sheriff, or coroner, to be executed. The sects. 46 and 47 in the County Court Act of the same year as the Mercantile Law Amendment Act (19 & 20 Vict. c. 97) 1856, are merely directory, and do not declare the law to be that the goods shall be bound by the issue of the warrant, but only regulates the priority in case of one or more writs issuing from County Courts, or writs from a Superior and the County Court. Sect. 33 of the original County Court Act enacts that the high bailiff shall be responsible in like manner as the sheriff'; and in Burton v. Le Gros (34 L. J., N. S., 91, Q. B.), Mr. Justice BLACKBURN says: "Unless the defendants can make out the distinction between the position and liability of the high bailiff of a County Court and those of the sheriff, they are liable."

THE judgment of the County Court Judges on Mr. BASS's proposals to abolish credit for the working man by making debts either irrecoverable and judgments not enforcable by commitment, appears to be unanimous. Mr. INGHAM, Judge of the Cumberland circuit, agrees with the other Judges, Mr. DANIEL and Mr. STONOR, who have expressed opinions on the subject. The Bill to abolish the power to recover debts under 40s. Mr. INGHAM calls "the drinking Bill"-not, apparently, because in itself it has anything to do with beer scores, but because it will give the debtor, who is not compellable to pay the tradesmen who supply him with necessaries, more money to spend at the beershop. It is going rather far, perhaps, to say that the non-payment of a debt when a man has the means is a fraud, and we do not altogether agree with Mr. INGHAM when he places this offence upon the same footing as that of being drunk and incapable in the public streets, or the father of a bastard. Drunkenness in the streets is an offence against morality which we consider should be punished by imprisonment without the option of a fine. So a father must, by a wise provision of our law, provide for his children, legitimate and illegitimate. If he fails in this duty he sins against the community, and is properly liable to imprisonment. No offence, however, is committed by accepting credit which a tradesman is willing to give, and, as pointed out by Mr. DANIEL, the commitment of a debtor to prison is not for the purpose of punishment, but to coerce him into payment. And this is the basis upon which imprisonment for debt, if retained at all, must rest. No hardship is entailed upon the debtor by the present system of commitment, for, as Mr. INGHAM takes the trouble to follow us in showing, in answer to the Daily Telegraph, no order is made until the debtor has had full opportunity of avoiding the last alternative. Finally, Mr. INGHAM passes a rather sweeping condemnation upon "members of the Legislature, Judges of the Superior Courts, and those who stand highest in the Profession," for their ignorance "about the jurisdiction and practical working of the County Courts." Undoubtedly it is advisable that the County Court system should not be interfered with until the County Court Judges have had an opportunity of expressing their opinions upon the contemplated reforms or innovations; but we question whether ignorance prevails so universally as Mr. INGHAM appears to believe.

No one who knew anything of the character of Lord Justice CHRISTIAN could expect that he would for ever remain silent under the caustic reference to his criticism upon the operation of the Irish Land Act made in Parliament by Mr. GLADSTONE. The menaces thrown out by the PRIME MINISTER, the severe reproof administered in all but express terms, we can quite believe, have rankled for months past in the 'mind of the spirited Irish Judge. We do not for a moment share the opinions of those who condemn his lordship. On the contrary, we regard with satisfaction those outbursts of high independent spirit which have come alike from the English and the Irish Bench. It is, of course, unfortunate that the Government should have given occasion to the objections so forcibly put forward in the one case by our own LORD CHIEF JUSTICE to the mode of creating members of one of our highest courts of appeal, and by the Irish Lord Justice to the scope and effect of the Irish Land Act. These, however, were errors shared in by the Legislature either by enactment or ratification; but the blunders superadded to these errors by the LORD CHANCELLOR and Mr. GLADSTONE are personal. It was a blunder in both to treat the protests of the LORD CHIEF JUSTICE in the COLLIER case with less courtesy and consideration than they deserved; it was a blunder in Mr. GLADSTONE to scold Lord Justice CHRISTIAN. The retort which now comes from Lord Justice CHRISTIAN, though somewhat late, is none the less forcible. "I take leave to say," he observed in court, "that in case it shall ever happen during the brief remainder of a judicial life which is now not far from its close, that this Act shall come up again to this court for interpretation, or any other Act or any other question, be it what it may, I hope it will be seen that I shall not be afraid to deal with it in the way that during my fourteen years upon the Bench it has ever been my endeavour to deal with every case that has come before me in this or any other court in which I have ever had the honour to sit, to form upon it, and speak out, after my own fashion, my own independent opinion--not propping myself upon others, nor making of myself a mere echo of the thoughts or ideas of others, nor shrink

ing from my own convictions through dread of having to stand alone in them. This, my long-accustomed course, I hope I shall have the firmness still to pursue, unmoved by menaces-menaces of hostile notices' and severe reproofs '-correctives which it seems to be thought now-a-days that the ministers of the Crown bave a right to hold suspended in terrorem over the heads of the Judges, to be let fall upon any of them who should be found rash enough, in the exercise of his office, to criticise unfavourably some privileged measure with which the prestige of some powerful minister might happen to be associated. Speaking for myself, and I think I may add, if not for, yet in the interest of the whole independent judiciary, whose independence would be but a name if such a pretension could be maintained, I impugn the new-fangled and most unconstitutional assumption of a right of censorship in the executive Government, or in any member of it, over the judgments we deliver in our courts." We see nothing in this to condemn, very much to admire: and we shall regret the day, should it ever come, when our judges fail to emulate Lord Chief Justice COCKBURN and Lord Justice CHRISTIAN in criticising the acts of an administration.

THE LAW FOR THE PROTECTION OF WOMEN. IT has been the habit of female writers of late to find fault with our legislators. They complain that woman does not obtain sufficient consideration at their hands, and this is attributed to an inclination to regard every question from an exclusively mascu line point of view. Whatever might have been the case at one time, this is scarcely true of the present House of Commons, the floor of which is now quite the stage for the champions of woman and the advocates of female rights. In fact, there are in the present House of Commons several worthy members who would have won high renown in the age of chivalry, when it was the habit of the chivalrous man to wander about the country seeking to redress the grievances of the weaker sex, and to avenge their wrongs. But we do not live in that golden age. And the spirit of knight errantry, however admirable, is scarcely the quality we would desire to find in a legislator. Women are said to be the creatures of impulse-we may safely say their champions in the House are decidedly so. It is, however, not safe to legislate on impulse and in the heat of blood. It is not statesmanlike, nor is it consistent with that deliberativeness which ought to be the greatest characteristic of a true statesman. Of course, at times, reason will become subservient to the influences of the moment;

but a lapse of time generally restores equilibrium. Not So, however, with Mr. DENMAN and Mr. STRAIGHT, who appear to us, in their impetuous eagerness to protect women from calumny and violence, in a light which, while it does credit to their hearts, is by no means complimentary to their reason.

We all more or less regretted the failure of justice witnessed in one of our metropolitan police courts, some three months ago, in the escape of a person who, whether he spoke the truth or not, fully merited severe punishment for bringing ignominy and ruin on a family occupying a high position in society. But we do not admit that it was the fault of the law; for there can be little doubt that had the prosecution been carried on to its issue, the law would have fully vindicated itself, for even if the defendant had proved that what he said was true, it would have been in itself no defence. unless it was also proved that it was for the public benefit that the matters charged should be published. And even if that could be done, the prosecution could have proceeded on the charge of attempting to extort money by threats to publish a libel, in which the truth or falsehood of the libel would not, we think, be in issue at all.

Again, we have from time to time to deplore the state of society in which the ruffians are to be found capable of inflicting the gross outrages and assaults upon women, the details of which the newspapers occasionally publish. But is it the fault of the law? If severer punishments were inflicted on the wrongdoers, would there be an end to such violent assaults, or would they be decreased?

The punishments which the law now imposes on persons guilty of publishing defamatory libels, are regulated by the 4th and 5th sections of the 6 & 7 Vict. c. 96, being imprisonment for periods not exceeding one and two years respectively. The 44th, 46th, and 47th sections of the 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, regulate the punishment to be inflicted upon persons guilty of sending letters threatening to accuse persons of various crimes for the purpose of extorting money. Persons guilty of the offences thereby provided for, are liable to imprisonment with or without hard labour, and solitary confinement for any period not exceeding two years, and to penal servitude (in some cases) for life, or for any period not less than five years. Mr. DENMAN is, however, of opinion that these punishments are insufficient to deter, and that it is expedient to make further provision for the punishment of libel and defamation. No person can be sentenced to hard labour for libel. This Mr. DENMAN proposes to amend, and he proposes also that persons convicted of threats with intent to extort money by odious accusations, may, in addition to the punishment now imposed, be whipped privately from one to three times; if under sixteen years of age, by a number of lashes not exceeding twenty-five, by a

birch rod, and if exceeding that age, to have lashes not exceeding thirty, the court to specify the number and instrument of punishment. The 4th section of Mr. DEN MAN'S Bill contains the novel and startling proposal to make it a felony punishable with penal servitude for life, or imprisonment for two years with hard labour, and solitary confinement, and also whipping as before specified, for any person to accuse or threaten to accuse, by letter or otherwise, any woman of unchastity, with the intent to extort money from any person. This is a proposal so sweeping that we can hardly believe Mr. DENMAN to be in earnest, and we feel certain that the Legislature will never sanction any Bill containing such a section as the one in question. The second reading of Mr. DENMAN'S Bill is fixed for the 5th June.

The law regulating the punishment for aggravated assaults upon women and children renders an offender guilty of such an assault liable to be tried summarily by justices of the peace, and to be imprisoned for a term not exceeding six months, or a fine not exceeding £20, and to find sureties to keep the peace for the term of six more months after the expiration of the punishment (24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, s. 43). For rape, attempt at rape, and indecent assault, the various punishments are enacted by the 48th, 50th, 51st, and 52nd sections of the same Act, enlarged, however, as to the period of penal servitude, by the 27 & 28 Vict. c. 47. But these punishments are not, in the opinion of Mr. STRAIGHT, sufficient in their severity, and he also, like Mr. DENMAN, proposes the addition of corporal punishment by whipping, and has introduced a Bill having this object in view.

And so we have two measures before the House of Commons whose object is to revive the brutal and demoralising infliction of whipping. No doubt those whose names are placed on the backs of the Bills in question are influenced by a sincere desire to do what is best for the protection of the weak; but there can be no doubt they have been led away by the sensational clap-trap in which some newspapers indulge. It is impossible, from newspaper reports, to ascertain the truth. The whole case is garbled and placed before the public in a fanciful light. The magistrate who hears the evidence, and knows all that can be known of the case, and observes the demeanour of the witnesses and the appearance of the parties, is in a better position to know how to deal with the case than any outsider who gleans his information from the columns of a newspaper. The wife-beating cases, of which we recently heard so much, were disposed of by the magistrates who exercised their powers without complaining of their insufficiency; and if they felt at all that their powers were limited, they could have sent the prisoners for trial.

What, therefore, is the object of this agitation in favour of corporal punishment? Is it to wreak vengeance on the offender, or is it supposed that it would be the means of deterring persons from using violence who cannot be deterred by any other punishment? It is almost universally admitted by those who have given the matter the most serious consideration, that it is not deterrent. It is not proposed to inflict it in public; and if inflicted in private its terror is lost and its deterrent influence gone. In a recent number of a medical contemporary it was defined as barbarous in its cruelty, and its influence on the community at large would be as demoralising as it is in itself barbarous. The old idea of wreaking vengeance on the criminal as the end and aim of punishment has been long exploded, and is never now followed. This is clearly, therefore, a retrograde movement, and is opposed to the modern spirit of legislation.

It may be as well to state that in 1853, when the provisions now applicable to aggravated assaults received for the first time the sanction of the Legislatare, an attempt was made to include in the punishment corporal chastisement, but the attempt proved futile. More than two to one of the House of Commons refused to accept such a proposal. Lord PALMERSTON, who was one of those who introduced the Bill which afterwards formed the statute 16 & 17 Vict. c. 30 (the provisions of which relating to aggravated assaults were re-enacted by the 43rd section of the 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100) opposed whipping, and we cannot do better here than quote from his speech the reasons he adduced for his opposition, and which are equally applicable to the present occasion. He asked, "What was the object of punishment? He held that it was not revenge upon the offender. We did not measure punishment in proportion to the degree of criminality attaching to the person who had committed the offence. If we did it would be right to follow the example of other ages and to pursue the offender with torture in imprisonment, we should inflict bodily punishment in prison adequate to the magnitude of the offence committed. But we had abandoned that system, and the main object of punishment in these days was by public example to deter others from committing the offence. It was for the protection of society, and not for vengeance upon the individual." And as relating to the punishment of wife-beaters, his reasons are all the more telling against the introduction of whipping:-"It would tend to produce a lasting resentment between man and wife. If the punishment, besides being severe, were to be a degrading one, and one which would leave upon the husband marks which would remain for life, the wife would be deterred from making the complaint, because she would share in the disgrace which she would bring down upon her own husband and family; and, in the next place,

by inflicting upon the man marks which would last for life they would sow the seeds of domestic resentment which it could not be the object of the Legislature to implant." Other speakers fol lowed in the same strain, and succeeded in rejecting the proposal for whipping. Several brutal

The same state of things existed then as now. assaults were made upon women by men who ought to have been their protectors. Then, as now, there were men in the House ready to do battle for the weak, but who in their eagerness overstepped the true principles of legislation, and were happily defeated. We have no desire to say one word in extenuation of the cowardly conduct of the ruffians who illtreat their wives, but it is because we are really desirous of having effectual legislation for the protection of society that we are opposed to corporal punishment. Any undue severity, and the infliction of the degrading "cat," would only create a sympathy for the sufferer, and would take it away from the original victim; and thus justice would be self-destructive. Torture in a way which would not now be tolerated has been tried in this country, and had to be given up, as being opposed to the instincts of humanity, and as being useless as a punishment. It is not by torture, but by more humanising influences that a brute can be reformed. And, of course, though punishment must be awarded to the offender, we have to look to education for an ultimate cure of this ugly blot on our social condition.

THE LIABILITY OF MINE OWNERS AND THE MINES REGULATION BILL.-II.

We propose now to treat very briefly the question of the liability of mine owners to an action for damages for the breach of their statutory obligations with regard to the management of mines. As we have said, they are at present under certain such statutory obligations, and Mr. Bruce's Bills contain general rules for the management of mines, the owner being made guilty of an offence against the Act in case of contravention of, or non-compliance with, any of these rules by any person whomsoever, unless he proves that he has taken all reasonable means to prevent such contravention or non-compliance; and a penalty of not exceeding £20 is imposed for such an offence. But will he be liable besides to his servant for damages consequent on a failnre to perform this statutory duty? Will he, when he is liable to the penalty, also be liable in damages if injury has been consequent on his (and his servant's by the Act, is made his) default? The object of the Act is the protection of the servant. It is therefore a question of some importance, for there would be thus at once provided a penalty on the defaulter and compensation in damages for the sufferer.

We have already stated the grounds on which Wilson v. Merry was decided ; but, the case being a mining case, this very question was raised, though it was not decided, as not being within the exception to the Judge's ruling which was before the court.

It was urged on behalf of the appellant that the respondents were liable under the 23 & 24 Vict. 151, for the regulation of mines. By the 10th section of that Act, certain general rules are to be observed in coal mines and collieries by the owner or agent thereof, and among the rest an adequate amount of ventilation is to be constantly provided. By the 22nd section if any of the rules are neglected or wilfully violated by the owner or agent of the mine, such person is liable to a penalty of £20. It was argued that as the statute had imposed upon the owner the duty of providing proper ventilation, a failure in this respect (no matter to whom attritutable) rendered the owner responsible for the consequences.

Lords Cairns and Cranworth gave no opinion. Lord Colonsay said a question might be raised whether the workman might not be entitled to rely on the performance of the duties, as being implied in the contract of service, the purpose of the Act being to give greater safety to the workmen. Lord Chelmsford remarked upon the authorities quoted for the appellant in a sense adverse to her claim. It will be convenient to give the substance of those authorities before giving Lord Chelmsford's comment. These cases, we think, will point out pretty clearly what is the law on the subject.

The first case cited for the appellant was Couch v. Steel (3 El. & Bl. 403). This was an action by a seaman. against a shipower for neglecting to keep a proper supply of medicines on board the vessel, whereby the plaintiff's health suffered. The statute 7 & 8 Vict. c. 112, s. 18, makes it the duty of the shipowner to have on board a proper supply of medicines, and imposes a penalty recoverable by a common informer for a breach of that duty. It was held on demurrer, that the penalty was the specific remedy for breach of the duty as to the public, and that notwithstanding the penalty, sailors sustaining a private injury from the breach of the statutory duty are entitled to mantain an action to recover damages. The principles on which they were held so entitled appear from the following extract from Lord Campbell's judgment (p. 511):

"Were it not for the penalty to which the owner of the ship is subjected for not providing and keeping on board a supply of medicines, it seems clear that the action would be maintainable. The enactment provides a benefit for the seamen, and, according

The

to the plaintiff's allegations, the defendant has violated this enactment, and thereby the plaintiff, being a seaman on board, was deprived of that benefit, and his health was injured. The general rule is that when a man has a temporal loss or damage by the wrong of another, he may have an action upon the case to be repaired with damages': Com. Dig., 'Action upon the Case' (A). statute of Westminster 2 (1 Stat. 13 Ed. 1), c. 50, gives a remedy by action on the case to all who are aggrieved by the neglect of any duty created by statute: (see 2nd Inst. 486). And in Com. Dig., Action upon Statute' (F), it is laid down that in every case where a statute enacts or prohibits a thing for the benefit of a person, he shall have a remedy upon the same statute, for the thing enacted to his advantage, or for the recompense of a wrong done to him contrary to the said law.' Therefore the simple enactment, requiring the supply of medicines, would have entitled the plaintiff to an action, in the same manner as if the obligation had been expressly imposed by the common law, or had been expressly included in the ship's articles."

His Lordship then passed to the objection, which was the one substantially relied on, that the penalty concluded the plaintiff. He explained that the penalty was the remedy for the public wrong, and that, so far as the public wrong was concerned, there was no remedy but that presented by the Act of Parliament. But, beyond the public wrong, there was a special and peculiar damage sustained by the plaintiff by reason of the breach of duty by the defendant, for which he had no remedy, unless an action on the case at his suit were maintainable, and the question was, whether in such case the penalty concluded the plaintiff as well as the public, although no part of the penalty was payable to him? "If the performance of a new duty created by Act of Parliament is enforced by a penalty recoverable by the party grieved by the nonperformance, there is no other remedy than that given by the Act, either for the public or the private wrong; but by the penalty given in this Act, compensation for private and special damage seems not to have been contemplated. The penalty is recoverable in case of a breach of the public duty, though no damage may actually have been sustained by anybody, and no authority has been cited to us, nor are we aware of any, in which it has been held that in such a case as the present the common law ought to maintain an action in respect of a special damage resulting from the breach of a public duty (whether such duty exists at common law or is created by statute) is taken away by reason of a penalty recoverable by a common informer being annexed as a punishment for the nonperformance of a public duty."

Upon principle, therefore, as well as upon authority, the court held that the plaintiff was entitled to an action.

It will be remembered that, as we have said, in the proposed Acts the penalties are of the same nature as those in Couch v. Steel, recoverable by any person and payable into the Exchequer, and not intended as a compensation to injured persons; there being an express provision against the permitted payment of the penalty to sufferers by the Home Secretary affecting any legal proceeding consequent on the offence.

The second case cited was Gray v. Pullen and Hubble (5 B. & S. 970; 8 L. T. Rep. N. S. 201.) The head note, which properly expresses what was decided is, that "where a statutory obligation is imposed on a person, he is liable for any injury that arises to others in consequence of its having been negligently performed, and this, whether it were performed by himself or a contractor employed by him."

The facts were these: By the 110th section of the Metropolis Local Management Act (18 & 19 Vict. c. 120), whenever it is necessary for any person to break up the pavement of a street, he is bound to take certain precautions, and by sect. 111, if he fails to take them, he is to forfeit £5, and a further sum of 40s. for every day during which the offence continues. The defendant Pullen employed the defendant Hubble as a contractor to make a drain from his premises across a public footpath. The plaintiff, passing along the footpath at night, fell into a hole or trench over the drain, and sustained injury. Mr. Justice Blackburn, at the trial, directed a verdict for the defendant Pullen, on the ground that there was no evidence that Hubble had acted as his servant, but that the evidence was that he had acted as a contractor for the work, and that Pullen did not come within the 110th and 111th sections, so as to be liable. Leave was reserved to move to enter a verdict against him, The Queen's Bench unanimously refused the rule, but the Exchequer Chamber overruled the Queen's Bench. The plaintiff argued for two propositions-first, that where a statute imposes a duty, and gives no penalty to the party aggrieved by its non-performance, that party is entitled, on common law principles, to maintain an action; secondly, that a person cannot relieve himself from the liability by employing a contractor to perform his statutory duty. The first of these propositions the defendant did not dispute. The whole argument was on the second. The court held that the duty was imposed on the defendant by the sections of the Act; and after citing Pickard v. Smith (10 C. B., N. S., 470), they say, 'It appears to us that the defendant Pullen is not excused from liability for the omission to fill up the drain properly on the ground that he had employed a contractor to do the duty for him, and the contractor was negligent, and left the duty unperformed.

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We

think that the duty was implied in the grant of the power to open the drain in a highway in sect. 77, and was expressed in sect. 110; and that this statutable duty is created absolutely, and is not a duty, created by sect. 111 imposing a penalty, to be enforced solely by enforcing the penalty. The penalty imposed by sect. 111 appears to us to be a cumulative remedy." That is to say, a remedy over and above the remedy by action for damages consequent on a breach of a statutory duty.

Assuming that there was the statutory obligation upon the owner to provide ventilation in Wilson v. Merry, and that the failure to perform it was attributable to his manager, we should have thought that these two cases would have been decisive in favour of the plaintiff.

But Lord Chelmsford thought otherwise. As to Couch v. Steel, he says, "In this case there was no question as to the liability of the shipowner, the decision being merely that a person suffering damage from an omission of a duty was not deprived of his remedy because the Legislature had attached a penalty to such omission." But he makes no remark as to the ground of the undoubted liability of the shipowner to an action, viz., the statutory duty; and from his remarks on Gray v. Pullen, he seems to have thought that that liability was one existing inde pendently of the statute; that the penalty was the only liability imposed by the statute, and that all that the case decided was that the old liability and the new existed side by side. For commenting on Gray v. Pullen with especial reference to the last sentences quoted from the last judgment, he says: I must confess that this reasoning is not at all satisfactory to my mind. The statutable duty is no doubt created absolutely for the purposes of the Act; but it is a duty which, if unperformed, can only be enforced by the penalty, and this for the protection of the public is to be recovered against the owner or occupier who causes the works to be done. If an individual sustains an injury in consequence of the work being imperfectly performed, a civil liability is not imposed upon the owner if, without the statutable obligation, he would not have been liable."

This appears inconsistent with the principle laid down in Couch v. Steel, and admitted in Gray v. Pullen, that a statutory duty does subject a person failing to perform it to an action for damages for the consequence of his failure, notwithstanding a penalty recoverable by a public informer.

His Lordship proceeds: "The remedy is in one sense cumu lative, because the imposition of the penalty by the statute does not take away the civil remedy; but the two proceedings have totally different objects-the one to punish an offence, the other to redress an injury. For the sake of the public it may be right to make a person liable for acts which another has done on his account, but it would be a violation of principle to make him civilly responsible for such acts where he is in no sense a principal or master of the person doing them."

In these sentences again his Lordship apparently dissents from both the propositious established in Gray v. Pullen (1), that the statutory duty gave a right of action; (2), that it made no dif ference that the performance of the duty was entrusted to another, even though he was an independent contractor. As to the latter point, his Lordship apparently thought that the question depended on the relation of principal and agent, or master and servant. As to which we may refer to the judgment of Mr. Justice Blackburn in The Mersey Dock Trustees v. Gibbs (L. Rep. 1 Eng. & Ir. App 114; 14 L. T. Rep. N. S. 677), where that learned Judge clearly explains the distinction (previously pointed out in Richard v. Smith), between the responsibility of a person who causes any thing to be done which is wrongful, or fails to perform something which there was a legal obligation on him to perform, and the liability for the negligence of those who are employed in the work. "Liability," he says, "for doing an improper act depends on the order given to do that thing; and the liability for an omission to do something, depends entirely on the extent to which a duty is imposed to cause that thing to be done; in these two cases it is quite immaterial whether the actual actors are servants or not." But "liability for collateral negligence depends entirely on the existence of the relation of master and servant, between the employer and the person actually in default," upon the principle that Qui facit per alium facit per se.

If, then, Mr. Bruce's Bill becomes law, will not the mine owner in every case where he has made himself liable to the penalties under the Act, be also responsible in damages for the conse quences of his default? Once grant the statutory liability, and it would appear that in this case, at all events, it is no matter to whom the owner entrusts his duty, he will still be liable, if it is not performed; for the act specially makes the default of the agent the owner's offence. If the clause stopped there, it would be easy; but it goes on to say, "unless he proves that he has taken all reasonable means to prevent such contravention or noncompliance." What are reasonable precautions will be a question. Will the selection of competent agents and the supply to them of proper materials be reasonable means on the part of the owner? If so, the liability will be just as it was before. Or will the owner be required to do more, and see for himself, not only that the agent is competent to do, but that he does, his duty? The default of the agent being the offence of the owner, will not the owner be

in the subsequent case of Dent v. Dent (30 Beav. 363), which, however, was the case of a legal tenant for life, and a power to lay out the residuary personal estate in land, the Master of the Rolls was pressed in vain with Re Barrington's Estate, and preferring to follow Dunne v. Dunne, declined, except as to two items, to direct inquiries whether the outlays by the life tenant, in improvements and repairs of buildings, were for the benefit of the inheritance.

Does the distinction then come to this, that if the house formed part of the testator's or settlor's estate, at the date of the death or deed, it may not be repaired at the expense of the inheritance, but that if it did not, but was acquired afterwards, it may? If so, surely the distinction is fine and unsatisfactory? What difference can that circumstance make, or ought it to make, in the rights of the tenant for life?

Now we think that the general liability of a tenant for life to bear his own repairs might be advantageously relaxed, and that it would be safe to give all trustees of realty a discretionary power to charge the inheritance with them, or to defray them out of the corpus of any personal trust estate, which stands limited to the same persons as the realty. It seems to be stating the case too strongly against the tenant for life to say with Mr. Lewin, “That his repairs are his own voluntary act, and that he is not obliged to do them." Granting that the law is now settled, as it appears to be, that he is not in equity liable to permissive waste, that he may, in other words, allow the house to tumble about his ears, and that his trustees-at least where they have no special power of management-cannot, in such a case, interfere with his possession (Lewin 416); yet it is a hard alternative to subject him to, either to repair at all hazards out of his own pocket to however great an amount, or come to the court, uncertain whether he will be allowed the expenditure out of the general trust estate, or else relinquish what may be his whole income. Neither does it seem to get rid of this difficulty-to say that the repairs are a calculable outgoing, and to be taken as a known deduction (like insurance or property tax), when he accepts the property; or that the trustees may sell, if the house does not "pay its way." For although an average of the repairs, as of everything else, may be found; and good and bad years may be taken one with another, nothing is so uncertain as their yearly amount, and the particular life tenancy may be during the bad years, or be a very short one; whilst, as to sale, it might be often un vise to press such a property into the market at any particular time; or if put up to auction, there may be no bidder, and the costs of the sale be the only result. Moreover, the tenant for life might reasonably withhold his consent to a sale, either from a preference to hold the property in specie, or from a knowledge that the choice of securities in which to invest the purchase moneys is a narrow one, and that the sale would be at a loss to him of income. But if the trustees were allowed to maintain the fabric in repair, and charge the expenses of doing so on the inheritance, either under the general law of the land, or under the reimbursement clause, as so many "costs, charges, and expenses incurred in the execution of the trust," no one would be damnified; each would bear his proportion of the expense; the tenant for life, by losing the income, and the remainderman by losing the capital, of the sum expended; whilst each would be benefited by the maintenance of the fabric; the life tenant to the extent of his interest, and the remainderman by having that, which in its nature is perishable, secured, as far as may be, for permanent enjoyment.

Now a short amendment to Lord St. Leonard's Act-declaring that any deed, will, or other instrument creating a trust estate, shall, without prejudice to the clauses actually contained, or unless it be otherwise expressed therein, be deemed to contain a clause to the effect that the trustees may, if they shall think it beneficial to those in remainder, advance any settlement moneys (say, not exceeding a specified proportion), for the repairs of houses and buildings on the settled estate, and charge the inheritance therewith, or otherwise reimburse themselves out of the general trust estate for moneys so expended-would meet the difficulty, and would, we think, be found to work well, and be a considerable improvement in this branch of the law of Real Property.

THE STOCK MARKETS.

CITY, THURSDAY, MAY 23. THE receding value of money which has been generally anticipated has reached a point fully per cent. below the bank official minimum. The prices of public securities generally have in consequence been supported with daily increasing firmness, especially in cases where other circumstances of a favourable character have been in operation, as, for instance, in the British Railway market. The recent large arrivals of gold have, it is true, been taken for Germany, but to such extent the requirements for that quarter are satisfied without touching our existing reserve, and its chances of being disturbed are in proportion diminished. The more reasonable weather the last day or two has exercised a favourable effect, coming as it does, when much wanted from an agricultural point of view.

No change has been made in the Bank rate of discount, neither could any have been possible but a reduction.

The easier value of money has brought forward several of the numbers of new schemes known to have been in course of preparation

The British Funds are higher iu price than a week ago.

American Securities have moved very little. The feature has been the rise to 59 in Eries and the relapse to the price to-day of 55. The competition for shares for registration previous to the election, which has raised the price for immediate delivery, has been the chief influence at work on the other side.

A further substantial improvement in the value of home railway stocks has to be recorded. The four months' accrued dividend, and the prospective summer traffic offer inducements to buyers. Great Western takes the lead at a rise of 3, followed by Great Northern A., which is 2 better. London and North-Western stock is 14 higher; Midland and Great Northern 1; Caledonian, Lancashire and Yorkshire, London and SouthWestern, North-Eastern, and South-Eastern Ordinary and ditto Deferred, , &c. The rise in Great Western is due a good deal to the advantages which it is seen will arise from the substitution of the narrow for the broad gauge. Lombards and Antwerp and Rotterdam shares are higher. All the changes in the prices of foreign stocks are favourable for the week, with the exception of Spanish, which is lower, owing to a fall of to-day, the reason for which is not as yet ascertained. Italian, Mexican, and Brazilian New 5 per Cents. are higher; Argentine 6 per Cents. of 1871, In telegraphs, Anglo-American and Anglo-Mediterranean are 1 higher for the week. In miscellaneous shares, Phosphate Sewage have fallen 3, and Native Guano 1.

His Excellency, Señor Don Carlos Gutierrez, Minister Plenipotentiary for the Government of the Republic of Honduras to the Court of St. James's, being authorised by full powers, dated 24th Nov. 1871, to raise for his government a loan for the purpose of adapting the present Interoceanic Railway now in course of construction, to a ship railway across the Republic of Honduras in accordance with the plan of Mr. James Brunlees, M.I.C.E., the government engineer, announces that he is prepared to receive applica tions for the sum of £15,000,000 sterling nominal, at the Honduras Government Financial Agency, 8, Moorgate-street. The number of bonds is 150,000 of £100 each to bearer, carrying 10 per cent. interest. They will be issued at 80 per cent., and redeemed at par in sterling within fifteen years by half-yearly drawings, on the 1st April and 1st Oct. in each year, by means of an accumulative sinking fund of 3 per cent. per annum.

The Patent Cotton Gunpowder Company (Limited), with a capital of £120,000 in 12,000 shares of £10 each, of which 8500 are now offered to the public, is a new undertaking, the chief object of which is stated to be to acquire and work an invention patented by Mr. R. Punshon for the produc tion of a new, safe, controllable and powerful explosive, adapted for employment in Naval and Military warfare, and for mining, blasting and sporting purposes. The application of this improved substitute for Gunpowder and or dinary Gun Cotton will tend to secure the following advantages: Security during every stage of manufacture, whereby the disastrous calamities which so frequently occur in the production of gunpowder and of ordinary gun cotton are avoided. Safety in handling and storage and freedom from spontaneous combustion. A diminution in the weight of material to be transported, 50 grains of the cotton gunpowder being estimated to produce greater velocity and penetration than 85 grains of gunpowder.

The latest quotations for British Funds are as follows: Consols, for money, 93 to 93; ditto 1st June Account, 93 3-16 to 93 5-16; Reduced, and New Three per Cents., 91 to 91; Exchequer Bills, 6s. to 1s. dis. ; India Five per Cent. Stock, 110 to 111; ditto Four per Cent., 103 to 1034; ditto Enfaced Paper Four per Cent., 96 to 97; ditto Five and a Half per Cent., 103 to 108; Bank of England Stock, 243 to 245; Metropolitan Three and a Half per Cent., 974 to 97; and French Rentes in this market, 54 to 54.

French Rentes were quoted in Paris this morning at 55fr. 7c. Market flat. The sum of £11,000 has been sent into the Bank this day. Discount demand very quiet.

In the market for American Securities, the United States 5-20 Bonds of 1882 are marked 90 to 904; do. 10-40 Bonds, 91 to 91; Atlantic and Great Western Bonds, 39 to 40; ditto Debentures, 49 to 50%; Eries, 55 to 55: Illinois, 109 to 110; and United States Funded Loan, 891 to 891.

In the Railway Market the prices are:-Caledonians, 114 to 115; Great Eastern, 52 to 52 Great Northern, 138 to 139; ditto, A, 164 to 165; Great Western, 113 to 114; Lancashire and Yorkshire, 155 to 156; London and Brighton, 82 to 83; London, Chatham, and Dover, 261 to 27; ditto 4 per cent. preference, 654 to 65; London and North-Western, 151} to 151; London and South-Western. 106 to 107; Manchester and Sheffield, 76 to 76; Metropolitan, 64 to 643; ditto District, 323 to 32; Midland, 149 to 149; North British, 653 to 66; North Eastern Consols, 1694 to 1694; South-Eastern, 102 to 102; ditto deferred, 79 to 80; Grand Trunk of Canada, 214 to 213; Great Western of Canada, 22 to 221; Antwerp and Rotterdam, 181 to 19; Great Luxembourg, 18 to 18 and Lombardo Venetian, 17 to 17.

The prices of the principal Foreign Stocks are as follows: Argentine, 1868, 97 to 98; do., 6 per cent., 1871, 92 to 93; Brazilian, 5 per cent., 1865, 96 to 9; do., 5 per cent., 1871, 95 to 964; Egyptian, 7 per cent., 1858, 88 to 88; do., Viceroy Loan, 91 to 93; do., Khedive Mortgage Bonds, 79 to 793; French Morgan 6 per cent. Loan, 97 to 97; do. National 5 per cent. Loan, 4 to 4 pm. ex. div.; Greek 5 per cent., 224 to 231; Italian, 68 to 68; Mexican, 15 to 15; Paraguay 8 per cent. Loan, 914 to 92; Peruvian, 5 per cent. 1865, 101 to 102; do. 6 per cent. 1870, 81 to 81; Spanish 3 per cent. 303 to 303; do. Quicksilver, 81 to 821; do. 3 per cent. 1871, 30 to 301; Turkish, 5 per cent. 1865, 531 to 531; do. 6 per cent. 1865, 711⁄2 to 72; do. 6 per cent. 1859, 61 to 613; and do. 6 per cent. 1871, 70 to 71.

In the Telegraph Market, Anglo-American Stock is quoted at 117 to 119; Anglo-Mediterranean. 183 to 186; British Australian, 9 to 9; British Ind an Extension, 12 to 124; ditto Submarine, 10 to 11; Chinas, 8 to9; Cubas, 8 to 8; Falmouths, 11 to 11; Marseilles, Algiers, and Malta, 9 to 9; Mediterranean Extension, 6 to 6; French Cables, 22 to 22; Reuter's, 10 to 114; and West India and Panama, 64 to 6).

In miscellaneous shares the prices are as follows:-Crystal Palace 24 to 26; General Credit and Discount, 24 to 24 pm.; International Finance, dis. to pm. ; India Rubber and Gutta Percha, 42 to 44; National Discount, 13 to 14; Telegraph Construction, 334 to 33; Native Guano, 19 to 21; Phosphate Sewage, 15 to 16; and Royal Mail Steam, 88 to 90. The Honduras Railway Loan is quoted at 11 to 1 pm.; and the Shares of the Patent Gun Cotton at to 1 pm.