brother; and had made that acquisition before any one suspected it in the slightest degree. He made a prodigious advance in mechanics while he was a farmer's boy, without any instructor, or the help of any one book. Of an evening, after he had brought home the sheep, he employed himself in contemplating the stars; and began the study of astronomy, by laying down, from his own observation only, a celestial globe: in these observations and occupations he was discovered, and introduced to public notice.

The famous Buxton had not the slightest recollection when his passion for numbers began. His attention was, from the earliest times of his life, so constantly fixt upon arithmetic, that he frequently, when a child, took no cognisance of external objects; and when he did, it was only of their numbers. If any space of time. was mentioned, he immediately reduced it to seconds; if any person mentioned that he had been travelling so many miles, Buxton told him the number of hair'sbreadths he had been over. At church, he found it quite impossible to attend to the meaning of what the clergyman said, but he knew exactly of how many words, syllables, and letters, the sermon consisted. It

is very difficult to ascribe such instances as these to any other cause than the mere love of knowledge itself; but in general, it is the instrument of some other desire at first, -till at last, by the customary process of association, it becomes to be loved on its own account. The desire of knowledge in any people begins from the love of novelty, is cherished by the love of utility, and then principally encouraged by the fame and distinction to which it leads. Curiosity would be the first motive in a savage, to examine the arms and instruments of Europeans; a consciousness of their utility would increase this desire; and, in process of time, the distinctions obtained by inventors and improvers of these things, would be the most customary incitement to the

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cultivation of knowledge. Nothing can be more important to the welfare of a community, than the wide extension of rational curiosity in the desire of knowledge; it not only increases the comforts, enlivens the feelings, and improves the faculties of man, but it forms the firmest barrier against the love of pleasure, and stops the progress of corruption. Every nation has its chances for happiness increased, in proportion as it honours and rewards a spirit which, above all things, honours and rewards it.

The strongest of all our desires, seems to be the desire of esteem. It is the cause of innumerable other desires: it is the frequent cause (as I have before said) of the love of knowledge: it is the cause, very often, of the love of wealth; for no man, I presume, who lived in a desert, and moved about without a single soul to look at him, would care what sort of a coat he wore, provided he was kept from the cold; or whether he eat out of earthenware, or silver, provided his meat was kept out of the dirt. In the same way, the love of power may be traced to it; not but that there exists a love of power, quite independent of it, but that men very often love power, only for the additional esteem they gain from it among their fellow-creatures. The love of life perpetually gives way to the love of esteem; men are shot, and hacked to pieces, from the hope of gaining esteem, or the fear of losing it. Upon this subject of the desire of esteem, there are two opinions which require consideration; the one of Dr. Adam Smith, the other of Mr. Hume. "We are not content," says the former of these writers," with praise, unless we deserve "it; nor are we content with deserving it, unless we "obtain it." It is probable, therefore, that there are two original principles in the human mind: the one, the love of praise; the other, the love of praiseworthiness. In the same manner, we are not easy when we are blamed, even though we deserve it; nor are we easy

to deserve it, even though we are not blamed: therefore, here the double principle is observable, first, the dread of blame; next, the dread of blameworthiness. The opinion of Mr. Hume is, that there is no love of the esteem of others, except as that esteem enables us to esteem ourselves: that the thing wanted is selfapprobation; and the praise of others is only important as it is a means of gratifying this feeling.

In the first place, what, in a mere 'moral point of view, is meant by self-approbation? (Put religion out of the question for a moment.) Examine, in a mere human point of view, what passes in your own mind when you approve yourself. It is really nothing more, than that pleasure which results from the esteem of all honest and reflecting men. When you are universally blamed, though you know you have done right, you always comfort yourself that the world would have determined otherwise, had they been acquainted with all the circumstances, and informed of the real motives. You refer the matter to a more enlightened tribunal, or to posterity: you do not pretend to set up your own selfapprobation, against the judgment of others; but you approve yourself, merely because you say, better men, more enlightened men, and more impartial men, would have decided in a very different manner. Therefore, I cannot see how self-esteem, and the desire of the esteem of others, can be compared together: for, called upon to define self-esteem, I could say nothing else of it than that it was that agreeable feeling which proceeds from the belief that we possess, or that we ought to possess, the esteem of others. Then again, it is very true, that we love praise, and we love to deserve praise; but the love of praiseworthiness is merely a consequence of the love of praise, -not an original principle. To make my meaning the more clear, I will put this case:- A great battle is gained, the plan and dispositions of which are admirable; the general who conducted the

army, is considered as a consuminate master of the military art, and arrives at the very summit of reputation as an accomplished officer; but this plan of the battle was drawn out for him the evening before, by one of his aides-de-camp, whose original conception it was, and to whom all the merit is really due. Which is the most enviable situation? His, who is praised without being praiseworthy; or his, who is praiseworthy without being praised? Nobody' here could entertain a moment's doubt about the matter, that the praiseworthiness is preferable to the praise. But why? Merely from the love of praise; merely because it, in the end, procures more praise. A miser may refuse a sum of money, because, by so doing, in the end he may gain a greater: his reputation is worth more to him than the sum which he is offered for it; he does not love reputation better than money, but he loves reputation merely because he loves money. Just so with praiseworthiness: it grows out of the love of praise, and is only preferred to it at any particular time, because, by that temporary preference, it is probable more praise, in the end, will be obtained; at last, like every other preference, it grows into a habit.

The desire of power, I cannot better describe than in the words of Mr. Dugald Stewart. I quote from his "Outlines of Moral Philosophy;" and his views upon this subject appear to be so truly excellent, that I shall quote them at some length:

"Whenever we are led to consider ourselves as the "authors of any effect, we feel a sensible pride or exul"tation in the consciousness of power; and the pleasure "is, in general, proportioned to the greatness of the "effect, compared to the smallness of the exertion.

"The infant, while still on the breast, delights in "exerting its little strength upon every object it meets "with; and is mortified, when any accident convinces "it of its imbecility. The pastimes of the boy are,

"almost without exception, such as suggest to him the "idea of his power:- and the same remark may be "extended to the active sports, and the athletic exer"cises, of youth and of manhood.

"As we advance in years, and as our animal powers "lose their activity and vigour, we gradually aim at "extending our influence over others, by the superiority "of fortune and of situation, or by the still more "flattering superiority of intellectual endowment: by "the force of our understanding, by the extent of our information, by the arts of persuasion, or the "accomplishments of address. What but the idea of power, pleases the orator, in the consciousness of his "eloquence; when he silences the reasons of others by superior ingenuity; bends to his purposes their desires "and passions; and, without the aid of force or the "splendour of rank, becomes the arbiter of the fate of "nations?

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"To the same principle we may trace, in part, the pleasure arising from the discovery of general theorems. Every such discovery puts us in possession "of innumerable particular truths, or particular facts; "and gives us a ready command of a great stock of "knowledge, to which we had not access before. The "desire of power, therefore, comes, in the progress of "reason and experience, to act as an auxiliary to our "instinctive desire of knowledge.

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"The idea of power is, partly at least, the foundation "of our attachment to property. It is not enough for us to have the use of an object. We desire to have it "completely at our own disposal; without being responsible to any person whatever.

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"Avarice is a particular modification of the desire of power; arising from the various functions of money in "a commercial country. Its influence as an active principle is much strengthened by habit and association. "The love of liberty proceeds, in part, from the same