Power of the Creator changing its Original Nature and Conftitution, cou'd diveft it of Thought; and then, in what Part of the Universe foever, it wou'd think and be felf-conscious; which, in fense and reality, is the fame thing with an Immaterial SubStance united to Human Body: Or, however, is to make Man at once material and immortal in his Individual Nature; whereas all Corporealifts difown the latter, as inconfiftent with the former.

Befides, it is impoffible to conceive fuch a fix'd, as well as thinking, Monad of Matter, in any one Part of Human Body; when all of it, in its most Effential Parts, is under a perpetual Flux and Alteration.

Again, as to the Motion it must be fuppofed to communicate to the rest of the Body, this must be done either by moving about its own Center, or progressively: The first indeed seems the only conceivable Way of its Motion, in order to receive, as we do, the fame Impreffions a fecond time from the fame Object: But then it is impoffible to conceive how, by moving in this manner like a Star in its Vortex, it shou'd communicate thofe Motions quaquaversum, which are obvious, and each Moment perform'd in our Bodies; and which require a Principle with a Power in it, at the fame time, of communicating Motion every Way; where

whereas 'tis impoffible to conceive in Body, a Power of communicating Motion to any more, than one determinate Point at once.

If its Motion be fuppos'd to be progressive, fo that it moves, the Animal Spirits fuppofe, by impulse; being, by unconceivable Degrees less than the least Pore in our Body, it wou'd find none, or no effectual Refistance; and fo, inftead of communicating Motion to it, wou'd, by its own Rectileal, as its Natural Motion, pervade and defert the Body.

These are some of the Impoffibilities and Abfurdities attending the Suppofition of Thought in one Particle of the Body; the other Suppofition, which places it in a Collection or Combination of these Monads, in the Brain or fome Ventricle of it, is attended with these, and fome Confequences, of the like nature, peculiar to it felf.

It makes not One, but a Multitude of Percipient and Intelligent Agents within us; which, like fo many Senators, muft debate and propose their feveral Sentiments, before they can be concluded by one, and that shall commence an Human Thought: For it is as abfurd to suppose that one Monad can be confcious, without Communication, of the Thoughts of another, as to suppose the fame in two or more Men. But I need not labour to prove that this

is inconfiftent with the Manner of our receiving Impreffions, and forming Ideas, nor expose this fenceless Suppofition any farther.

But there is another Sort of Corpufcularians, who differ from the former in this, that they own no Phyfically Indivisible Parts of Matter; but, tho' as Corpufcularians, they differ, in this; yet as Corporealifts they do not: For this Difpute lyes only between one and a farther Extent of Power confeffedly Mechanical; and therefore they are justly chargeable with all the Confequences that attend the other Hypothefis; adding only this, that their Thought must be both figurate and divifible: For, fixing no Limits to the Division of Matter, neither can they limit the Division of its Qualities; for if the leaft poffible Body (pardon the abfurdity of the Expreffion) is divifible into two lefs Bodies; then, fo is the least poffible Quality too: For instance the Whitenefs of it, is, with the Body, divifible into two lefs Whiteneffes; and tho' a Circle does not divide into two Circles, nor a Square into two Squares, yet as Figures in general they divide one into two; which fhews us that there is no Coporeal Property but what is divifible, with the Body, it belongs to: And therefore 'till the Inftrument is invented, so fine

as

as in reality to split a Thought, I think we must be forc'd to take up this with Conclufion, that Phyfically extended Subftance, is, in its own nature, utterly incapable of Human Thought.

SECT. VIII.

That Cogitation cannot be fuperadded to Matter.

IN

N the preceding Section we have proved that, according to our first, and there fore clearest Idea of Matter, it is both devoid and incapable of Thought; which might, reasonably, prevent any farther Difpute upon this Point when 'tis confider'd that, according to that infallible Maxim, Quicquid recipitur, recipitur ad modum recipientis; no external Cause can. act upon the Subject, beyond the Capacity of it: But, notwithstanding this, our Idea of Motion, and of the Qualities producible by it in Bodies, is so very different from our Idea of Matter, and feems to discover in it fuch a vaft Capacity, beyond what that wou'd afford us; and, efpecially, fuch is our Venerable Notion of

the

the Creative and Omnipotent Power, that when we confider these abstractedly from Matter, we are we are driven back from our Conclufion, and still kept in Doubt, whether there may not be fome, to us unknown, Capacity of Thought in Matter; and whether it has not pleas'd the Almighty to bestow the Faculty of it upon fome Corporeal Systems. If therefore it is poffible that this Faculty fhou'd be fuperadded to Matter, it is poffible to be done but one or other of these three Ways: 1. Motion 2. Generation ; or 3. Omnipotence and a distinct Confutation of these ; will answer the Title of this Section.

1. Let us confider, Whether Perception and Cogitation can arise upon Matter, by the help of Motion only.

Effay, lib. 3. c. 4. S. 4, &c.

I think it, with Mr. L. of good use in Philofophy, to know what Words can, and what cannot be defin'd; and I am perfuaded also that, of the latter Scrt only, are the Names of our Simple Ideas, of which Motion is one: If any Man fhou'd ask me what Motion is, the best Answer I cou'd give him, wou'd be to bid him confult a Moving Body; not that the Idea of Motion is too obfcure, but too perfpicuous to be illuftrated by the Intervention of any other.

The