Veffels taken up Cape Fear River, by a detachment of the army and gallies, the ft of February, 1781.

Rose, a new brig of 120 tons, two three-pounders, pierced for twelve guns, loaded with rice, tobacco, and bale goods.

Schooner Betfey, 70 tons, fix nine-pound carronades, loaded with rice, flour, rum, and fome ammunition.

Schooner Flying Fish, loaded with rice, flour, turpentine, and

rum.

Schooner Ceres, 25 tons, loaded with rice, flour, and ammunition.

Schooner Wild Cat, 26 tons, empty.

A fchooner and floop, with ftores, ammunition and provifions, burnt.

Note 228. Lift of the Fleet under Rear-Admiral Hood, that arrived at New-York, August 28.

Note 229.

Line of Battle of the British Fleet under the command of Rear-Admiral Graves, in the action off the Chefapeake, September 5th, 1781.

LINE OF BATTLE.

The Alfred with the Starboard, and the Shrewsbury with the Lar

Frigates.

board tacks on board.

Ja. Brine.

Cha. Saxton.
Sir Sam. Hood, Rear-

Adm. of the Blue.
Capt. Alex. Hood.
Frs. Reynolds.
J. Inglefield.

Commander in Chief, Rear-Admiral Graves' Divifion.

Note 230. Lofs fuftained by the Rebels at Fort Griswold, New London, &c.

Ten or twelve fhips burned, three or four of them armed veffels and one loaded with naval ftores.

An immenfe quantity of European and Weft India goods found among the ftores, the whole of which was burnt with the ftores. Upwards of 50 pieces of cannon deftroyed, exclufive of the guns belonging to the fhips.

A confiderable powder magazine, and barracks capable of containing 300 men, destroyed in Fort Grifwold.

Eighty-five of the rebels were found dead in Fort Grifwold, and fixty wounded mortally.

Note 231.

Minutes taken by one of the Lieutenants, who was on board the London, Admiral Graves's flag-fhip, from October 1780, until after the action off Chesapeak.

It appears by this journal, that Admiral Graves did not take the chief command before the 5th of July, and that he failed from NewYork the 21st of July, on a cruize to Boston bay (as it is faid, by orders from England to intercept a Dutch convoy) and by the journals he returned to New-York on the 17th of Auguft, and was employed in refitting, taking in ftores, &c. from that time to the 28th of August, when at three P. M. Sir Samuel Hood came and anchored without Sandy Hook: the 29th and 30th of August were employed in making the neceffary preparations to join the two fleets; and on the 31ft Admiral Graves, with five fhips of the line, being all that he could get into condition fit to fail, ran over the Bar, and at fix P. M. bore away with only 19 fail of the line, and came to action with De Graffe on the 5th of September, off the Chefapeak, who had 24 fail of the line.

It alfo appears by the journal, that with only twelve fail, the English Admiral beat De Graffe fo far as that he bore away with his whole fleet before the van and the centre of the English; for the journal ftates, that the rear of Sir Samuel Hood's divifion, never bore up until an hour and a quarter after the action commenced, and when it was nearly over. although the fignal for close action was flying at the onfet, and continued to be diftinctly flying the whole time, except five minutes, when the fignal for the line was hoifted, and the fignal for clofe action appears to have been repeated during the fight.

It further appears by the journal, that at the time the Admiral fent both to the van and the rear, to tell them to ceafe firing; he alfo defired, that if he should come to action in the morning, they would engage c'ofer, and not keep at a distance from the enemy.

It is now known too, that the action took place in the most fortunate and critical moment, for De Graffe had four of his ships of 50

guns

guns and upwards at the time up the Chesapeak, which did not come into the action, and De Barras was not arrived from Rhode Island with his fquadron.

From this true narrative the public may fee that Sir George Brydges Rodney has no ground to charge Admiral Graves with delay. He might with equal propriety charge him with cowardice in feeking and fighting De Graffe with an inferiority of five ships of the line, after Sir George had declined engaging him off Tobago with nearly an equal force.

Note 232. Tranflation of the French Account of the action off the Chefapeak, as published by their Commanders at the Cape, and printed in the Jamaica paper.

Cape Francois, 27th Nov. 1781.

"The fleet in Lynnhaven-bay was waiting for news from General Washington, and the return of its boats, when, on the 5th of September, at eight in the morning, the look-out frigate made the fignal of feeing twenty fail to the eastward, fteering for the bay, the wind at N. E. It was foon difcovered to be an enemy's fleet, and not that of the Compte de Barras, which was expected.

"The English fleet forcing fail was foon near enough to be perceived forming the line of battle a-head on the starboard tack, and placing its heaviest ships in the van.

"As foon as it was known to be the enemy's fleet, the Compte de Graffe gave orders to prepare for battle, to recall the boats from watering, and for the fleet to be ready to get under fail. At noon the tide permitted to get under fail; accordingly the fignal was made, as alfo to form the line promifcuously as the ships could get under weigh.

"All the captains applied themselves fo diligently to the manœuvre, that, notwithstanding the abfence of ninety officers and eighteen hundred men, the fleet was under fail in lefs than three quarters of an hour, and the line formed in the following order: Pluton, Marfeillois, Bourgogne, Diademe, Reflechi, Augufte, L'Esprit, Caton, Cæfar, Deftin, Ville de Paris, Victoire, Sceptre, Northumberland, Palmier, Solitaire, Citoyen, Scipion, Magnanime, Hercule, Languedoc, Zelé, Hector, Souverain. The Languedoc, commanded by M. de Monteil, Commodore of the White and Blue fquadron, happened to be the ship next a-head of the Ville de Paris; and the Compte de Graffe, obferving that no general officer was in his rear, gave M. de Montreil a verbal order to go and take the command there.

"The enemy coming down took care in forming their line on the ftarboard tack, ftill to preferve the wind. At two o'clock they wore altogether, and formed the line upon the tack as the French.

"In this pofition the two fleets were on the fame tack, but by no means parallel, as the rear guard of Admiral Graves was infinitely to windward of his van.

"At three o'clock the headmost of the French fhips, from the varying of the wind and current, finding themselves too far to windward for a well formed line, the Compte de Graffe made them bear up two points, that his ships might have the advantage of engaging together; and they kept the wind as foon as they were fufficiently in line to leeward.

"The headmost ships of both fleets approached each other to within mufquet-fhot. At four the action commenced in the van, commanded by M. de Bougainville, by a very brifk fire, and the main body were fucceffively engaged. At five the wind continuing to vary, even to four points, placed the vanguard ftill too much to windward. The Compte de Graffe ardently wished to make the action general, and to difpofe the enemy to it, ordered again his vanguard to bear away; that of Admiral Graves was very ill treated, and he profited of the advantage the wind gave him to be master of his distance, and to avoid being attacked by the French rear, who were using their utmost endeavour to reach his rear and his centre. "The fetting of the fun at last terminated the battlc. The English fleet kept their wind, and having preferved it, employed all the next day in repairing their damages.

"The 7th at noon, the wind changed in favour of the French, the Compte de Graffe approached the enemy, and manoeuvred in the night fo as to preserve the wind.

"At day break on the 8th, the wind favoured Admiral Graves, it enabled his fhips to look up to windward of the French, who were then in bow and quarter line upon a wind on the starboard tack, but the Compte de Graffe perceiving it tacked his whole fleet together. They were by this movement in a well formed line approaching the enemy, who were upon the contrary tack in a line badly formed, and appeared inclined, notwithstanding their bad order, to difpute the wind. The Compte de Graffe made the fignal for his van to pafs close to windward of the enemy, who were now attempting to form the line of battle by tacking one ship after another, to come to the fame tack with the fleet of France.

"Admiral Graves then perceived how dangerous fuch a movement would be, and that to continue it, would give opportunity to the French to attack him before his fleet was half formed; thofe of his ships had already tacked, when he made his fleet wear together, and form aftern of his rear-guard, by which means he gave up the weather-gage to the French, and made fail from them.

"In the nights of the 8th and 9th, another variation of wind gave them the weather-gage; but during the night of the 9th, the Compte de Graffe regained it by his manoeuvres, for his fhips having fuffered lefs in the action, he had the advantage of carrying more fail than the enemy. In the nights of the 9th and 10th the English difap. peared.

The