inevitable not only that barristers and solicitors should be educated in the same school, but that they should all learn the same subjects, because their fusion will be inevitable. And lastly, Ireland and England must have entirely separate systems of education. Irish bar students must be exempted from the necessity of belonging to English schools and Inns of Court. Keeping these things in view we may look forward hopefully. Sir ROUNDELL PALMER will not forsake his friends, nor will he forget the principles which he has advocated.

WHAT ought to be the condition of an untried prisoner in custody? The law assumes his innocence; the logical conclusion is, therefore, that the law should treat him in all respects as an innocent man. But, according to Mr. DE TRACY GOULD, who read a paper at the Social Science Congress at Plymouth on this subject, he is deprived of many things which are necessary to his comfort, and the deprivation of which is not essential to his safe custody. We hold the opinion that the law blunders in assuming a suspected person to be innocent until his guilt is proved. In ninety-nine cases out of a hundred the assumption is erroneous, and it is surely no great hardship that the one person out of the hundred who must have done something irregular to be suspected should go without his tobacco or his pastry. This is the grievance as put by Mr. GOULD :"A prisoner too poor to maintain himself entirely, is not allowed to supplement the prison diet by any occasional morsel of better food from without; a restriction as arbitrary and cruel as it is unreasonable. A prisoner supplying his own food may neither purchase nor receive any but the plainest food. Fruit and pastry are prohibited, and I believe salad also. A pint of draught beer a day is allowed, but no wine, and no tobacco in any form or under any circumstances. Those who are unfortunately habituated to the use of tobacco can appreciate the really terrible effect of this prohibition, upon the comfort, the spirits, and even the health, of those to whom its use has become not merely a second nature, but an absolute and recognised necessity; and, at any rate, you may fairly ask whether the elements of disorder are supposed to lurk beneath the crust of a fruit tart, or the means of escape to be concealed in a cluster of grapes or a plate of strawberries." To be suspected and imprisoned is a misfortune, which doubtless ought not to be augmented by a denial of essential comforts. A more humane system prevails we are told on the continent; and as no possible harm could result from relaxing the present prison rules in this respect it is to be hoped that Mr. GOULD'S paper may have the desired effect.

THE announcement of the death of Mr. Justice WILLES, which took place under most painful circumstances at his residence, near Watford, on Wednesday, will be received by the legal profession with profound regret. It will be universally felt that the Judicial Bench has suffered an irreparable loss; that one of the world's greatest lawyers has departed; and that one of the wisest and most learned expounders of English law is for ever silent. This great Judge was not only appreciated by his brethren on the bench and by the Bar; the public knew his value. He had a reputation amongst all classes; but perhaps he was most famous in the heart of the metropolis. There are few merchants in the city of London, few shipowners who have had occasion to inquire into their rights and liabilities, who have not found light in the decisions of Mr. Justice WILLES. We could name case after case in which he has illuminated the mercantile and maritime law of England, and whenever the resources of our own jurisprudence failed to supply the necessary principles, his prodigious memory was always able to furnish the requisite instruction from the Roman law or the Continental codes. But his extraordinary capacity did not confine itself to knowledge of legal principles and decisions. His power of marshalling facts and weighing evidence was wonderfully exemplified in the work which he did as Judge under the Election Petitions Act. In the cases of Lichfield, Coventry, Westbury, Tamworth, Windsor, and Blackburn, he delivered judgments of singular completeness and perspicuity. As one of the first judges to sit upon these petitions he laid down principles which were uniformly adopted by his successors on the rota. Finally, a matter known to everyone must be referred to-his successful labours as a Common Law Commissioner, resulting in the improvement of legal administration by the passing of the Common Law Procedure Acts, which so long as they continue to exist will bear record of his ability. Mr. Justice WILLES may be truly said to have loved his profession. Law was his recreation, as well as his occupation; and, judging from an anecdote concerning him, he had strong confidence in his powers from his earliest years. He had been in practice a very short time when he demurred to a pleading. The solicitor doubted the wisdom of arguing the demurrer, but Mr. WILLES would go on and was beaten-but he paid the client all the costs which had been incurred. This anecdote gives us an idea of the late Judge's kind, and almost womanly disposition. He invariably showed to the Bar kindness and courtesy, and he was beloved by all who knew him. It is a long time since by the death of a Judge the Bench, the Profession, and the public sustained so serious a loss.

Ir is perfectly plain that we have more than one sanguine legal prophet among us. A short while since we alluded to Mr. HOLKER'S glowing prospect under conservative auspices,-England blessed with a magnificent jurisprudence. Mr. DANIEL, Q.C., sees an equally attractive future for suitors under the régime recommended by the Judicature Commissioners in their reports. All the "prolix" proceedings of the Court of Chancery are to disappear. "Various classes of cases which are now the subject of prolix pleadings," Mr. DANIEL says in his paper read at Plymouth, "and equally prolix written evidence, and which must now be brought to a formal hearing at great expense and with much delay, would be disposed of, and the proper order made upon the original application. Formal pleadings in suits for foreclosure or redemp tion, for realising equitable securities, for dissolution and winding-up partnerships, for the declaration and execution of trusts, for the administration of estates real and personal, for the delivering up and cancellation of agreements, deeds, or securities, improperly obtained, the reformation of instruments executed in mistake, and, in short, suits for many of the various objects which range themselves under the heads of fraud, accident and mistake, would no longer be necessary, but in the great majority of such cases the appropriate relief would be obtained upon a proceeding as simple as a summons under the Winding-up Acts, and less onerous and more satisfactory, because the hearing would be in the first instance before the Judge himself." In addition to this we are asked to contemplate a saving of 10 per cent., or 125,000l. a year in costs. The common law is to be administered in a manner equally delightful. "There would be no formal pleading, the ars bene placitandi would change its character, but not its object, a simple intelligible statement of the plaintiff's claim, and a like simple statement of the defendant's answer, each sufficient without prolixity, brief without obscurity, accurate without needless technicality, precise without needless formality-with these the Judges in the first instance would have to deal, and from these sources the real question in controversy between the parties would be eliminated and ascertained by the Judge." It is difficult to realise that our system of pleading at equity and common law, built up with care and learning in successive ages, should be utterly worthless, and destined at one fell stroke to be swept away to make room for crude and naked simplicity. Mr. DANIEL, we think, rightly apprehends that the results of these changes will be "startling and confounding."

THE following is Mr. Justice BRETT'S definition of a broker. His Lordship came to the conclusion that a broker as such cannot be sued by anyone; but his view did not prevail in the case from which we quote-Fowler v. Hollins (27 L. T. Rep. N. S. 168; L. Rep. 7 Q. B. 617) :-" The true definition of a broker seems to be that he is an agent employed to make bargains and contracts between other persons in matters of trade, commerce, or navigation. Properly speaking, a broker is a mere negotiator between other parties. If the contract which the broker makes between the parties be a contract of purchase and sale, the property in the goods, even if they belonged to the supposed seller, may or may not pass by the contract. The property may pass by the contract at once, or may not pass until a subsequent appropriation of goods has been made by the seller and has been assented to by the buyer. Whatever may be the effect of the contract as between the princi pals, in either case no effect goes out of the broker. If he sign the contract, his signature has no effect as his; but only because it is in contemplation of law the signature of one or both of the principals; no effect passes out of the broker to change the property in the goods. The property changes either by a contract which is not his, or by an appropriation and assent, neither of which is his. In modern times, in England, the broker has undertaken a further duty with regard to the contract of purchase and sale of goods. If the goods be in existence, the broker frequently passes a delivery order to the vendor to be signed, and, on its being signed, he passes it to the vendee. In so doing he still does no more than act as a mere intervener between the principals. He himself, considered as only a broker, has no possession of the goods, no power actual or legal of determining the destination of the goods, no power or authority to determine whether the goods belong to buyer or seller, or either: no power, legal or actual, to determine whether the goods shall be delivered to the one or be kept by the other. He is throughout merely the negotiator between the parties. And, therefore, by the civil law, brokers "were not treated as ordinarily incurring any personal liability by their intervention unless there was some fraud on their part:" (Story on Agency, sect. 30.) And if all a broker has done be what I have hitherto described, I apprehend it to be clear that he would have incurred no liability to anyone according to English law. He could not be sued by either party to the contract for any breach of it. He could not sue anyone in any action in which it was necessary to assert that he was owner of the goods. He is dealing only with the making of a contract, which may or may not be fulfilled, and making himself the intermediary passer-on or carrier of a document, which may or may not be obeyed, without any liability thereby attaching to him towards either party to the contract. He is, so long as he acts

only as a broker in the way described, claiming no property in or use of the goods, or even possession of them, either on his own behalf or on behalf of anyone else. Obedience or disobedience to the contract, and its effect upon the goods, are matters entirely dependent upon the will and conduct of one or both of the principals, and in no way within his cognizance. Under such circumstances, and so far, it seems to me clear that a broker cannot be sued with effect by anyone."

THE RETIREMENT OF THE LORD CHANCELLOR. ONE of the most useful professional and judicial careers of which legal history gives any record is about to draw to a close. In the first year of the present century WILLIAM PAGE WOOD was born, being the second son of Sir MATTHEW WOOD, Member for the City, and twice Lord Mayor of London. Of his parentage and his birthplace he has always been proud, rarely losing an opportunity afforded him by the great civic banquets to recall the pleasing associations of his youth. After having received his early education at Winchester, he entered at Trinity College, Cambridge. He graduated as 24th Wrangler, and was a Fellow of his college from 1825 to 1830. At the age of twenty-six, that is to say, in November 1827, he was called to the Bar by Lincoln's Inn. His rise in his profession was not rapid, for he did not obtain a silk gown until he had been at the Bar eighteen years. But he was a counsel who could be thoroughly trusted, for throughout his career to discharge his duty conscientiously has been his first and controlling object. Mr. WOOD entered Parliament as Member for Oxford City in 1847; he became Solicitor-General in 1851, and in 1853 he was made a Vice-Chancellor.

As an equity judge SIR WILLIAM PAGE WOOD obtained a reputation which will live: as a Lord Chancellor he will be known for his failures and errors of judgment. But when we speak of him as a judge, we do not confine the observations which we have made to the period during which he was a Vice-Chancellor. Although some of the judgments which he has delivered at Lincoln's Inn as Lord Chancellor have not been remarkable for the lucidity and power which characterised his earlier decisions, owing perhaps to his additional labours, and, in no small degree, to the deference which he always struggled to show to those judges whose decrees he was called upon to review, we consider that in a large number of cases he fully sustained his reputation; whilst in the House of Lords he manifested a judicial capacity certainly little if at all, inferior to that of the other law lords. A disinclination to write his judgments has been referred to by the Press as a failing, and doubtless to this is to be attributed the involved nature of some of his judgments. This, however, is not a matter of large consequence where the law applied is sound, and there are careful reporters to carry the decisions into print.

There are few heads of equity jurisdiction which have not felt the influence of Vice-Chancellor Woop. He played a great part in administering the difficult law relating to public companies, and the law of patents, and in dealing with the former he more than once enjoined a greater regard to morality in commercial dealings. In reversing as LORD CHANCELLOR the decree of the MASTER OF THE ROLLS in Re the Agricultural Cattle Insurance Company (Bush's case) (L. Rep. 6 Ch. 247), his Lordship said, referring to a particular report on the affairs of the company, "It is very difficult to say decidedly what is the exact legal view which ought to be taken by persons who have a report of this kind presented to them. Of course one would rejoice to see everything laid plainly before the shareholders of the company. On the other hand it would not be just for us, who have never been concerned with mercantile arrangements, to lay down as a fixed rule that which I individually should be very glad to see established as a principle of mercantile morality, that every firm should publish all its accounts as is done by the Bank of England and others." The same principle, the same earnest desire not to allow judicial strictness to misinterpret commercial rules and customs, pervades all his judgments, and it is this which gives them their peculiar value. We would recommend those who would limit Lord HATHERLEY'S judicial fame to the period of his Vice-Chancellorship to examine the recent text books on subjects of equity jurisdiction, and great as was the authority of Vice-Chancellor WOOD it will be found that Lord HATHERLEY continued to direct and control the courts of equity.

It is unhappily the fault of our system that the judicial reputation of a Lord Chancellor is liable to be clouded by the misfortunes of his political administration. When Vice-Chancellor WOOD became Lord HATHERLEY, he was far advanced in years, and ill able to bear up against the constant pressure from within and without the Cabinet; and both by age and by nature he was illfitted to deal roughly, and as the public service demanded, with the importunate. Furthermore, so many years had elapsed since he had been engaged in political warfare, that he was not armed for a contest with party exigencies and contingencies. Rarely has a Chancellor received the Great Seal under greater disadvantages. The subject of law reform was in the front rank of urgent public questions; but it owed its position, not to the action of reformers who had indicated the kind of reform which was wanted, but to an agitation which, by clamouring for an immediate remedy, made calm

deliberation and cautious preparation impossible. The introduction of some measure or other became imperative, and Lord HATHERLEY was goaded on to sacrifice himself to the necessities of the administration, the result being that he was torn to pieces, not only by the enemies of the Government, but by every lawyer in the House who had sufficient industry to detect the inadequacy of the Chancellor's scheme. Then, again, what can be said of the COLLIER scandal? Shall that be written down a personal misfeasance of Lord HATHERLEY? It really originated in a bit of blundering legislation, which failed to comprehend in a plan for recruiting the judicial power of the Privy Council, the law officers of the Government. But for once in his life the Lord CHANCELLOR was carried away by temper. Having offered the appointment to all the Common Law Judges whom he considered eligible, and being repelled in each case, he looked beyond the Act of Parliament, and made a selection which could not be justified. Then, he made the further mistake of defending that which was indefensible, and was, to say the least, impolite to the LORD CHIEF JUSTICE. This undoubtedly is matter for sincere regret; but it cannot be considered an incident which history should regard as seriously affecting Lord HATHERLEY's reputation.

There is but one opinion in the legal profession concerning Lord HATHERLEY. The courtesy and kindness which endeared him to the Bar when he was Vice-Chancellor characterised him as Lord Chancellor, and although he was less frequently brought into contact with its members he was equally revered. And here we should remark that in the midst of his manifold duties he never willingly declined to preside over any legal society which sought his patronage, and of nearly every such society, more particularly those whose design is to succour distress and relieve necessity, he has always been a warm supporter.

In judging of Lord HATHERLEY it is not to be forgotten that he has famous contemporaries who may have raised the standard of excellence. It is not the fortune of every Chancellor to be preceded by a WESTBURY and a CAIRNS, and to be succeeded by a PALMER. The latter has, during the whole period of Lord HATHERLEY'S Chancellorship, enjoyed a reputation which has in a measure eclipsed that of the actual occupant of the woolsack. It has been no secret that Sir ROUNDELL PALMER was the coming Chancellor, and that the Government considered that they had some sort of vested interest in his capacity. Such a state of things was not favourable to the LORD CHANCELLOR. And in conclusion, therefore, without indulging in eulogy which could not fail to be distasteful to its object, we say simply that Lord HATHERLEY has maintained the high judicial reputation of Vice-Chancellor Woon, and that as a Chancellor he has failed where even younger and more capable men would not have succeeded; whilst as the head of the law he retires beloved by all to whom he was known and honoured, and respected by the entire Profession.

CERTIFICATES FOR COSTS.

THE 5th section of the County Courts Act 1867 (30 & 31 Vict. c. 142) is of course familiar to all our readers, operating as it does to deprive a plaintiff of his costs if he fails to recover in the Superior Court a sum not exceeding £20 in contract, and £10 in tort, "unless the Judge shall certify on the record that there was sufficient reason for bringing such action in such Superior Court, or unless the Court or a Judge at Chambers shail by rule or order allow such costs." There are two recent cases on this section to which attention should be directed, inasmuch, as, primâ facie, they are somewhat in conflict. Those cases are Hinde v. Sheppard (25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 500) and Barlow v. Briggs, which we report to-day.

The case of Hinde v. Sheppard was an action to try an alleged customary right to play games upon certain land purchased by the plaintiff. The jury found for the plaintiff as to the custom, but the defendants amended their pleadings just before the trial by adding two pleas and claiming a right of way, upon one of which they succeeded. Mr. Justice Willes refused to certify for costs, the defendants undertaking not to move for a new trial. Barlow v. Briggs was an action for trespass to land and obstruction to light, and the plaintiff recovered 40s., whereupon Mr. Justice Lush, considering the right claimed of small value, refused to certify for costs. In these cases there is something more than a distinction as to the importance of the right claimed, for in Hinde v. Sheppard the Court seemed to recognise that where the right claimed is of sufficient importance the decision of the Judge at Nisi Prius may be reviewed, whereas in Barlow v. Briggs doubts were raised as to this jurisdiction in the court in banco. Baron Martin said the Court had no jurisdiction, "the 5th section not giving either to a Judge at Chambers, or to the court, a right to sit in appeal over the Judge who tried the cause, whose judgment on the question of costs the Legislature intended to be final and conclusive." When the section is looked at closely this would really seem to be the case. The exception is in the alternative; no costs are to be given unless the Judge certify on the record, or unless the Court or a Judge at Chambers shall by rule or order allow such costs. That is to say, that if a certificate is not applied for at the trial application may be subsequently made to the Court or a Judge at Chambers. It is very

forcibly stated in Barlow v. Briggs why there should not be an appeal against the decision of the Judge at the trial. He has full cognisance of the facts; the nature of the claim and of the property or right in respect of which it is made is fully within his knowledge, and forming his judgment upon such knowledge he arrives at a conclusion, which is a mattor of of discretion, to refuse the costs of an action in the Superior Court. If a Judge at Chambers or the Court is called upon to review that determination he or it does so without any of the advantages possessed by the Judge at the trial and without any evidence to supply this deficiency. Therefore, if an appeal were to be allowed at all it should be as stated by Baron Cleasby in Hinde v. Sheppard, only "under very exceptional circumstances."

With reference to the distinction between the cases, however, it is to be observed that in Hinde v. Sheppard Baron Bramwell speaks of the claim as involving an interest of large pecuniary value, and also a general right of inhabitants. The Lord Chief Baron (who dissents in Barlow v. Briggs) also said that the action "involving as it did a substantial and important right," was one which was properly brought in a Superior Court. His Lordship took this same ground in Barlow v. Briggs, and observed that although the actual damage sustained might be only 5s., the right of passage, leading as it did from one cottage to another, might be very important to the plaintiff. Upon this point, which is one of which a Judge at Nisi Prius must be the best judge, the court was divided, the Lord Chief Baron being opposed to the rest of the court. When judges of discrimination disagree-and Baron Cleasby, if he had given an unbiassed opinion, would have differed from the rest of the court in Hinde v. Sheppard-there can be no stronger argument for leaving the question to the Judge who has the greatest opportunities for forming a correct opinion.

At present we cannot say that there is no jurisdiction to review the decision of a Judge at Nisi Prius on the question of costs; the weight of judicial opinion is in favour of the opposite view. But, unfortunately, we cannot give any indication what description of case is likely to be awarded a certificate. Mr. Justice Lush in Barlow v. Briggs expressed his opinion that the right claimed was of trifling value, yet the Lord Chief Baron thought that it might be of considerable value, and would have given the plaintiff his costs. This is a subject upon which there ought to be some certain and fixed rule: either the question should be decided definitively by the Judge who tries the cause, or there should be some assessment of value at the trial by which a Court or a Judge, knowing nothing of the facts, could be guided. When some half-dozen other suitors have been to the expense of obtaining more conflicting judicial opinions, counsel may make a near guess in giving an opinion as to bringing particular actions in the Superior Court. We cannot ask for the intervention of the Legislature, as very little satisfaction, as a general rule, is derived from that proceeding.

MARINE INSURANCE.

CONVERSION OF PARTIAL INTO TOTAL Loss.

Ir is an interesting question on this difficult branch of law whether the proceedings of a Court of Admiralty, ordering a sale at the suit of salvors can convert a partial loss into a total loss. In illustration, the case of De Mattos v. Saunders (27 L. T. Rep. N.S. 120, C.P.) should be looked at. The insurance was upon a cargo of salt. During her voyage the vessel sprung a leak, and was towed by tugs into safety. She was subsequently arrested in two salvage suits, and bail not being put in by the owner of cargo, it remained under arrest, and was ultimately sold. The damage to the cargo was this: Sea water, which after having come in contact with the iron bolts of the ship fell upon or otherwise reached the salt, had caused it to be coloured with brownish and yellowish specks. In order to have made any portion of the salt merchantable, it would have been necessary to pick out such portions as were perfectly clean, or only very slightly discoloured, and to have collected the same for shipment. This would have been a matter of great difficulty, and doubtful profit. The condition of the salt was, therefore, that it existed in specie, but in a damaged condition, and, independently of the proceedings in admiralty, would have been a partial loss. The remarks of Mr. Justice Willes on this head are important.

His Lordship said: "It has been contended that the partial loss was converted into a total loss by the seizure of the salvors and by the proceedings taken in the Court of Admiralty; but that contention cannot hold good. The proceedings in question are not at all the necessary consequences of sea damage, although in this case they were the natural and necessary consequence of the particular sea damage which occurred; and the assured is entitled to recover, not in respect of the proximate consequences of the particular sea damage, but in respect of the consequences of sea damage in general. There is, however, in the present case a link wanting between the damage and the seizure by salvors, and the subsequent proceedings in the Court of Admiralty. If these facts be taken as having the effect of converting a partial loss into a total loss, we arrive at the absurd conclusion, that, if proceedings are taken for a false salvage claim, that circumstance alone would suffice to make a total loss. There is nothing here to convert the sea damage and the proceedings by salvors, so as to

constitute a total loss. The cases cited by Mr. Butt, and on the authority of which he founds his argument, are easily distinguishable. In those cases there was a hostile seizure, the natural consequence of which is that the ship is taken into a foreign prize court and condemned. In such a case you have a hostile seizure to begin with, and all that follows is accessory to the fact. Those cases, therefore, do not apply to the present."

The case, which was apparently principally relied upon by counsel was Stringer v. The English and Scottish Marine Insurance Company (L. Rep. 4, Q. B. 676), but there the fact was as stated by Mr. Justice Willes above, that there was a hostile seizure. A decree was given against the captors in the first instance, and the assured elected to treat the loss as partial; the captors appealed, and the assured gave notice of abandonment. It was held that there had not been such a change of facts as would entitle the assured to abandon, but that as a prudent owner would not have given bail to prevent the sale, the sale was a total loss occasioned by the seizure. This and similar cases are clearly distinguishable from De Mattos v. Saunders.

Another point raised in this case was as to

STRANDING.

The vessel, as stated, was taken in tow, and she was towed on to a bank where it was usual for vessels to bring up to anchor and to take the ground until there is sufficient water to enable them to get into harbour. While lying there, which she did on her port side for several tides, she sustained injury by straining in conse quence of the strong current, her want of anchors, and the damage she had sustained. Adopting the principle laid down by Chief Justice Lord Tenterden in Wells v. Hopwood (3 B. & Ad. 20), viz., that where grounding arises from an accident or out of the common course of navigation, it is a stranding, the court came to the conclusion that the beaching did amount to a stranding. The comparison of the cases on stranding, and especially with reference to Magnus v. Buttemer (11 C. B. 876), shows that there is a great want of a settled principle. We incline to the opinion that Magnus v. Buttemer was not decided in strict accordance with the prevailing rule, and that the safest course in such cases is to apply Lord Tenterden's doctrine liberally and fairly.

A DIGEST OF PATENT LAW CASES.

(By CLEMENT HIGGINS, Esq., B.A., F.C.S., Barrister-at-Law.) NOVELTY.

Hill v. Thompson, 1818.-Dallas, J., in delivering the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas, said: "This, like every other patent, must undoubtedly, stand on the ground of improvement or discovery. If of improvement, it must stand on the ground of improvement invented; if of discovery, it must stand on the ground of the discovery of something altogether new; and the patent must distinguish and adapt itself accordingly. If the patent be taken out for discovery, when the alleged discovery is merely an addition or improvement, it is scarcely necessary to observe that it will be altogether void. If the discovery claimed were known and made use of before, the patent is at an end. Now, with refer ence to this particular case, it may be proper shortly to consider, what novelty and discovery are deemed to be; and when I say novelty and discovery, I mean to distinguish between those terms; for it is not enough to have discovered what was unknown to others before, if the discovery be confined to the knowledge of the party having made it; but it must have been communicated, more or less, or it must have been more or less made use of, so as to constitute discovery, as applied to subjects of this sort. The case of Dollond has been mentioned at the bar, as also Tennant's patent for bleaching liquor, and they stand so contrasted as to illustrate the distinction to which I allude. If any part of the alleged discovery, being a material part, fail (the discovery in its entirety forming one entire consideration), the patent is altogether void." It was further held, that a book printed and published, prior to the grant of the patent, which in substance informed the public of what the specification of the patent professed to inform them, completely negatived the novelty of the alleged invention. (2 B. Mo. 424; 8 Taunt. 375; 1 Web. P. C. 239.)

Forsyth v. Riviere, 1819.-If several persons simultaneously discover the same thing, the party first communicating it to the public, under the protection of letters patent, becomes the legal inventor. (Chitty's Prerog. Crown, 182; 1 Web. P. C., 97; 1 Carp. P. C., 401.)

Brunton v. Hawkes, 1821.-Patent for "certain improvements in the construction, making, or manufacturing of ships' anchors, and windlasses, and chain cables or mooring." It was proved at Nisi Prius, that the mode of manufacturing anchors described in the plaintiff's specification had never been applied before to ships' anchors; but had been applied to the adze-anchor, and the mushroom-anchor. These anchors are used only for the purpose of mooring floating lights or vessels intended to be stationary, and are never taken on board. The jury having found a verdict for the plaintiff, the defendant obtained a rule nisi for a new trial, which the court afterwards made absolute. In his judgment, Abbott, C.J., said: "I feel myself compelled to say that I think so much of the plaintiff's invention, as respects the anchor, is not new, and that the whole patent is therefore void. The mode of joining the shank to the flukes of the anchor is put to the end of the shank, which is in the form of a solid cylinder, through the hollow and conical aperture, and it is then made to fill up the hollow, and to unite itself with it. Now that is precisely the mode by which the shank of the mushroom-anchor is united to the mushroom top, by which the shank of the adze-anchor is united to its other parts. It is indeed the mode by which the different parts of the common hammer and pickaxe also are united together. Now a patent for a machine, each part of which was in use before, but in which the combination of the different parts is new, and a new result produced, is good, because there is a novelty in the combination. But here the case is perfectly different; formerly three pieces were united together; the plaintiff only unites two; and, if the union of those two had been effected in a mode unknown before, as applied in any degree to similar purposes, I should have thought it a good ground for s

patent; but unfortunately the mode was well known and long practised. I think that a man cannot be entitled to a patent for uniting two things instead of three, where that union is effected in a mode well known and long practised for a similar purpose. It seems to me, therefore, that there is no novelty in that part of the patent as affects the anchor, and if the patent had been taken out for that alone, I should have had no hesitation in declaring that it was bad. Then, if there be no novelty in that part of the patent, can the plaintiff sustain his patent for the other part as to the mooring chain? As at present advised. I am inclined to think that the combination of a link of this particular form with the stay of the form which he uses, although the form of the link might have been known before, is so far new and beneficial as to sustain a patent for that part of the invention, if the patent had been taken out for that part alone. But inasmuch as one of the things is not new, the question arises whether any part can be sustained. It is quite clear that a patent granted by the Crown cannot extend beyond the consideration of the patent. The king could not, in consideration of a new invention in one article, grant a patent for that article and another. The question then is whether, if a party applies for a patent, reciting that he has discovered improvements in three things, and obtains a patent for these three things, and in the result it turns out that there is no novelty in one of them, he can sustain his patent. It appears to me that the case of Hill v. Thompson, which underwent great consideration in the Common Pleas, is decisive upon that question. The consideration of

the patent is the improvement in the three articles, and not in one; for an improvement in only one of them would render the patent bad. The consideration is the entirety of the improvement of the three; and if it turns out there is no novelty in one of the improvements, the consideration fails in the whole, and the patentee is not entitled to the benefit of that other part of his invention." (4 B. & Ald. 541; 7 D. &. R. 703; 1 Carp. P. C. 405.)

Barber v. Walduck. N. P. 1823.-Action for the infringement of a patent for an improvement in making hats. One of the plaintiff's witnesses proved, that he had made the improvement, which was the subject of the patent, while employed in their workshop. Holroyd, J. ordered a nonsuit. (1 C. & P. 567; 1 Carp. P. C. 438.)

Bloxam v. Elsee. N. P. 1825.-Action for the infringement of a patent for "a machine for making paper in single sheets without seam or joinings." The principle of this invention consisted in receiving the pulp to be made into paper upon an endless wire web, stretched upon revolving cylinders, so that the paper was moved forward as fast as it was formed. The patentee discovered the principle of this invention, but the mechanical details necessary for carrying the invention into complete effect were numerous and complicated, and therefore he engaged Mr. Donkin, an engineer, to give him his professional assistance, and several parts of the machine were suggested to the patentee by Mr. Donkin. It was objected by the defendants that the patentee under these circumstances could not be the inventor; but it was answered that Mr. Donkin was merely acting as the patentee's servant, and the objection was not sustained. (1 ̊C. & P. 567; 1 Web. P. C. 132n; Carp. P. C. 434.)

Lewis v. Marling. 1829.-Action for the infringement of a patent for certain improvements on shearing machines. It was proved by the defendant, that the specification of a similar machine had previously been enrolled in America, that a model of an exactly similar machine had been exhibited to three or four persons in England, and that a manufacturer in England had commenced the construction of a machine from the American specification. This, however, was never completed, and it was proved by the plaintiffs that the same manufacturer had purchased the plaintiff's machines. Tenterden, C.J., in summing up to the jury at Nisi Prius, said: "It is no doubt incumbent on the plaintiffs to show that their machine is new, but it is not necessary that they should have invented it from their own heads; it is sufficient that it should be new as to the general use and public exercise in this kingdom. If it were shown that the plaintiffs had borrowed from some one else, then, of course, their patent would fail. To show that the machine was not new, evidence is given that a model has been seen by three or four persons, and that the making of a similar machine was begun; but it appears to me, that the defendant has failed to prove that such a machine was generally known or generally used in England before the taking out of this patent by the plaintiffs." (3 C. & P. 502; 1 Web. P. C. 488; 1 Carp. P. C. 475.) On a motion, in the Court of King's Bench, for a new trial, Tenterden, C.J. said, that the evidence showed "that until the plaintiff's invention came out no machine was publicly known or used here for shearing from list to list. I told the jury that if it could be shown that the plaintiffs had seen the model or specification, that might answer the claim of the invention, but there was no evidence of that kind, and I left it to them to say whether it had been in public use and operation before the granting of the patent." Bailey, J., said: "If it had been shown that the plaintiffs had seen the model, and had borrowed from it, he would not have been the true inventor, and would, therefore, have misled the Crown; but if I made a discovery, and am enabled to produce an effect from my own experiments, judgment, and skill, it is no objection that some one else has made a similar discovery by his mind, unless it has become public. So, if I introduce a discovery, bona fide made, I may have a patent for it, though a person might have received privately a communication from abroad, which would have enabled him to have made the machine. " (10 B. & C. 22: 4 C. & P. 57; 1 Web. P. C. 493; 1 Carp. P. C.) Jones v. Pearce, N. P., 1832.-The plaintiff obtained a patent, dated 1826, for "an improved method of making carriage wheels." The defendant proved that Mr. Strutt, in 1814, had wheels constructed upon the same principle as the patent, but differing from it in the details of construction. These wheels were used on a cart for a year, but subsequently getting out of order were laid aside. Patterson, J., referring to the novelty of the invention, said to the jury: "It is not necessary to show that it was actually in use at the moment of taking out the patent. The circumstance of ceasing to use it would not make it new. The question is, was there really an invention by Mr. Strutt in use known to others? If you should think his was an abortive attempt, and a failure, or a mere experiment which did not answer, then it would not invalidate the plaintiff's patent." After summing up the evidence, his lordship continued: "But it is for you to say, if on the whole of this evidence, either on the one side or the other, it appeared this wheel constructed by Mr. Strutt's order in 1814, was a wheel on the same principles, and in substance the same wheel as the other for which the plaintiff has taken out his patent, and that was used openly in public, so that everybody might see it, and had continued to use the same thing up to the time of taking out the patent, undoubtedly then that would be a ground to say that the plaintiff's invention is not new, and if it is not new, of course his patent is bad, and he cannot recover in this action; but if, on the other hand, you are of opinion that Mr. Strutt's was an experi. ment, and that he found it did not answer, and ceased to use it altogether, and abandoned it as useless, and nobody else followed it up, and that the

plaintiff's invention, which came afterwards, was his own invention, and remedied the defects, if I may so say, although he knew nothing of Mr. Strutt's wheel, he remedied the defects of Mr. Strutt's wheel, then there is no reason for saying the plaintiff's patent is not good; it depends entirely upon what is your opinion upon the evidence with respect to that, because, supposing you are of opinion that it is a new invention of the plaintiff's, the patent is then good:" (1 Cap. P. C. 524; 1 Web. P. C. 122.)

Minter v. Wells, N. P., 1834.-Action for the infringement of a patent for improvements in the construction, making, or manufacturing of chairs." The patentee claimed "the application of a self-adjusting leverage to the back and seat of a chair, whereby the weight on the seat acts as a counterbalance to the pressure against the back of such chair, as above described." The defendants contended that the invention was made, not by the patentee, but by a person by the name of Sutton. Alderson, B., in summing up to the jury, said: "He (the patentee) claims under the patent, stating it in his petition to the Crown, that he is the true inventor of the machine in question; and if it could be shown that he was not the true inventor, but that some one else had invented it, the Crown is deceived in that suggestion, which was the foundation on which it granted the patent; and then the law is, that a patent obtained under such circumstances would be void, and no action could be maintained against a party for the infringement of the patent, by reason of the suggestion to the Crown not being true . . . . The essence of the claim to invention, and undoubtedly his claim, is the application of a self-adjusting leverage to the chair, and if it could be shown that any self-adjusting leverage had been, before the plaintiff's patent, applied to a chair, the patent would be void, because the priority of the specification given to him would claim every species of the application of a self-adjusting leverage to the back and seat of a chair. If Sutton suggested the

principle to Mr. Minter, then he (Sutton) would be the inventor. If, on the other hand, Mr. Minter suggested the principle to Sutton, and Sutton was assisting him, then Mr. Minter would be the first and true inventor, and Sutton would be a machine, so to speak, which Mr. Minter uses for the purpose of enabling him to carry his original conception into effect." 1 Web. P. C. 127; 1 Carp. P. C. 622.)

LAW LIBRARY.

The Law and Practice of Registration and Elections. By E. W. Cox, Serjeant-at-Law, Recorder of Portsmouth, and S. G. GRADY, Barrister-at-Law, Recorder of Gravesend. Eleventh Edition. London: Horace Cox.

THIS well-known work has reached, its eleventh edition at an important period of our electoral history. The practice of elections has been in a measure revolutionised by the adoption of secret voting, and the Ballot Act is, of course, the prominent feature in this volume. Every care has, apparently, been used to bring up the law and practice to the present date, and Mr. F. O. Crump has contributed a useful chapter on the legal principles relating to corrupt practices, as laid down by the Judges under the Election Petitions Act.

Forms and Precedents in Conveyancing. By WILLIAM WHITTAKER BARRY, of Lincoln's Inn, Barrister-at-Law. London: Simpkin, Marshall, and Co.

THE only criticism of this work which would be really worth anything, would be the criticism of some one who had tested the forms in practice. All that we can do for Mr. Barry is to express our respect for the sources from which he tells us in his introduction he obtained much of his material. The forms are preceded by a useful introduction relating to the duties and labours of conveyancers, and, there being a good index, we have no doubt that to those members of the Profession who find Prideaux too cumbersome or too expensive, Mr. Barry's work will prove very useful. As far as we can form an opinion, it appears to have been carefully compiled, and Mr. Barry's reputation is a sufficient guarantee of

accuracy.

WE have to acknowledge the Fourth Edition of Currie's Indian Criminal Codes (London: Flack and Co., 3, Warwick-court, Holborn); A Popular Edition of the Ballot Act, by W. A. HOLDSWORTH, Esq., Barrister-at-Law (Routledge and Sons), having a sensible introduction; the same Act, with an introduction, "forming a guide to the procedure at Parliamentary and Municipal Elections," by GERALD A. R. FITZGERALD, Barrister-at-Law (Stevens and Sons). We have also received four works on The Licensing Act, the authors being Mr. OKE (Butterworths), Messrs. LELY and FOULKES, barristers (H. Sweet); Mr. HOLDSWORTH (Routledge); and Mr. FORD, solicitor, of Portsmouth, this latter being a synopsis of the Act.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

Mayne's Treatise on Damages. Second edition. By Lumley Smith, Barrister-at-Law. Stevens and Haynes.

Savigny on Obligations. By A. Brown, Esq. Stevens and Haynes. Outlines of Roman Law. By T. Whitcombe Greene, B.C.L., Barrister-atLaw. Stevens and Sons.

A Concordance of the Constitution of the United States. By C. W. Stearns, M.D. Trubner and Co.

THE STOCK MARKETS.

CITY, THURSDAY, OCT. 3. Ar their weekly meeting to-day, the Bank directors made a further rise of per cent. in their minimum rate to 5, being the third advance in three successive weeks. The movement was not thought unlikely, although the circumstances at the moment affecting the general market are not such as to create apprehen

sions of a foreign drain. At this season of the year, however, the currency usually expands in response to requirements, which increase as we get into the autumn, and it is inferred that the decline in the reserve which has led to the rise in the rate is owing chiefly to a demand for more sovereigns in the provinces. The gradual decline in prices which has been uninterrupted for some weeks past, continues, but no very material effect was produced by the change to-day as it was thought likely.

The Consol account was concluded yesterday, and the price now for November with the accrued interest, shows a rise for the week of. For money it is lower. Exchequer Bills are 3s. lower; and the new French loan.

In American Stocks the changes for the week are a rise of 1 in Illinois; and of in the 10-40 Government Bonds; but a fall of 1 in Eries, and Atlantic and Great Western Railway Debentures.

Notwithstanding the good traffic receipts, and the hopes of a reduction in the price of coal at no distant date, all the chief changes in price are downwards for the week, a movement which is only to be expected as the natural consequence of a rise in the value of money. The principal changes for the week are a fall of 2 in Great Northern A; of 14 in Midland; of 1 in Lancashire and Yorkshire; of in Great Eastern, London and NorthWestern, Metropolitan, and South-Eastern; and of in Great Western, North-Eastern, and South-Eastern Deferred. On the other hand, North British is 23 higher; and Manchester and Sheffield

In the foreign market this week there has been especial dullness in French Stocks, in consequence of M. Gambetta's speeches in the provinces, which considerably depressed the Paris Bourse, and also this market.

To-day there has been less weakness in those descriptions. South American Stocks have also been prominently depressed, on unfavourable advices from Honduras more particularly. There is a fall for the week of 4 in Honduras; of 1 in Paraguay of 1872; of 2 in Bolivian; of 1 in Paraguay old, and Peruvian; and of in the French National; and of in Spanish and Turkish. Mexican and Egyptian are somewhat better.

In Telegraph Shares, Anglo-American is 1 higher for the week, and Chinas.

In Miscellaneous shares Hudson's Bay are 1 better; and Native Guano and Phosphate Sewage

The rate allowed for deposits by the Banks and Discount houses has been advanced at call from 3 to 4 per cent.; at 7 days' notice from 3 to 44; and at 14 days' notice from 4 to 44.

One hundred thousand sovereigns have been sent into the Bank this day from Hamburg, and £78,000 in bar gold withdrawn. The latest quotations for British Funds are as follows: Consols for money 92 to 921; ditto November account, 924 to 923; Reduced and New Three per Cents., 90 to 903; Exchequer Bills, 3s. dis to 2s prem.; India Five per Cent. Stock, 110 to 111; ditto Four per Cent., 101 to 105; ditto Enfaced Paper Four per Cent. 96 to 97; ditto Five and Half per Cent., 106 to 107; Metropolitan Three and a Half per Cent., 98 to 99; and French Rentes in this market 51 to 52, ex.-div.

The latest price for French Rentes received from Paris was 53fr. 10c. In the market for American Securities, the United States 5-20 bonds of 1882 are marked 923 to 92; do. 1885, 934 to 93; do. 1887, 92 to 92; ditto 10-40 Bonds, 87 to 88; Atlantic and Great Western Bonds, 31 to 32; ditto Debentures, 40 to 41; Eries, 381 to 384; Illinois, 104 to 105; and United States Funded Loan, 89 to 89.

In the Railway Market the prices are:-Caledonians, 108 to 109 ex. div.; Great Eastern, 46 to 471; Great Northern, 133 to 135; ditto, A, 154 to 156; Great Western, 116 to 117; Lancashire and Yorkshire, 149 to 150; London and Brighton, 73 to 73; London, Chatham, and Dover, 23 to 23; ditto 4 per cent. preference, 60 to 61; London and North-Western, 142 to 143; London and SouthWestern, 101 to 105; Manchester and Sheffield, 81 to 81; Metropolitan, 584 to 58; ditto District, 274 to 274; Midland, 110 to 140; North British, 83 to 84; North Eastern Consols 161 to 162; South Eastern, 1024 to 102; ditto Deferred, 84 to 844; Grand Trunk of Canada, 19 to 201; Great Western of Canada, 22 to 221; Antwerp and Rotterdam, 25 to 26; Great Luxembourg, 17 to 173; and Lombardo Venetian, 19 to 19. The prices of the principal Foreign Stocks are as follows: Argentine 1868, 95 to 96; do., 6 per cent., 1871, 90 to 91; Bolivian, 6 per cent. 56 to 57; Brazilian, 5 per cent. 1865, 94 to 95; do., 5 per cent, 1871, 94 to 95; Costa Rica Scrip, 1872, 10 to 7 dis.; Egyptian, 7 per cent., 1868, 891 to 893; do., Viceroy Loan, 91 to 93: do., Khedive 79% to 80 ex. div.; French Morgan, 6 per cent. Loan, 96 to 97 ex. div.; do., National, 5 per cent. Loan, 1871, par to 4 pm. ; do., 1872 Scrip, 1 to 13 prem.; Greek, 14 to 15; Honduras, 33 to 35; Italian of 1861, 66 to 66; Mexican, 15 to 15; Paraguay, 8 per cent., 1871, 74 to 75; do., 1872, 10 to 5 dis.; Peruvian 6 per cent. 1870, 741 to 743; do., 5 per cent. 1872 scrip., 1 to 24 prem.; Spanish 29 to 291; do., 3 per cent., 1871, 29 to 291; Turkish, 5 per cent. 1865, 514 to 52; do. 6 per cent., 1869, 60% to 633; and do., 6 per cent. 1871, 72% to 723.

In the Telegraph Market, Anglo-American Stock is quoted at 119 to 121; British Australian, 7 to 8; British Indian Extension, 11 to 11: Chinas, 8 to 9; Cubas, 7 to 8; Eastern, 9 to 9; Great Northern, 103 to 11; Indo European, 13 to 15; Mediterranean Extension, 6 to 7; Reuter's, 9 to 10; and West India and Panama, 5 to 54.

In miscellaneous shares the prices are as follows :-General Credit and Discount 24 to 2 pm.; International Finance, to dis.; Hooper's Tele graph Works, to pm; Hudson's Bay, 13 to 14; India Rubber and Gutta Percha, 32 to 33; National Discount, 11 to 12; Telegraph Construction, 32 to 33; Royal Mail Steam, 88 to 90; Native Guano, 1 to 15; Phosphate Sewage, 111 to 11; New Sombrero Phosphate, 1 to 4); and Phospho Guano, 11 to 111.

SOLICITORS' JOURNAL.

BANK OF ENGLAND.

Transferred to the Commissioners for the Reduction of the

National Debt, and which will be paid to the pers respectively whose names are prefixed to each in three months, unless other claimants sooner appear.]

ster. £300 Three per Cent. Annuities. Claimant, Emily Garrard, widow, administratrix to Louisa Bolton, spin. ster, deceased.

LORD MAYOR'S COURT.

APPOINTMENTS UNDER THE JOINT-STOCK WINDING-UP ACTS.

Serjeant.) Wednesday, Oct. 2. POWELL V. SIMS. Evidence-Composition deed, 24 & 25 Vict. c. 134, s. 192―The certificate of registration endorsed on a deed of composition, under the Bankruptcy Act 1861, stating the time and place of registration and that it was duly registered pursuant to the Act, is prima facie evidence that all the necessities of the statute were complied with, and it is not requisite to prove the truth of the affidavit;-Omnia rite acta præsumuntur. THIS was a claim for clothes supplied to the defendant by the plaintiff, a tailor. There was a plea of a deed of composition under the Bankruptcy Act 1861, dated subsequently to the time of the plaintiff's claim.

Kemp for the plaintiff.

Salter for the defendant opened the case (the onus being upon him to prove the deed) by calling the witness to the deed of composition, and having proved the signature, and produced the certifi

necessary affidavit."

for winding-up to be heard Oct. 10, before V.C. M., at Great Western Hotel, Reading, at 11 o'clock. EASTERN DISTRICT FREEHOLD ESTATES COMPANY (LIMITED) -Petition for winding-up to be heard Nov. 9, before the M. R. UNITED AUCTION ADVANCE AND INVESTMENT COMPANY (LIMITED.)-Creditors to send in by Oct. 14 their names and addresses, and the particulars of their claims, and the names and addresses of their solicitors (if any), to James W. Sully, 23, Gresham House, Old Broad-street, E.C., the official liquidator of the said company. Nov. 11, at twelve o'clock, at the chambers of the M. R., is the time appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon such claims. CREDITORS UNDER ESTATES IN CHANCERY.

LAST DAY OF PROOF. SCARLETT (Ann), Saxmundham, Suffolk. Oct. 18: Henry Southwell, solicitor, Saxmundham, Nov. 1, V.C. B., as twelve o'clock.

GAMBLE (Geo.), 25, Spencer-street, Everton-road, Liverpoo

engineer. Oct. 1; Arthur Preston, solicitor, Norwich, Nov. 6, M. R., at twelve o'clock. Sept. $; J. Hartill, solicitor, 6A, Bishopsgate-street Without, E.C.. Nov. 4, V.C. M., at twelve o'clock.

SIDWELL (Robert F.). Stanwell, Middlesex.

CREDITORS UNDER 22 & 23 VICT. c. 35. Last Day of Claim, and to whom Particulars to be sent. ADNUTT (Rev. Robert T.), Cadeby, Leicester, clerk. Nov. 6; Freer and Co., solicitors, New-street, Leicester. BELL (Frances), Black Bull Inn, Sunderland-street. Neg castle-upon-Tyne, innkeeper. Dec. 1: J. G. and J. E Joel, solicitors, 1, Newgate-street, Newcastle-upon-Tyre. BLISSETT (John), 322, High Holborn, W.C., gun and pistol manufacturer. Nov. 16; G. R. Burn, solicitor, 33, Carter. lane, Doctor's-commons, E.C.

BRIDGER (John), Manchester, and Seymour-road, Higher Crumpsall, Lancaster, merchant and commission agent. Dec. 1: Swinburne and Co., solicitors, 67, King-street. Manchester.