150 ADMINISTRATION OF BRITISH COLONIES. portion have gone there and settled themselves, of their own free will and accord, it is still more unquestionable that the sovereign of Great Britain, of all sovereigns of the earth, cannot do so, possessing as he does only a limited accountable authority, even over the British dominions. With these observations upon the general right of any nation, or body of individuals, to take possession of an unoccupied portion of the earth's surface, or to establish colonies, and upon the inconsistency of our conduct, in the way in which we have sanctioned or prohibited new settlements by British subjects, let us consider, next, the constitutional power of Britain to administer foreign settlements, however acquired. CHAPTER VII. THE POWER, CONSTITUTIONALLY, OF THE BRITISH SOVEREIGN TO RULE, BY HIMSELF, POSSESSIONS BEYOND THE LIMITS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM. PASSING from the mode in which settlements or colonies may be acquired, let us consider how they are to be held or governed, in consistency with those ruling principles of the British constitution which distinguish the British monarchy from all others. In doing this, let us first consider if, in this respect, the sovereign alone can legislate for British colonies, whether they be acquired by conquest, or by cession, or by voluntary settlement. SECTION I.-POWER TO RULE POSSESSIONS ACQUIRED BY CONQUEST. With regard to colonies acquired by conquest or by cession, if a district of country or an island have been either taken by force of arms from the possessors, or have been voluntarily ceded, the monarch for the time, in exercise of the rights of sovereignty which are in theory recognized to be, as fully and with as little limitation, in the King of Great Britain as they are in the Autocrat of all the Russias, may, in the case of forcible conquest, impose such terms upon the conquered inhabitants as he pleases, and in the case of cession, he may make such terms with the ceding power as he pleases. In neither instance is there, either in the theory or in the practice of the British constitution, any check, at this stage of the proceeding, upon the exercise of the most despotic and tyrannical power, which the terror of the sovereign's arms may compel submission to. The sovereign of Great Britain, as the depositary of the executive power of the empire, must necessarily, for the discharge of that power with efficiency and with the dignity due to the empire, be unlimited as to the mode of its exercise in all external relations. It would be both inconvenient and impracticable if the sovereign, before he could accept a capitulation or a cession of territory, were obliged to refer the terms to the parliament of Great Britain, however near the place about to capitulate or to be ceded might be geographically to London. Nay, even if time and space, which railway and electricity have gone far to annihilate, did not present any difficulty, it would still be impracticable as well as inconvenient if the sovereign were obliged, from time to time, to make public beforehand the advantages he meant to ask and the concessions he meant to make, while conducting, through his officers, the terms of a capitulation or a cession of territory. In these instances, therefore, of capitulation and cession, as in the instance of treaties, and for the same reasons, the sovereign is unfettered and uncontrolled in the exercise of the executive power, except in so far as the sovereign and the officers through whom he acts have before their eyes the fear of parliament, to which they must render an account afterwards of the most minute article of every capitulation or cession, and of the reasons which induced it. The parliament may not repudiate the terms of a capitulation or cession, any more than it may repudiate the terms of a treaty made by the sovereign. It cannot, like the Roman senate in the second Samnite war and in other instances, repudiate what the executive has concluded, when that is considered to be disadvantageous or dishonorable to the empire; neither can the parliament punish the monarch in his person for the injury done to the state, but it may punish, with death even, the officers of the monarch who, by yielding to him, have put in force orders which, without their concurrence, could not have been executed; and it may punish even the sovereign himself, in an indirect manner, by withholding from him the supplies of money, necessary for the continuance of his government, until the matter of complaint shall have been repaired, so far as that is possible to be done in the circumstances. In effect, therefore, it is only in theory that the monarch of Britain is absolute as to the terms upon which he may permit a capitulation to his troops, or accept a cession of territory from an enemy. Practically, the conditions-both those that are to take effect immediately, and those which are to continue in operation for a period of time-are always made with reference to those principles alone which are recognized by the British constitution, and which are sure to be appealed to in the scrutiny which each and every member of the legislature is entitled to make of them. Vattel, speaking of conquests, says: "It is asked to whom the conquest belongs, to the prince who made it, or to the state? This question ought never to have been heard of. Can the sovereign act, as such, for any other end than the good of the state? Whose are the forces employed in the war? Even if he had made the conquest at his own expense, out of his own revenue, or his patrimonial estates, does not he make use of his subjects' arms? Is it not their blood that is shed? Is it not for the cause of the state and of the nation that he takes arms? Therefore, all the rights proceeding from it appertain to the nation." In Calvin's case, in Coke's reports, it was resolved that, "If a king come to a kingdom by conquest, he may, at his pleasure, alter and change |