as follows: in the article, "The Love of the Arts and Sciences," it is said, that

"The greater part of mankind honour letters as they do religion and virtue, that is to say, as a thing which they ne peuvent, can not understand, nor love, nor practice. These words can not, have offended some persons, and for that reason we have substituted the words, ne veulent, will not, in the printed errata at the end of the second volume; however, if it may be allowed us to represent to the timorous who have so easily taken an alarm, that the words ne pouvoir are not always taken in the sense of an absolute impossibility. There is not any one, Lord!' (says Mordecai in the book of Esther who can resist thy will? However, in truth, man being a free agent, can resist the will of God. Hence this passage should not be taken in the fullest extent of its meaning; why not then have supposed that the author of the proposition on that subject might have in view a more orthodox opinion? But it is needful to raise up against the work, truly good men, too commonly the dupes of those who only wish to appear so."

Now we think, and all the facts of sacred history will bear us through the opinion, that man, though a free agent, can not resist the will of God; we consider man only a free agent as in his several relations to his dominion over the creation of this world, and to his fellow-creature MAN; he is only left free as to his desires by the organization of his mind, the better to display his character, and that he may serve voluntarily the truth; but we believe that the mischievous will of man may be restrained, controuled, and prevented by the superior will of God working through the mysteriousness of his Providence. There is something impious in the thought, that the Supreme Being cannot direct nor controul the will of his creature man. May not the philosopher say, that it is owing to that power that we sometimes receive by our sensations direct intelligencies, which we combine and act upon as our own, by which we adopt insensibly the conformation and result of his will over that over our own? Thus was the bad heart of Pharaoh, made by Gon himself to resist the will of God himself, that his power in favour of the children of Israel might be manifested; and that they, obdurate and incredulous as they were, might see that the Almighty could perform the promises he made, and bring every thing about for the good of those he loved.

We recollect a beautiful passage, in a work where it would not be looked for, the Arabian Nights Entertainments, which very finely expresses this particular power of the Deity, "call upon the Almighty he will help thee, thou needst not perplex thyself about any thing else; shut thine eyes, and while that thou art asleep, he will change thy bad fortune into good;" and, indeed, without the hope of this direction, what beacon have the good to look to, in the voyage of human life?

To complete the system of his discourse, the philosopher next unfolds the remaining subjects of his Encyclopedia, Painting, Sculp

Gg 4

ture,

ture, Architecture, Poetry, and Music, being that share of the general division of science which is created by the imagination, and properly denominated the fine arts.

What follows of this admirable discourse of the philosopher D'Alembert, is a summary of the gradations of knowledge, to its arrival at its present state in the world, in which the author has occasion to mention the various philosophers, as well English as French, who have gone over the same scientific ground before him; and it is but doing him justice to say, that he very fairly appreciates the talents of each of those his fellow-labourers in the culture of the human understanding.

At the end of this discourse is the ingenious Chart of the Intelligencies of the Human Mind, under the general head of Knowledge, and the three grand divisions, Memory, Reason, and the Understanding. This chart is the workmanship of M. Diderot, and is very fairly stated to have owed its origin to the Tree of Knowledge of the illus trious Bacon.

The second volume of the author's works presents to us the Elements of Philosophy, wherein he developes the first principles of the several sciences on which he treats, in a way that deserves particular mention. Logic, metaphysics, morals, grammar, mathematics, geometry, mechanics, astronomy, &c. &c. are discussed in a style of clearness and precision that would engage even a reader unaccustomed to abstract studies, to a perusal of its pages, which contain more truths in a small space, than perhaps are to be found in most other works on science.The explications which accompany each separate treatise, are curious and even entertaining; in short, the whole of the Elements of Philosophy, which are on subjects suitably enough denominated by him difficult and uninteresting, derive from his style compichensiveness and ingenuity, a position of instruction both advantageous and acceptable to the reflecting mind, which would fain acquire the knowledge it seeks after, not only by the most direct and nearest road, but by that path which may not be altogether destitute of the scenery of science. We cannot enough recommend this course of elementary knowledge to the scholar in philosophy.

Logic is the first subject of this elementary treatise, and its explication is very ably conducted. The Art of Conjecture is distinguished by the author as divided into three branches; the first, the Analysis of Probabilities in the Game of Hazaid; the second, an Extension of that Analysis to different Questions relative to common Life: as that which applies to the Duration of the Existence of any Man, to the Price of Annuities, to Insurances, to Inoculation. The third branch has for its object the sciences wherein it is most rare or impossible to arrive at demonstration, and in which the Art of Conjecture is usetul, as Physics, History, Medicine, and the Science of the World, or the art of conducting ourselves with society so as to derive every possible advantage from it, without breaking through the obligations which for the good of all it necessarily imposes,

In this treatise on the Art of Conjecture, is the very flattering com pliment paid by our author to the great Frederic of Prussia. In a voyage which the author made to Wesel, whither he had been sent for by that King, after the peace of 1763, the Monarch, after embracing him affectionately, demanded, Whether the mathematics furnish any means of calculating probabilities in politics? The geometrician answered with more politeness than belongs to our English geometricians," that he did not know of any method of arriving at that object through the mathematics; but that if there did exist one, the hero who had put the question, had rendered it no longer of use." We shall take notice of a curious explication of the author's on the subject of Usury, contained in the section of MORALS in his elementary treatise, both for its novelty, and the unexpected truth of calculation which it conveys, that if compound interest is more burthensome to a debtor than simple interest, when the debtor discharges the loan after the time when the interest is first made payable, compound interest, on the contrary, is more favourable to the debtor when he can pay it off before that time. It has the following note.

"To make this observation as plain as possible to our readers, suppose any one to lend to another a sum of money at 3 for interest per year that exorbitant usury could never doubtless be allowed of in morality, -but the example is chosen to render the calculation easier. It is clear that at the beginning of the first year, that is to say, at the instant of the loan, the debtor would simply owe the sum lent, 1; that at the beginning of the second year he would owe the sum 4, and that that sum 4 would bear interest at 3 for 1; there will be due at the commencement of the third year the sum 4 plus 12 or 16, so that the sums 1, 4, 16, due at the beginning of each year, that is to say, at equal intervals, will form a proportion in which the third number contains the second as many times as the second contains the first; or by the same reasoning, if we seek the sum due in the middle of the first year, we shall find that sum to be 2, because the sum due in the middle of the first year ought to be in an equal ratio, and 4 due at the beginning and at the end of that year; and that in fact the sum I is contained in the sum 2, as many times as the sum 2 is contained in the sum 4. Now in the case of simple interest, the debtor of the sum 4, at the commencement of the second year, would only owe the sum 7, and not 16, at the beginning of the third. But in the middle of the first year he would owe the sum 24 for the money which brings 3 for 1 at the end of the year in the case of simple interest, and 6 (that is to say the double of 3), at the end of the second year, ought to bring (that is to say) the moiety of 3 in the middle of the first year. Hence in the case of compound interest, the debtor would owe less at the end of the first year than in the case of simple interest; thus if the compound interest is advantageous to the creditor in certain cases, it is so to the debtor in others. The compensation, it is true, is not equal, since the advantage of the debtor ends with the first year, and that that of the creditor then begins to augment with the number of years. Nevertheless, it is not a remark unworthy notice, if it were only to show that simple interest, in certain cases, is less advantageous to the debtor than com

pound.

pound interest, if the agreement be such that the debtor is to pay the money before the end of the year in which he borrows it."

We cannot, however, from this ingenious calculation, see much practical use that it can be to the men of business of this country, mong whom compound interest is scarcely known. The usury mong us, though frequently exorbitant and infamous, where it suplies the distressed, is not liable to any of the advantages of arithmetic n favour of the borrower.

The third volume of our author consists of several miscellaneous essays, which are elegant specimens of his general information, style, and composition.

The essay on the Society of Men of Letters, and on the GREAT, on REPUTATION, on the different Patrons of Literature, and on Literary Rewards, is extremely well written, severe perhaps, but true, and applicable also to the state of literature in this country as well as to that for which it was written. The note on the Republic of Letters, subjoined to this essay, if true, is worthy of the consideration of the rulers and great men of any country. It says, "whoever is desirous of acquiring or of preserving the esteem and confidence of the public, must encourage the writers of their nation. They are to their age, and to their posterity, the distributors of good fame and of censure; the arbiters of opinion; and it is by their collected judgments that the talents and worth of men are fairly appreciated."

We are far from feeling offended, as many men of letters were at the time, with this essay; we do not feel depressed that the slavery and servitude of Genius should be better known to the world. It shews the proud superiority of true merit, which no tyranny can subdue, no oppression can utterly destroy. The great are even ashamed of this part of their despotism, they hardly know how to govern their dependants; rank and riches are continually presenting, as well as receiving, tributes from men of talents, and so poorly does the great and rich man who has talents, seriously think of the two first of those his acquisitions, that he has been always seen to be most proud of inlisting himself with the class of philosophers. A fact, which well determines the true, that is, the intrinsic value of each of those acquirements. That some of the most sensible, and enlightened among the GREAT, see and disapprove of this tyranny, is exemplified in the answer of a Lady of the Court of France, to some of those persons who reproached D'Alembert with having exaggerated the despotism of the great over men of letters, and the state of slavery to which they think they have a right to subject them: "If he had consulted me (said this Lady), I could have told him a great deal more!" Perhaps it would be for the reciprocal interests of the parties to read this essay with attention. The situation of men of letters who devote their services to the GREAT, is also represented to our view by the author in a quotation from LuCIAN, who he says, may be called the Grecian SWIFT, because like him he turned every thing to ridicule,

"Figure

"Figure to yourself, said he, Fortune upon an high throne, surrounded with precipices, and around her an immense quantity of persons endea vouring to climb up, so much are they struck with her charms. Hope in the richest raiment present herself to the multitude to guide them, hav. ing at her side Disappointment and Dependence, Behind her is Labour and Care, tormenting these unhappy beings, and in the end leaving them to old age and repentance of their folly."

"I am sorry for this same Lucian, after having said that servitude was among the great called friendship, should have finished by accepting å place in the employ of the Emperor, and what is still worse, by way of making as bad an excuse as he could, compared himself to the mountebank, who though he was very ill himself of cold, was at the same time selling an infallible remedy against that complaint."

We wish for the rational entertainment, as well as for the satisfaction of the philosophical reader, that we could make further extracts from this, as well as from the essays on "the Harmony of Language, the Latinity of the Moderns; the License of Music; and the Reflections on the use and abuse of Philosophy in matters of Taste;" but we are forbid, and must hasten to a comprehensive review of the fourth and last volume.

The subject which chiefly attracts our attention in the fourth vo lume, is the "Essay on the Abuse of Criticism in Matters of Reli gion;" and in this, if we may be allowed the expression, the honest 5 philosopher appears, and the Atheist, who may hope to seek support in our author's opinions, will find himself much mistaken. D'Alembert, used to axioms and demonstrations, seems 'tis true at times to slight other evidence, but the genius which a Deity bestowed, seems gracefully to present to the philosopher the truth of the existence of a Deity. D'Alembert says, "we need only to look into ourselves to acknowledge the work of a Supreme Intelligence which has given us existence, and which preserves it to us. That existence is a prodigy which does not astonish us as it ought, because it is continual; it nevertheless brings us back every instant to the contemplation of a Supreme Power on which it depends.'

We shall defer giving our summary opinion of this great man (for such he certainly was), till we have reviewed the remaining volumes, which will be in our next Appendix.

Sur