any sensible phenomena that can occur, in the progress of the physical sciences. They are derived from a far higher science; a paramount science, which must ever govern and control them all. His "rules of philosophising," though prefixed and immediately applied by himself to the mathematical science, are not, therefore, exclusively mathematical; they are general rules, deduced from that universal science which Bacon denominates prima philosophia," viz. the science of universal logic, that is, of universal and immutable REASON1. 66 The mineral geology, confidently reposes on its delusive error, that he who sees most, judges best; and it expects, by that rule, to secure the palm in every geological contest. As if judgment, were the necessary product of vision. But, as the two faculties have no such necessary ordination and dependence; he who sees enough, with a more instructed judgment, will better apprehend the fundamental truths of geology, than he who sees more than enough, with a judgment less instructed. 'Regula philosophandi :- Reg. 1. "More causes of natural things "ought not to be admitted, than are true, and sufficient for explaining "their phenomena. Reg. 2. "Therefore, to natural things of the same kind, the same causes ought to be assigned, as far as it is possible. Reg. 3. "Qualities of bodies which cannot be increased or lost, and "which pertain to all bodies that we can subject to our experiment, are to be accounted qualities of all bodies, universally. Reg. 4. "In experimental philosophy, propositions, drawn from "phenomena by induction, are to be accounted as true, either strictly, or "nearly approaching to it, until other phenomena occur, by which they "may be rendered either more accurate, or open to exceptions." It is one thing to accumulate data, and another thing to reason soundly upon them when accumulated as will be frequently exemplified in the progress of this work. There is occasion for the ne quid nimis in geology, as well as in morals. There is a mental habit of prosecuting sensible details, which discapacitates the mind, in the same proportion, for the exercise of intellectual generalisation. Certainly, he who has read numerically most books, is not necessarily the best critic; and, by the same principle, he who has seen numerically most rocks, is not necessarily the best geologist. The mental eye, like the corporeal, must find the just point of visual distance, before it can embrace the whole of the object on which it looks, and apprehend the relations of its parts; and, the mineral geology is constitutionally averse to remove itself to that necessary distance from the inspection of its mineral phenomena. Although, then, it is undeniably true, that those who have con"tributed most to the advancement of Natural Philosophy, have had, at the same time, a tendency to generalise, and an accurate knowledge "of a great many particular facts';" yet, it was not the tendency, but the sound ability, that enabled them to contribute to that advancement. The science of mineralogy, valuable as it is within its own proper sphere, is, in itself, only a physical science-viz. the science of mineral characters 1 HUMBOLDT, Superp. of Rocks, p. 32. and mineral qualities; and, if it reasons wrong within its assumptive sphere of geology, it can never transmute its false reasoning into true reasoning, by virtue of any physical resources of its own whereas, Newton's philosophy being essentially logical, that is, rational, possessed always a rectifying and conservative principle in itself. In Newton, intuitive logic was dominant; and mathematics, were only the steps by which his logic ascended to the elevation to which it attained. In the mineral geology, physical impressions are dominant; and its logic, is only an artificial instrument which it seeks to employ for arranging those impressions. How many eminent mathematicians had seen apples fall to the ground, before the intuitive LOGIC of Newton's mind apprehended the phenomenon! How different that logic was from the logic of the mineral geology, we have seen by the difference of their respective conclusions. CHAPTER V. It will now be easy to point out, after the preceding distinction, the cause of the signal contradiction thus subsisting between Newton and the Mineral Geology. It is simply this; that, in attempting to reason of the MODE of first formations by Newton's method of analysis and induction, the mineral geology has not carried the process of analysis far enough back; whereas, Newton carried it as far back as it could extend. Let us hear Newton himself. 66 66 By this way of analysis," said he, we may proceed from compounds to ingredients, and "from motions to the forces producing them; and, in general, from effects to their causes, "and from particular causes to more general 66 66 66 ones, till the argument end in the MOST GENE66 RAL. This is the method of analysis. And "the synthesis consists in assuming the causes, "discovered and established, as principles; and by them explaining the phenomena proceeding from them, and proving the explanations'." To set this doctrine in all its light, I shall subjoin the commentary of his exact reporter upon this passage. 66 "In order to proceed with perfect security, 1 Optics, lib. iii. in fin. 66 and to put an end for ever to disputes, he pro posed, that, in our inquiries into nature, the "methods of analysis and synthesis should be "both employed in a proper order; that we "should begin with the phenomena or effects, and "from them investigate the powers or causes that operate in nature; that, from particular causes "we should proceed to the more general ones, till "the argument end in the most general: this 66 66 66 66 is the method of analysis. Being once pos"sessed of these causes, that we should then descend, in a contrary order; and from them, as "established principles, explain all phenomena that are their consequences, and prove our explanations and this is synthesis. It is evident, that as in mathematics, so in natural philosophy, the investigation of difficult things by the method of analysis, ought ever to pre"cede the method of composition, or the synthesis. "For, in any other way we can never be sure that we assume the principles which really obtain in nature; and that our system, after we have composed it with great labour, is not mere dream and "illusion1." 66 66 66 66 Now, the analysis of the mineral geology does not extend beyond mineral matter; whereas, that of Newton went back to all matter, of which mineral matter is only a part. It must be evident, that it is in the highest degree unphilosophical to 1 MACLAURIN, Account of Sir I. Newton's Phil. p. 9. |