I,-Conceptions differ from the ordinary sensations and perceptions in this respect, that both their causes and their objects are absent. When the rose, the honeysuckle, or other odoriferous body is presented to us, the effect, which follows in the mind, is termed a sensation, When we afterwards think of that sensation, (as we sometimes express it,) when the sensation is recalled even though very imperfectly, without the object which originally caused it being present, it then becomes, by the use of language, a conception. And it is the same in any instance of perception. When, in strictness of speech, we are said to perceive any thing, as a tree, a building, or a mountain, the objects of our perceptions are in all cases before us. But we may form conceptions of them, that may be recalled and exist in the mind's eye, however remote they may be in fact, both in time and place.

II,-They differ also from remembrances or ideas of memory. We take no account of the period, when those subjects, which laid the foundation of them were present; whereas in every act of the memory there is combined with the conception a notion of the past. Hence as those states of mind, which we call conceptions, possess these distinctive marks, they are well entitled to a separate

name.

CONCEPTIONS being merely mental states or acts of a particular kind are regulated by the general laws of the intellect, and make their appearance and disappearance on the principles of association. Those principles have been explained in a former chapter.Whenever at any time we may use the phrase "power of conception" or "faculty of conception," nothing more is to be understood by such expressions than this, that there is in the mind a susceptibility of feelings or ideas possessing the marks, which we have ascribed to this class.

S. 198. Of conceptions of objects of sight.

One of the striking facts in regard to our conceptions is, that we can far more easily conceive of the objects of some senses than of others. Suppose a person to have

travelled abroad, and to have seen among the achievements of human effort St. Peter's church, the Vatican, and the Pyramids, or to have visited among nature's still greater works the cataract of Niagara and the falls of St. Anthony, or any other interesting object of sight; it is well known, that the mind of this person afterwards even for many years very readily forms a conception of those objects. Such ideas are so easily and so distinctly recalled, that it is hardly too much to say of them, that they seem to exist as permanent pictures in the mind. It is quite different with a particular sound, which we have formerly heard, and with a particular taste, or any pleasant or painful sensations of the touch, which we have formerly experienced. When the original perceptions have in these last cases departed, we find that the ideas do not readily exist again in the absence of their appropriate objects, and never with the distinctness, which they possessed at first. Ideas of visible objects, therefore, are more readily recalled, or we can more easily form conceptions of such objects, than we can of the objects of the other senses.— This peculiarity in the case of visible objects may be thus partially explained.

Visible objects or rather the outlines of them are complex; that is, they are made up of a great number of points or very small portions. Hence the conception, which we form of such an object as a whole, is aided by the principles of association. The reason is obvious. As every original perception of a visible object is compound, made up of many parts, whenever we subsequently have a conception of it, the process is the same; we have a conception of a part of the object, and the principles of association help us in conceiving of the other parts. Association connects the parts together; it presents them to the mind in their proper arrangement, and helps to sustain them there.

We are not equally aided by the laws of association in forming our conceptions of the objects of the other senWhen we think of some sound, or taste, or touch, the object of our conception is either a single detached

ses.

sensation, or a series of sensations. In every such detached sound, or taste, or sensation of touch, whether we consider it at its first origin or when it is subsequently recalled, there is not of course that association of the parts, which we suppose to exist in every visual perception, and which must exist also in every conception of objects of sight, which subsequently takes place. Accordingly our concep tions of the latter objects arise more readily, and are more distinct than of the others.-There is a greater readiness and distinctness also,when there is a series of sensations and perceptions, for the visual conceptions are aided by association both in time and place, but the others only in time. §. 199. Of the influence of habit on our conceptions.

It is another circumstance worthy of notice in regard to conceptions, that the power of forming them depends in some measure on habit.――A few instances will help to illustrate the statement, that what is termed Habit may extend to the susceptibility of conceptions; and the first to be given will be of conceptions of sounds. Our conceptions of sounds are in general very indistinct, as appeared in the last section. But a person may acquire the power of amusing himself with reading written music. Having frequently associated the sounds with the notes, he has at last such a strong conception of the sound that he experiences, by merely reading the notes, a very sensible pleasure. It is for the same reason, viz, because our associations are strengthened by habit, that readers may enjoy the harmony of poetical numbers without at all articulating the words. In both cases they truly hear nothing, but there is a virtual melody in the mind.

That our power of forming conceptions is strengthened by habit is capable of being further illustrated from the sight. A person, who has been accustomed to drawing, retains a much more perfect notion of a building, landscape, or other visible object, than one who has not. A portrait painter, or any person, who has been in the practice of drawing such sketches, can trace the outlines of the human form with very great ease; it requires hardly

more effort from them than to write their names.-This point may also be illustrated by the difference, which we sometimes notice in people in their conceptions of colours. Some are fully sensible of the difference between two colours when they are presented to them, but cannot with confidence give names to these colours when they see them apart, and may even confound the one with the other. Their original sensations or perceptions are supposed to be equally distinct with those of other persons; but their subsequent conception of the colours is far. from being so. This defect arises partly at least from want of practice, that is, from their not having formed a habit. The persons, who exhibit this weakness of conception, have not been compelled by their situation, nor by mere inclination, to distinguish and to name colours so much as is common.

§. 200. Of the subserviency of our conceptions to description.

It is highly favorable to the talent for lively description, when a person's conceptions are readily suggested and are distinct. Even such an one's common conversation differs from that of those, whose conceptions arise more slowly, and are more faint. One man, whether in conversation or in written description, seems to place the object, which he would give us an idea of, directly before us; it is represented distinctly and to the life. Another, although not wanting in a command of language, is confused and embarrassed amid a multitude of particulars, which, in consequence of the feebleness of his conceptions, he finds himself but half acquainted with; and he, therefore, gives us but a very imperfect notion of the thing which he would describe.

It has been by some supposed, that a person might give a happier description of an edifice, of a landscape, or other object, from the conception than from the actual perception of it. The perfection of a description does not always consist in a minute specification of circumstances; in general the description is better, when there is a judicious selection of them. The best rule for making the se

lection is, to attend to the particulars, that make the deepest impression on our own minds, or, what is the same thing, that most readily and distinctly take a place in our conceptions. When the object is actually before us, it is extremely difficult to compare the impressions, which dif ferent circumstances produce. When we afterwards conceive of the object, we possess merely the outline of it; but it is an outline made up of the most striking circumstances. Those circumstances, it is true, will not impress all persons alike, but will somewhat vary with the degree of their taste. But when with a correct and delicate taste any one combines lively conceptions, and gives a description from those conceptions, he can hardly fail to succeed in it.

§. 201. Of conceptions attended with a momentary belief.

Our conceptions are sometimes attended with belief; when they are very lively, we are apt to ascribe to them a real outward existence, or believe in them. We do not undertake to assert, that the belief is permanent ;.but a number of facts strongly lead to the conclusion, that it has a momentary existence.

(1) A painter, in drawing the features, and bodily form of an absent friend, may have so strong a conception, so vivid a mental picture, as to believe for a moment that his friend is before him. After carefully recalling his thoughts at such times and reflecting upon them, almost every painter is ready to say, that he has experienced some illusions of this kind. It is true, the illusion is very short, because the intensity of conception, which is the foundation of it, can never be kept up long when the mind is in a sound state. Such intense conceptions are unnatural. And, further all the surrounding objects of perception, which no one can altogether disregard for any length of time, every now and then check the illusion and terminate it.

(2) When a blow is aimed at any one, although in sport, and he fully knows it to be so, he forms so vivid a conception of what might possibly be the effect, that his be lief is for a moment controlled, and he unavoidably shrinks