K. Attempts to eject Separatists from public buildings checked by French intervention. At Bonn, 25th October, 1923 (White Book, No. 7, No. 18). At Coblenz (White Book, No. 18). At Speyer, 11th November, 1923 (White Book, No. 18). At Lauterecken, January 1924 (The Times, 26th and 28th January, 1924). λ. Pressure brought to bear by French authorities upon German officials to carry out their work under the Separatist régime. At Coblenz, 26th October, 1923 (White Book, No. 7). At Trier, 24th October, 1923 (White Book, No. 7). At Diez, 29th October, 1923 (White Book, No. 7, No. 18). At Kirchheimbolanden [Palatinate] (White Book, No. 8). In the Palatinate (White Book, No. 13, No. 16). At Kreuznach (White Book, No. 18). p. Free railway passes and free ration indents granted to Separatists. με At Trier (White Book, No. 7). In the Palatinate (White Book, No. 13, No. 16). At Wiesbaden (White Book, No. 18). At Landau (White Book, No. 18). In the Palatinate (Yellow Book, pp. 23-4). Ration Indents (Yellow Book, pp. 24-5). Facsimiles of Régie railway passes for Separatists (Heidelberg Documents, III, pp. 21-3). v. Separatist Notyeld. At Meyen and Andernach (White Book, No. 9). At Kreuznach, 31st October, 1923 (Yellow Book, p. 26). . Expulsions and deportations by the Separatists with French connivance. At Trier [with actual assistance of French gendarmes] (White Book, No. 7). In the Palatinate (White Book, No. 13, No. 18). Facsimiles of expulsion orders (Heidelberg Documents, III, p. 31). o. Criminal elements in the Separatists ranks. White Book, No. 18. Yellow Book, p. 6. Heidelberg Documents, III, p. 28. Schwaab, the Separatist Commissary at Pirmasens (The Times, 6th Feb ruary, 1924). (iv) The Negotiations between the Powers from the 2nd May to the 19th September, 1923. While the German people and Government were replying to the Franco-Belgian invasion of the Ruhr by the 'direct action' which has been described in Section (ii), Germany twice took the initiative in reopening the diplomatic discussion of the Reparation Problem which had been broken off at the Paris Conference of the 2nd-4th January, in the hope that a solution on this plane might bring the struggle in the Ruhr to an end on tolerable conditions. During these negotiations Belgium, without retreating from the stand which she had taken by the side of France on the 6th-9th January, made an attempt to bring France and Great Britain together.1 Although, for reasons already explained, the Belgian statesmen had decided to maintain their solidarity with France even at the cost of following where M. Poincaré's policy led them, they regarded the occupation of the Ruhr as a temporary means to a limited end; they were conscious that the reconstitution of the Western Entente' was almost as necessary as the individual support of France for the permanent security of their country; and they were also aware of the damage which Belgium would suffer if she were to alienate 2 1 For an authoritative account of Belgium's attitude towards her two West European Allies from the time of the peace settlement down to the eve of the London Conference of the 16th July-16th August, 1924, see the translation (reprinted from the Journal of the British Institute of International Affairs) of a paper read to the Institute on the 27th May, 1924, by M. Jaspar, particularly the following passage: The Belgian post-war Governments have constantly striven to prevent the end of the Western Entente during the various negotiations and conferences which took place after the signature of the Peace Treaty. They never aspired to play a part disproportionate to their importance; they never said, as some publicists and critics have done, that they acted as arbiters and mediators when their friends did not agree. It would have been childish. But they endeavoured, conscientiously and loyally, to keep their friends together, and they endeavoured, often laboriously and sometimes successfully, to suggest conciliatory solutions.' M. Jaspar proceeded to support this claim by a number of illustrations taken from the history of the preceding four years. For a Belgian criticism of the policy, here expounded by M. Jaspar, see the report (in Le Temps, 18th January, 1924) of a speech delivered on the 16th January, 1924, in the Belgian Senate, by M. Ch. Maquette (Lib.). This was emphasized in the following passage in a note, dated the 17th May, 1923, from the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Belgian Ambassador in Paris: 'L'occupation de la Ruhr par le Gouvernment belge n'a jamais été qu'un moyen de pression aux fins d'obtenir paiement des réparations allemandes. Ni directement ni indirectement en termes exprès ou tacitement nous ne pourrions admettre que le caractère en soit dénaturé. Il en serait ainsi, notamment, si elle devait se prolonger au delà du temps nécessaire à l'obtention du but que nous avons poursuivi.' (Belgian Grey Book, Doc. 23; see also Doc. 30, concluding paragraph.) the public opinion of the world by gaining a reputation for intransigence.1 This effort failed because the resumption of diplomatic correspondence which Germany had initiated and Belgium had promoted led M. Poincaré and Lord Curzon to enunciate the opposing French and British views with greater precision and vehemence than before, so that the immediate effect was to widen the diplomatic gulf without contributing to the pacification of the Ruhr. The correspondence did, however, give vent to the suggestion for an Expert Committee (other than the Reparation Commission, though its relations with that body remained to be defined) and thus provided a starting-point for the next diplomatic overtures, which were attended with better success.2 The negotiations were opened by a note from Germany to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and Belgium dated the 2nd May,3 in which she made new proposals for a general settlement of the Reparation Problem, though without abandoning her juridical standpoint or renouncing passive resistance, which would be continued until the districts occupied beyond the terms of the Versailles Treaty had been evacuated and a legal state of affairs had been re-established in the Rhineland.' Subject to this reservation, and to the observation that her credit could not be restored without a foreign loan, Germany now suggested that her total Reparation liability should be fixed at thirty milliard marks (gold) to be raised by the flotation of loans, on ordinary conditions, on the international market-twenty milliards by the 1st July, 1927, five more by the 1st July, 1929, and the last five by the 1st July, 1931. Interest up to the 1st July, 1927, was to be paid out of the capital raised in the first issue; any balance of the twenty milliards not covered was to be funded at 5 per cent. interest and 1 per cent. sinking fund ; and if it were found impossible to raise the two subsequent instalments on normal conditions, an impartial international commission' (to consist either of the consortium which had advanced the first twenty milliards, or of a committee of international business 1 Belgian Grey Book, Docs. 19 and 30. 2 The history of the Expert Committees, from the British note of the 12th October, 1923, onwards, is dealt with in Section (v), below. 3 Text in Belgian Grey Book, Doc. 20: As early as April 13th, 1923, that is to say, three months after the entry into the Ruhr, they [i.e. the Belgian Government] tried to reach an understanding with the French Government with a view to obtaining from the French and Belgian delegations on the Reparation Commission a plan which could be submitted to her English and Italian Allies, and which might form the basis of a common answer to Germany on the day when the latter should end her resistance.' (M. Jaspar, loc. cit., p. 10.) men on which Germany was to be represented on a footing of equality, or of representatives of the German Government and the Reparation Commission with a third member to be appointed, in the last resort, by the President of the United States) was to determine 'whether, when, and how' the balance was to be raised, and 'whether, when, and how' the interest was eventually to be paid on the first twenty milliards. There were also to be deliveries in kind; and this offer represented Germany's maximum capacity; but in case of doubt she was willing to submit the entire Reparation Problem to an international commission independent of every political influence'. She would negotiate with the proposed international consortium and with the Reparation Commission for the assignment of specific guarantees. The offer depended, however, on the stabilization of the German currency (a step which would incidentally safeguard other industrial countries against unfair German competition); upon the violent seizure of pledges and application of sanctions being ruled out for the future; upon the earliest possible restoration of unity of administration' for the whole of Germany; and upon the suppression of the provisions in the Versailles Treaty for the penalization of Germany in international trade. Negotiations must start from the restoration of the status quo ante, which would involve that the districts occupied beyond the terms of the Versailles Treaty should be evacuated, a legal state of affairs in the Rhineland re-established, imprisoned German citizens released, and expelled persons reinstated in their places of residence and in their official positions '.1 On the 6th May France and Belgium rejected these German proposals in an identic note,2 in which they maintained that passive resistance in the Ruhr was not spontaneous but had been 'willed and organized' by the German Government; declared that they 'would be unable to consider any German proposals so long as this resistance continued'; and announced that in any case the present proposals were totally unacceptable from several points of view'. The figures suggested were inadequate; the Reparation Commission could not be superseded by any kind of international committee; the reference to specific guarantees was itself vague and obscure. France and Belgium had decided that they would only evacuate the newly-occupied territories in proportion as payments were 6 1 The question of French security was also reopened by a proposal for a Franco-German treaty to introduce compulsory arbitration. 2 Belgian Grey Book, Doc. 22. effected. They saw no reason to modify this resolution', and they could not refrain from observing 'that the German note, from beginning to end, is nothing but the scarcely-veiled expression of a systematic revolt against the Treaty of Versailles'. In less energetic terms, these German proposals of the 2nd May were also rejected by Great Britain and Italy on the 13th and by Japan on the 15th; but the British Government took occasion to invite the German Government to make a fresh offer, and, in anticipation of this, the Belgian Government prepared 'three studies relative to the Reparation Problem examined in its relations with the financial capacity of Germany', which it submitted to the French Government on the 24th May. The first of these studies 2 discussed the receipts which might be realized, for the benefit of the Powers entitled to Reparation, by farming out to private capitalists the exploitation of the German State Railways and the monopoly of certain articles of consumption, and by resuming deliveries of Reparation coal, after the German currency had been stabilized and the Budget balanced under a moratorium. The second study 3 suggested in a more tentative way the participation of the Reparation Commission in the profits of German private business enterprises; and the third was an attempt to demonstrate that the diversion to Reparation account of the sources of German public revenue envisaged in the two preceding studies would not necessarily prevent the German Budget from balancing. 4 In a note dated the 7th June 5 Germany duly addressed a fresh series of proposals to those Powers to whom she had circulated the proposals of the 2nd May. This new German memorandum started with the proposition that the question of Germany's capacity to pay was after all a question of fact', and with an offer' to furnish all the materials for a trustworthy estimate of German capacity '. The German Government would permit, on demand, a full inspection of the public financial administration and would give all information that might be called for in regard to the resources of Germany's national economic life'. One of the criticisms contained in the Franco-Belgian note of the 6th May was met this time by a definite offer of specific guarantees. The State Railways should 1 Belgian Grey Book, Doc. 24; Jaspar, loc. cit., 2 Belgian Grey Book, Doc. 30, Annex 1. 3 Doc. cit., Annex 2. p. 11. 4 Doc. cit., Annex 3. 5 Belgian Grey Book, Doc. 27; British White Paper, Correspondence with the Allied Governments respecting Reparation Payments by Germany (Cmd. 1943 of 1923), Doc. 1. |