would be likely to deteriorate rather than to improve the present character of articled clerks.

On the whole we do not regard the congress as a great success. We have seen only a newspaper summary of the themes and discussions, but nothing of a very practical character appears to have been accomplished. Should the experiment be repeated, we hope that the time will be devoted to new projects, and not to the condemnation of things as they exist. What we want is not agitation, but invention-invention first and agitation afterwards.

A DIGEST OF PATENT LAW CASES. (By CLEMENT HIGGINS, Esq., B.A., F.C.S., Barrister-at-Law.) SUBJECT-MATTER OF A PATENTABLE INVENTION. Manufacture.-Darcy v. Allen. 1602.-"Where any man, by his own charge and industry, or by his own wit or invention, doth bring any new trade into the realm, or any engine tending to the furtherance of a trade that never was used before, and that for the good of the realm, that in such cases the king may grant to him a monopoly patent, for some reasonable time, until the subjects may learn the same, in consideration of the good that he doth bring by his invention to the commonwealth, otherwise not." (Noy's R. 182; 11 Co. R. 84 b.; Moor. 671.)

The Clothworkers of Ipswich. 1615.-"If a man hath brought in a new invention and a new trade within the kingdom in peril of his life, and consumption of his estate or stock, or if a man hath made a new discovery of anything; in such cases the king, of his grace and favour, in recompense of his costs and travail, may grant by charter unto him, that he only shall use such a trade or traffic for a certain time, because at first the people of the kingdom are ignorant, and have not the knowledge or skill to use it; but when the patent is expired, the king cannot make a new grant thereof. For when the trade is become common, and others have been bound apprentices in the same trade, there is no reason that such should be forbidden to use it." (Godbolt's R. 252; 1 Roll R. 4.)

Mitchellv. Reynolds. 1713.-"The grant of the sole use of a trade is void, but a grant of a trade newly invented, and for a time, is good; for the public has an advantage in the invention of a useful trade, which, after a limited time is to be public; and the inventor's industry is sufficiently encouraged by the sole use of it secured to him by charter for such a time; but a second grant would be void, even in this case; and the statute 21 Jac. 1, c. 3, limits the time for which such grant may be made to fourteen years.' (19 Mod. R. 130; 1 P. Wms. 181.)

Boulton and Watts v. Bull. 1795.-A patent was granted to Watt for a new invented method of lessening the consumption of steam and fuel in fire engines. The validity of the patent was called in question. Mr. Justice Heath, speaking of the word "manufacture" in 21 Jac. 1, c. 3, s. 6, said, "What then falls within the scope of the proviso? Such manufacturers as are reducible to two classes. The first class includes machinery, the second substances (such as medicines) formed by chemical and other processes, where the vendible substance is the thing produced, and that which operates preserves no permanent form. In the first class the machine, and in the second the substance produced, is the subject of the patent. I approve of the term manufacture in the statute, because it precludes all nice refinements; it gives us to understand the reason of the proviso that it was introduced for the benefit of trade. That which is the subject of a patent ought to be specified, and it ought to be that which is vendible, otherwise it cannot be a manufacture," p. 482. Chief Justice Eyre said, when referring to the same subject, "It was admitted in the argument at the bar, that the word manufacture' in the statute was of extensive signification, that it applied not only to things made, but to the practice of making, to principles carried into practice in a new manner, to new results of principles carried into practice. Let us pursue this admission. Under things made, we may class, in the first place, new compositions of things, such as manufactures in the most ordinary sense of the word; secondly, all mechanical inventions, whether made to produce old or new effects, for a new piece of mechanism is certainly a thing made. Under the practice of making we may class all new artificial manners of operating with the hand, or with instruments in common use, new processes in any art producing effects useful to the public. When the effect produced is some new substance or composition of things, it should seem that the privilege of the sole working or making, ought to be for such new substance or composition, without regard to the mechanism or process by which it has been produced, which, though perhaps also new, will be only useful as producing the new substance," p. 493 : (2 H. Bl. 463; Dav. P. C. 162; 1 Carp. P. C. 117.)

Hall v. Boot. N. P., 1822.-The patent was granted for a "method of improving every kind of lace," &c. The invention consisted in causing lace to pass through a flame of gas, in order to singe off the projecting fibres, and the specification described the means by which the invention was to be performed. The patentee claimed the application of the flame of inflammable gas to the purposes described in the specification. It was proved that before the date of the patent muslin had been passed over rollers of heated iron, and that mits and stockings had been passed through oil and alcohol flames for a similar purpose. It was objected that the mere doing that with the flame of gas which had long before been done by means of other kinds of flame, was not such an invention as to constitute the subject matter of a patent. The patent was, however, held to be good. (1 Web. P. C. 100; 1 Carp. P. C. 423.)

Rex. v. Wheeler. 1829.-Abbott, C.J., delivering the judgment of the Court of King's Bench, said: "It is well known that the granting of monopolies was restrained by the statute 21 Jac. 1, c. 3, to the sole working or making of any manner of new manufactures, and to the true and first inventor of snch manufactures. Now the word 'manufactures' has been generally understood to denote either a thing made, which is useful for its own sake, and vendible as such, as a medicine, a stove, a telescope, and many others, or to mean an engine or instrument, or some part of an engine or instrument, to be employed, either in the making of some previously known article, or in some other useful purpose, as a stocking-frame, or a steam-engine for raising water from mines. Or it may perhaps extend also to a new process to be carried on by known implements, or elements, acting upon known substances, and ultimately producing some other known substance, but producing it in a cheaper or more expeditious manner, or of a better and more useful kind. But no merely philosophical or abstract principle can answer to the word manufactures. Something of a corporeal and substantial nature, something that can be made by man from the matters subjected to his art and skill, or at

the least some new mode of employing practically his art and skill, is required to satisfy this word." (2 B. & Ald. 345; 1 Carp. P. C. 394). Lewis et al. v. Davis. N. P. 1829.-The shearing of cloth from list to list by shears, and the shearing it from end to end by means of rotary cutters were known and in use before the date of the patent. The patentee constructed a machine to shear from list to list by means of rotary cutters, and this was held to be a new manufacture within the statute of James, and a sufficient invention to sustain a patent. (3 Car. & P. 502; 1 Web. P. C. 488; 1 Carp. P. C. 471.)

Saunders v. Aston. 1832.-Patent for "certain improvements in constructing or making buttons." The specification stated the improvements to consist in the substitution of a flexible material for metal shanks on buttons. It then described the modes in which this material might be fixed to the button. Several of these modes were old, but one method which consisted in the use of a metal collet or ring with teeth was new. Neither the construction of the button nor the application of a flexible shank was new. Littledale, J., agreeing with the rest of the court, said: "Neither the button nor the flexible shaft was new, and they did not, by merely being put together, constitute such an invention as could support this patent. It is contended that the operation of the collet, under the present patent, is new; but that is not stated in the specification as the object of the invention, and it is in fact only one mode of carrying it into effect; it appears on the plaintiff's case that there were other ways of producing the same result." (3 B. & A. 881; 1 L. J., N. S. 265, K. B.; 1 Carp. P. C. 510.)

LEASEHOLD PROPERTY IN BANKRUPTCY.

MR. KING, of Maidstone, sends us the following observations :Considerable difficulty seems to be felt on all sides in giving a construc tion to the 23rd and 31st sections of the Bankruptcy Act 1869 which will do justice to all parties in respect of leasehold property of a bankrupt. The 23rd section enables the trustee to disclaim such property, whereupon it is to be deemed to be surrendered from the date of the adjudication; and sect. 3 declares all debts and liabilities present or future, certain or contingent, of the bankrupt provable in the bankruptcy.

It has been contended that under the 31st section if the trustee does not disclaim, the landlord can prove for all the future rent under the covenant in the lease, and that in case a disclaimer is executed, any charges which may have been created by the bankrupt on the term will be discharged; also that in case the bankrupt is an assignee of the term, the disclaimer of his trustee will release the original lessee from his liability by contract to the landlord under the lease.

It cannot be denied but that these consequences would be unjust and unfair, and therefore that there is a strong presumption for any construction which would avoid them, and I venture to submit the following as one which does no violence to the language of the Act, but yet does complete justice to all parties, viz. :

First. The Act does not give any right to prove for future rent, unless it can be shown that the property is not of the yearly value of the rent reserved, and then only for the difference between the value and the rent. The definition of rent is "a sum of money or other consideration issuing out of lands or tenements;" it is not a debt, but an interest in land incident to and forming part of the reversion expectant on the determination of the lease, and usually reserved out of the term at the time of its creation. It belongs to the landlord not personally, but as the owner of the reversion, and, if the landlord convey the reversion, the right to the future rent will pass to the alienee, and the fact that the original landlord has received such rent in advance, will not, it would seem, operate as a satisfaction: (De Nicols v. Saunders, 22 L. T. Rep. N. S. 661.) The remedy by action of debt is only a collateral security, and, though in terms the covenant for payment of rent is absolute and unconditional, it is to be regarded only as a guarantee that rent will issue out of the land as reserved by the lease. (Arnott v. Holden, 22 L. J. 14, Q. B.) It is, therefore, only proveable as a contingent debt after giving credit for the annual value of the land (Re William Willis, 4 Ex. 530.) See also Re London and Colonial Company (18 L. T. Rep. N. S. 103) where Vice-Chancellor Giffard said as to the 158th section of the Companies Act 1862, the words of which are nearly identical with those now in question-" I am of opinion that the section does not apply to the case of a lessor who has the lease always as an absolute secu rity, a continual remedy by distress, a remedy by re-entry if he desires it." Lord Justice Mellish said, in Ex parte Llynri Coal and Iron Company (25 L. T. Rep. N.S. 609) that "if the trustee assigns to an insolvent person practically the damages would be to the full amount of what the bankrupt was liable to pay under his covenant;" but, if the trustee were to assign to a millionaire, the millionare might assign to an insolvent person the next day, and get rid of all his liability. The solvency of the assignee cannot, therefore, be a fair criterion as to the value of the claim; secondly, where the bankrupt is the legal owner of a term upon which he has created incumbrances, the bankrupt is in the first place for the incumbrancer, and, if the trustee disclaims, the disclaimer can only operate as a release of the beneficial interest of the bankrupt to the person having the prior beneficial interest. The consequence is that the whole of the beneficial interest will remain in the incumbrancer, and by virtue of the first subsection of sect. 15 the legal estate in the term will remain in the bankrupt as property held by him in trust for another person. It is true that the bankrupt will continue liable on the covenants, but he will be entitled to compel the incumbrancer (who by insisting on his charge will have elected to treat the bankrupt as his trustee), to take an assignment and indemnify him. In the case of an underlease the bankrupt is also, if the landlord refuses to accept the surrender, subject to the underlease, a trustee of the original term for the purpose of supporting the underlease, and the underlessee must elect either to forfeit the underlease or to consider his bankrupt landlord as a trustee of the original term for him; thirdly, where the bankrupt is an assignee of the term and the trustee disclaims, the original lessee has an implied lien on the lease for any rent or damages he may be called on to pay under the covenants in the lease, the bankrupt is therefore, for this purpose, a trustee for the original lessee, and if the landlord on the execution of the disclaimer, refuses to accept possession, and insists on his remedy against the original lessee, the disclaimer can only operate as a release of the beneficial interest of the bankrupt to the original lessee, leaving the legal estate in the bankrupt as trustee for the original lessee who stands in the same position as an incumbrancer; fourthly, where the bankrupt has only an equitable interest in the term the disclaimer will, of course, only operate as a release of the equitable right to the person in whom the legal estate is vested.

a trustee

LAW LIBRARY.

Commercial Guide in Bankruptcy and Liquidation under the Bankruptcy Act 1869. By JOHN GILMOUR, Barrister-at-Law. ongmans, Green, and Co. 1872.

is little work, although bearing the modest title of "Gilmour's mmercial Guide in Bankruptcy," is certainly the most terse, tructive, and perfect handy book of the kind we have seen. e subject is one which has already been dwelt upon in existive works by various learned authors; but the treatise ore us gives what no other has yet attempted-a clear elucidan of the principles of the Scottish system, on which the new kruptcy law of England has been founded. The learned author imself both a Scotch and an English lawyer. His work, in every apter, discloses a familiar acquaintance in all its details with the ottish system, and his experience as Judge of the Liverpool unty Court during the last eighteen months, as the deputy of Blair, without having had a single appeal from his decisions, ints to the advantages of his knowledge of the principles upon ich the English system is based. On this part of the subject cannot do better than quote the words of the author. The Bankruptcy Act of 1869 was a Government measure brought in by Robert Collier, the Attorney-General of the day, who announced, in roducing it, that he had adopted the Scottish system of bankruptcy. The Scottish system of bankruptcy, with some exceptions and some provements, has accordingly been adopted; and those exceptions and provements are briefly explained in their proper place, in the succeeding apters of this work.

The whole scheme of the Bankruptcy Act of 1869 is to ignore, so far as acticable, official aid, to entrust the winding up of the estate to a trustee der the inspection of a committee of the creditors-all elected by and ting under the governing power of the general body of the creditors. The awarding of adjudication in bankruptcy, the hearing of motions and peals, and interposing their judicial sanction to the proceedings of the ustee, the committee of inspection, and the general body of the creditors, nstitute the main functions of the new courts of bankruptcy. The trustee is to exercise the functions of a court of the first instance in ljudicating on the claims of the creditors, subject to an appeal to the court. Adopting the Scottish system, a new officer, called the comptroller in ankruptcy, supervises the whole proceedings of the trustee. He examines ie statements or reports, which every trustee is required by the statute to ansmit to him periodically, and to call the trustee to account for any isconduct or neglect. He may require the trustee to make good any ss the estate may have sustained by such neglect or misconduct; and he shall fail to transmit such statement within the specified time, the omptroller reports the case to the court, and the court makes such order 3 it thinks fit.

On the question of settlement by composition, Mr. Gilmour oints out certain provisions in the Scottish system which have ot been adopted in the Bankruptcy Act 1869. He explains the eason why and suggests the proper remedy. His views we will ive in his own language:

The mode of settlement by composition under the English Bankruptcy Act 1869, differs in two material respects from the Scottish system. The one, that, in Scotland, the finding of security for payment of the composiion is an essential condition of its being entertained for consideration; whereas by this statute security is not essential to the offer. The other, hat, under the operation of the Scottish system of summary diligence, execution issues as a matter of course against the bankrupt and his sureties for payment of the composition; whereas by this statute the provisions of the composition contract can only be enforced by the court on a motion made in court.

By the operation of summary diligence in Scotland, the simple act of registration of the bond by the bankrupt and his sureties is a judgmentcalled a decree of registration-at the instance of each creditor separately against the bankrupt and his sureties, jointly and severally, for payment of the composition; and is besides a running judgment for each future instalment of the composition as it becomes due, ready for execution, without any application to the court.

Another valuable element in summary diligence, whether on a money bond, a bill of exchange, or promissory note, is this-that the debtor must become plaintiff to set aside the pecuniary obligation which he has undertaken, and that, as a rule, he can only be heard to challenge it on finding security for debt and costs.

For want of this system of summary diligence in England, the framer of the Bankruptcy Act of 1869 found it necessary to provide in its stead that any disobedience of the provisions of any composition contract may be enforced by the court on a motion made in a summary manner; but a motion in court in every instance of the nonpayment of a composition costs a vast deal of money throughout the year, which the Scottish decree of registration would entirely save.

In 1855 and 1856 Lord Brougham brought in a Bill-prepared by Mr. Gilmour-to introduce into England the Scottish system of summary diligence. That Bill was passed by the House of Lords twice, and had all but passed the House of Commons at the end of the session of 1856, when, in consequence of a pressure of Government Bills, it was withdrawn. But amongst the great changes now impending in the judicature of England, it may be a matter for consideration whether this valuable measure be not worthy of adoption.

The Law Relating to Fraudulent Conveyances under the Statute of Elizabeth and the Bankruptcy Acts, with remarks on the Law relating to Bills of Sale. By ARTHUR JOSEPH HUNT, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. London: Butterworths.

THIS is one of the increasing class of "concise treatises " which are acceptable substitutes for the heavier works. These latter can always be consulted if more extensive references to cases, and argumentative writing-which we should discourage in text books

-are required; but for the purposes of practical utility the easily portable books which state the law concisely are to be preferred. The law on the subject treated by Mr Hunt is probably more or less familiar to our readers, and the chief feature possessing novelty is the portion relating to the Bankruptcy Act of 1869. We have looked at this with some care, and find that whilst being concise Mr. Hunt is clear, which means that he understands what he writes about. We were somewhat struck with the skill with which he left all the chaff in the decisions in the various cases on the right of execution creditors, and selected the one point necessary to state. He is perhaps a little too prone to set out sections of Acts of Parliament, but this is merely a question of space; as he does not appear to have unduly abbreviated any portion of his work, it may be a merit rather than a defect.

A treatise on the same subject by Mr. May was published in 1871, by which the wind must have been considerably taken out of Mr. Hunt's sails, and we must confess that we should prefer to give a little more money and possess Mr. May's work. But, standing alone, Mr. Hunt's book may be commended as an accurate and concise statement of the law.

The History and Law of Church Seats or Pews. By ALFRED HEALES, F.S.A., Proctor in Doctors'-commons. London: Butterworths. THIS work is published in two slender volumes, one of which is devoted to history and the other to law. The subject is one in which it is possible a considerable number of persons will be interested, but there are few in the legal profession sufficiently engaged in ecclesiastical law to make them anxious on the various questions very ably treated by Mr. Heales. The object of the work he declares to be of a twofold nature. "The first part is an investigation of the early history of the subject, from its origin (so far as the gathered mists of antiquity will permit) until it acquired the form in which it is now clothed." The writer, we are told, has deemed it as much a point of duty to his readers as of honour to himself, to place before them every authority which has come within his range, and has endeavoured to draw impartial conclusions from his materials. We must here take issue with Mr. Heales. Citing every case on record does not always redound to an author's credit; the omission of reference to obsolete law and overruled authority could not affect the honour of a writer, and it might be that duty to his readers might lie more in that direction than in rigid retention. The second part is "intended to show, under a special arrangement of the subject, what points have been decided hitherto," again including "all cases to the present date." Fortunately, however, the cases are not numerous. The author tells us that his work contains between 1400 and 1500 extracts from or references to about 350 authorities.

We have gone through the second part of the work, namely, that devoted to law, and find that it is admirable. The arrangement is good, and the style clear. Part A of book 2, only a couple of pages, refers to seats in cathedrals; part B, division A, deals with ordinary seats in parish churches; division B treats of the rector's seat, and division C to private scats-and private seats, we need hardly say, occupy the greatest amount of the author's attention. Part C, division A, shortly refers to private chapels; and division B of the same part to proprietary chapels. Part D relates to churches built under Acts of Parliament, and here the general Church Building Acts are fully discussed. From a list which is given it appears that twenty-two of these Acts have been passed since 1818. Part D, division B, treats of private Acts. To the work are appended a list of cases and a good index.

The cutting up of the work, first into two volumes and then into parts and divisions, was a mistake, and we should recommend Mr. Heales to rectify it if a second edition is called for. If the subject were more attractive, and more commonly under discussion, the book possesses amply sufficient merit to reach a second edition in a very short time.

The Burgh Laws. By ALEXANDER J. WARDEN, F.S.A., London: Longmans.

To those interested in ancient history this work will be interesting. No collection of the statutes and ordinances, the acts, laws, and regulations of the guildry or trade incorporations in any of the Scottish burghs has, we are told, ever been published. It strikes us that a great deal of old and useless-useless for any purpose, we mean provisions are here compiled; but on the other hand, the compilation generally throws considerable light upon the legal history of Scotland. To the antiquarian more than to the modern lawyer, Mr. Warden's work must commend itself.

Oke's Magisterial Synopsis. Eleventh Edition. Butterworths. THE tenth edition of this valuable work was published so recently as 1868, and this fact is more eloquent of the merits of Mr. Oke's labours than any amount of commendation from us. It is only necessary that we should notice the appearance of this last edition, which we do with much pleasure.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

Browning's Laws of Marriage and Divorce.

Snell's Principles of Equity. Second Edition. By Griffiths.

Third Volume of the Revised Statutes, the period embraced being from 11 Geo. 3 to 4 1 Geo. 3-1770 to 1800.

THE STOCK MARKETS.

CITY, THURSDAY, MAY 30. THE course of the Money Market since the Bank rate was raised to 5 per cent. on the 9th May, has plainly indicated that it was impossible to maintain such a rate, and the evidence confirming this view has been stronger from day to day, until, to-day, the Bank directors lowered their minimum rate to 4. This change was followed by a reduction of the rates outside for fine short bills to 33 to, while the deposit rates were lowered 1 per cent. to 3 per cent. at call, and 34 at notice. The markets for public securities have moved firmly in the upward direction owing in the first place to the circumstances just referred to. Ă further additional strength was imparted early in the week, founded upon the hopes that were entertained that the success of the supplementary article would at length render effective the Washington Treaty and set at rest the question of which all the world is weary. At the moment, however, the intelligence is not so encouraging, and a temporarily dull tone characterised the markets at the opening to-day, but the reduction in the value of money exercised a favourable influence and there was a rally. During this week business has been restricted on account of the races, which yesterday, as usual, thinned the attendance in the Stock Exchange. The progress of the settlement has also engaged attention to the exclusion of new business for the moment. The British Funds for the week are to higher.

The last quotation for French Rentes from Paris was 55fr. 20c. The sum of £119,000 has been sent into the bank to-day, and in consequence of the reduced rate the demand for discount has been on a somewhat extensive scale.

In American securities the United States 5-20 Bonds of 1862, and the 10-40s have risen for the week, but Eries are 3 lower.

In some cases the rise in British railway stocks has been more marked this week than last, owing chiefly to the improved traffic receipts which have been published, with fine weather, to encourage the belief that the dividends will average the rates calculated upon for the current half-year. Lancashire and Yorkshire stock is 5 higher for the week; Great Northern, Midland, and North-Eastern, 4; London and North-Western and London and South-Western, 24; Caledonian, Great Northern A, 2; North British, 1 ; &c.

The changes for the week in Foreign Stocks are favourable generally, with the exception of one or two outside Stocks being a little dull to an extent not calling for particular remarks. There is an improvement of 1 in Egyptian 7 per Cent. 1868, and Spanish Quicksilver; of in Brazilian 5 per Cent. 1865; of in Argentine 1868, the French Loans, Turkish 5 per Cent. 1865; ditto 6 per Cent. 1865, and ditto 6 per Cent. 1871; and of the Spanish descriptions and Turkish 6 per Cent. 1869.

in

The Telegraph market has been characterised by inactivity, and the movements are few in number and of minor importance. Anglo-American stock is 2 higher than when we last wrote, Anglo-American 1, and Mediterranean Extension, but French Cables have relapsed.

In miscellaneous stocks and shares the tone, as a rule, has been healthy, and transactions have been on an extended scale. Several fluctuations have occurred during the week, but to-day prices do not show a particularly striking contrast with last week's. Phosphate Sewage has risen from 2 to 3; Native Guano, 1; and Telegraph Construction 4.

The latest quotations for British Funds are as follows: Consols, for money, 93 to 93; ditto 4th July account, 92 to 923 ex. div.; Reduced, and New Three per Cents., 914 to 91; Exchequer Bills, 6s. to 4s. dis. to par.; India Five per Cent. Stock, 111 to 112; ditto Four per Cent., 103 to 104; ditto Enfaced Paper Four per Çent., 96 to 97; ditto Five and a Half per Cent., 107 to 108; Bank of England Stock, 243 to 245; Metropolitan Three and a Half per Cent., 974 to 97; and French Rentes in this market, 54 to 541.

In the market for American Securities, the United States 5-20 Bonds of 1882 are marked 903 to 90%; do. 10-40 Bonds, 891 to 89; Atlantic and Great Western Bonds, 39 to 401; ditto Debentures, 49 to 501; ditto Reorganisation Stock, 100 to 101; Eries, 52 to 53: Illinois, 109 to 110; and United States Funded Loan, 891 to 894.

In the Railway Market the prices are:-Caledonians, 1163 to 117; Great Eastern, 53 to 531; Great Northern, 142 to 143; ditto, A, 166 to 166}; Great Western, 114 to 114; Lancashire and Yorkshire, 160 to 161 London and Brighton, 823 to 83; London, Chatham, and Dover, 263 to 271; ditto 4 per cent. preference, 661 to 66; London and North-Western, 1531 to 154 London and South-Western. 109 to 110; Manchester and Sheffield, 77 to 77; Metropolitan, 64 to 64; ditto District, 32 to 32; Midland, 153 to 154; North British, 66 to 67; North Eastern, 172 to 173; South-Eastern, 102 to 103; ditto deferred, 814 to 811; Grand Trunk of Canada, 21 to 224; Great Western of Canada, 221 to 22; Antwerp and Rotterdam, 19 to 20; Great Luxembourg, 18 to 181; and Lombardo Venetian, 17 to 177.

The prices of the principal Foreign Stocks are as follows: Argentine, 1868, 98 to 98; do., 6 per cent., 1871, 923 to 93; Brazilian, 5 per cent., 1865, 97 to 97: do., 5 per cent., 1871, 96 to 963; Egyptian, 7 per cent., 1868, 89 to 90; do., Viceroy Loan, 91 to 93; do., Khedive Mortgage Bonds, 79 to 79; French Morgan 6 per cent. Loan, 973 to 984; do. National 5 per cent. Loan, 43 to 4 pm.; Greek 5 per cent., 22 to 23; Italian of 1861, 68 to 68; Mexican, 15 to 15; Paraguay 90 to 91; Peruvian, 5 per cent. 1865, 101 to 102; do. 6 per cent. 1870, 81 to 82; Spanish, 30 to 303; do. 3 per cent. 1871, 30 to 30%; Turkish, 5 per cent. 1865, 53 to 54; do. 6 per cent. 1865, 72 to 721; do. 6 per cent. 1869, 61 to 613; and do. 6 per cent. 1871, 71 to 71.

In the Telegraph Market, Anglo-American Stock is quoted at 118 to 120; Anglo-Mediterranean, 185 to 188; British Australian, 9 to 9; British Indian Extension, 12 to 124; ditto Submarine, 11 to 111; Chinas, 8 to 9; Cubas, 8 to 8; Falmouths, 11 to 11; Great Northern, 14 to 15; Marseilles, Algiers, and Malta, 9 to 9; Mediterranean Extension, 61 to 6; Reuter's, 10 to 11; French Cables, 21 to 224; and West India and Panama, 6 to 6).

In miscellaneous shares the prices are as follows:-Crystal Palace 24 to 26; Credit Foncier of England, 5 to 6; General Credit and Discount, 2} to 24 pm.; International Finance, dis. to par; Hooper's Telegraph Works, 1 to 2 pm.; Hudson's Bay, 10 to 11; India Rubber and Gutta Percha, 43 to 44; National Discount, 13 to 14; Telegraph Construction, 33 to 33; Native Guano, 20 to 22; Phosphate Sewage, 17 to 19; New Sombrero Phosphate, 6 to 7; Phospho Guano, 11 to 11; and Royal Mail Steam, 88 to 90.

NOTES OF THE WEEK. COURT OF APPEAL IN CHANCERY. Thursday, May 23. (Before the LORD CHANCELLOR and the LORDS JUSTICES.)

Re THE MEYRICKE FUND. Endowed Schools Commissioners-Endowment

University-Jurisdiction-Discovery-DistrictEndowed Schools Act 1869 (32 & 33 Vict. c. 56). THIS was an appeal motion from an order of Wickens V. C. By his will, dated the 25th March 1712, the Rev. E. Meyricke gave his real and personal estates to trustees for the purpose of founding six scholarships of £10 a year, and six exhibitions of £8 a year, in favour of natives of the six counties of North Wales, to be held by them during their residence at Jesus College, Oxford. The Meyricke property having increased very considerably in value, the six scholarships had been raised to £40 a year each, and the exhibitions had been increased in number to twenty-four, and in value to £35 a year each. In 1871 the Endowed Schools Commissioners called upon Jesus College, the principal and two of the senior fellows of which were the trustees of the fund, to answer certain questions with respect to it, and the college having declined to do so, the commissioners moved formally before the ViceChancellor under the 49th section of the Endowed Schools Act 1869, for an order of committal against the bursar (as the actual custodian of the documents relating to the Meyricke fund), and a writ of sequestration against the property of the college as for a contempt of court, the real object of the motion being to try the question as to the jurisdiction of the Endowed Schools Commissioners over this endowment. The Vice-Chancellor held that they had jurisdiction, and were

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Malins, V.C. in chambers, his Honour expressed an adverse opinion as to the plaintiff's case, and directed the parties to come before him again on a certain day. Before that day the cause of Peplow v. Seabrook was, together with a number of other causes, transferred from the book of causes of Malins, V.C. to that of Bacon, V.C. The defendant, thereupon, asked the plaintiff to consent to a re-transfer of the cause. This the plaintiff refused to do, alleging that he did not wish to have the hearing of the cause delayed. The defen. dant now moved that the cause might be retrans ferred to the book of causes of Malins, V.C., and that the plaintiff might be ordered to pay the costs of the application.

Horton Smith, for the applicant, contended, on the authority of Wilson v. Gray (14 W. R. 783) and Platt v. Walter (L. Rep. 1 Ch. 471) that he was entitled to a re-transfer, as the judge from whose court the cause had been transferred had, by means of the application in chambers, become acquainted with the facts of the case; and on the authority of Cocq v. Husnageria Coffee Company (L. Rep. 4 Ch. 415) that the plaintiff should pay the costs of the motion, as he had refused to consent to the re-transfer on insufficient grounds. Berkeley for the plaintiff.

Lord Justice JAMES thought that the applicant was entitled to an order for a retransfer, and that the plaintiff must pay the costs, as the reasonable course would have been to consent to the re-trans. fer at once.

Solicitor: C. A. Wright.

BETTS v. CLEAVER. Practice Costs-Taxation - Solicitor-Perusing affidavits-Three counsel-Retainer. THIS was an appeal from a decision of Bacon, V.C. The taxing master had disallowed charges made by the defendant's solicitors — first, for

were about to be rebuilt, to require them to be rebuilt in a general line fixed by their architect, without compensating the owner of the land, under the 74th section of the Act, and, accordingly, he granted the injunction prayed for. From this order the defendants appealed, and, on the appeal motion coming on to be heard, it was arranged that the hearing of the cause should be taken before the Lords Justices in the first instance.

Glasse, Q. C. and Macnaghten for the plaintiff. Bristowe, Q. C. and Cracknall for the defendants. Their LORDSHIPS were of opinion that the ViceChancellor's decision was perfectly right. The plot of land was in the same position as if houses were standing on it when the plaintiff purchased it and he had himself pulled them down. The case did not come within the 75th section at all. There must, therefore, be an order in the terms of the prayer of the bill.

Solicitors: R. Lambert and Son; I. and C. and W. Rogers.

ROLLS COURT. April 16, 17, 18, and May 22.

GUILBERT v. GUIGNON.

Holders of bills of lading-Priority-Notice. THIS was a bill filed by the representative of the West of England and South Wales Bank claiming to be entitled to a cargo of wheat, under the following circumstances:-Messrs. Forbes, Knight, and Co., carrying on business at Glasgow and San Francisco, received a large order from a miller named Kemp for wheat to be shipped from San Francisco. Several cargoes were shipped and received by Kemp and duly paid for, about which no question arose, but on the 11th Sept. 1868, 10,760 bags of wheat were shipped on board the Theodor Ducos, then lying at San Francisco, to Kemp's order, and on the following day Forbes, Knight, and Co. sent him a letter of advice, enclosing an original bill of lading. It appeared that the mode of dealing adopted between Forbes, Knight, and Co. and Kemp was for Forbes, Knight, and Co. to draw on Kemp against shipments by bills at sixty days sight, and then to sell the bills with the bills of lading attached, at the same time sending a copy of the bill of lading to Kemp. The bill drawn by Forbes, Knight, and Co. against the cargo of the Theodor Ducos was sold to the Bank of British Columbia on the 12th Sept. 1868, and on the 12th Oct. following it was presented by their agent in England to Kemp, who accepted it, but failed to pay it when it became due, and it was ultimately taken up by the drawers, Forbes, Knight and Co. On the 13th Oct. 1868, Kemp assigned the bill of lading which had been sent to him by mistake to the West of England and South Wales Bank as a security for advances. Kemp subsequently became bankrupt, and the cargo, on its arrival, was claimed by the plaintiff's bank, as assignee of the bill of lading, and by the Bank of British Columbia as purchasers for value of the bill. By an order of the court the cargo was sold and the proceeds of the sale paid into court.

Fry, Q.C. and Ince and Murch (of the Common Law Bar), for the plaintiff. Benjamin (of the Common Law Bar), and Bradford, for Forbes, Knight and Co.

Sir R Baggallay, QC. and Kekewich, for the Bank of British Columbia.

Lord ROMILLY said he was of opinion that Kemp was well aware of the mode of dealing pursued by Forbes, Knight and Co. in their transactions with him, and that this mode was adopted with his consent, and the mistake of Forbes, Knight and Co. in sending an original bill of lading instead of a copy had occasioned the suit. The question to be determined was, who was the first transferee of the bill of lading, and he was of opinion that the Bank of British Columbia was, and that the letter of advice of the 12th Sept. 1868 amounted to notice of the claim of the Bank of British Columbia, both to Kemp and to the plaintiff's bank. The Bank of British Columbia had sold their claim to Forbes, Knight and Co., who stood in the shoes of the bank, and were entitled to enforce all the legal rights and equities of the bank. His Lordship held that Forbes, Knight and Co. were entitled to the proceeds of the sale of the cargo, and dismissed the bill with costs as against all the defendants except Kemp. Solicitors: Clarke, Woodcock, and Ryland; Rooks, Kenrick, and Harston; Freshfields.

chairman of the company, purchased, by the direction, and on behalf of the plaintiffs, 102 £10 shares in the Lynn and Hunstanton Railway Company, and such shares were on the 23rd July 1863, transferred to Mr. Love. Notice that Mr. Love was a trustee for the plaintiffs was given to the secretary of the Lynn and Hunstanton Railway Company. In August 1863, Mr. Love ceased to be chairman of the plaintiff company, and Mr. Goodson was appointed in his stead, and on the 20th Sept. 1863, the shares were transferred by Love to Goodson. In Feb. 1864, the shares were converted into £1020 stock of the same company, which was duly registered in the name of James Goodson. In Feb. 1866, Goodson ceased to be chairman, and the defendant Turner was appointed in his place, and by a deed dated in July 1866, Goodson transferred the stock to Turner, and the transfer was shortly afterwards registered in the books of the Lynn and Hunstanton Railway Company. On the 4th Sept. 1869, Turner was adjudicated bankrupt and the defendants Field and Foreman were appointed creditors' assignees, and they now claimed the stock as having been in Turner's order and disposition, with the consent of the true owner, at the date of his bankruptcy. They admitted the trust by their answer, but contended it was an illegal one, inasmuch as the plaintiff company was not authorised to hold shares or stock in another company.

defendant, in carrying on his business of a lighterman and wharfinger, without receiving any regular remuneration, but received irregular payments for the maintenance of himself and family, amounting to about £200 per year. In 1850 the plaintiff and his father entered into partnership as lightermen and wharfingers. There was no deed of partnership, but a verbal arrangement that, after deducting £210 out of the profits to be paid to Newell, the father, out of which he was to pay the ground rent and all rates and taxes in respect of the wharf, the residue was to be divided between them equally. The partnership continued down to the year 1866, when plaintiff's mind became affected, and in Jan. 1867 he was placed in a private asylum, where he remained for more than three years, and was then discharged, cured. Early in 1867 the defendant Newell advertised a dissolution of the partnership, and entered into an arrangement with the defendant, John Edmund Bovill, to grant him a lease of the wharf for a term of twenty-one years, and in order to do this, obtained the execution of a release by the plaintiff of all his interest in the premises. The deed was taken to plaintiff, and his execution obtained by his uncle, Mr. Raper, with whom, as plaintiff in cross-examination admitted, he had always lived on affectionate terms, and who would not be likely to do anything antagonistic to his interests. The bill prayed that the release might be delivered up to be cancelled, and that the lease to Bovill might be set aside. The plaintiff admitted by the bill that he had no beneficial interest in the Fry, Q.C. and Bagshawe for the creditors' property as long as his father lived, and that assignees. during his life he was a mere trustee for him. Sir R. Baggallay, Q.C. and Gardiner for the plaintiff.

Sir R. Baggallay, Q.C. and Smart, for the plaintiffs.

Speed for Turner.

Lord ROMILLY held that the creditors' as

signees were entitled to the stock which the plaintiffs could not legally hold, and that it did not come within that description of trust property which is excepted from being in the order and disposition of the bankrupt, and dismissed the bill with costs.

Solicitors: W. H. Shaw; Wild, Barber and Brown; Learoyd and Learoyd.

May 8, 23, and 24.

SMITH V. ADKINS.

Execution of power-Formalities-Published, acknowledged and declared, équivalent to delivered.

THIS suit raised the question whether a power of appointment, to be executed by a deed or deeds, instrument, or instruments in writing, with or without power of revocation, to be signed, sealed, and delivered in the presence of two credible witnesses, was well exercised by the will of the donee of the power, signed, sealed, published, acknowledged, and declared. The deed creating the power was executed prior to the Wills Act (1 Vict. c. 26), and it was contended that it could power should be exercised by will, as at that time it required three witnesses to a will to pass real estate, the subject of the power being a freehold house and grounds. The will, which the plaintiff alleged exercised the power, was dated the 5th Aug. 1851.

not have been the intention of the donor that the

Fry, Q.C. and Wm. Pearson for the plaintiff. Sir R. Baggallay, Q.C., and Hallett for the defendant.

Willis Bund for the trustees.

Lord ROMILLY said he was quite clear that this was a good execution of the power. Even assuming that the donor intended it to be an act inter vivos, the authorities show that it may be executed by a will, provided the formalities required are complied with. Here it is required to be signed, sealed, and delivered. It is signed and sealed, and also published, acknowledged, and declared, which is equivalent to delivery, for it is not necessary that the instrument should be parted with in order to make a delivery.

Solicitors, Terrell and Chamberlain; B. Hunt.

Friday, May 24. NEWELL. NEWELL. Execution of release by person of unsound mindCancellation.

THIS was a suit to set aside a deed executed by the plaintiff, at the instance of the defendant, whilst an inmate of a private lunatic asylum, without any independent legal advice. By an indenture of lease, dated the 29th Sept. 1842, certain premises on the south bank of the Thames were demised, by Sir William Abdy, to the defendant John Newell and the plaintiff, for a term of seventy years, at the yearly rent therein reserved, and subject to the rents and covenants therein contained. The bill alleged that the plaintiff's name was inserted in the lease by the defendant Newell, who was his father, as a provision for him, and in order that the property might belong to the plaintiff on the death of the defendant Newell. Subsequently, a building known as Newell's wharf was erected on the premises. From the year 1843 until 1850 the plaintiff, trust'ing to such arrrangement, assisted his father, the

Fry, Q.C. and Decimus Sturges for the defendant Newell.

Southgate, Q.C. and Nalder for Bovill. Lord ROMILLY held that the release could not stand; that Bovill was a necessary party to the suit, but that he could not set aside a lease to him in the present proceedings, and ordered the defendant Newell to pay the costs of the suit.

Solicitors: Swann and Co.; Jenkinson and Son; Collyer-Bristow, Withers, and Russell.

May 6 and 27.

LOCKING v. PARKER. Trust for sale in third person as security for loan -Possession of lender for more than twenty one years-Statute of Limitations (3 & 4, Will. 4, c. 27, ss. 25, 28)-Surrender of term. THIS suit raised a question under the Statute of Limitations, whether a trust for sale, vested in a third person by way of security for money lent, is within the 25th section of 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, relating to express trusts, or whether time runs in favour of the trustee in possession, in the same manner as it does in favour of a mortgagee in possession, under the 28th section of the Act, where the mortgage is in the ordinary form. Cn the 10th May 1822, William Locking demised a certain property, derived under his father's will, to Lysimachus Parker, to secure certain advances. By an indenture of 25th April 1828, he further charged the same property with £100, and also demised a second property to Lysimachus Parker for a term of 2000 years, and by an indenture of the 11th Feb. 1829, William Locking, having borrowed a further sum of £560 from Lysimachus Parker, conveyed the fee in both properties, together with a third property, to Cornelius Parker, in trust to sell, and out of the proceeds to pay, first, the costs attending the sale and incurred in the execution of the trusts; secondly, the amount due to Lysimachus Parker, and the residue to William Locking. On the same day Lysimachus Parker entered into possession of the property, William Locking having attorned tenant to him, and he continued in possession until his death, in Aug. 1860, except as to portions of the estate which were sold and conveyed by Cornelius Parker in the years 1832, 1839, 1840, and 1843. Lysimachus Parker, by his will, devised all his property to Cornelius Parker and his co-defendant. The plaintiff, as the heirat-law of William Locking, filed his bill to have the trusts of the deed of 11th Feb. 1829, carried into execution, and for an account. dants contended that the transaction was virtually a mortgage, and that the plaintiff, representing the mortgagor, was barred by the 28th section of the Act, the mortgagee having been in possession more than twenty-one years. It was also contended that the deed of 1829, did not operate as a surrender of the terms created by the indentures of the 10th May, 1822, and the 25th April 1828.

The defen

Fry, Q. C., C. Hall, and Marcy for the plaintiff. Southgate, Q. C., and Nalder for the defendants. Lord ROMILLY said it was impossible not to hold that this was an express trust. The property was conveyed to Cornelius Parker upon several trusts, the last of which was in favour of William Locking. Cornelius Parker accepted the trusts, as was evidenced by his having executed them in