large curved branches also are indispensable for knees and ribs. Such trees as these should be carefully guarded by their proprie tors; and trees growing in open and exposed situations should be cherished, as likely to be at some future period valuable to the whole community. An unfortunate idea has prevailed among the inhabitants of this country, that wood was unsightly and a mark of bad cultivation; in consequence our farmers, when they undertake to improve, as they term it, begin by laying waste the forest; and often do not even leave sufficient trees standing to afford the necessary shade for their cattle. We have heard the anecdote of an American set on shore in the neighbourhood of Aberdeen, who pronounced the north of Scotland the most highly cultivated country he had ever seen, as not a tree was to be met with; this anecdote is characteristic, and shows the unfortunate prejudice against wood in this country.

In Philadelphia, where the finest merchant ships are certainly built, both for model and durability, it has been the habit to make the floor timbers and lower foothooks of white oak, and all the others of live oak and red cedar. This mode of building, though sanctioned by long custom, is not the most prudent. In the Philadelphia ships. we have examined, (and we have seen some of their finest opened at almost every stage of their duration,) the floor timbers have almost uniformly been found in a state of comparative decay, and in some cases entirely rotten. The reason that has been alleged for making those important timbers of a more perishable material than the rest of the ship is, that white oak when wet will last as long as live oak. This mode of reasoning, however, can only apply to such of them as are in the well of the ship; those at a distance from it being always dry, and those in its neighbourhood liable to changes from moist to dry, which are very pernicious to timber. Some builders, it is said, bave lately began to construct those timbers of live oak, and we have no doubt but the duration of their vessels will be much increased. Live oak is only to be met with in the southern states, and principally in Georgia. Much of the most valuable trees for the construction of large vessels, which could be easily brought to the waters, were felled for the construction of seventy-fours, at the close of the administration of Mr. Adams; they still remain in

our dockyards, and, if they have been properly preserved, are still fit for the purposes they were originally intended to answer. Some live oak still remains uncut, and in favourable situations. But the number of trees that will supply timber for the building of line of battle ships is so small, especially in our thick natural forests, that we fear too much is calculated from this source. Much may, however, be drawn from the Floridas.

The upper timbers in Philadelphia are usually, in their best ships, made of the live oak and red cedar. This last wood is also brought from the southward; for in the northern states it is of too small a growth to be considered as shipbuilding timber. The larch is to be found in the state of Vermont in large quantities, and it has been applied in Europe to a variety of purposes in shipbuilding. White pine for masts and spars, and pitch pine for joiners' work are to be procured with ease in all the ports of the northern, and pitch pine abounds in the southern states, where masts are often made of it, and it excels in strength and durability. The chesnut has been recommended by some late wri ters in England as a useful wood; we, however, have never heard of its being used, either here or in that country. Should it answer, it is a tree of the quickest growth and largest size, and from its pliability admirably calculated for the wales and bends of large ships. It is, however, liable to splinter, and its durability in ships has never been tested, although it has been found to last a great length of time in sheltered situations. The Lombardy poplar was, on its first introduction, highly spoken of as ship timber; its wood, however, appears of too soft and perishable a nature. The treenails are usually made of locust; the quantity of this valuable wood is unfortunately diminishing, in consequence of a disease which affects it. There are many other trees which probably might be useful. The tulip, the largest of our forest trees, grows to an immense height, of straight and knotless "trunk, and would make fine keels and beams; but it has never been tried as yet, and therefore cannot be employed with safety.

Iron is to be had in every direction in our country, and much of it of excellent quality, both hammered and cast. Copper is much scarcer; we have only heard of one mine which has been worked, that of Belville in Jersey, belonging to the Schuyler

family; and that has been neglected for several years. Its ore was abundant and rich in quality. A vast mass of copper exists on Lake Superior, but ages may elapse before it can be turned to account. As copper is one of the most important materials in the equipment of a ship of war, our government should lose no time in searching for this valuable mineral, and in procuring the opening of those mines which may be discovered. Hemp can be raised to any extent in this country, and we have two other plants which may serve as its substitutes. Its cultivation should be encouraged by an ordinance forbidding its importation, while it can be supplied to the navy at a fixed price and of good quality. There is a manufactory of sailcloth at Boston, which is, as far as we know, the only one in the country. Naval stores of all kinds abound in the state of North Carolina.

It is thus evident that our country possesses within itself every material for a navy; and the beauty of our merchant ships, the fine and perfect construction of our frigates, show that we have plenty of excellent workmen. The cannon cast in this country, however, are very inferior to those of Europe, in strength, beauty, and lightness. This might, with a little attention, be obviated; as cylinders for steam engines, certainly a much more difficult manufacture, have been cast and bored in the city of New-York no way inferior to those of Watt & Boulton.

As to the manning of our ships, we have seamen sufficient for any navy that can be desired. Previous to the first embargo there were in the merchant service and fisheries, 100,000 seamen; it cannot be denied that many of these are lost to their country since; but enough still remain, and the war will render it easy to procure a larger proportion of those for manning a navy than before. 30,000 would man 20 sail of the line, 30 large frigates, and 50 or 60 smaller vessels; and it is a far less numerical proportion of our whole body of seamen than is employed in the navy of any other nation. The commerce of Great Britain does not employ so many seamen as its navy by one third. The navy of France employs at least four times the number of its merchant service; and Sweden, with less than one half the population, and without one third of the foreign commerce possessed by the United States previous to the war, sends to sea 12 sail of the line, and a proportionate number of other vessels.

But although the above is stated as the force the United States might have equipped previous to the war, and as that which, at the commencement of hostilities, would have been the most formidable, it is probable that it would be impossible to collect such a fleet under existing circumstances, and that it would not be effective when collected. In the first place, the number of navy officers is small, and can only be increased gradually. Ships are more easily built than officers made. Every increase of force, above that which can be commanded by officers who have risen to their stations through the regular grades of marine education, would only serve to render our navy, like that of the French, a ponderous mass of weakness and insufficiency. It had better remain on the limited and frugal footing in which it is at present than that this should happen; for the character of our navy is far more terrible to an enemy than its effective force can be made, and that character should be preserved. Should heavy ships of the line be built, it would be impossible to have them concentrated; for until a national navy-yard is established sufficiently extensive to build, equip, and repair the whole force, they must be constructed in far separate ports. A squadron of a few ships cruising on the coast, without attempting a blockade, would prevent their junction; as it would be madness to put to sea, in single ships on a coasting voyage, while a superior force might be met in the track. The utility of our navy, moreover, consists, not in guarding our coast, for it is to be hoped that our countrymen, except in a few exposed situations, are fully brave and numerous enough to defend their own firesides, but in annoying the commerce of the enemy; and for such purpose ships of the line are useless, except in attacking some of their great commercial fleets; to protect which, however, in the event of our collecting a navy sufficiently powerful, squadrons could be sent by Great Britain. It is on her own coast that she is vulnerable. Some of our countrymen may still remember that at the breaking out of the American war such was the success of the cruisers of the United States, that the British merchants took up French vessels to carry on the trade to Ireland, and that the goods were shipped as French (then neutral) property. What happened then may happen again, and would have happened, had not the blockade of our ports existed to such VOL. II. New Series.

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an extent as to deprive our private armed vessels of any reasonable chance of bringing in their prizes. With government vessels the case is different; let them sink, burn and destroy; the crews will serve to deliver, by exchange, our brave countrymen from bondage, and increase our own resources; the loss of the vessels will inflict a wound upon that very trade to which the British look for support, should all their communications with other countries be destroyed. It would, therefore, be politic to discontinue the building of ships of the line, except, perhaps, three or four, to act, as occasion may offer, upon our own coasts; but that every other description of vessels be increased as much as possible. The security of large fast-sailing frigates from capture, is easily seen from the proof that only one of ours has fallen into the hands of an enemy who blockades every port, and whose navy covers every sea, and that was captured in a combat which was sought for. Our smaller vessels have had nearly as much good fortune as the frigates. The measure which would be most likely to annoy the enemy, would be to put into commission a number of stout pilot built schooners, which would be equal in force to the British gun brigs, but a very superior description of vessels; they would furnish separate commands for numbers of meritorious young officers, and give room for an increase in the number of junior lieutenants and midshipmen. The injury they might do to the enemy's commerce in its most vital parts, by preventing the assembling of convoys, by ruining its fisheries, and by harassing its colonies, is incalculable. They might be procured at the present time in any number which might be wanted; skilful sailing-masters may be found for them; they can be fitted and repaired in any port; no blockade can be so rigid as to keep them from sailing, or prevent their return. We have seen, since the breaking out of the war, the most gallant actions fought by this description of vessels in private employ; whose successes have added little to the national wealth, and nothing to the national honour. Booty has been their only object; danger, where booty could not be obtained, has been studiously avoided. In the hands of national officers, booty would be a secondary concern; danger would be courted, and difficulties surmounted in the pursuit of reputation. While our larger vessels might be cooped in port,