How pleasant, in another hour,
Our wand'ring there will be!
When the dim ships, like shadows, ride
Over the star-lit sea.

When sailing in the deep blue heav'n,
The moon, like a young bride,
Comes timid, as she fear'd to claim
Her empire o'er the tide.

Then, to return from the white cliffs,
Where winds and waters beat,
How shall we love the leaves and flow'rs
Of our own calm retreat!

We should be happy ;--yet let all
Sweet dreams, like these, depart :
It matters not whate'er his lot,-
Love's home is in the heart.

TO CLARINDA

Oн, that I were a Seer of old,
And could futurity unfold,

L. E. L.

Thy life should be my earliest theme,
Thy fate my first prophetic dream,
Should Happiness await thee here,
Of joy and bliss a bright career,
I'd bid the maiden to be wise,
And use each moment ere it flies.
But o'er thy head should sorrow pend,
And grief upon thy years attend,
I'd bid thee resignation learn,

And smile, like patience, o'er the urn.
And as it is, I warn thee now,
That flatterers will around thee bow,
And heartless friends with guileful vows,
May fill thy cup of life with woes.
On the world's praises do not smile,
Nor listen to the voice of guile,
And, as you fear to meet despair,
Of Flattery's honied tongue beware.

BEPPO.

ON MATTERS OF OPINION.

UNDER this head may be classed all topics of a speculative nature, on which neither mankind at large, nor éven men of learning, can be expected generally to agree, and on which most persons of ordinary capacity and moderate information may be supposed in some measure competent to form a judgment. Theology, for instance, history, civil and natural philosophy, morals, and metaphysics, politics, political economy, legislation, the fine arts, literature, criticism, and the like, may all be regarded as matters of opinion. In none of these, can we say of their principles generally, that they are susceptible of certainty; they do not admit of absolute proof; they are speculative, nay, sometimes, positively imaginary; and, at best, depend only on the correct exertion of the reasoning faculty, which will be different in different men.

The absurd extent to which deference to authority has been sometimes carried on these subjects, is one of the first things that strikes the attention. Many are the occasions on which the use of the reasoning powers has been absolutely suspended. Some great man has promulgated certain opinions; he was profoundly versed in the subject; therefore it was concluded he must be right. On no better foundation have hundreds and thousands of persons, nay, whole nations, taken upon trust the most erroneous notions, and persevered in them with the utmost pertinacity. To presume to think differently, was heresy; to exercise the reason that heaven gave, was arrogance. What! could it be possible for so great a man to err, and to be followed in his error, if it were so, by such a multitude? Never. The dissentient individual must be wrong, and it has sometimes been his misfortune to atone for his error either with his liberty or his life. The condemnation of Socrates, and the persecution of Galileo, are apt examples. Great advances in knowledge and liberality have, it is true, been made in modern times; yet nothing is more common, even now, than to meet with

those who have no better reason to give for their opinions, than that they were entertained by some distinguished character. Such was the opinion of Luther or Calvin, of Milton or Locke, of Paley or Adam Smith; and shall we presume to be wiser than they? Persons of this sort do not seem to be aware that the profession of different opinions on a particular subject is no assumption of general superiority, and that it is perfectly possible for one of very inferior understanding and acquirements to be right on some points, on which person of far superior intellect may be wrong, or of which, perhaps, he may be wholly ignorant. They forget, also, that the great men whose opinions they are so ready to take on trust, did not rise to eminence by that servile sort of conduct, but by maturely investigating, and freely questioning, when necessary, the sentiments of their predecessors; by pursuing, in short, the middle course between scepticism and credulity, neither calling in question every opinion they met with, nor admitting it, without inquiry, as an indubitable truth.

But, however manifest may be the absurdity of sacrificing the freedom of our minds on the altar of authority, however degrading to the dignity of the human intellect, and however calculated to establish us in error, and to mislead us in our search for truth; many there are, and many, it is to be feared, there always will be, for whom a great and venerable name has, on some account or other, such charms, that they find it impossible to resist its influence.

The causes of this are various. One of the most conspicuous is mental indolence, an evil of great extent, and productive of incalculable mischief. The assertion may, at first, appear somewhat paradoxical; but it is nevertheless true, that, though the human mind possesses a certain disposition to activity, it is for the most part disinclined to vigorous exertion. There is a great difference between exercise and labour, whether mental or bodily; and, as every one must know by his own experience, his mind may be occupied and em

ployed, without being obliged to undergo that intellectual toil, which, in profound reflection, or close reasoning, it is impossible to avoid. Now it is so much easier and pleasanter to acquiesce in the sentiments of a distinguished author, than it is to oppose, or even to investigate them, that it cannot be a matter of wonder, though it may of regret, that so many should wrap themselves up in the convenient cloak of affected humility, but real sloth, instead of endeavouring to ascend the same hill, of which the summit has been reached by the objects of their admiration.

Another cause of excessive deference to authority, is mental cowardice. Some persons are so afraid of any thing in the shape of opposition, especially if attended with the remotest semblance of general disapprobation, that they will shrink from the avowal of an unfashionable sentiment, or of a difference of opinion with an author of celebrity, as they would from the grossest breach of propriety or decorum. They seem to confound ability with infallibility; at least, they act and speak as if they thought that one who is often right could be never wrong; that because a person is possessed of genius and talent, those qualities must be always called forth upon every occasion; or that, whenever they are exerted, it must invariably be with the same degree of efficiency and success. But can it be any reason that we should acquiesce implicitly in all the sentiments of a man, because they are generally good? By no means. Let every one think for himself-soberly, indeed, but freely; and let him dare to communicate what he has laboured to attain.

Additional causes may be found in vanity, which assumes a variety of forms, and is frequently seen to exhibit an affectation of learning. Perhaps no praises are more gratifying than those which tend to exalt the person praised in his own opinion; and none are more calculated to produce that effect, than those which relate to mental excellence. Personal strength, or beauty, power, wealth, or magnificence, are adventitious qualities, more attributable to chance than to

merit. But acquirements of an intellectual nature imply qualities in their possessor of a more praiseworthy kind, and such as claim a species of reverence, if not greater in degree, at least proceeding from more dignified motives, and more exalted feelings. Power, wealth, or beauty, unaccompanied by mental talent, may be, and frequently is, compelled to feel its own insignificance; but he whose intellect is vigorous by nature, and has been improved by art and cultivation, and is refined and embellished by delicate and noble sensibilities, is as far superior to those whose recommendations are merely of an external nature, as that which is intellectual must ever be to what is merely corporeal. It is therefore easy to account for the readiness with which some persons pay their homage to the authority of illustrious characters. To be acquainted with their writings, confers a reputation for learning and taste, to some extent, at least. But grant that their principles are erroneous, and the value of the acquisition is destroyed. Hence, it becomes indispensable to maintain the accuracy of their opinions, and to defer to them implicitly upon all occasions. This tends to strengthen the belief of their excellence, and to raise the character of those whose reputation, as men of understanding or intelligence, depends merely on the display of these borrowed plumes, in which they delight to shine.

Sometimes, perhaps, an extreme deference for authority may proceed from a very different temper of mind. There are individuals, though it is believed their number is but small, who really think so humbly of themselves, that they are ready to give up their opinions to every one by whom they may be called in question. Such persons naturally regard it as the height of arrogance, to doubt the truth of what has been advanced by those whom, on account of their fearning or genius, are justly regarded as the benelactors of mankind. They accordingly pay to mere human authority, a degree of deference due only to that which is divine. They concern themselves merely