are good grounds for saying in general terms, that the mind is in some way permanently limited as to its knowledge of the essence of objects. The word ESSENCE is understood to express that interiour, but imperceptible constitution of things, which is the foundation of the various properties and qualities that are perceived; in other words, that particular constitution, which all existences must be supposed to have in themselves, independently of any thing and every thig external. But whatever this may be, either in the spiritual or material world, no man knows it, no man understands it.

A person may look on the outside of a watch or clock, and the visible part, the face and hands may indicate to him what was intended, viz. the hour and minute of the day. But although he may clearly apprehend this, he may be altogether ignorant of the internal and invisible mechanism, on which the external and visible result depends. And so in the material world we know the outward and sensible, while we are altogether shut out from that unsearchable efficacy, on which the external agency depends; and in the immaterial world we know the properties and qualities, while we are ignorant of that

to his philosophical researches. The inquiries in the first and second books, which are of a much more abstract, as well as scholastic nature, than the sequel of the work, probably opened gradually on the author's mind, in proportion as he studied his subject with a closer and more continued attention. They relate chiefly to the origin and to the technical classification of our ideas, frequently branching out into collateral, and sometimes into digressive, discussions, without much regard to method or connection. The third book, (by far the most important of the whole,) where the nature, the use, and the abuse of language are so clearly and happily illus trated, seems, from Locke's own account, to have been a sort of after-thought; and the two excellent chapters on the Association of Ideas and on Enthusiasm (the former of which has contributed, as much as any thing else in Locke's writings, to the 'subsequent progress of Metaphysical philosophy) were printed, for the first time, in the fourth edition of the Essay."

subjective entity, without which qualities and properties could not exist.

§. 52. Our knowledge of the nature of mind itself limited.

Some particulars will help to illustrate and establish what has been remarked.-In the first place, with the nature of the mind itself, which is the instrument and foundation of all other knowledge, men possess but an imperfect and limited acquaintance; nor have.we reason to suppose that it will ever be essentially otherwise than it is at present. That the mind exists is a truth; this simple fact is a matter of undoubted knowledge; but the mode or nature of its existence; that interiour vitality, which constitutes the true mental being in distinction not only from material being, but also from its own attributes and qualities, is what men have never been able fully to comprehend, and probably never will.

In proof of the correctness of this sentiment, reference might safely be made again to consciousness, to each one's inward and personally deep conviction of ignorance on this subject. Not that consciousness makes a positive declaration of this ignorance, but it very clearly implies it, by its acknowledged inability to make us 'acquainted with any thing further than the mere qualities and operations of the mind. The schoolmen also might here be brought to our recollection, who long attempted, with all the force of their acute and disputatious intellects, to break down this barrier of knowledge, but without success. And without impropriety, we might refer likewise to the remarks, which are so commonly, and every where made, that the mind is not a direct subject of contemplation, that what is called its essence can never be found out, and that we know nothing of it in itself. Remarks of this kind are not made so frequently without grounds for them; they are founded in the general experience, and of course are valuable, considered as an expression of that experi

ence.

This view, it is important to be kept in recollection, is not exclusive; we assert our ignorance of the mind in

some respects, but not in all. Our knowledge embraces a certain extent, but is unable to go beyond.

§. 53. Remarks on the extent of this limitation.

To prevent misapprehensions, therefore, it seems proper to point out some of the particulars, in which actual knowledge in respect to the mind, is supposed to exist.

(1) Men universally experience certain. internal feelings and operations, such as perceiving, belief, volition, imagining, and comparing; and so far as the mere existence of these mental states is concerned, they have knowledge. They know the fact of their taking place, and know them also, as we shall have occasion to see, in their relations. (2) These feelings give occasion for the additional and altogether distinct notion of mind. It seems to be a well settled sentiment, that, without such mental states as have been referred to, the latter notion could never exist; that, without the actual experience of intelligence and emotion, men could never form the idea of an intelligent and sentient being. And so far, therefore, as the mere occasions of forming the idea of mind, and the mere existence of the idea, which they give rise to, are concerned, we may suppose ourselves to possess knowledge.-(3) Subsequently, but almost immediately, we experience another original state of mind, that of the relative suggestion of appropriation or possession. That is to say, we feel the ideas, which were the occasions of the additional notion of mind, to belong to this latter idea; the relative suggestion, the origin of which is inseparable from our constitution, indissolubly binds the two together as subject and attribute. And so far also we have knowledge.-We may go further in our inquiries into the mind, and say with certainty what it is not; for instance that it is not material, since we have never been able to observe and detect in it the qualities and operations of matter. Nor is it necessary to assert, that these are all the particulars, in which we may obtain direct and positive knowledge.

But after all, when we return to the main question of what the mind is in itself, of what the mind is, consider

ed as separate from its qualities and operations, and any mere attendant circumstances, it is then we cannot avoid feeling our utter inability to penetrate the pale of its interiour nature. We contemplate it in the outer temple, but the veil excludes us from the shrine. Again and again we return to the examination of this high and mysterious thought, but it still remains simple, inseparable, and indefinable; and however long and intently we may revolve it for the purpose of breaking up its simplicity, and knowing more of its hidden and invisible essence, it will ever set our efforts at defiance.

§. 54. Our knowledge of maller in certain respects limited.

If we turn from mind to matter, to the knowledge of which some may suppose we possess a more obvious and easy access, we shall find our efforts circumscribed by like limits. We are able to advance to a certain extent in our inquiries, but there we find ourselves compelled to op.

When, for example, a piece of wood, or any other of those material bodies, by which we are surrounded, is presented to any one for his examination, there are some things in this material substance, which may be known, and others, which cannot. Its colour, its hardness or softness, its extension are subjects, upon which he can inform himself, can reason, can arrive at knowledge. He opens his eye; an impression is made on the organ of vision, and he has the idea of colour. By means of the application of his hand to the wood, he learns the penetrability or impenetrability, the softness or hardness of the mass, which he holds. By moving his hand from one point to another in the mass, he is informed of the continuity or extension of its parts. But when he pushes his inquiries beneath the surface of this body, when he attempts to become acquainted not only with its qualities, but with that supposed something, in which those qualities are often imagined to inhere, and, in a word, expends his efforts, in obedience to this unprofitable determination, in learning what matter is, independently of its properties, he then

stumbles on a boundary, which cannot be passed, and seeks for knowledge where by their very constitution men are not permitted to know.

§. 55. Our ignorance of the reciprocal connection of mind and

maller.

If we find both mind and matter incomprehensible to a certain extent, we might naturally anticipate no less mystery in their connection with each other, in their reciprocal action and influence. The fact of such a connection, and the extent to which it exists, have already been briefly remarked on. When the mind is strongly affected, the body is for the most part affected also; and on the other hand, when the body is either vigorous with health or depressed with sickness, the mind generally exhibits a sympathetic vigor of depression. If this be not uniformly and always the case, it certainly is in a great number of instances.

Of the truth of the general fact, with those exceptions and modifications made in the last chapter, there can be no doubt; but of the mode of the fact, of the manner of this connection, it is not within the powers of the human mind to conceive; for it is to be observed, it is not the operation of matter on matter, nor of mind on mind, which might be supposed to be something coming more readily within the range of our comprehension; but the operation on each other of existences, utterly distinct; not possessing, as far as can be judged, a single attribute in com

mon.

§. 56. Illustrated in the case of voluntary action.

What has now been said, it will be noticed, relates to the general connection of mind and matter, the general reciprocation of influence; but this striking law of our nature shows itself constantly, and in particular instances.

We might refer, in particular, to all cases of voluntary exertion. Putting forth that act of the mind, which we call volition, we move a hand, a finger, a foot; mind puts