when the income by customs for 1811 did not exceed thirteen millions, and that of 1812 was only about nine millions and a half. All modern wars are carried on in part by loans, but loans secured by taxes. Our war was to be sustained by borrowed money without taxes, at any rate till after the presidential election. The loan of sixteen millions, authorized by act of the 8th of February, 1813, superadded to that for eleven millions, authorized by act of the 14th of March, 1812, together with an issue of five millions of treasury notes by act of the 30th of June 1812; these thirty-two millions of dollars, borrowed without any substantial pledge for payment, of even interest of the debt to that amount, were the device of the treasury, and the delusion of Congress. The loan of 1813, for sixteen millions of dollars, was taken at 88 per cent. for 6 per cent. stocks, or at par with an annuity of one and a half per cent. per annum. Seven millions of the sum were subscribed by Stephen Girard and David Parish, two millions by John Jacob Astor, the other seven millions by different banks and persons, mostly at Philadelphia and New York. Stephen Girard being by birth a Frenchman, Astor and Parish Germans, and Mr. Gallatin a Swiss, though all American citizens of high standing, and all but Parish of long standing, it was objected that all the means the American government had for carrying on the war were supplied by foreigners; an imputation to which nearly all the governments of Europe, since, have frequently been obnoxious, if not always. Governments, like individuals, when inclined to borrow, get the loan wherever they can. It was a much more serious objection to this loan of ours that it was a resort, if not ruinous, at least dangerous, to that wasteful system of finance which paper money, bank-credits and devolution of payment on posterity engrafted on the stock of substantial revenue. It was also remarked that while Frenchmen and Germans supplied our war funds, their administration was confided through the war to Mr. Gallatin, a Swiss, Mr. Campbell, a Scotchman, and Mr. Dallas, an Englishman: to which also, however, the reply was that the American financial system originated with Robert Morris, an Englishman, and Alexander Hamilton, a native of an English West India island. My small subscription, (of all I was worth, however,) in the alphabetical list of the Bank of Pennsylvania, came next to that of a rich German, Jacob Gerard Koch, who subscribed half a million of dollars. Opposition to

the loans caused some reacting patriotism; and many subscribed more than they otherwise would, in order to show their confidence in the government and support of the war: of which class Mr. Koch was one.

Thus curtailed of war's common appliances at home, the Senate deprived Madison abroad of whatever the House of Representatives did not combine with it to stint him of. The president's power is strongly executive to fortify the country with sentinels in the character of foreign ministers whenever he may think proper. Madison had never been on any of those missions, but Monroe and Pinkney who had, were well aware of their importance at such a conjuncture. They would have been of great importance to plead and vindicate the cause of our forlorn war in Europe. But it lingered for more than a year without one such help. Mr. Adams was in Russia; but like Mr. Gallatin, of opinion that nothing but prompt peace could save the country from ruin. Joel Barlow, our minister to France, died at Zarnowich, in Poland, the 26th of December, 1812. Jonathan Russel, transferred from Paris to London, was American charge d'affaires there, only till the declaration of war withdrew his faculties. Mr. George W. Erving went in 1811 on a special mission to Denmark, like Mr. Adams, far from the scene for explanation; and not commissioned with any special view to it. Till Mr. Crawford took Mr. Barlow's place, in April, 1813, we had hardly a representative in all Europe. Austria, Prussia, Italy, Spain, Holland, Portugal, Sweden, where we now have public agents, (and even the Congress of the Revolution deemed them, as they always are, essential,) were without an American public minister or private emissary. It is true that Holland and Portugal, Italy and other parts of Europe were then welded into the vast machinery of French dominion. Yet while Spain was disputed between Ferdinand and Joseph, we had no minister there, for what, under the peculiar circumstances, was the very reason why two should have been commissioned or more if necessary. Madison was thwarted by a jealous Senate. In May, 1813, when he nominated Jonathan Russel as Minister Plenipotentiary to Sweden, the appointment was negatived by the Senate on frivolous pretences largely set forth in publications on the subject by William B. Giles, one of the Virginia senators. In November of that year, Mr. De Kantzow arrived at Washington as minister resident from

Sweden, and then, at last, Mr. Russel was suffered to pass the Senate. But the president should have had several more at other European capitals; his power for that purpose was ample, as Washington had exercised it without the sanction of the Senate. Excepting, however, the special mission of Messrs. Gallatin and Bayard, to be united with Mr. Adams at Gottenburg, under the fruitless Russian mediation, the whole war was conducted from first to last without a diplomatic assistant in Europe. When Mr. Crawford reached Paris the French government was helpless, was English. Mr. Bayard, a gentleman of too much honour and integrity to be wanting to his country, was, nevertheless, of the party opposed to war; Mr. Adams soliciting the Russian mediation, confessed to Romanstzoff, the Czar's minister, that the war could do no good; he had no hope of it; he avowed his hostile feelings against France. Mr. Gallatin went still further in quest of any peace rather than any war. Our foreign relations. were deserted and desolate.

VOL. I.-7

CHAPTER II.

INVASION OF CANADA.-HALIFAX CAMPAIGN.-HULL'S EXPEDITION.— CAPTURE OF MICHILIMACINACK.-HULL'S SURRENDER.-LOSS OF MICHIGAN. - · GENERAL CRAIG.-CAPTURE OF THE FRIGATE GUERRIERE.-CAPTAIN HULL.-GENERAL VAN RENSSELAER.-BATTLE OF QUEENSTOWN.-GENERAL SMYTHE.-GENERAL SCOTT.-MILITIA.— SMYTHE'S FAILURE.-NORTHERN ARMY.-GENERAL DEARBORN.— COLONEL DUANE.-END OF CAMPAIGN OF 1812.

My Historical Sketch will begin with the first session of the thirteenth Congress, May, 1813, when I took my seat; that I may tell only what I had occasion to know. But the events of 1813, '14, and '15 will not be so intelligible as if premised by some preliminary account of those of 1812. The first chapter having explained the causes and character of the war, this chapter will submit an outline of the belligerent operations of the six months of the first year after its declaration.

To conquer Canada was the promise and reliance of those who made war against orders in council and impressment. Nothing could be done by sea, as was supposed; and one of the embarrassments of the advocates of war was, that while defensive against maritime aggressions, it must take the appearance and bear the odium of being aggressive, for foreign conquest. This false position was especially a hindrance, as the constituted authorities and majority of the people of the New England states were opposed to the war, and denounced the invasion of Canada as its worst direction and effort. Its advantages and disadvantages were then fully discussed; expatiation on them now since the design came to nothing, would be useless. A more important historical consideration is, whether our plan of invasion was not wrong; beginning with blows aimed at the branches instead of striking at once at the root of English territorial and naval power in America.

A project was then presented by a very young American officer, whose name will occur often hereafter in connection with the most brilliant feats of arms. A project was presented to

Eustis, the Secretary of War, which he put aside with the rather contemptuous remark, that it was a very pretty plan. It predicated the enemy's resistless control of the ocean; and the probability that Napoleon's gigantic domination by land was tottering to its fall. To meet Great Britain's superior force, then triumphant everywhere, the United States had but the skeletons of a few regiments, and a few frigates. The American sea-coast would soon be entirely blockaded, while our land operations during the first year of hostilities must be left chiefly to volunteers and militia. How then should we make what force we had be most effectually felt? Study of naval power shows that it does not depend on ships but on seamen, that the nurseries of seamen are commerce and fisheries; the naval marine depends on the commercial. In both the United States are second only to Great Britain, with advantages of position which with energetic action would enable them to neutralize, if not destroy her transatlantic ascendency. France, when she possessed the north-eastern coasts of America and adjacent islands, employing thirty thousand seamen in the fisheries and the trade they nourished, was a full match for England at sea. At that time the American colonies fitted out an expedition which besieged and took Louisburg, on cape Breton, finally exchanged for Madras at the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle. At last, however, France lost those possessions, and with them the trident of the ocean passed into the hands of Great Britain. North American territories and fisheries are the main pillar of British naval power. With Nova Scotia and cape Breton to protect the Canadas, command Newfoundland and the gulf St. Lawrence fisheries, Great Britain is an insular fortress with these (and numerous other) outworks from which to project ships of war, like missile weapons, upon the wings of every wind, with which to strike any quarter of the X globe. Hemp and ship timber for her navy she may get from her North American colonies, as well as from the north of Europe; with her American fisheries and possessions, she can build, man, equip, rig, arm, and refit her fleets altogether from her own means. Bermuda is another outwork, by means of which Mexico is controlled, a nation that never can be naval. While the United States act on the policy of not interfering with foreign nations, Great Britain, with Halifax in the North-East, and Bermuda in the South, can put the Mexicans, the Indians,