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"insist on a prompt execution of the Treaty, and, in case it "be refused or longer delayed, take redress into their own "hands. After the delay on the part of France of a quarter "of a century in acknowledging these claims by Treaty, "it is not to be tolerated that another quarter of a century "is to be wasted in negotiating about the payment. The "laws of nations provide a remedy for such occasions. It " is a well-settled principle of the International Code, that "where one nation owes another a liquidated debt, which it "refuses or neglects to pay, the aggrieved party may seize "on the property belonging to the other, its citizens or sub"jects, sufficient to pay the debt, without giving just cause "of war. This remedy has been repeatedly resorted to, "and recently by France herself towards Portugal, under "circumstances less questionable. The time at which resort "should be had to this or any other mode of redress, is a "point to be decided by Congress. If an appropriation shall "not be made by the French Chambers at their next session, "it may justly be concluded, that the Government of France "has finally determined to disregard its own solemn under"taking, and refused to pay an acknowledged debt. In "that event every day's delay on our part will be a stain upon our national honour, as well as a denial of justice to "our injured citizens. Prompt measures, when the refusal "of France shall be complete, will not only be most honour"able and just, but will have the best effect upon our national "character. Since France, in violation of the pledges given "through her Minister here, has delayed her final action so "long that her decision will not probably be known in time "to be communicated to this Congress, I recommend that a "law be passed, authorising Reprisals upon French property, "in case provisions shall not be made for the payment of the "debt at the approaching session of the French Chambers. "Such a measure ought not to be considered by France as 66 a menace. Her pride and power are too well known to "expect anything from her fears, and preclude the necessity of a declaration that nothing partaking of the character of

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"intimidation is intended by us. "as the evidence only of an inflexible determination on the "part of the United States to insist on their rights. That "Government, by doing only what it has itself acknow"ledged to be just, will be able to spare the United States "the necessity of taking redress into their own hands, and "save the property of French citizens from that seizure and 'sequestration which American citizens so long endured "without retaliation or redress. If she should continue to "refuse that act of acknowledged justice, and, in violation "of the Law of Nations, make Reprisals on our part the "occasion of hostilities against the United States, she would "but add violence to injustice, and could not fail to expose "herself to the just censure of civilised nations, and the "retributive judgments of heaven" (x).

One of the grounds of the last War, not Reprisals, between the N. A. United States and Mexico was the nonpayment of debts due from the Government of that country to the subjects of the United States.

The intervention in the affairs of Mexico by England, France, and Spain, which took place in 1861, was partly in the nature of reprisals, and has been fully discussed in an early part of the work (y).

XXIV. These observations on Reprisals may not unfitly be closed in the words of Bynkershoek (z):

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'Sic, manente pace, ipsius Principis est judicium de jure "vel injuriâ querelæ, et sic Princeps qui judicavit litem suam “facit. Utile sanè est ejusmodi pactis Repressaliarum usum "restringere, in totum enim tollere, eorum, qui non uni "Principi subsunt, improbitas non patitur."

(x) Annual Register, 1834, pp. 360-1.

(y) Vol. i. p. 307.

(2) Q. J. P. 1. i. c. xxiv.

CHAPTER III.

EMBARGO.

XXV. THERE is a mode of redress known to International Law which stands, as it were, midway between Reprisals and War, and which is known by the name of Embargo.

Embargo is an act of the State (a), done in contemplation of hostilities, a retorsio facti, a seizure or rather a sequestration of property belonging to the Government or the individual members of the State which is the alleged wrongdoer. It may or may not be accompanied by a seizure of the persons to whom the goods belong. In maritime Embargoes the persons and goods are usually seized (b).

The character and effect of such sequestration is thus described by Lord Stowell (c):

"Upon property so detained the declaration of war is said "to have a retroactive effect, and to render it liable to be "considered as the property of enemies taken in time of 66 war. The property is seized provisionally,—an act hostile "enough in the mere execution, but equivocal as to its "effects, and liable to be varied by subsequent events, and "by the conduct of the Government, the property of whose

(a) The Theresa Bonita, 4 Rob. Adm. Rep. 431.

(b) So Lord Stowell, discussing the claim of the master of an embargoed but subsequently restored vessel to freight, observes: "In the situation in which the two countries stood, the master had no right to make his demand against any subject of this country, being himself under detention as well as the vessel, on whose behalf this demand arises.” -Ib. 241.

(c) The Bades Lust, 5 Ib. 245-6.

"subjects is so detained. This first seizure is equivocal, and "if the matter in dispute terminates in reconciliation, the "seizure is converted into a mere Civil Embargo, so termi"nated. This would be the retroactive effect of that course "of circumstances. On the contrary, if the transactions "end in hostility, the retroactive effect is directly the other "way. It impresses a hostile character upon the original "seizure. It is declared to be Embargo; it is no longer an equivocal act, subject to two interpretations; there is a "declaration of the animus, by which it was done, that it was done hostili animo, and is to be considered a hostile 66 measure ab initio. The property taken is liable to be used "as the property of persons trespassers ab initio, and guilty "of injuries which they have refused to redeem by any "amicable alteration of their measures.

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"This is the necessary course, if no particular compact "intervenes for the restitution of such property taken "before a formal declaration of hostilities " (d).

XXVI. There is another kind of Embargo which is a matter of English Public Law-namely, the Civil Embargo. The established law in England is, that the Sovereign may prohibit any of his subjects from leaving the realm; a proclamation, therefore, forbidding this, in general for three weeks, by laying an Embargo upon all shipping in time of war, will be equally binding as an Act of Parliament, because founded upon a prior law (e).

These Civil Embargoes are founded upon a particular and urgent necessity of State,-upon the maxim, in fact, salus populi suprema lex,-yet the proclamations by which they are laid may be illegal, as contradicting an established law. This was the case respecting the Embargo to prevent the exportation of corn in 1766, such exportation being allowed by law at the time; and therefore the

(d) See, too, as the possible retroactive effect of a Declaration of War, The Hersteller (1 Rob. Adm. Rep. 117-18).

(e) Stephen's (Blackstone's) Com. vol. ii. (ed. 1858), p. 519.

preamble to the Stat. 7 Geo. 3. c. 7, for indemnifying all persons advising or acting under the Order of Council, laying an Embargo on all ships laden with corn or flour, during the recess of Parliament, in 1766, says, "which "Order could not be justified by law, but was so much "for the service of the public, and so necessary for the safety " and preservation of His Majesty's subjects, that it ought "to be justified by Act of Parliament." This Embargo, as was allowed, saved the people from famine; yet it was declared illegal by the above Act of the legislature; and the proprietors of the embargoed ships and cargoes were accordingly indemnified by Government (ƒ).

The leading case upon this subject is that of Sir Josiah Child v. Sands (g), in which it was finally agreed by the Judges that the King might lay Embargoes, but then it must be pro bono publico, and not for the private advantage of a particular trader or company.

The Crown, of course, has not this power of imposing a Civil Embargo in foreign ports, though possibly it might have power to do so in the ports of an ally.

The distinction between the Civil and the Belligerent (so to speak) Embargo, is explained in a judgement given by Lord Stowell, in the matter of the Dutch ships detained in port, at the Cape of Good Hope, before declaration of hostilities against Holland, claimed as droits of Admiralty, condemned to the Crown jure coronæ.

"On the breaking out, I cannot say of war, but of that "ambiguous situation into which the irregular conduct of "France had put different countries, but dissolving the con"nection between the governors and the governed, it was

(f) Beawes, Lex Mercatoria, vol. i. p. 393. Chapter Of Embargoes, or Restraints of Princes.

(g) This case will be found referred to in the books as follows:-In Skinner's Reports, p. 91, Sandys and the East India Company; and p. 334, Sands v. Child & Lynch. In 4 Modern Reports, 176 (Case 70), Sands v. Child. In 1 Salkeld's Reports, 31, tit. Admiralty (Case 2), Sir Josiah Child v. Smith.

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