pressions, which have been already referred to in eminent writers? What shall we say, (to take a single instance out of the multitude, that might be brought together,) of the following language of a learned critic,* in relation to a speech of Mr. Fox in Parliament, on the great question of the Slave Trade :-"It is among the happiest productions of a rapid and vigorous INTELLECT, called into action. suddenly by the warmth of an honest and noble HEART. The FEELING seems all INTELLECT; the INTELLECT all FEELING. §. 131. The nature of this classification a maller of con sciousness. The classification, which we are considering, is the more important, because it is founded, not in the mere circumstances attending the origin of the mental states, but in the nature of the states themselves. We feel, we know them to be different. But when we are required to state with precision what the actual difference is between these two classes of the exercises of the soul, it cannot be denied, that the question is more readily proposed, than answered. A man may believe and know himself, (it is very often the case,) what he may find it difficult to communicate, and explain to others. An inability to set forth in words the nature of any particular acts of the soul is not a proof, that those exercises do not exist, or that the condition of one state of the mind does not differ from that of another. On the contrary it may be answered in this case, as in others, that every person knows from his CONSCIOUSNESS, that great and ultimate guide which Providence has given men, that there is not only a difference, but a radical and essential difference between the two classes. No one, for instance, can be supposed to be insensible of this diversity in the mental states, expressed by the terms, truth, belief, certainty, order, equality, and the like, and those, expressed by the terms, pleasure, pain, hope, * Edin. Review on Clarkson's History of the Abolition of the Slave Trade, July 1808. desire, love, &c. We refer, therefore, on this point to each one's internal experience, to his own consciousness. "Every man, [says Condillac, Origin of Knowledge, Pt. I. CH. I,] is conscious of his thought; he distinguishes it perfectly from every thing else; he even distinguishes one thought from another; and that is sufficient. If we go any further, we stray from a point, which we apprehend so clearly, that it can never lead us into errour." §. 132. Of the different names given to it.' It remains to be remarked further, that the explicit and scientific statement of this classification is by no means new; on the contrary, in its essential features, it has repeatedly made a formal appearance under various names. Some of these designations will be briefly referred to. I, Cognitive and Motive.-A long time since, it was proposed, particularly by Mr. Hobbes, to employ these two words, as expressive of the general division under consideration. Undoubtedly the epithet COGNITIVE, whether we consult its etymology or its meaning as established by use, is sufficiently applicable to that part of our mental nature, which regards the mere origin of knowledge, as perception, judgment, reasoning, &c. The term MOTIVE, as indicative of the other part of our mental constitution, was probably adopted on the ground, that our emotions, desires, and passions are particularly connected with movement or action. This nomenclature seems not, however, to have been generally adopted. "The terms cognitive and motive, [says Mr. Stewart, Elements, Pt. II,] were long ago proposed for the same purpose by Hobbes; but they never appear to have come into general use, and are indeed liable to obvious objections." II, The Understanding and Will.--The generic classification, which we have been considering, has made its appearance also under these names. We have already had occasion to refer to Locke and Edwards; those distinguished writers not only recognized the classification in question, and made it the basis of the particular direc frequently employed this Under the term Underintellectual, the thinking tion of their great efforts, but phraseology as expressive of it. standing was included the whole and reasoning part of our nature. By the Will seems to have been meant that ability, in whatever way it might exhibit itself, which was supposed to be necessary in bringing the mental constitution into action; it was the mind's impelling and controlling principle; something which moved and governed it. To determine precisely, however, what feelings and operations belonged to the one and what belonged to the other was by no means a matter well settled, but of no small doubt and contention. The designation of the arrangement by these names has consequently fallen into comparative discredit. The word Understanding, however, is still employed in its original extent, as synonymous with intellect; the word Will, with a much restricted signification. III, Intellectual and Active Powers.For the epithet MOTIVE proposed by Hobbes, the term Active has been substituted by some modern writers, particularly Reid and Stewart. This epithet, like that for which it was substituted, was probably introduced on the ground, that the sentient part of our nature is immediately and particularly connected with motion, effort, or action. It is probably not meant to be intimated by those who adopt this designation, that the feelings and powers,included under it, possess in themselves more activity than others, but are active in the sense of being particularly connected with, and leading to action; which is undoubtedly the truth. §. 133. Classification of the intellectual states of the mind. For the reasons, which have been given, we find ourselves authorized, in the first place, in considering the states, exercises, or acts of the mind, (for these terms, the most general we can employ, will apply to both classes,) under the two general heads of Intellectual and Sentient. Our intellectual states of mind, together with their corresponding susceptibilities and powers, will first come under consideration. On looking attentively, however, at the intellectual part of our nature, we readily discover, that the results, which are to be attributed to it, are susceptible of a subordinate classification, viz, into INTELLECTUAL STATES of External, and those of Internal origin. It is presumed, that on a little examination this distinction will be sufficiently obvious. If the mind were insulated and cut off from the outward world, or if there were no such outward world, could we feel, or see, or hear? All those mental affections, which we express, when we speak of the diversities of taste and touch, of sound and sight, are utterly dependent on the existence and presence of something, which is exteriour to the intellect itself. But this cannot be said of what is expressed by the words, truth, falsehood, opinion, intelligence, cause, obligation, effect and numerous creations of the intellect of a like kind. It is worthy of remark, that the subordinate classification, which is now proposed to be made, did not escape, in its essential characteristics, the notice of very ancient writers. We have the authority of Cudworth,* that those intellectual states, which have an internal origin, bore among the Greeks the name of NOEMATA, thoughts or intellections; while those of external origin were called AISTHEMATA, sensations. Although this classifiation, the grounds of which cannot fail readily to present themselves, has been recognized and sanctioned, in some form or other, by numerous writers on the human mind, some future opportunity will be found more fully to explain and defend it; the objections, which have been made, will not be overlooked; and it will be readily perceived, that we shall be the better prepared for this proposed explanation, after having considered the relation, which the mind sustains to the external world by means of the senses, and analyzed the knowledge, which has its origin in that source. * Cudworth's Immutable Morality, Bk. IV. CH. 1. |
