and his lordship's is by no means a solitary instance of correct decisions unsupported by substantial proof.

The argument cannot, from its length, be transferred to your pages. His lordship, however, is of opinion, not merely that a double sense has not been shewn to exist; but, further, that its existence never can be shewn: that since the secondary sense is not the literal one, it cannot be discovered by human ingenuity. "That there is no system whatever by which we can establish the existence of secondary senses; or by which, on the supposition of their existence, we can discover their real meaning*.' But "in whatever case a passage of the Old Testament, which according to its strict and literal sense relates to some earlier event in the Jewish history, is yet applied by Christ, or an Apostle of Christ, to what happened in their days; and moreover so applied, as to indicate that the passage is prophetic: of such passage we must conclude, on their authority, that besides its plain and primary sense, it has also a remote or secondary sense. The difficulties which no human system can remove are, in such cases, removed by Divine power: the discoveries which human reason attempts in vain, are there unfolded by Divine intelligence."

Why the learned prelate supposes that the difficulties are such as no human system can remove, may be thus briefly explained: Before the argument as to the accomplishment of any given prophecy can be entertained, it is necessary to prove that the prophecy itself exists; or, in other words, that the passage in question was designed to be prophetic. Now if we consider the peculiar character of prophecy in a secondary sense, we shall find that the existence of every such prophecy must be established before we can begin to argue about its accomplishment. And to conduct Lectures on the Interpretation of the

Bible. Lect. X. Camb. 1828.

such an argument is not quite so easy as many writers have imagined; for when we attempt to discover a secondary sense, we go further than the words, the literal sense, the grammatical analysis, will carry us. And if we say that a prophecy relating, in a secondary sense, for example, to the Messiah, may be understood by us because we have the advantage of having seen its accomplishment, we argue, though unconsciously, from a petitio principii. (pp. 444. 8. 6.)

The learned professor of divinity has, I think, been misled in this reasoning by the circumstance of his dislike of hypothesis. There is, however, a legitimate use of hypothesis perfectly consistent with the utmost severity of inductive argument.

There is a wide difference between conjecture used as the basis of argument, and conjecture employed as the ultimate solution of a difficulty: the former is always to be admitted; the latter to be as constantly opposed. Now the case before us is this: I meet with a certain passage which, it may be on very slight grounds, I take to be prophetic in a primary or a secondary sense; for that is a point which does not affect the argument; the question is, How am I to satisfy myself? Surely I may be allowed to compare the supposed prediction with events which have since occurred and is it not possible that I may find some one which so perfectly fulfils the terms of the supposed prophecy, that I cannot entertain a doubt but that the one was intended to foretel the other. Is it not now at least a reasonable conclusion, that the coincidence was designed; that is, that the words in question were really prophetic ? The probability that they are so will vary with the degree of accuracy with which their presumed fulfilment can be traced: but, to say the least, it is possible that I may discover an event so exactly described, and that in every minute circumstance, as to leave me assured

on a very high, not to say the highest, degree of probable evidence, that I was right in my conjecture; and that the passage before me is a prophecy fulfilled. Nor do I think that it can be fairly said, that as a general rule -the advocates of the double sense "go further in their attempts to discover the secondary meaning than the words, the literal sense, the grammatical analysis, will carry them." This inay be the case sometimes; perhaps in a majority of instances: but if it is not always the case, it proves nothing against the system. The Prophet Isaiah (chap. Ixv.) describes the introduction of the Gospel dispensation under the figure of a new heavens and a new earth, wherein dwelleth righteousness. (2 Pet. iii. 13.) Now if we apply this, as St. Peter has done, to the spiritual kingdom of heaven, the words carry us just as far as if we confine the accomplishment to the promulgation of the Gospel. In either sense, the interpretation is equally clear: in fact, it is the same in both.

I cannot, then, avail myself of the high critical authority of Bishop Marsh. The possibility of ascertaining the secondary sense-supposing it to exist-I see no reason to dispute that it has actually, in any one instance, been discovered, I see as little reason to admit. If the subject were not involved, in the minds of many persons, in a most unreasonable prejudice, I should be satisfied with simply leaving it before your readers to be decided by one experiment. Let an instance be produced in which a prediction -fulfilled already in one sense has actually disclosed another sense in which it is again in a course of fulfilment. This will be a short and a sufficient answer to every objection and I, for one, shall be grateful for the removal of my doubts.

To those who hold the double interpretation, this will, no doubt, appear to be an easy task. If it

be, I trust that some of your readers will at once accomplish it; and thus afford a triumphant refutation to my objections. to my objections. But if a judgment may be formed from the success which has accompanied the attempts of Horsley, and of Hurd, it is a task which, though frequently attempted, has not yet been satisfactorily performed. I mention the names of these two learned prelates, because they have both attempted the removal of the difficulties which attend the twofold system of interpretation: each has attempted it on different grounds: both, I venture to affirm, have failed: and the mistakes of each of them are those not merely of the individuals themselves, but of large classes of interpreters.

66

1. Bishop Horsley, advancing to the charge with his usual confidence, maintains, not merely that he has discovered two senses, but that he has "found in holy writ a plain instance of a prophecy which bears more than a double meaning; one that has various accomplishments, in events of various kinds, in various ages of the world." It was not without much surprise that I discovered that, after all these strong assertions, his lordship had, in fact, either misunderstood the exact point of debate; or else had unconsciously shifted his ground in the course of his argument; and thus brought out a result, true indeed and of great importance, but without the slightest reference to the question which he undertook to set at rest.

The prediction which he brings forward with so much alleged certainty, is that which fell from the expiring lips of Noah: "Cursed be Canaan; a servant of servants shall he be unto his brethren." This prophecy, he maintains, had its accomplishment, of which there cannot be a doubt, in numerous events; in the triumphs of Rome, in Asia, and Africa; in the conquests of Alexander; and in the incursions of Scythians into the possessions of

Shem. "The application," he adds, "of the prophecy to any one of these events, bears all the characteristics of a true interpretation. Every one of these events must therefore pass with a believer for a true completion."

Undoubtedly it must: but by no means for an entire completion; for an accomplishment so full and perfect as to admit of no additional circumstance. Had the question been, Whether any prophecy were so constructed as to admit of a gradual fulfilment; not confined to one event, but extending through a multitude; then, indeed, his lordship's case would have been in point, and his argument complete. But the question of a double sense is totally distinct from this. It is not, Whether, on the one hand, a prediction is by its nature incapable of embracing more than one distinct and specific object; or, whether, on the other, it may extend through a long course of years, and point out a succession of events, all tending to one point, all centered in one purpose. No. The question of a double sense is this: Whether a prophecy fulfilled in one sense, looks forward to another accomplishment in a sense entirely new; utterly independent of the former sense; not bearing on the same point, nor forming a part of the same dispensation, nor referring to the same general design. Such are the prophecies to which a double sense is given by the writers of the New Testament; but such are not the prophecies brought forward by Bishop Horsley, and other interpreters of the same class. When, for instance, St. Matthew applies to the slaughter of the innocents a prediction which had already been accomplished in the circumstances which attended the invasion of Nebuzar-adan, there is no connection between the two events; no common interest by which they are united they are-for any thing that we can possibly discover—

Sermon XVII. on 2 Peter i. 20.

as unconnected as any two events which the world has ever witnessed. But in Noah's prediction, all this is exactly inverted. The fall of Carthage and the conquests of Alexander are links in the same chain : we are able to trace a unity of purpose. For what was the object of the prediction?-To foretell the fortunes of Shem and Canaan throughout every age of time: that is, to include, and to point out every event in every age by which the humiliation of the one, and the superiority of the other, were to be maintained. Lord Bacon has been quoted as an advocate for the double sense of prophecy. I am persuaded that, in this respect, injustice has been done to his memory. "The springing and germinant accomplishment," of which he speaks*, is no other than the gradual completion we trace in such prophecies as this of the patriarch Noah.

2. Bishop Hurd is equally confused and unsatisfactory. His illustration of the double sense of prophecy is, I think, a sufficient proof that upon that one interesting point he has not reasoned with his usual clearness. Your readers are no doubt acquainted with it. He makes the supposition, that about the time of Romulus, a series of prophets had been commissioned to foretell the future splendour of Rome under its consular government; but that God, having determined to place the Roman nation for a while under the yoke of regal government, had also instructed his prophets to predict the wars and other occurrences of that period of their history. Would it surprise us, then, he asks, "if the prophets, in dilating on this part of their scheme, should, in a secondary sense, predict the more splendid part of it? That, having the whole equally presented to their view, they should anticipate the glories of their free state, even in a prophecy which directly concerned their regal and • Advancement of Learning, quoted by Hurd. Vol. I. p. 66.

fold sense, which proceeds upon the air of dignity, splendour, and profoundness, which it is supposed to throw over the word of God. For it would be just as easy, and in my opinion quite as forcible, to advance on the other hand, that the simplicity of a single interpretation is more conducive to the true dignity of the Divine Author of prophecy than any complication of meanings. But neither the one nor the other of these considerations ought to weigh with the inquirer. I fear they alike indicate some wish to avoid the offence of the Cross. They are alike improper, when applied to a Book which is altogether Divine, and which stands in need of no other commendation. And after all -to use the simple, but expressive, language of Butler-the Bible is what it is. We can add nothing to its splendour: nor should the attempt be made. It becomes us rather to be satisfied with truth in its simplest form,- that form in which it most frequently appears; and to "receive with meekness the engrafted word, which is able to save our souls."

I. B. M.

ON THE DOCTRINE OF TWO

RESURRECTIONS.

Tothe Editorofthe Christian Observer.

I WISH to call the attention of your readers to an article in the First Number of "The Morning Watch," upon the first resurrection. It is not my intention to enter upon the subject of two resurrections, of the just and the unjust, the one antecedent to the other. My object is only to notice the incorrect manner in which the sacred text is cited in that paper; a proceeding not allowable, whether employed in defence of a truth or of an untruth.

The author endeavours to prove the two resurrections from two distinct modes of expression, which he says are adopted in the New Testa

ment when speaking of the resurrection. I shall put the argument in his own words. "It appears," he says, "to have escaped the notice of many readers of Scripture, that there are two distinct modes of expression adopted in the New Testament; each of which has its appropriate use, and which does not admit of being interchanged with the other. The expressions we refer to are η αναστασις εκ των νεκρών the resurrection from [from out of] the dead and η αναστασις των νεκρων, the resurrection of the dead.

The former expression, we are prepared to maintain, is applicable exclusively to the resurrection of the saints, and could not be used to express the idea of a general resurrection." (p. 63.)

Will it be believed, that of these two expressions on which this argument is built the first never occurs in any copy of the New Testament which I have seen? I have examined the places referred to in the subsequent part of the paper, in seven different editions of the Greek Testament, and in none of them do I find αναστασις εκ των νεκρων even once used. I at first thought that there might have been in p. 63, an error of the press, and that the article Twv, might have been introduced by the mistake of the printer: but I find the same expression again in p. 67 and p. 68. The expression used in the New Testament is, αναστασις εκ νεκρών, not

εκ των νεκρων.

Perhaps it may be said, that the omission or introduction of the article makes no difference in the argument; and that the distinction between αναστασις εκ νεκρών, and avaσraσiç vεкpwv, equally proves two resurrections. This would not justify a wrong quotation of the text. But I deny that the omission or introduction of the article makes no difference in the argument. I admit the force of the author's argument, on the supposition that the article is inserted; but I deny it if the article be left out. I may