characteristical difference between the speculations of men. of philosophic minds and those of the common mass of people, which is worthy of some notice. The difference between the two is not so much, that philosophers are accustomed to carry on processes of reasoning to a greater extent, as this, that they are more in the habit of employing general abstract ideas and general terms, and that, consequently, the conclusions which they form are more comprehensive. Nor are their general reasonings, although the conclusions at which they arrive seem in their particular applications to indicate wonderful fertility of invention, so difficult in the performance as is apt to be supposed. They have so often and so long looked at general ideas and general propositions, have been so accustomed, as one may say, to contemplate the general nature of things, divested of all superfluous and all specific circumstances, that they have formed a habit; and the operation is performed without difficulty. It requires in such persons no greater intellectual effort, than would be necessary in skilfully managing the details of ordinary business.

The speculations of the great bulk of mankind differ from those of philosophers in being, both in the subjects of them and in their results, particular. They discover

an inability to enlarge their view to universal propositions, which embrace a great number of individuals. They may possess the power of mere argument, of comparing propositions together which concern particulars, and deducing inferences from them to a great degree; but when they attempt to contemplate general propositions, their minds are perplexed, and the conclusions, which are drawn from them, appear obscure,however clearly the previous process of reasoning may have been expressed. And this restrictedness and particularity of intellectual action may be even superinduced on minds, that were originally not wanting in breadth of survey, or had at least the advantages of education.

CHAPTER FOURTEENTH.

OF ATTENTION.

§. 236. Of the general nature of attention.

WITHOUT Considering it necessary to speak of attention as a separate intellectual power or faculty, as some may be inclined to do, it seems to be sufficient to say, that ATTENTION expresses the state of the mind, when it is steadily directed, for a length of time, to some object of sense or intellect, exclusive of other objects. When we say, that any external object, or any subject of thought, which is purely internal, receives attention, it seems to be the fact, as far as we are able to determine, that the mind is occupied with the subject of its attention, whatever it is, for a certain period, and that all other things are for the time being, shut out. In other words, the grasp, which the mind fixes upon the object of its comtemplations, is an undivided, an unbroken one.

But it is natural to inquire, How this differs from the direction of the mind to a subject in any other case? Since in all instances, the mind,for the time being, is in one state merely; it always embraces one subject or part of a subject, exclusive of others.The answer to be given to this inquiry is, that in ATTENTION the direction of the mind to a particular subject, or, (what is the same thing,) its continuance in a particular state or series of states, is accompanied with a feeling of preference, desire, or interest;

1

which feeling of desire is the cause of that continuance. So that in all cases of attention, the act of the mind is a complex one, involving two things, (1) The mere thought or series of thoughts, (2) The accompanying emotion of interest, which prevents that continual change in the thought, which would otherwise happen.

§. 237. Of different degrees of allention.

In agreement with this view of the subject, we often speak of attention great or small, as existing in a very high or a very slight degree. When the view of the mind is only momentary, and is unaccompanied, as it generally is at such times, with any force of emotion; then the attention is said to be slight. When it bends itself upon a thought or series of thoughts with earnestness, and for a considerable length of time, and refuses to attend to any thing else; then the attention is said to be intense.

We commonly judge at first of the degree of attention to a subject from the length of time, during which the mind is occupied with it. But when we look a little further, it will be found, that the time will generally depend upon the strength and permanency of the attendant emotion of interest. And hence both the time and the degree of feeling are to be regarded in our estimate of the power of attention in any particular case; the former being the result, and, in some sense, a measure of the latter.

Of instances of people, who are able to give but slight attention to any subject of thought, who cannot bring their minds to it with steadiness and power, we every where find multitudes; and there are some instances where this ability has been possessed in such a high degree as to be worthy of notice. There have been mathematicians, who could investigate the most complicated problems amid every variety and character of disturbance. It was said of Julius Caesar, that, while writing a despatch, he could at the same time dictate four others to his secretaries, and if he did not write himself, could dictate seven letters at once. The same thing is asserted also of the emperor Napoleon, who had a wonderful capo b'lity of di

recting his whole mental energy to whatever came before him.*

The chess-player Philidor could direct three games of chess at the same time, of one of which only he required ocular inspection, the moves of the other two being announced to him by an assistant. The moves of the chess men formed the subject, about which his thoughts were employed, and such was the intensity of interest, that the mind found no difficulty in dwelling upon it to the exclusion of other subjects, and for a considerable length of time.

§. 238. Dependence of memory on attention.

There seems to be no fact in mental philosophy more clearly established than this, that memory depends on attention; that is, where attention is very slight, remembrance is weak, and where attention is intense, remem brance continues longer. The following statement of Mr. Hobbes, in his political treatise of the Leviathan, will tend to illustrate this fact.He says, he was once in company, where the conversation turned on the English civil war. A person abruptly asked, in the course of the conversation, What was the value of a Roman denarius? Such a question, so remote from the general direction of the conversation, had the appearance not only of great abruptness, but of impertinence. Mr. Hobbes says, that, on a little reflection, he was able to trace the train of thought, which suggested the question. The original subject of discourse naturally introduced the history of king Charles; the king naturally suggested the treachery of those, who surrendered him up to his enemies; the treachery of these persons readily introduced to the mind the treachery of Judas Iscariot; the conduct of Judas was associated with the thirty pieces of silver, and as the Romans occupied Judea at the time of the crucifixion of the Saviour, the pieces of silver were associated with the Roman denarii. All these trains of thought passed through the mind of the person, who asked the question, in a Segur's History of the Expedition to Russia, Bk. VII, ch. 13.

twinkling; and with good reason Mr. Stewart, in remarking on this anecdote, thinks it not improbable, that he would himself have been unable readily to state the train of ideas, which led to the unexpected inquiry.--Every one is able to detect analogous facts in his own mental experiences. We unexpectedly find ourselves reflecting on a subject, to which we must have been conducted by a long concatenation of thought. But the preceding series, which conducted to the present subject of our meditations, occupied our attention for so short a time, that no foundation was laid for the memory, and it has irretrievably vanished.

§. 239. Further illustrations of the dependence of memory on

attention.

There are other facts perhaps of a still more obvious. and satisfactory nature, which confirm the principle under consideration. In the course of a single day persons,, who are in the habit of winking, will close their eyelids perhaps thousands of times, and as often as they close them will place themselves in utter darkness. Probably, they are conscious at the time both of closing their eyelids and of being in the dark, but as their attention is chiefly taken up with other things, they have entirely forgotten it.

(2) Let a person be much engaged in conversation, or occupied with any very interesting speculation, and the clock will strike in the room where he is, apparently without his having any knowledge of it. He hears the clock strike as much as at any other time, but, not attending to the perception of sound and having his thoughts directed another way, he immediately forgets.

(3) In the occupations of the day, when toils, and tumults, and cares are pressing us on every side, a thousand things escape our notice; they appear to be neither seen nor heard, nor to affect us in any way whatever. But at the stillness of evening, when toils are quicted, and there is a general pause in nature, we seem to be endued with a new sense, and the slightest sound attracts our attention. Shakspeare has marked even this.