skirmishing, but no general engagement. On September 13 Colonel John A. Washington, in the Confederate service, was killed near Elkwater. He was a relative of President Washington, and also a relative General R. E. Lee, whose family and the Washingtons were closely connected. General Lee sent a flag of truce and asked for the body. It was sent to the Confederate lines on September 14. That day the Confederates concentrated ten miles from Elkwater, and the next day again advanced, this time threatening Cheat Mountain, but their attack was unsuccessful. In this series of skirmishes the Union forces had lost nine killed, fifteen wounded and about sixty prisoners. The result was a defeat for the Confederates, who were thwarted in their design of penetrating northward and westward. The failure of the Confederates to bring on a battle was due to their different detachments not acting in concert. It was Lee's plan to attack both positions at the same time. He sent detachments against Elkwater and Cheat Mountain. The sound of cannon attacking one position was to be the signal for attacking the other. The troops marched in rain and mud, along paths and in the woods, and when they found them selves in front of the Federal position, the detachment which was to have begun the attack failed to do so. The other detachment waited in vain for the signal, and then retreated. General Lee was much hurt by the failure of his plan.*

He

General Loring's army of 8,500, which was camped at Huntersville, in Pocahontas County, was sent to that place for a particular purpose. was to sweep round toward the west, then march north toward Weston and Clarksburg, strike the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and by threatening or cutting off General Reynolds' line of communication with his base of supplies, compel him to fall back. This plan was General Lee's. He left its execution to General Loring, who moved slowly, halted often, camped long, hesitated frequently, and consumed much valuable time. His men became sick. Rains made progress difficult, and he did not seem in a hurry to get along. General Lee waited but Loring still failed to march. He was an older officer than Lee, and although Lee had a right to order him forward,

* See H. A. White's Life of Robert E. Lee.

he refrained from doing so for fear of wounding Loring's feelings. The time for executing the movement passed, and the flank movement, which probably would have succeeded, was given up.

The Confederates were not yet willing to abandon West Virginia. They fell back to the Greenbrier River, thirteen miles from the Union camp, on Cheat Mountain, and fortified their position. They were commanded by General H. R. Jackson, and their number was believed to be about nine thousand. On October 3, 1861, General Reynolds advanced at the head of five thousand troops. During the first part of the engagement the Union forces were successful, driving the Confederates nearly a mile, but here several batteries of artillery were encountered, and reinforcements arriving to the support of the Confederates, the battle was renewed and General Reynolds was forced to fall back, with a loss of nine killed and thirty-five wounded. On December 10 General Reynolds was transferred to other fields, and the command of the Union forces in the Cheat Mountain district was given to General R. H. Milroy. Within three days after he assumed command he moved forward to attack the Confederate camp on the summit of the Alleghanies. The Confederates had gone into winter quarters there; and as the weather was severe, and as the Union forces appeared satisfied to hold what they had without attempting any additional conquests in midwinter, the Confederates were not expecting an attack. However, on December 13, 1861, General Milroy moved forward and assaulted their position. The fighting was severe for several hours, and finally resulted in the retreat of the Union forces. The Confederates made no attempt to follow. General Milroy marched to Huntersville, in Pocahontas county, and went into winter quarters. The Rebels remained on the summit of the Alleghanies till spring and then went over the mountains, out of West Virginia, thus ending the attempt to re-conquer northwestern Virginia.

It now remains to be seen what success attended the efforts of the Confederates to gain control of the Kanawha Valley. Their campaign in West Virginia for the year 1861 was divided into two parts, in the northwest and in the Kanawha Valley. General Henry A. Wise was ordered to the Kanawha June 6, two days before General Garnett was ordered to take command of the troops which had been driven south from Grafton. Colonel Tompkins was already on the Kanawha in charge of Confederate forces. The authorities at Richmond at that time believed that a General, with the nucleus of an army in the Kanawha Valley, could raise all the troops necessary among the people there. On April 29 General Lee had ordered Major John McCausland to the Kanawha to organize companies for the Confederacy. Only five hundred flint-lock muskets could be had at that time to arm the troops in that quarter. General Lee suggested that the valley could be held by posting the force below Charleston. Very poor success attended the efforts at raising volunteers, and the arms found in the district were insufficient to equip the men. Supplies were sent as soon as possible from Virginia.

When General Wise arrived and had collected all his forces he had 8,000 men, of whom 2,000 were militia from Raleigh, Fayette and Mercer Counties. With these he was expected to occupy the Kanawha Valley, and resist invasion should Union forces attempt to penetrate that part of the State. General John B. Floyd, who had been Secretary of War under President Buchanan, was guarding the railroad leading from Richmond into Tennessee, and was posted south of the present limits of West Virginia, but

within supporting distance of General Wise. In case a Union army invaded the Kanawha Valley it was expected that General Floyd would unite his forces with those of General Wise, and that they would act in concert if not in conjunction. General Floyd was the older officer, and in case their forces were consolidated he would be the commander in-chief. But General Floyd and General Wise were enemies. Their hatred for the Yankees was less than their hatred for each other. They were both Virginia politicians, and they had crossed each other's paths too often in the past to be reconciled now. General Lee tried in vain to induce them to work in harmony. They both fought the Union troops bravely, but never in concert. When Wise was in front of General Cox, General Floyd was elsewhere. When Floyd was pitted in battle against General Rosecrans, General Wise was absent. Thus the Union troops beat these quarreling Virginia Brigadier Generals in detail, as will be seen in the following narrative of the campaign during the summer and fall of 1861 in the Kanawha Valley.

When Generals Wise and Floyd were sent to their districts in the West it was announced in their camps that they would march to Clarksburg, Parkersburg and Wheeling. This would have brought them in conflict with General McClellan's army. On July 2 McClellan put troops in motion against the Confederates in the Kanawha Valley. On that date he appointed General J. D. Cox to the command of regiments from Kentucky and Ohio, and ordered him to cross the Ohio at Gallipolis and take possession of Point Pleasant, at the mouth of the Kanawha. On July 23 General Rosecrans succeeded McClellan in command of the Department of Ohio. Rosecrans pushed the preparation for a vigorous campaign, which had already been commenced. He styled the troops under General Cox the Brigade of Kanawha. On July 17, in Putnam County, a fight occurred between detachments of Union and Confederate forces, in which the latter appeared for the time victorious, but soon retreated eastward. From that time until September 10 there was constant skirmishing between the armies, the advantage being sometimes on one side, sometimes on the other; but the Union forces constantly advanced and the Confederates fell back. On August 1 General Wise was in Greenbrier County, and in a report made to General Lee on that date, he says he fell back not a moment too soon. He complained that his militia were worthless as soldiers, and urged General Lee to send him guns and other arms, and clothing and shoes, as his men were ragged and barefooted. On August 20 General Rosecrans was at Clarksburg preparing to go in person to lead reinforcements into the Kanawha. He issued a proclamation to the people of West Virginia, calling on them to obey the laws, maintain order and co-operate with the military in its efforts to drive the armed Confederates from the State.

Prior to that time Colonel E. B. Tyler, with a Federal force, had advanced to the Gauley River, and on August 13 he took up a position at Cross Lanes. He thus covered Carnifex Ferry. General Cox was at that time on the Gauley River, twenty miles lower down, near the mouth of that stream, nearly forty miles above Charleston. General Floyd advanced, and on August 26 crossed the Gauley at Carnifex Ferry with 2,500 men, and fell upon Colonel Tyler at Cross Lanes with such suddenness that the Union troops were routed, with fifteen killed and fifty wounded. The latter fell into the hands of the Confederates, who took fifty other prisoners also. The remainder of Tyler's force made its retreat to Charleston, and General Floyd fortified the position just gained and prepared to hold it. On Sep

tember 3 General Wise made an attack on General Cox at Gauley Bridge, near the mouth of the river, twenty miles below Carnifex Ferry. The attack failed. The Confederates were beaten and were vigorously pursued. Had Wise held Gauley Bridge, Floyd already being in possession of Carnifex Ferry, they would have been in positions to dispute the further advance of the Union forces up the Kanawha Valley.

General Rosecrans left Clarksburg September 3, with re-inforcements, and after a march of seven days reached Carnifex Ferry, and that same evening began an attack upon the Confederates under General Floyd, who were entrenched on top of a mountain on the west bank of the Gauley River, in Nicholas County. General Floyd had about 4000 men and sixteen cannon, and his position was so well protected by woods, that assault, with chance of success, was considered exceedingly difficult. He had fortified this naturally strong position, and felt confident that it could not be captured by any force the Union general could bring against him. The fight began late in the afternoon, General Rosecrans having marched seventeen miles that day. It was not his purpose to bring on a general engagement that afternoon, and he directed his forces to advance cautiously and find where the enemy lay; for the position of the Confederates was not yet known. While thus advancing a camp was found in the woods, from which the Confederates had evidently fled in haste. Military stores and private property were scattered in confusion. From this fact it was supposed that the enemy was in retreat, and the Union troops pushed on through thickets and over ridges. Presently they discovered that they had been mistaken. They were fired upon by the Confederate army in line of battle. From that hour until darkness put a stop to the fighting, the battle continued. The Union troops had not been able to carry any of the Rebel works; and General Rosecrans withdrew his men for the night, prepared to renew the battle next morning. But during the night General Floyd retreated. He had grown doubtful of his ability to hold out if the attack was resumed with the same impetuosity as on the preceding evening. But he was more fearful that the Union troops would cut off his retreat if he remained. So, while it was yet time, he withdrew in the direction of Lewisburg, in Greenbrier County, destroying the bridge over the Gauley, and also the ferry across that stream. General Rosecrans was unable to pursue because he could not cross the river. It is a powerful, turbulent stream, and at this place flows several miles down a deep gorge, filled with rocks and cataracts. Among spoils which fell into the hands of the victors was General Floyd's hospital, in which were fifty wounded Union soldiers who had been captured when Colonel Tyler was driven from this same place on August 26. General Rosecrans lost seventeen killed and one hundred and forty-one wounded The Confederate loss was never ascertained.

After a rest of a few days the Union army advanced to Big Sewell Mountain. The weather was wet, and the roads became so muddy that it was almost impossible to haul supplies over them. For this reason it was deemed advisable to fall back. On October 5 General Rosecrans began to withdraw his forces to Gauley Bridge, and in the course of two weeks had transferred his command to that place, where he had water communication with his base of supplies.

On November 10 another action was fought between General Floyd and General Rosecrans, in which the Confederates were defeated. This virtually closed the campaign for the year 1861 in that quarter, and resulted in

the occupation of all the lower Kanawha Valley and the greater part of the upper valley. The Confederates were finally driven out, and never again obtained a foothold in that part of the State, although large bodies were at times in the Valley of the Kanawha, and occasionally remained a considerable time.

The Confederate Government, and the State of Virginia as a member of that Government, had an object in view when they sent their forces into West Virginia at the commencement of the Civil War. Virginia as a State was interested in retaining the territory between the Alleghany Mountains and the Ohio River and did not believe she could do so without force and arms, because her long neglect and oppression had alienated the western counties. Virginia correctly judged that they would seize the first opportunity and organize a separate State. To prevent them from doing so, and to retain that large part of her domain lying west of the Alleghanies, were the chief motives which prompted Virginia, as a State, to invade the western part of her own territory, even before open war was acknowledged to exist between the Southern Confederacy and the United States Government. The purpose which prompted the Southern Confederacy to push troops across the Alleghanies in such haste was to obtain possession of the country to the borders of Ohio and Pennsylvania, and to fortify the frontiers against invasion from the north and west. It was well understood at the headquarters of the Southern Confederacy that the thousands of soldiers already mustering beyond the Ohio River, and the tens of thousands who would no doubt soon take the field in the same quarter, would speedily cross the Ohio, unless prevented. The bold move which the South undertook was to make the borders of Ohio and Pennsylvania the battle ground. The southern leaders did not at that time appreciate the magnitude of the war which was at hand. If they had understood it, and had had a military man in the place of Jefferson Davis, it is probable that the battle ground would have been different from what it was. Consequently, to rightly understand the early movements of the Confederates in West Virginia, it is necessary to consider that their purpose was to hold the country to the Ohio river. Their effort was weak, to be sure, but that was partly due to their miscalculation as to the assistance they would receive from the people of West Virginia. If they could have organized an army of forty thousand West Virginians and reinforced them with as many more men from the South, it can be readily seen that McClellan could not have crossed the Ohio as he did. But the scheme failed. The West Virginians not only would not enlist in the Confederate army, but they enlisted in the opposing force; and when Garnett made his report from Laurel Hill he told General Lee that, for all the help he received from the people, he might as well carry on a campaign in a foreign country. From that time it was regarded by the Confederates as the enemy's country; and when, later in the war, Jones, Jackson, Imboden and others made raids into West Virginia they acted toward persons and property in the same way as when raids were made in Ohio and Pennsylvania.

The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, crossing West Virginia from Harper's Ferry to Wheeling, and from Grafton to Parkersburg, was considered of the utmost importance by both the North and the South. It was so near the boundary between what was regarded as the Southern Confederacy and the North that during the early part of the war neither the one side nor the other felt sure of holding it. The management of the road was in sympa