appeals have always been a part of the business of the Bar, and that which is a substitute for them should be so too. On the other hand, attorneys appear before the licensing justices, and they consider that they ought to be entitled to carry the case before the licensing committee. We trust there will be no serious conflict of interests, and that the committees may succeed in satisfying all parties. THE JURISDICTION OF JUSTICES. By a judgment in the case of Lanyon, which came before a Judge at Chambers, Mr. Justice Quain has held that where an informal bastardy order is served upon a defendant, the magistrates, upon the application of the mother, may subsequently issue a formal order. The only adjudication made in such a case is upon the first application, and if the order is irregularly drawn up the adjudication is not abortive, and without any tender of costs to the defendant the applicant may have the record amended, and upon this amended order may obtain the commitment of the defendant to prison. The following cases bear upon the question of the validity and operation of the orders of magistrates:-Reg. v. Brisley (18 L. J. 157, M. C.) decides that where a magistrate's order is bad on the face of it, it may be treated as a nullity, and need not be quashed on appeal or certiorari before a second application to other justices can be made. The case is also an authority for the position that, where an order is faulty, and the second application is made to different justices from those who made the order, there must be a fresh summons and a fresh hearing. But, if the second application be made to the same justices there is no necessity to issue a fresh summons. This was decided in the case of Wilkins v. Hemsworth (7 A. & E. 807). In that case the justices signed two orders, intended to be duplicate, but, by mistake the order intended for the mother was served on the father, and the order directed to the father was served on the mother. It was held that the mal-service of the order did not vitiate it, when it was once correctly pronounced, but that a correct copy might afterwards be drawn up and properly served. The case of Lanyon, therefore, was concluded by the case of Reg. v. Brisley (ubi sup.), with respect to the point whether the first order should be quashed before a second was made; and, as the two orders in Lanyon's case were signed by the same justices, the principle of Wilkins v. Hemsworth applied. In such cases in fact, there is no second order, the first being a nullity, though, of course, if the application to have an order signed is made to fresh justices, there must be a fresh hearing. But, if the order is bad on the face of it, and the application is made to the same justices who heard the case, all difficulty would seem to be at an end, especially as it was held in Ex parte Johnson (3 B. & S. 947) that an order in bastardy is made when it is pronounced in court, and that the drawing up and signing it are mere accessaries to, or evidences of, the original making or pronouncing of it. The time for ap pealing from such order accordingly, is the date when it is pronounced, and not when it is drawn up. If, however, the first proceedings had been abortive, there should have been a tender of costs before the second application could be granted: (Reg. v. Hinchcliff, 10 Q. B. 356.) NOTE OR MEMORANDUM UNDER THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. THE case of Buxton v. Rust (27 L. T. Rep. N. S. 211) raised another of those questions which are destined to arise so long as the Statute of Frauds remains on the Statute Book. What is a sufficient note or memorandum to satisfy the terms of the 17th section of that enactment? In a book which we recently reviewed, Professor Langdell brings together the principles connected with this statute in the form of an index. From that work we make the following summary, leaving those of our readers who wish to have the authorities to consult Langdell's Cases on Sales of Personal Property : The Statute of Frauds may be satisfied by writing in two modes; by putting the contract in writing, or by furnishing evidence in writing of a verbal contract. When the contract is in writing it is governed by the same rules to which it would have been subject if the Statute had never been passed; the effect being the same as if contracts in writing had been in terms excluded but for the operation of the statute. When the statute is sought to be satisfied by means of a memorandum in writing of a verbal contract, various questions may arise as to the sufficiency of such memorandum, which have no application to contracts in writing. Hence, in many cases, the first inquiry is, to which of the foregoing classes a given contract belongs. If the contract was created by the mutual adoption of a writing by the parties, it is a contract in writing, but if it was originally created without writing, it will remain a verbal contract, notwithstanding the parties afterwards adopt a writing as containing a correct statement of its terms. The parties may of course put an end to the verbal contract at their pleasure, and make a written one in its stead; but so long as the original contract remains in force, no writing which can be adopted will be more than evidence of its terms. As a contract, whether verbal or written, cannot be made without two parties, if a writing has been adopted, or agreed to by one party only, it cannot be a contract; and if any contract exists in such a case, it must be verbal. It seems, too, that the same person cannot represent both parties in making a contract; and hence, neither entries or memoranda made by brokers, and retained in their own possession, nor bought and sold notes made and delivered by them to the parties respectively, are commonly more than evidence of a verbal contract. As ordinary executory contracts of sale consist of two promises or undertakings, one by the buyer, the other by the seller, either of which may be the subject of an action, the statute is satisfied if the promise or undertaking sued on be in writing, or be proved by competent written evidence; and the writing need make no reference to the promise or undertaking by the plaintiff to the defendant, though it be the consideration of the promise or undertaking sued on. And this rule has been applied to writings which contained only an offer by the defendant. When the contract is in writing, its terms must be ascertained from the writing alone, but when the statute is sought to be satisfied by a memorandum of a verbal contract, the sufficiency of the memorandum may depend upon whether it states all the terms of the contract correctly, and for the purpose of determining the latter question, any competent evidence of the contract is admissible, though not in writing. A memorandum in writing may be contained in separate papers, but they must all be signed by the party to be charged or his agent, or such as be not so signed must be connected either physically or by reference with one that is. If a signed and an unsigned paper be physically connected at the time of the signature, it is immaterial that they afterwards become separated. It seems not to be sufficient that a signed and an unsigned paper refer to the same contract, the signed paper must refer to the unsigned one. When a memorandum is drawn up in duplicate, one copy being signed by the buyer, and the other by the seller, it seems that the two may be read together, and that they will have the same effect as if each had been signed by both. Having the principle thus stated, let us look at Burton v. Rust. The plaintiff, on the 11th Jan., agreed by parol with the defendant to buy the latter's wool for a price above 10l., and a memorandum of the terms of the bargain was thereupon written and signed by the plaintiff and handed by him to the defendant, who took it away with him. One of the terms of the bargain was, "the whole to be cleared in about twenty-one days." None of the wool was delivered by the defendant, and there was nothing given in earnest or part payment by the plaintiff. On the 8th Feb. the defendant wrote as follows to the plaintiff: "It is now twenty-eight days since you and I had a deal for my wool, which was for you to have taken all away in twenty-one days from the time you bought it. I do not consider it business to put it off like this; therefore I shall consider the deal off, as you have not completed your part of the contract." On the 9th Feb. the plaintiff orally asked the defendant to let him have a copy of the contract which he had given him on the 11th Jan., and subsequently, on the same day, the defendant, in answer to such request, wrote and signed a letter to the defendant, inclosing a copy of the memorandum of the 11th Jan. in the following terms, "I beg to inclose a copy of your letter of the 11th Jan. 1871." The plaintiff brought an action against the defendant for non-delivery of the wool; and it was held by the Court of Exchequer Chamber (affirming the judgment of the Court of Exchequer) that the defendant's letter to the plaintiff of the 9th Feb. with the inclosure therein, taken together with his letter of the 8th Feb., amounted to a clear and distinct admission of the existence of a contract between them and of the terms thereof; and constituted a sufficient "note or memorandum in writing,' signed by the defendant, to bind him under sect. 17 of the Statute of Frauds. The only point which, beyond the decision-which carries its own teaching requires notice, is the utter explosion of the doctrine already sufficiently disposed of by decided cases, but laid down in "Blackburn on Sale," that a repudiation of a contract cannot be a good memorandum. That learned author has now admitted the inaccuracy of what he wrote in 1815, and it must be finally accepted that if a defendant has written repudiating the contract, that very repudiation may, by referring to "the contract," be a sufficient memorandum within the statute. A DIGEST OF PATENT LAW CASES. Cornish v. Keene. N. P., 1835.-Action for the infringement of a patent, which was held invalid for want of novelty. Tindal, C.J., in summing up to the jury, said: "Sometimes it is a material question to determine. whether the party who got the patent was the real and original inventor or not, because these patents are granted as a reward, not only for the benefit that is conferred upon the public by the discovery, but also to the ingenuity of the first inventor; and, although it is proved that it is a new discovery so far as the world is concerned, yet if any body is able to show that although that was new-that the party who got the patent was not the man whose ingenuity first discovered it that he had borrowed it from A. or B. one or taken it from a book that was printed in England, and which was open to all the world-then, although the public had the benefit of it, it would become an important question whether he was the first and original inventor of it. A man may make experiments in his own closet for the purpose of improving any art or manufacture in public use; if he makes these experiments and never communicates them to the world, and lays them by as forgotten things, another person, who has made the same experiments, or has gone a little further, or is satisfied with the experiments, may take out a patent, and protect himself in the privilege of the sole making of the article for fourteen years; and it will be no answer to him to say that another person before him made the same experiments, and, therefore, that he was not the first discoverer of it, because there may be many discoverers starting at the same time, many rivals that may be running on the same road at the same time, and the first which comes to the Crown and takes out a patent, it not being generally known to the public, is the man who has a right to clothe himself with the authority of the patent, and enjoy its benefits. That would be an extreme case on side, but if the evidence that is brought in any case, when properly considered, classes itself under the description of experiment only, and unsuccessful experiment, that would be no answer to the validity of the patent. On the other hand, the use of an article may be so general as to be almost universal. In a case like that, you can hardly suppose that any one would incur the expense and trouble of taking out a patent. That would be a case where all mankind would say, 'You have no right to step in and take that which is in almost universal use, for that is, in fact, to create a monopoly to yourself in this article, without either giving the benefit to the world of the new discovery, or the personal right to the value of the patent, to which you would be entitled from your ingenuity, and from your application.' Therefore, it must be between those two (if I may so call it) limits that cases will range themselves in evidence, and it must be for a jury to say, whether, supposing those points to be out of the question, in any particular case, evidence which has been brought before them convinces them to their understandings that the subject of the patent was in public use and operation at that time-at the time when the patent itself was granted by the Crown. If it was in public use and operation, then the patent is a void patent, and amounts to a monopoly, if it was not the patent stands good." The defendants put in evidence the specification of a prior patent obtained by the plaintiff, which, the defendants alleged, described the invention for which the patent in question was granted. His Lordship, referring to this, said: " Undoubtedly, if you could show under the hand of the plaintiff, or any body's hand, that the secret had been publicly communicated to the world which was intended to be covered by the subsequent patent, there is an end of that patent; if the world at large had been informed by the specification of the colour, fabric, and manufacture which is intended to be effected by the subsequent patent, the subsequent patent must fall to the ground, otherwise a man would have nothing to do but to take out patent after patent when the former has nearly expired, and so afterwards procure to himself an unlimited privilege." (1 Web. P. C. 501; 2 Carp. P. C. 314.) On a motion for a new trial in the Court of Common Pleas it was held, that a patent will not be set aside for want of novelty by proof that after the date of the patent, although before the date of the specification, the invention was described or mentioned in the specification of some prior patent. (3 Bing. N. C. 570; 1 Web. P. C. 513; 2 Carp. P. C. 371.) Morgan v. Seaward. 1837.-Patent for "certain improvements in steamengines, and in rhinery for propelling vessels." The invention patented consisted (inter alia) in an improvement on paddle-wheels for propelling vessels, whereby the float-boards or paddles are made to enter and come out of the water in positions the best adapted for giving full effect to the power applied. It was proved at the trial that, before the date of the patent, Galloway, the patentee, ordered an engineer, under an injunction of secrecy, to make two pairs of paddle-wheels upon the principle of the patent. The wheels when completed were packed at the engineer's factory, and sold to, and exported by, the plaintiff, who was the assignee of the patent, and the managing director of a foreign company, by whom the paddle-wheels were used abroad. The plaintiff paid the engineer for the wheels. The question before the court was whether the invention, at the date of the patent, was new in the legal sense of that word. Park, B., delivering the judgment of the court, said:"The words of the statute are, that grants are to be good of the sole working or making of any manner of new manufacture within this realm to the first and true inventor or inventors of such manufactures, which others, at the time of the making of such letters patent and grants, did not use; and the proviso in the patent in question, founded on the statute, is, that if the invention be not a new invention as to the public use and exercise thereof in England, the patent should be void. The word 'manufacture' in the statute must be construed in one of two ways: it may mean the machine when completed, or the mode of constructing the machine. If it mean the former, undoubtedly there has been no use of the machine, as a machine, in England, either by the patentee himself or any other person; nor indeed any use of the machine in a foreign country before the date of the patent. If the word manufacture' be construed to be the mode of constructing the machine, there has been no use or exercise of it in England in any sense which can be called public. It must be admitted, that if the patentee himself had, before his patent, constructed machines for sale as an article of commerce or gain to himself, and been in the practice of selling them publicly, that is, to any one of the public who would buy, the invention would not be new at the date of the patent. This was laid down in the case of Wood v. Zimmer, and appears to be founded on reason. For if the inventor could sell his invention, keeping the secret to himself, and when it was likely to be discovered by another take out a patent, he might have practically a monopoly for a much longer period than fourteen years. Nor are we prepared to say, that if such a sale was of articles that were only fit for a foreign market, or to be used abroad, it would make any difference; nor that a single instance of such a sale as an article of commerce, to anyone who chose to buy, might not be deemed the commencement of such a practice, and a public use of the invention, so as to defeat the patent." (2 M. & W. 544; M. & H. 55; 1 Jur. 527; 1 Web. P. C. 187.) Losh v. Hague. N. P., 1838.-If a man claims by his patent a number of things, as being the inventor of them, whether they consist of improvements or original inventions, and it turns out that some of them be not original and not improvements, his patent his void. The publicly making and selling an article to one individual, though there be no demand or use for it by the public, will vitiate a subsequent patent. (1 Web. P. C. 202.) Galloway v. Bleaden. N. P., 1839.-Tindal, C.J., thus laid down the law with regard to the novelty of an invention: "A mere experiment, or a mere course of experiments, for the purpose of producing a result which is more not brought to its completion, but begins and ends in uncertain experiments, that is not such an invention as should prevent another person, who successful, or pursues with greater industry the chain in the line that has been laid out for him by the preceding inventor, from availing himself of it, and having the benefit of it." (1 Web. P. C. 521.) Elliott v. Aston. N. P., 1840.-The question of public use is for the jury; as, whether the instances adduced show a manufacture to have been in public use. (1 Web. P. C. 222.) Carpenter v. Smith. 1841.-Action for the infringement of a patent for certain improvements in locks. It was proved that a lock, substantially the same as the plaintiff's, had been put upon a gate in a public place, and used by Mr. Davies for many years before the date of the patent. At Nisi Prius, Abinger, C.B., said:-" I think what is meant by public use and exercise,' as has been held by my predecessors before (and I think one's own common sense leads one to adopt that definition), is this: a man is entitled to a patent for a new invention, and if his invention is new and useful, he shall not be prejudiced by any other man having invented that before, and not made any use of it; because the mere speculations of ingenious men, which may be fruitful of a great variety of inventions, if they are not brought into actual use, ought not to stand in the way of other men equally ingenious, who may afterwards make the same inven. tions, and apply them." Seven and a-half dozen of the locks had been manufactured, before the date of the patent, and exported to America. Referring to this, his Lordship said: "Here you have an article, manufactured by an English manufacturer, and sold, and in my opinion, if it was sold even for the assumed purpose of being sent to America, I cannot but think that that would be destructive of the novelty of the plaintiff's invention. And here let me be clearly understood; I do not mean to say, that if a man in America employs an agent to see if he can get an article manufactured in England by a particular model, and chooses to take out a patent for it himself, but not with a view of making it public at all, I do not mean to say that that man is to be considered as not entitled to the invention afterwards, because he employs a workman to assist him in it, or, that if he had failed entirely, that some other man might make the invention in England; but where a model is sent to a workman, who sells seven and a half dozen, and sells them for a certain price, I must say, and think the invention was used and publicly exercised." (1 Web. P. C. 530.) The defendant subsequently moved for a new trial, on the ground of misdirection. The court, however, refused even a rule nisi, and held, that "the public use and exercise of an invention, means a use and exercise in public, not by the public." (9 M. & W. 300; 1 Web. P. C. 540.) Gibson v. Brand. N.P., 1841.-Tindal, C.J., in summing up to the jury in this case, said: "A man may publish to the world that which is perfectly new in all its use, and has not before been enjoyed, and yet he may not be the first and true inventor; he may have borrowed it from some other person, he may have taken it from a book, he may have learnt it from a specification, and then the Legislature never intended that a person who had taken all his knowledge from the art of another, from the labours and assiduity or ingenuity of another, should be the man who was to receive the benefit of another's skill. There is some distinction, although perhaps not a very broad one, between the plea which alleges the plaintiffs were not the first and true inventors, and that on which I conceive the principle question between the parties will turn-the third in order, viz., whether the subject-matter of this patent was known in England at the time the letters patent were granted. It is quite clear, if on the evidence you have heard you are satisfied that this which is alleged to be a discovery by the plaintiffs had been publicly known and practised in England, there is an end to the validity of the patent. It would not be sufficient to destroy the patent to show, that learned persons in their studies had foreseen, or had found out this discovery, that is afterwards made public, or that a man in his private warehouse had by various experi ments endeavoured to discover it and failed, and had given it up. But if you perceive on the evidence, that the thing which is now sought to be protected by the patent has been used, and for a considerable period, and used so far to the benefit of the public as to be sold to anybody that thought proper to purchase it of those who made it, then it becomes a material question, whether such mode of user is not in your judgment a public using of the article, of the process, or of the invention, before the letters patent were granted." (1 Web. P. C. 627.) The Court of Common Pleas held, that, inasmuch as the patentees claimed eight several heads of invention, in order to support their patent they were bound to show that each of the parts was new. And that, if the patent be for a new or improved process, and the jury find the process not to be new bat improved, semble that the patent is invalid. (4 M. & G. 179; 1 Web. P. C. 631.) CITY, THURSDAY, OCT. 17. A RATHER general impression has prevailed in the markets for public securities, that the Bank rate of 6 per cent. would not be maintained even over to-day, the belief being based upon the fact that the rates outside have receded more than per cent. below the Bank minimum, that there have been but few bills offering, while there has been an abundance of money available. The course of prices has in consequence been upwards since we last wrote, and the level of values, the British Funds almost alone excepted, which are a trifle lower for the week, has considerably improved. On the announcement to-day, however, that there would be no change in the Bank rate, the markets were dull, and the tendency of prices became downwards, but the improving business anticipated with the conclusion of the settlement yesterday has not been realised at present, and there is very little doing. American securities have been generally strong, and with the exception of a decline of in the 10-40 bonds, all the movements for the week are favourable. Eries have risen 2: Atlantic and Great Western bonds, and ditto debentures 3; and the United States Funding Loan 14. In British railway stocks there is no exception to the consider able improvement in prices, in which South Eastern Deferred, and Lancashire and Yorkshire, take the lead at a rise of 3 for the week; Great Northern A, London and Brighton, and London and North Western are 24 higher; Manchester and Sheffield, Metropolitan, and Midland 2; North Eastern, Great Western, and South Eastern 14, &c. The principal movements in foreign stocks have been in the South American descriptions, and they have been adverse. Costa Rica scrip, and Honduras of 1867 have fallen 5; but in other respects the changes accord with the favourable course of prices in other markets. There is a rise of 1 for the week in Greek, and Peruvian 5 per. cents. of 1872; of in Turkish 6 per cent. of 1865; of in the ditto 5 per cent. of 1865; and of in the French National and Italian-Bolivian has risen 1. In Telegraph shares Cubas and Panama have risen 14, and in Miscellaneous India Rubber and Gutta Percha have risen 6, and Royal Mail 23. The Stock Markets remain dull to the close, and there has been very little doing. The sum of £10,000 has been sent into the Bank from Paris this day, and £5000 withdrawn for Rio. Discount demand at the Bank very fair. The latest quotations for British Funds are as follows: Consols for money 913 to 92; ditto 5th Nov. account, 92 3-16 to 92 5-16; Reduced and New Three per Cents., 903 to 901; Exchequer Bills, 58. dis. to par. ; India Five per Cent. Stock, 1114 to 1113; ditto Four per Cent., 104 to 105; ditto Enfaced Paper Four per Cent. 95 to 96; ditto Five and Half per Cent., 105 to 106; Bank of England Stock, 240 to 242; Metropolitan Three and a Half per Cent., 96 to 97; and French Rentos in this market 51 to 52. The latest price for French Rentes received from Paris was 53fr. 15c., with a firm market. In the market for American Securities, the United States 5-20 bonds of 1882 are marked 90 to 904 ex. div.; ditto 10-40 Bonds, 874 to 88; Atlantic and Great Western Bonds, 35 to 36; ditto, Debentures, 46 to 47; ditto Reorganization Stock, 95 to 97; Eries, 40 to 403; Illinois, 103 to 101; and United States Funded Loan, 80 to 884. In the Railway Market the prices are:-Caledonians, 1093 to 110; Great Eastern, 474 to 47; Great Northern, 134 to 135; ditto, A, 157 to 153; Great Western, 119 to 119; Lancashire and Yorkshire, 153 to 154; London and Brighton, 781 to 78; London, Chatham, and Dover, 23 to 24; ditto 4 per cent. preference, 63 to 63; London and North-Western, 145 to 146; London and South-Western, 104 to 105; Manchester and Sheffield, 85 to 85 ex. new; Metropolitan, 62 to 62; ditto District, 29 to 291; Midland, 141 to 141 ex. new; North British, 824 to 831; North Eastern Consols 162 to 163; SouthEastern, 101 to 1044; ditto Deferred, 88 to 88; Grand Trunk of Canada, 201 to 201; Great Western of Canada, 223 to 23); Antwerp and Rotterdam, 24 to 25; Great Luxembourg, 17 to 17; and Lombardo Venetian, 18 to 19. The prices of the principal Foreign Stocks are as follows: Argentine 1868, 91 to 951; do., 6 per cent., 1871, 90 to 91; Bolivian, 6 per cent. 57 to 58; Brazilian, 5 per cent. 1865, 94 to 95; do., 5 per cent., 1871, 94 to 95; Costa Rica 1872, Scrip, 15 to 13 dis.; Egyptian, 7 per cent., 1868, 90 to 904; do., Viceroy Loan, 92 to 94; do., Khedive Mortgage Bonds, 79 to 80; French Morgan, 6 per cent. Loan, 96 to 962; do., National, per cent. Loan, to 1 pm.; do. 1872 Scrip, 2 to 24 pm.; Paraguay, 8 per cent., 1871, 75 to 76; do., 1872, Scrip. 10 to 7 dis.; Peruvian 6 per cent. 1870, 744 to 74; do., 5 per cent. 1872, Scrip, 8 to 6 dis.; Spanish 29 to 30; do., 3 per cent.,; 1871, 29 to 29; Turkish, 5 per cent. 1865, 52 to 53; do. 6 per cent., 1869, 61 to 6114; and do., 6 per cent. 1871, 693 to 701. In the Telegraph Market, Anglo-American Stock is quoted at 118 to 120; British Australian, 8 to 8; British, Indian Extension, 11 to 12: Chinas, 9 to 9; Cubas, 9 to 9; Eastern, 93 to 93; Great Northern, 10 to 111; Indo European, 13 to 15; Mediterranean Extension, 6 to 63; French Cables, 214 to 21; and West India and Panama, 6} to 6. In miscellaneous shares the prices are as follows :-General Credit and Discount 2 to 2 pm.; International Finance, a to dis.; Hooper's Telegraph Works, 10 to 10; Hudson's Bay, 14 to 143; India Rubber and Gutta Percha, 37 to 39; National Discount, 12 to 12; Telegraph Construction, 32 to 33; Royal Mail Steam, 91 to 93; Native Guano, 144 to 15; Phosphate Sewage, 9 to 101; New Sombrero Phosphate, 3 to 4; and Phospho Guano, 11 to 11 ELECTION LAW. MR. DENMAN AND HIS CONSTITUENTS. The Hon. G. Denman, in his farewell address to the electors of the borough of Tiverton, says :-"A vacancy having occurred on the bench by the melancholy death of Mr. Justice Willes, I have, received and accepted the offer of the puisne judgeship of the Common Pleas, so long and so honourably held by him. I make this communication to you with mingled feelings of gratification and regret. On the one hand, I have been selected for promotion to an honourable office, for which it has been the main object of my life to qualify, myself. On the other hand, it is impossible without regret to contemplate the severance of those honourable ties which have for the last thirteen years, and especially since the winter of 1865, bound me to Tiverton. The splendid and generous testimonial which I then received from a large number of the inhabitants of your borough will always remain to me the most precious gift I ever received; and I shall never forget the kindness I have since uniformly received from you all-even from strong political opponents. I must now take leave of you so far as political relations are concerned. But I cannot do so without saying that I deem it the highest possible honour and privilege to have enjoyed for so long a period the confidence of a constituency which has earned and maintained an honourable name for complete electoral purity, combined with decided political convictions. Though I shall henceforth be debarred from taking any part in political affairs, I can never cease to regard with interest all that affects the welfare of your borough, and your high character as a constituency-a character which I trust you will always maintain as unsullied as it has hitherto been. To each and all of you I return my cordial thanks." CLAIM OF A PEER TO THE FRANCHISE DISALLOWED.-On Thursday, Oct. 10, Mr. Charles Clark, revising barrister, held a court for the revision of the list of voters for the polling districts of Hatfield and Welwyn, at the Red Lion, Hatfield. Among the claims to be inserted on the list of voters for the county of Hereford objected to by the liberals was the claim of the Marquis of Salisbury. Mr. Bontems appeared as the objector; Mr. Armstrong supported the claim. Mr. Clark, after hearing the argument, delivered judgment. He said he was clearly of opinion that the claim of the Marquis of Salisbury to be put on the register as a voter for the county of Hertford must be disallowed. After the decision of Mr. Arnold, pronounced in 1841, and never attempted to be questioned, it might have been thought SOLICITORS' JOURNAL. NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. BY that the matter was considered settled. But of 66 SURETY PROMISSORY NOTE-CO-SURETIESAGREEMENT TO SHARE LIABILITY EQUALLY.— C. having got into difficulties, four friends agreed to help him, and became liable for him on various bills, none of which were signed by all the four. By an agreement subsequently signed by the four friends, they appointed W. their joint solicitor, to with full authority to settle the same on the best act for them in all matters relating to the bills, terms he could, and, upon the amount being ascertained for which the liabilities could be discharged, they undertook to provide the same in proportion of one-fourth each. W. failed to effect any settlement: Held (reversing the decision of Malins, V.C.), that the agreement was not binding, inasmuch as the settlement in consideration of which it was made, could not be effected: (Arcedeckne v. Lord Howard, 27 L. T. Rep. N. S. 194. Chan.) WILL-BEQUESTS TO CONFESSOR OF TESTATRIX-UNDUE INFLUENCE-ONUS PROBANDIEVIDENCE.-The doctrine of undue influeuce adopted in courts of equity in regard to gifts inter vivos does not apply to the making of wills. The natural influence which is created by the relations of parent and child, husband and wife, doctor and patient, attorney and clent, and confessor and penitent, is not held to be "undue" by the Court of Probate, and it may lawfully be exerted to obtain a will or legacy as long as the the testator thoroughly understands what he is doing, and is a free agent. The testatrix, a Roman Catholic, bequeathed the bulk of her I' perty to a Roman Catholic priest who had been for many years her corfessor, and had resided in her house. Held, that undue influence could not be inferred from the relations between the two, combined with the .disposal of the property, and that it was incumbent on those who pleaded undue influence in opposition to the will, to prove it affirmatively. To prove an issue it is not necessary to prove every fact or conclusion on which the issue depends. From every fact proved legitimate and reasonable inferences may be drawn. In deciding, therefore, whether there is evidence to go to the jury, the court has only to consider whether, assuming the facts proved to be true, and adding to them the inferences which a jury might reasonably draw from them, there is sufficient evidence to support the issue: (Parfitt v. Lawless, 27 L. T. Rep. N. S. 215. Prob.) UNCLAIMED STOCK AND DIVIDENDS IN THE [Transferred to the Commissioners for the Reduction of the GUILLAUME (Mary), Bletchley, Bucks, spinster. £350 Three per Cent. Annuities. Claimant, said Mary Guillaume, spinster. HALKETT (Lieut. Peter Alexander), R.N. £679 33. 4d. Reduced Three per Cent. Annuities. Claimant, said Peter Alexander Haikett. STONE (Catherine Maria), Sydney House, Bath, widow. £1586 88. 6d. New Three per Cents. Annuities. Claimant, said Catherine Maria Stone. pressly agreed between them that if at any time it within the borough from Lammas to Candlemas; and they have conveyed the common rights to persons at various times, who have subsequently exercised commonable rights over the lands. The plaintiff's land was conveyed to him "subject to any rights or privileges which the corporation or any person claiming under them might possess over the same." It was contended on behalf of the plaintiff, that the right of common was appur tenant, and therefore inalienable, and that a release of part was a release of the whole common. able lands. Held, that, admitting the plaintiff's contention to be correct, yet that the conclusions to be drawn from the repeated grants by the corporation, were that they were made in pursuance of a legal right, which, in the absence of proof that it was modern, must be deemed to have originated before the time of legal memory; and that the court would assume therefore that the common was originally granted in gross, with power to release any portions without releasing any other part of the commonable lands. (John son v. Barnes, 27 L. T. Rep. N. S. 152. C. P.) BOROUGH QUARTER SESSIONS. When holden. GRANT BY A CORPORATE BODY OF RIGHT OF COMMON.-To an action of trespass to land, the defendant justified as grantee under a conveyance from the corporation of Colchester, and also as a burgess of the borough of Colchester, and claimed right of common in the lands. The corporation has from time immemorial exercised an exclusive right of pasturage upon certain lands round the walls of the town for cattle levant and couchant Borough. Birmingham Monday, Oct. 28 Recorder. A. R. Adams, Esq., Q.C. H. J. Hodgson, Esq. CREDITORS UNDER 22 & 23 VICT. c. 35. Last Day of Claim, and to whom Particulars to be sent. BATEY (Geo.), Nottingham Cottage, Victoria-road, Tranmere, Chester, gentleman. Dec. 3; T. M. Downham, solicitor, 7, Market-street, Birkenhead. BOOTH Jos., formerly of Peppin Bank, Bacup, but lately residing at 23, Eaves-lane, Chorley, Lancashire. Dec. 8; Jos. Ashworth, Daisy-hill, Stacksteads. BOWER (John),, Botolph-lane, E.C., Wholesale fruiterer. Nov. 1; Halse and Co., solicitors, 61, Cheapside, E.C. BROWN Win.), Esq., 7, Pembridge square, Bayswater. Nov. 18; J. T. Simpson, solicitor, 62, Moorgate-street, E.C. BURGE (Lucy), formerly of Blandford, but late of 5, Turton-pelled to make some comments upon the action of street, Weymouth, Dorset. Nov. 19; R. D. Marshfield, solicitor, Wareham. shire. CATTLOW Katharine', Dorrington Cottage, near Pipe-rate, Kendal. E.C. farmer. Nov. 30; J. L. Jones, solicitor, Alcester.. HEATH (Richard C.), formerly of Salford, farmer. Nov. 30; J. L. Jones, solicitor, Alcester. bun and Son, solicitors, Huntingdon. KERFOOT (Thos.), 32, Bullock-street, Within, Little Bolton, THE RECORDER OF BATH AND THE MAGISTRATES.-At the recent quarter sessions for the borough of Bath, there were no prisoners to try. Thereupon the recorder (Mr. T. W. Saunders), took occasion to observe. "I regret to be coma most estimable body of gentlemen. I do it with a great deal of pain; but my sense of duty compels me to do so, because I find that a great many people-I won't say a great many, but many persons-have been committed summarily by them over whom they had no jurisdiction, and who ought to have been committed to these sessions. I have not the slightest hesitation in saying that whatever the magistrates have done, they have done it from an honourable and creditable object. Still I must say that they have greatly exceeded their jurisdiction in the course they have adopted within the last few months. You are well aware that they are entrusted with the disposal of many classes of offences-simple larcenies, for instance; but they are strictly enjoined by the Legislature not to convict summarily in cases where the parties have been previously convicted. The law has very wisely apportioned to those previously convicted a measure of punishment which it is not thought fit the magistrates should have the power of dispensing. But in the last quarter many instances of this kind have taken place. Lancaster, engraver. Nov. 15: J. Gerrard, solicitor, 21, Acrestield, Bolton. Hence this maiden session, whereas, but for this KING (Wm., Bull Beggars Farm, Elstree, Herts, farmer. careless action on the part of the justices, we Dec. 1; Wm. Lund, solicitor, 37, Castle-street, Holborn. LLOYD (Mary), formerly of 6, York-terrace, Queen's-road, should have had, at least, seven or eight cases for Peckham, then of 9. Wood-vale, Lordship-lane, Foresttrial. My attention was drawn to an observation hill, both in the county of Surrey, but late of Lindsay in one of the papers with reference to the case Villa, Shanklin, Isle of Wight. Jan. 2; E. Hockley, solicitor, 10, Bell-yard, Doctor's-commons, E.C. of a young man named Starks, who was sumLUMB Wm. Esq., Meadow House, near Whitehaven, Cum-marily convicted by the magistrates, and who berland. Nov. 30; Lumb and Howson, solicitors, White6 was described as an old offender,' and if haven. MARSH (Frederick, F., formerly of 60, Commercial-road, so he was not a party who ought to have East, Middlesex, but late of the ship For West, of the Port been dealt with by the magistrates. I find that of London, master mariner. Nov. 19; Roy and Cartwright, solicitors, 4, Lothbury, E.C. on the 6th Sept. he was summarily convicted on PRENDERGAST (Mary), 16, South-street, Toore, near Tortwo charges of larceny and sentenced to two quay. Dec. 1; Upton and Co., solicitors, 20, Austin- months' hard labour for each, making four months SAMS (Wm. R.), Esq., formerly of 17, Cambridge-terrace, in all. That man in Nov. 1870 was summarily Hyde-park, Middlesex. Nov. 30; Capron and Co., solici convicted of stealing and sentenced to three tors, Saville-place, New Burlington-street, W. months' hard labour. In March, 1871, he was SHAILER (William), 21, Earl's-court-road, Chelsea, Middle-again summarily convicted, and had six weeks' sex, gentleman. Nov. 16: Wm. Walter, solicitor, 11, hard labour. On the 6th July, 1871, at these sesNewgate-street, E.C. sions, he was convicted also of stealing, and he then had six months' imprisonment, and he was put under police supervision for two years. Again, at the last sessions in July, he was indicted in a very clear case, but in consequence of the uncertainty of recollection on the part of one of the witnesses, the jury gave the prisoner the benefit of the slight doubt and acquitted him. There is no doubt he was a great and habitual offender, a fact that must have been notorious to everyone who has had to deal with him. The police must have known it, the clerk to the WHITE (David), Katrine House, Staines-road, Hounslow, justices must have known it, and the magistrates must have known it. Yet this man, who had been three times summarily convicted, and once sentenced here to six months' imprisonment, and to be kept two years under police supervision, was dealt with summarily and had four months' NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. imprisonment. The case was entirely beyond POOR-RATE-RATEABILITY OF MOORINGS- their jurisdiction, and I cannot help saying EASEMENT-BED OF A RIVER.-The Conserva- that it was a misadministration of the law. tors of the Thames, who are the owners of the In another case, that of Ellen Clement, she was, soil and bed of the river, gave permission to one on the 24th Aug., summarily convicted of larceny C. to lay down moorings in the river for the pur- and had two months' hard labour, and yet some pose of mooring a derrick coal hulk, it was ex- time before she had been summarily convicted of friare. E.C. solicitors, Dudley. SMITH Edward), High-street, Wrexham, draper. Nov. 5; MAGISTRATES' LAW. a similar offence and sentenced to three months' OCT. 19, 1872.] COMPANY LAW. was NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. INJURY BY ACCIDENT-MASTER AND SERVANT LIABILITY OF EMPLOYMENT DANGEROUS MASTER-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. - The defendants, who were owners of a "factory," within the meaning of the 7 & 8 Vict. c. 15, employed B., aged 22, to lubricate the bearings between the fly-wheel and the spur-wheel of a steam engine in the engine-house of their factory. The bearings on which the shaft revolved were fixed on a place in the wall, in which there was a hole called the "wall box," for the purpose of holding them. The wall was 2ft. 3in. thick. In order to do the work B. had to stand in this hole or "wall box," into which he crawled through the spokes of the fly-wheel, when the engine was at rest. The size of this cavity or "wall box" 2ft. Sin. wide, 5ft. long, and 4ft. high. The flywheel, 15ft. in diameter, was on his left hand, revolving in a wheel-race in the engine-house at the rate of fifty-six revolutions a minute, and the spurwheel, 16ft. in diameter, was on his right hand, revolving at the like rate in another room of the factory, and the utmost distance between the spokes of the two wheels was 2ft. 10in. The edge of the wheel race next the wall where D. was placed to do his work was not fenced, nor was the fly-wheel fenced, but children or young persons were not liable to pass or be employed near thereto. B. had worked there for five days successively, and whilst at work there on the sixth day he was caught by the fly-wheel, whirled round, and killed. In an action by his widow and administratrix against the defendants, under Lord Campbell's Act, for negligence in not fencing the wheel race, as required by sect. 21 of the 7 & 8 Vict. c. 21, it was found by the jury that B. had not been guilty of contributory negligence, either in undertaking the work, or in his mode of performing it, and a A rule verdict was returned for the plaintiff. having been granted, pursuant to leave, to set the verdict aside, on the grounds that there was no statutory duty on the defendants to fence the place in question, and that B. voluntarily encountered the risk of the employment, it was held (by Bramwell, Channell, and Pigott, BB.) that the plaintiff was entitled to recover, the defendants being bound (by sect. 21 of the 7 & 8 Vict. c. 15), to fence the spot in question, which was the edge of a wheel race not otherwise secured within the meaning of that section, and that the danger was not so obvious as that B. must necessarily have been aware of it; nor, even if he were so, would that be sufficient to make him a "volunteer," so as to exempt the defendants from liability for the breach of their statutory duty. Under sect. 21 there was an absolute and unqualified duty on the defendants to fence the fly wheel, whether or not children or young persons were liable to be employed or pass near it: (Britton v. The Great Western Cotton Company, 27 L. T. Rep. N. S. 125, Ex.). MERCANTILE LAW. NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. LIABILITY OF SURETY-DISCHARGE BY CREDITOR'S LACHES.-EQUITABLE PLEA.-In an action upon a deed, defendant pleaded and proved that the plant and stock in trade of a debtor were assigned to plaintiffs as security for money advanced, and that defendant was a mere surety for the repayment of the money. The plaintiffs had power to enter and seize upon default of payment by the debtor, but they neither entered nor registered their deed of assignment for six months after the first default. When the debtor became bankrupt, the subject of the assignment was taken by the trustee. The defendant knew nothing of this security, nor of the plaintiff's neglect to seize or register; but the plaintiffs were well aware of all the debtor's affairs, and acted as his attorneys in the bankruptcy: Held that the defendant was not liable for the amount which would have been covered by the security, if the plaintiffs had seized immediately upon default, and had registered the assignment: (Wulff v. Jay, 27 L. T. Rep. N. S. 118. Q. B.) STATUTE OF FRAUDS (29 Car. 2, c. 3), s. 17SALE OF GOODS FOR UPWARDS OF £10-NOTE OR MEMORANDUM IN WRITING-WHAT AMOUNTS TO A BINDING ONE WITHIN THE STATUTE.-The plaintiff, on the 11th Jan., agreed by parol with the defendant to buy the latter's wool for a price above £10, and a memorandum of the terms of the bargain was thereupon written and signed by the plaintiff and handed by him to the defendant, who took it away with him. One of the terms of the bargain was, the whole to be cleared in about twenty-one days." None of the wool was delivered by the defendant, and there was nothing given in earnest or part payment by the plaintiff. On the 8th Feb. the defendant wrote as follows to the plaintiff: "It is now twenty-eight days since you and I had a deal for my wool, which was for you to have taken all away in twenty-one 66 THE LAW TIMES. days from the time you bought it. I do not con- MARITIME LAW. His HONOUR, in replying, said: I accept the observations which you have been kind enough to address to me with the greatest pleasure. Although I am new to the Stourbridge County I am not a stranger to the district, having Court, presided for some time in a neighbouring court. The faces of the practitioners I see in this court are all quite familiar to me; and I am sure I shall not go further without expressing my regret at the receive here, as elsewhere, every assistance I am entitled to in the administration of justice. I canloss which all his friends have sustained in the death of Mr. Dinsdale. Although I was not acquainted with Mr. Dinsdale in the discharge of his duties as a County Court judge, I had the pleasure of being personally acquainted with that warmhearted and genial gentleman; and I am quite sure the fact that the state of his health did not enable him to discharge the duties of his office was to him a source of pain. It may be thought by some that under the circumstances in which Mr. Dinsdale found himself placed in regard to the condition of his health, it would have been judicious to resign his office as judge of this court. But those whom I have the honour to address will know from their familiarity with the Act of Parliament, how extremely difficult it is for a County Court Judge to resign, and particularly for a man who has any hope in his own From a conversation I had bodily condition. with Mr. Dinsdale, I believe that up to the last he was never without hope that his health might be so far restored that he would be able to discharge sense of personal honour, prevented him availing his judicial office, and this belief and a delicate himself of the provision of the Act, by retiring into private life, and devoting himself to those I trust this mention of Mr. Dinsdale's literary studies which were so congenial to his taste. actual condition may be satisfactory to the practitioners of this court and to the public; and that it may be some comfort and consolation to those Mr. Dinsdale's is not a singular case in respect to It is not the first nor the second who suffer so much from his loss. I know that resignation. instance, where, from the peculiar provisions of -I speak advisedly-from resigning. I say men this Act of Parliament judges have been deterred have been deterred from resigning in consequence of the stringent provisions of the Act of were made for gentlemen submitting their cases to Parliament. I think that when any alterations are made, it would be a great improvement if provision the authorities, when they found themselves incompetent to discharge fully, efficiently, and without pain to themselves, the duties of their judicial position-or after they had held office for a certain have found it convenient to establish in my other number of years. I think it may be useful to explain some general rules of practice which I MARINE AND FIRE INSURANCE-RESPECTIVE courts, and which will guide you in conducting of the courts. I think it conducive to the public LIABILITIES OF CARRIER AND UNDERWRITER- business before me, and promote the convenience surance has been effected are delivered to a comSUBROGATION.-Where goods upon which an in- of suitors in this court. First, as to the holding mon carrier, he is primarily liable for any loss convenience, and just to practitioners in the court, which may occur, but is entitled to be subrogated that the business entered on the list for one day to the rights of the assured as against the insurer. should be within the compass of a reasonable day's The principle of subrogation applies equally in work. I therefore propose to confine the business of the court at each sitting to such a quantity as the case of fire and marine insurance. Where a can make-will enable us to break up at a reasonloss arises by the fault of the carrier, the insurer by a fair estimate-such as the officer of the court who pays the amount of it to the assured is entitled to use his name in a suit to recoverably early hour. And I also propose to discharge damages against the carrier: (Hall v. Nashville and Chattanooga Railway Company, 27 L. T. Rep. - PROSALVAGE 182. U. S. Sup. Ct.) AGREED COMPENSATION CEEDINGS IN REM AND IN PERSONAM.-A salvor by contract is not an agent of the owners, and has A contract by salvors with no claim against the property saved beyond the contract price. owners for an agreed amount to be paid in any A wrecking company which event, creates only a personal obligation on the part of the owners. had agreed to raise a sunken schooner for a certain Held, that the proportion of her value, hired of the libellant a diver and certain apparatus. libellant, having knowledge of the contract, could not maintain a libel in rem: (The Schooner Marquette, 27 L. Rep. 183. U. S. Adm. Ct.) NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. COUNTY COURTS. PROCEDURE IN COUNTY COURTS. George Perry said: I have been requested, on the whole of the day's business at the day's sitting, |