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invalidate the patent. (Cit. in Boulton v. Bull, 2 H. Bl. 469, 470, 487; Dav. P. C. 170; 1 Web. P. C. 43; 1 Carp. P. C. 28.)

Liardet v. Johnson. N. P. 1778.-The general question is, whether the invention was known and in use before the patent. (Bull N. P. 76; 1 Web. P. C. 53; 1 Carp. P. C. 53.) R. v. Arkwright. N. P. 1785.-Scire facias to repeal letters patent granted to the defendant. The specification described various parts of machinery, but no complete machine, and the defendant did not point out what parts were new. Buller, J., left the following questions to the jury: -"First, whether this invention is new? secondly, if it be new, whether it was invented by the defendant?" After commenting upon the evidence, his Lordship said: "Thus the case stands as to the several component parts of this machine; and if, upon them, you are satisfied that none of them were inventions unknown at the time this patent was granted, or that they were not invented by the defendant. upon either of these points the prosecutor is entitled to your verdict. (Dav. P. C. 61; 1 Web. P. C. 64; 1 Carp. P. C. 53).

made, which is. a proof that the real demand is not of a nature at present to excite any alarm. A large supply of money is offering at short call in the Stock Exchange, and applicants for discount at the chief establishments have preferred to retain their paper to submitting to a charge of 4 per cent., which further indicates that the wants in the general market are not of a very pressing nature. There has been perhaps more excuse for the apprehensions that prevailed yesterday morning than is usually the case, as, considering the inflated state of the German bourses, the raising of the rate of discount by the Bank of Frankfort to 5 per cent. so soon after the Bank of Prussia had raised its terms to the same figure, a move here was not unlikely all things considered.

The British Funds have not been much affected, and are only lower for the week. On the approach of the special settlement in the new French Loan, which will take place to-morrow, the quotation has declined 1 per cent., and French Rentes in this

Bramah v. Hardcastle. N. P. 1789.-The patent was for a water-closet upon a new construction. It was objected that the patent, being taken for the whole water-closet, the arrangement of some of the parts only being new, was void. Kenyon, J., said: Unlearned men look at the specifica-market are also 1 lower for the week. tion, and suppose everything new that is there. If the whole be not new, it is hanging terrors over them." The question for the jury is, whether the principle of the invention, and the means employed to effect the object to be obtained, are new; whether the shape is new or not is immaterial. (Holroyd 81; 1 Carp. P. C. 168.)

Tennant's Case. Patent dated 1798.-Action for the infringement of a patent for a method of making a bleaching liquor. The general ignorance of bleachers with respect to such bleaching liquor, until after the date of the plaintiff's patent, was proved. On the part of the defendant it was established, that a bleacher had used the same means of preparing his bleaching liquor for five or six years anterior to the date of the plaintiff's patent. But that he had kept his method a secret from all but his two partners, and two servants connected in preparing it; and a chemist at Glasgow deposed, that he had suggested to the plaintiff a material part of the method which formed the subject of the patent. Ellenborough, C. J., nonsuited the plaintiff on two grounds-first, that the process had been used five or six years prior to the date of the patent; and, secondly, that the plaintiff was not the inventor of an indispensable part of the process. (Dav. P. C. 429; 1 Web. P. C. 125; 1 Carp. P. C. 177.)

Huddard v. Grimshaw. N. P. 1803.-Action for the infringement of a patent for a new mode of making cables and other cordage. Ellen borough, C. J., in addressing the jury, said: "In inventions of this sort, and every other through the medium of mechanism, there are some materials which are common, and cannot be supposed to be appropriated in the terms of any patent. There are common elementary materials to work with in machinery, but it is the adaptation of those materials, to the execution of any particular purpose, that constitutes the invention; and if the application of them be new, if the combination in its nature be essentially new, if it be productive of a new end, and beneficial to the public, it is that species of invention, which, protected by the king's patent, ought to continue to the person the sole right of vending it; but if, prior to the time of his obtaining a patent, any part of that which is of the substance of the invention has been communicated to the public in the shape of a specification of any other patent, or is a part of the service of the country, so as to be a known thing, in that case he cannot claim the benefit of his patent."... If, in his specification, the patentee "appropriates more than his own, he cannot avail himself of the benefit of it. I don't mean if he states a bobbin which was in common use before, but if he states any particular thing before in common use, applied in a new manner to the production, and effecting a new end, that is part of the substance of the invention. And if he states that which of itself is not new, but old and known to the world, though it was unnecessary for him to do so, having done so, he has overstepped his right, and has included in his invention that which is not his invention; in that respect his patent would be void." (Dav. P. C. 265 ; 1 Web. P. C. 85; 1 Carp. P. C. 200.)

1 Carp. P. C. 290.)

Wood v. Zimmer. N. P. 1815.-Gibbs, C.J. "The public sale of that which is afterwards made the subject of a patent, though sold by the inventor only, made the patent void." (1 Holt, N. P. C. 58; 1 Web. P. C. 44; Manton v. Manton. N. P. 1815.-Action for the infringement of two patents, one for a hammer upon an improved construction, for the locks of fire arms; the other, for "an improvement in double-barrelled guns." Gibbs, C.J., in directing the jury, said: "In order to support a right to the exclusive enjoyment of any invention, it is necessary that the party who takes out the patent should show that the invention is new, that it was unknown to the trade and to the world before, that it is not only new, but that it is useful to the public; and it is necessary likewise that he should show that he has accurately explained the nature of his invention in his specification, separating that which is new from that which is old. . . . If any one man made these locks, and was in possession of the secret of making them upon the same principle as Joseph Mauton's locks, there would be an end of the patent." (Dav. P. C. 333; 1 Carp. P. C. 278.)

R. v. Cutler. N. P. 1816.-Scire facias to repeal the defendant's patent for "improvements in firegrates or stoves.' The specification, after describing the stove, claims as the invention, the construction of stoves in such manner as that the fuel, necessary to supply the fire, shall be introduced from beneath, either in a perpendicular, or in an oblique direction. Ellenborough, C.J., was of opinion, that the evidence showed grates to have been constructed, prior to the patent, on a principle identical with that described in the specification; that the patentee, by his claim, had confined himself to that principle, which was not new, and that, therefore, the patent could not be supported, although the application of the principle, as described in the specification, was new. (1 Stark. 354; 1 Web. P. C. 76; 1 Carp. P. C. 351.)

THE STOCK MARKETS.

CITY, THURSDAY, SEPT. 19. THE feature of the week has been the unexpected raising of the Bank rate yesterday from 3 to 4 per cent., which was decided on at a special meeting of the directors in consequence of the notice of withdrawal of £205,000 in gold for Copenhagen, and the heavy precautionary pressure for discount in anticipation of a rise to-day. At to-day's meeting, however, of the Board, no further change was

All descriptions of American securities are lower for the week with the exception of Eries, which are higher. The quotation for these shares comes to-day from New York 524, which works out about 43 in this market. The absence of movement is at present unexplained. The 5-20's are lower for the week; Atlantic and Great Western bonds and ditto debentures 2; the United States Funded Loan 1; and Illinois .

Notwithstanding the continuously favourable traffic receipts home railway stocks have been severely prejudiced by fears of dearer money, and with the exception of North British, which is 24 higher for the week, all the movements are adverse. Among the chief are a fall of 3 in North Eastern and Metropolitan; of 2 in Great Northern A; of 2 in ditto Ordinary; of 1 in Midland; of 14 in South Eastern Deferred; of 1 in Caledonian, Great Western, Lancashire and Yorkshire, London and North Western, and Metropolitan District, &c. This afternoon the tone has been firmer. Lombardo-Venetian shares for the week are lower.

3

The foreign market, shows also a considerable fall for the week, the principal being a decline of 23 in Paraguay; of 4 in Peruvian of 1872; of 1 in Bolivian and Turkish; of 3 in the French National, Italian, and Spanish. In the last-named there have been sales to-day on the announced conversion of the debt and reduction in the rate of interest from 3 to 2 per cent.

In Telegraph shares Cubas are lower; and Eastern, . On the other hand, French Cables are higher.

In Miscellaneous shares, Phosphate Sewage are 1 lower;
General Credits, §; and International Finance, 4.
The sum of £8000 has been withdrawn for Rio from the Bank.
Discount demand very fair.

The latest quotations for British Funds are as follows: Consols for
money 92 to 92; ditto 2nd Oct. account, 92 to 923; Reduced and New
Three per Cents., 90% to 903; Exchequer Bills, par to 5s prem.; India
Five per Cent. Stock, 1103 to 111; ditto Four per Cent., 104 to 1051;
ditto Enfaced Paper Four per Cent. 96 to 97; ditto Five and Half per Cent.,
107 to 108; Metropolitan Three and a Half per Cent., 98 to 99); French
Rentes in this market 52 to 53; and ditto New Loan, 2 to 2 pm.
The latest quotation for French Rentes received from Paris was
54fr. 30c.

In the market for American Securities, the United States 5-20 bonds and Great Western Bonds, 31 to 32; ditto Debentures, 41 to 42; of 1882 are marked 92 to 923; ditto 10-40 Bonds, 874 to 87; Atlantic Eries, 39 to 391; Illinois, 101 to 105; and United States Funded Loan, 88 to 89.

157 to 158;

Great Eastern, 47 to 474; Great Northern, 131 to 135; ditto, A, In the Railway Market the prices are:-Caledonians, 111 to 112; shire, 150 to 150; London and Brighton, 72 to 73; London, Great Western, 115 to 116; Lancashire and YorkChatham, and Dover, 23 to 211; ditto 4 per cent. preference, 604 to 60; London and North-Western, 142 to 143; Manchester and Sheffield, 80 to 80; Metropolitan, 583 to 58; ditto District, 273 to 284; Midland, 110 to 141; North British, 80 to 80; North Eas tern Consols 161 to 162; South Eastern, 101 to 1024; ditto Deferred, 824 to 83; Grand Trunk of Canada, 19 to 20; Great Western of Canada, 22 to 221; Antwerp and Rotterdam, 241 to 25); Great Luxembourg, 17 to 17; and Lombardo Venetian, 18% to 191.

tine 1868, 95 to 96; do., 6 per cent., 1871, 90 to 91; Bolivian, 6 per The prices of the principal Foreign Stocks are as follows: Argencent. 57 to 59; Brazilian, 5 per cent. 1865, 95 to 96; do., 5 per cent., 1871, 95 to 96; Costa Rica Scrip, 1872, 10 to 7 dis.; Egyptian, 7 per cent., 1868, 88% to 891: do., Viceroy Loan, 91 to 93; do., Khedive Mortgage Bonds, 83 to 834; French Morgan, 6 per cent. Loan, 99 to 993; do., National, 5 per cent. Loan, 1871, to 1 pm.; Greek, 14 to 16; Honduras, 37 to 39; Italian of 1861, 661 to 661; Mexican, 15 to 15; Paraguay, 8 per cent., 1871, 74 to 75; do. 1872 scrip, 7 to 5 dis.; Peruvian 6 per cent. 1870, 74% to 75; do., 5 per cent. 1872 scrip, 10 to dis.; Spanish 394 to 393; do., 3 per cent., 1871, 29 to 293; Turkish, 5 per cent. 1865, 51 to 51; do. 6 per cent., 1869, 631 to 63; do., 6 per cent. 1871, 72 to 73; and Uruguay, 73 to 73.

In the Telegraph Market, Anglo-American Stock is quoted at 118 to 119; British Australian, 7 to 73; British Indian Extension, 113 to 113; Chinas, 83 to 8; Cubas, 7 to 8; Eastern, 94 to 9; Great Northern, 11 to 11; Mediterranean Extension, 6 to 7; Reuter's, 9 to 10; French Cables, 214 to 21; and West India and Panama, 5 to 54.

In miscellaneous shares the prices are as follows:-General Credit and Discount 2 to 2 pm.; International Finance, 1 to dis.; Hooper's Telegraph Works, to pm; Hudson's Bay, 12 to 12; India Rubber and Construction, 324 to 33; Royal Mail Steam, 88 to 90; Native Guano, 14 Gutta Percha, 32 to 33; National Discount, 11 to 12; Telegraph to 16; Phosphate Sewage, 11 to 12; New Sombrero Phosphate, 3 to 41; and Phospho Guano, 11 to 11.

LEGISLATION AND JURISPRU-
DENCE.

SOCIAL SCIENCE CONGRESS. THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL ON LAW REFORM. THURSDAY morning in last week was appointed for the delivery of the address of Sir John Coleridge, Q.C., M.P., the Attorney-General, the president of the Department of Jurisprudence. Sir John was briefly introduced by Lord Napier, and spoke as follows:

On taking the chair of this section-an honour which I owe to the fact of my filling for a time the office of Attorney-General-it is proper, and you will expect, that I should address to you a few words by way of opening; and my subject has been, I will not say dictated, but suggested, to me by those who asked me to take the chair. I was asked at the same time to address you upon law reform-a subject, indeed, of vast extent and great complication, one in which some persons take a keen and intelligent interest, in which many more profess to take an interest without knowing anything about it but the name, and which, if newspaper criticism be correct, I am the very last man in England to handle-a lethargic amateur, knowing nothing about the law, and, if possible, caring less, altogether wanting in breadth of view and manliness of mind, perfectly satisfied with everything as it exists, the indolent but inveterate foe of all improvement. Such is the flattering portrait drawn by candid and philosophical criticism of the chairman of this section of the Social Science Congress of 1872. It is very seldom worth the trouble to attempt a personal controversy; it certainly is not worth the trouble now; but even if it were, this is not the occasion for it, nor are you the person to inflict it on. J propose, therefore, as I have been asked to do so, simply to lay before you some of the notions on this subject which have been irmy mind for many years, careful only that the opinions shall be real, grounded on reasons which shall be stated, and capable of being practically enforced. With some exceptions-remarkable because they are exceptions-the English law, like the English people, is unscientific. It does not bear the

The Fusion of Law and Equity.
Take the fusion of our two systems of law and
equity a thing which is absolutely certain one
day to be done. To have two sets of courts
existing side by side, one main function of one set
being to prevent the injustice which would result
from the judgments of the other set, is in idea
barbaric, and in practice highly inconvenient.
But till you have settled, first, that law and
equity shall be united, and next, at least, the
leading terms of union, how can you possibly tell
what courts will be wanted, or by what rule of
procedure the courts shall be governed? It must
be remembered always that the things themselves,
law and equity, and the rights and liabilities
arising out of them, are inherently distinct. The
distinction is in the nature of things, and has not
been created, nor can it be abolished, by Act of
Parliament. The courts which now respectively
administer them have systems of procedure
adapted, or intended to be adapted, to these
respective jurisdictions. But if an entirely new
system of law is to be evoked by legislation from
the union of the two, the procedure by which it
is to be administered will require the most careful
framing; the principles, at least, of the new
system must be determined and expressed in
something like a code, or I venture to say that a
confusion of years will follow, profitable to no
one but to practising lawyers, and discreditable
to a great country which will have the meaning of
its law to be ascertained at the expense of suitors,
instead of taking the trouble to have it clearly
expressed by statute or code, to be sanctioned by
Parliamentary authority.

A Code or a Digest?

I have often before said, and I have been
laughed to scorn for saying, but I here delibe-
rately repeat, that there is no reason why the law
of England should not be expressed in a code. It
would not, undoubtedly, put an end to litigation,
It
nor prevent bad and conflicting decisions.
would not be an easy matter, and when done
would be open to bjections. But there is no
difficulty inherent in the nature of English law,
none which great and able lawyers might not
well overcome. That we
have had it

taking young barristers in no large practice, and
setting them to make digests of different heads of
the law. Such work is waste of time and money,
and has led to disputes and heartburnings much to
be regretted. A code, if it is to be made at
all, must be made by the first lawyers in the
country, men of power and authority sufficient,
not merely to digest the law, but, if need be, to
make it. The code of Justinian was made by the
greatest lawyers in the empire; so was the code
of Napoleon; so was the code of New York. To
pass a code clause by clause through the Houses
of Parliament is utterly impracticable. But I do
not think it is at all impracticable to pass a code
(as bodies of statutes are often passed), made by
competent men, submitted to Parliament, and
acquiring the force of law if Parliament does not
dissent. Choose your men and pay them properly,
and I believe a code, whether of law and of pro-
cedure, to be perfectly attainable. It would be
the best return the country ever received for the
expenditure of its money, and I believe there would
be no difficulty raised by Chancellors of the Ex-
chequer. I think I can answer for the present one.
My plan would be something of this sort. Take
three men, aud if you choose, four, of the very
highest position, give them, if they have not it
already, the rank of privy councillors, and the
salary of judges; make their services, in the pre-
paration of the code, count as judicial, and give
them, if not otherwise entitled to it, at the
expiration of their labours, the pension of
a judge. In some such way I am convinced
code might be prepared and sanctioned
in its integrity by Parliament-a triumph for the
minister who achieved it, and of great and per
manent advantage to the country. Whether the
opportunity might be taken to make one system
of law for the three kingdoms is a question for
politicians rather than for jurists. That there is
much in the Scotch law, and something in the
Irish procedure, which we might probably borrow.
I am sure ; and, on the other hand, both Scotland
and Ireland, it is possible, might with advantage
adopt something which at present is to be found
in English only. Such are my reasons for think-
ing a code possible-possible if aimed at in a
practical spirit, and with due adaptation of the
festly the first thing to be taken in hand, because,
if well accomplished, it will save the doing of
many others. Should, however, a complete code,
similar to what other nations have accomplished,

a

impress of one age or of one set of minds, still less at this moment I am fully ced, if we had means to the object; and, if possible, it is mani.

is it the creature of a single great act of legislation. This is not said in praise either of the law or of the people of this country. It is too much

the fashion to boast with a good deal of self-sufficiency of the practical character of Englishmen, and their impatience of system, of accuracy, of science, as it in themselves praiseworthy and excellent. It is a bad fashion, the cause of much slovenly legislation, and of the toleration of much

eccentric barbarism in our laws and customs. If things work fairly well, and result in no great or widely-felt grievance, nine Englishmen out of ten will be for leaving them alone.

The Jury System.

spent upon the code the money, the time, and the
labour that have been comparatively thrown
away in feeble and ineffectual attempts to make

a digest of English law. In general, with a few
magnificent exceptions, of whom Lord Mansfield
is the greatest, English judges having had to ad-
minister a system of unwritten law, except where
it has been modified or created by statute, have
brought to the task an almost superstitious
reverence for decisions, and a determination
to follow out a legal principle to its logical con-
sequences, utterly regardless too often of moral
and practical absurdities therefrom resulting. It
follows that to all men not lawyers, and to most
men that are, there is a multitude of decisions

cess of

deemed too great an undertaking for the Engpeople, there are certain heads of the law which led therton. Such are, for example, the themselves willingly to the great pro law of evidence, the criminal law, the law of real If a complete code be beyond us, por property. tions of it may not be unattainable, and if attained will render the great work easier accomplished. I have said in Parliament, and I here repeat, will endeavour to deal with that if I can in this way the law of evidence next year. Through mass of materials ready to nable amount of trouble

to scientific accuracy

with a sense that

There are, however, many things in our law utterly worthless, to say the best of them, which the labours of others, especially of Mr. Fitzjames which do not work well, and do result in great and diffusive grievances, and these may be handled at once with good hope of success. Such a subject is the law relating to juries. A good system of juries is of infinite importance; our present law works very badly, and occasions a large amount of unjust, oppressive, and entirely needless inconvenience. It is a subject entangled with a multitude of details, and difficult to deal with. But I invite your attention to the Bill upon the subject which it became my duty to endeavour to pass through Parliament this year, as an example of the manner in which I conceive it to be practicable and right to reform the law where it is faulty. If the Bill ever passes-and if I hold office I shall try earnestly that it shall-it will contain the whole law of juries, and will introduce certainly very large, and I hope very useful, alterations into one of the most important of all our institutions. To apply remedies to those things which experience has shown to work injustice is no doubt far less showy, but I think is far more real, than to attempt reconstruction from the very foundation of our judicial system-for which, as it exists, much is to be said, which has great positive advantages, and which I firmly believe with certain obvious modifications, presently to be pointed out, may be made to do the work of the country to the reasonable satisfaction of reasonable men. In speaking of law reform we speak of that which has to do with two things perfectly distinct and separate from each other, not only in idea but in fact. I mean the law itself, and the procedure by which the law is administered. Both may be improved; but the last procedure, is the handmaid of the first, law, and depends upon it. To my mind it is clear that you waste your time upon procedure if you have not clearly before your mind what the law should be, and what changes of principle, if any, you mean to make in it. No doubt you may make a bad law more endurable by administering it well, but if you have any reasonable hope of changing the law itself, and altering it for the better, this s the first step in the law reformer's journey.

for the credit of the law, had best be partly for-
gotten. It is of melancholy interest sometimes to
trace the ingenuity with which courts and judges
have striven to evade the authority of a bad or unjust
decision without in terms questioning its autho-
rity. Take, for instance, the struggle between the
courts as to the extent to which a principal can
take advantage of a mistake or a fraud committed
by his agent. A majority of one court, in a
famous case, where a principal put forward an
ignorant agent to tell a falsehood, by which he
benefited, and the person injured pleaded the
fraud as a fraud of the principal, said there was no
legal fraud. Such an outrageous absurdity is too
much for acquiescence of another court, which
accordingly proceeds to accept the authority of
the case, and at once to distinguish it, while
accepting it, by a line too fine for any but a legal
intellect to see and apprehend. Instances can be
multiplied fiftyfold, but this is enough to show you
what I mean, the worthlessness of a digest, as
compared with a code; for all these decisions will
be preserved in a digest, bad and good, sensible
and foolish alike, and a plain and intelligent
rule, if it can be drawn from them, will still
have to be drawn out by the ingenuity of courts
and judges. But these decisions will disappear
in a code. A code cuts the knot which a digest
leaves to be disentangled. Between two conflicting
principles it selects one, and clearness and sim-
plicity, the two main elements in all good law, are
at once and for ever secured. That the thing can
be done our own times have shown us. Perhaps
the Code Napoleon can hardly be said in strictness
to belong to our own times, but its date is only
just before them. We have ourselves, in the last
few years, enacted for India a code which in many
respects is a model of what such a code should be.
In New York a great code of procedure was
enacted but a few years since, which I under-
stand to have worked to the satisfaction of those
who had to administer it. These examples are
enough to show the possibility, at least, of an
English code. But it will never be made by

Stephens, there is a
hand, which a reaso
would without difficulty mould into a Bill. For
ar before I have done, I
reasons which will appe this subject, but at least
can give no pledge upon
I will try. I have pointed out already how only I
think with any approach harmonious system of
and completeness a single
ed from the present
law and equity can be evol
e denied us, I should
conflict of the two. If that by working with our
wish to try what can be done
w and equity by an
present materials. To fuse la conflict equity shall
enactment that whenever they
prevail, appears to me (I say it I remember the
I may be quite wrong, when lause, an utterly
eminent men who proposed the of dealing with
impracticable and slovenly way nty years of liti
the question. It would take twe
to settle the
gation, ten hecatombs of causestute. I should
meaning of one clause in a sta and to supple-
propose to proceed experimentally might show us
ment the scheme as experience class of court
what was wanted. Clothe each
with the whole jurisdiction of the equity, and
make every court of law a court observe certain
every court of equity a court of law, re bankruptcy,
special jurisdictions such as lunacy, do not in the
and, as now, divorce and probate (Ithese excep-
list enumerate the admiralty), and with plete remedy
tions make every Superior Court a comhis kind was
to the suitors in it. Something of t the great
nearly twenty years ago amongst in the reluc
changes in their procedure forced upclawyers who
tant courts of law. But the great ould none of
then dominated Westminster Hall wreduced the
it. They summarily rejected it, and letter, as in
Act of Parliament to nearly a dead in others, it
this respect, though most beneficial
has remained from that day to this jurisdiction,
them in terms with full equitable I know very
they could not refuse to exercise it. purts have no
well the stock objections-the cort of jurisdic
machinery for exercising another s practice, give
tion. If that turns out to be so ir

other class,

But clothe

it them as they want it. A vice-chancellor trying a horse cause in a court of common law, or the latter court dealing with a suit for winding-up a company, would be respectively unfitted for the subject-matter before them very likely, but first such business as, in its very nature, is unfit for one tribunal will never, as a rule, find its way before it. Next, do what you will, if you alter largely the present system, and make one court and one procedure, there will be a period of transition in which the judges will have to learn their work, and will not all be equally fitted for the discharge of every separate portion of their duty. There is no change to which an ingenious mind which dislikes the change cannot make objections. There are very few objections which do not give way before a resolution to go on in spite of them. To such objections as I have made, and to the like of such objections I answer, Try! Try what now exists already in most of our colonies, make every court a court of law and equity, and see what comes of it. You will find it, I believe, throw an unexpected light upon the nvmber of courts, and the amount of judicial power which the country requires to do its business. Such is the contribution I presume to make to the solution of this vexed question, which has at least the merit of simplicity, which would cost the country nothing, and which, if it failed in practice, would interpose no obstacle to the creation of another system.

1

A Supreme Court of Appeal.

I do not pretend to be able to suggest a simple and perfectly inoffensice amendment of the court of final appeal. Because these amendments are necessarily destructive. But there is no prescription in favour of two or three ennobled lawyers-ennobled often quite as much from political exigency as for legal distinctionsitting in appeal upon and reversing the decisions of all the judges of England; and I think (speaking, I hope, with due respect) that there is not any reason for continuing it, either personal or practical. I do not know what Lord St. Leonards would say now, but I know what Sir Edward Sugden did say in a great work reviewing the decisions of the House of Lords in real property cases. I have no means of knowing what the judges think of recent decisions overruling them, but I know what they thought and said of the Brownlow decision, and one or two others, which, from professional reasons, I refrain from mentioning. Moreover, small as the legal force of the House of Lords is at present, it is subject to continual diminution. Small blame, indeed, to those who can obtain the powers of Lord Cairns and Lord Westbury for obtaining them if they can, for the decision of their private affairs as arbitrators. Most suitors would be glad to be so fortunate. But their absence materially reduces the judicial strength of the court of appeal, and of this small and fluctuating body; and so it is that the court of appeal feels keenly the necessity of cloaking itself with what is in their case the unreal but imposing character of the House of Lords. They keep up the form of a deliberative assembly; the judgments are a debate; the decision is a vote of the House; and so tenacious are they, and from their point of view with good reason, of this utter unreality, that in the last proposal for a reform of the court of appeal, which we owe to Lord Cairns, the tribunal is to report both to the Queen and to the House of Lords, so that the judgment itself is proposed to be in one set of cases technically that of the Queen, in the other that of the House of Lords. Nay, more, a proposition in the select committee by Lord Redesdale, that the House should pass a standing order," Entrusting the hearing of appeals to a committee of peers selected by the House as specially qualified to do that duty," was (it is incredible, but true) negatived without a division. I said it was not easy to prepare a scheme for a supreme court of appeal which should not be open to objections. Yet the field is clear for us. The Judicature Commission, in its first report, pointedly, and of set purpose, abstained from saying a word about the House of Lords. The only scheme before the country is the one proposed by the House of Lords itself, or rather by a select committee of the House, of which committee every lawyer in the House except Lord St. Leonards was a member, though it does not appear that Lord Penzance ever attended. The scheme proposes the creation of a judicial committee, to exercise as far as the hearing goes, the functions of the present Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and of the House of Lords, to consist of the Lord Chancellor, four salaried officers at £7000 a year (£1000 a year being added to the original proposition on the motion of Lord Chelmsford), all law lords, the Chief Justices of England and of the Common Pleas, the Master of the Rolls, the Chief Baron, and the Lord Justices of Appeal in Chancery. None but the salaried members are to be obliged to attend more than twenty days in the year, and then only on the summonses of the Lord Chancellor. All the members "with a view," says the report, "to the greater

dignity of the committee, should be Privy Coun-
cillors." With the same view it proceeds to re-
commend that they should be peers. But what
sort of peers-peers for life? No, only while they
remain members of the committee. Peers of
Parliament? No; they may sit and vote in the
committee, but not even sit, still less vote" in
any legislative or other proceedings of the House."
The House is to keep its jurisdiction, and to exer-
cise it through men not worthy to share its digni-
ties and functions. These are to be preserved for
the noble and learned Lords upon whose minds it
has at least been forced that they can no longer
with satisfaction to the public alone discharge
one of the most important of them all. I ought
to add that a proposition to make those who were
to exercise the jurisdiction of the House of Lords
themselves real members of it, was made by Lord
Gray and Lord Redesdale, and was supported by
Lord Salisbury, Lord Derby, Lord Powis, Lord
Romiley, and others; but except Lord Romilly
(Lords Penzance and St. Leonards were not pre-
sent), every other lawyer in the House was against
admitting brother lawyers to the same dignities
and priviliges with themselves. Where have these
noble and learned persons been since they left the
bar? What air have they breathed, what com-
pany have they kept, what waters of oblivion
have they quaffed, that they should suppose that?
any Attorney-General, with one grain of self-
respect, or with the slightest feeling for his great
profession, would make to the House of Commons
such a proposal as this? My suggestion shall be
simple and direct. A court of eight members at
the least, in which Scotland, Ireland, and the
colonies should be represented, and of which all
existing law lords should be ex-officio and unpaid
members, should sit during all the present legal
terms and sittings, in two divisions, if necessary;
and I believe could well dispose of the business
now disposed of by the House of Lords, the
Judicial Committee, and the Exchequer Chamber.
Whether it could also dispose of intermediate
Chancery appeals, I am unable to say with con-
fidence, but I should think it could. One source
of supply for the future, would make the ex-
Lord Chancellors and Chief Justices, whose pen-
sions, whether maintained at their present rate or
reduced-as I think they might be-should be
dependent uutil some given age-seventy, or
seventy-five, perhaps, or until permanent incapa-
city-on some fixed amount of attendance as
members of the court of appeal. I, myself, think
it very important to have on the tribunal of last
resort some members who are not lawyers; but
this is a matter as to which there is a great differ-
ence of opinion.

The Arrangement of Courts.

ments made during the last twenty-five years could possibly have been made; and, further, as far as I can judge, the Government (I speak without distinction of party) neither knows much nor cares much for what lawyers think. But no sensible man can doubt the great importance of such a check, supposing it to exist in part. If possible, in the public interest, its strength should be increased, not lessened; whereas, with the multiplication and decentralization of bars and courts, some diminution of power in the bar and of authority in the court is all but inevitable. I admit all this; and because I admit it, I cannot concur in the present scheme to raise the County Courts somewhat, and make them do the work which our Superior Courts now performed in the provinces. I retain the opinion which, together with Sir Montague Smith, I expressed in March, 1869, either that the present system, which is based on the existing divisions of counties, and which brings justice reasonably near to the houses of suitors, witnesses, and jurymen, should, with some modifications, be continued; or that the present system of circuit should be altogether discontinued, and provincial courts established, with assigned districts, having judges who should go frequent circuits to convenient places within such districts, and with appeal in certain places to the Metropolitan court of appeal. I believe that with a more sensible distribution of the present judicial power, our thirty-one paid judges could do all the work now cast upon them with ease, and with largely increased dispatch and consequent satisfaction to the suitors. But if these arrangements cannot be made (which I deny), then I come, with great reluctance, but I do come, to the conclusion, that England should be broken into provinces, and that there should be provincial courts, sitting in Banco, in the capital of each province, and going frequent circuits within it, as the County Court judges now do.

Need of a Minister of Justice.

Time warns me to refrain from entering upon the subjects of land transfer and registry, as to which, in some place and at some time, I should like to say a word. But there is one subject most intimately connected with law reform on which, as I have a clear opinion about it, and it can be shortly stated, I will speak before I end. The first great law reform I believe to be the creation of a minister who shall really be responsible for the administration of the law and for its amendment. There is such a minister in most foreign countries. There is such a person in many, at least, and those the most important, of our colonial possessions. Nay, there is such a person in substance, though not in name, in Scotland and in Ireland. In England his functions are divided between, and, if performed This subject led me to consider, because it is so at all, are most imperfectly performed by, the intimately connected with it, the very important Lord Chancellor, the Home Secretary, and the question of the reconstruction of our judicial sys- Attorney-General. The Lord Chancellor is a great tem; as upon those matters which the Judicature judge, he has also a large and troublesome departCommission has dealt with in its recent report on ment of State to administer, and if he underthe character and work of the subordinate tri- takes law Bills he must undertake them at bunals-from which an appeal is to be made such time as the routine, but most important depends obviously the character and work of the work of his court and his department, leaves at court of ultimate appeal. Now, the question his command. The Home Secretary in a country raised, not in terms, but in substance, by this like ours is at least as hard worked as the Lord report, is very grave indeed. Shall we continue, Chancellor, yet upon him recent custom has imas now, a central bar, with central judges sent posed the duty of undertaking many Bills which round the country periodically to do the work, or are certainly more properly the work of a minister shall we have provincial courts, with provincial of justice. The Attorney-General remains: whose judges and a provincial bar, and with only an official work is enormous and of unspeakable imappeal in certain cases to the courts in London. portance, since it is said, at least, that delay in a A grave question, this is. Far more than most law officer's chambers is about to cost the country men think, is involved in maintaining, in even three millions of money, whose private practice raising, if it might be, the character of our ought to be considerable if he is to retain his judges and our bar. The interests of the bar proper weight in the courts and with the profesare the interests of those who have to employ sion, of which he is the head; and whose position, the bar, and the higher the character of its if he is not a man of altogether extraordinary and lawyers, the better, in all ways and in all times, commanding powers, is curiously and completely but especially in troubled times, for the country. inadequate to the functions which some I protest with my whole soul against the mis- expect of him. The Lord Advocate of Scotland chievous and foolish assumption which runs is now a Privy Councillor, and has always been a through too many writings and speeches on this great minister of state. He governs Scotland, and subject, that the object of the whole of the judicial has the weight and authority due to such a posisystem is the cheap and speedy dispatch of the tion. The Irish Attorney-General is a Privy business of suitors. It is one great object; per- Councillor also, but does not govern Ireland, nor haps, taken singly, it is of all the greatest object is he consulted except by the Irish Government, but it is not the only one, it is not to be pursued and if he attends to Parliament has time for the exclusively to the neglect of other objects, very consideration and the carriage of Bills through the great and very important. Cheap law and quick House. The English Attorney-General, alone of decision are purchased far beyond their value at the heads of profession in the three countries, has the expense of incompetence, of unchecked arro- no rank beyond that of the First Queen's Counsel.' gance, of the suspicion, even far less the reality, He is not in the Cabinet; he is not consulted by, of corruption. There is surely great force in what nor does he consult, the Lord Chancellor, and one Mr. Justice Blackburn says, assuming it to be of the very greatest and most powerful Attorneywell founded. The opinion of the Profession, he Generals of modern times told me that he found says, is the only practical check upon the judges, his position in that respect utterly unsatisfactory, and is a real check to any abuse of patronage by for that he often knew nothing whatever of law the Government. I hope what he says is well Bills till he was asked to support them in the founded in all instances. He ought to know as House of Commons. Supposing that I had the to the judges, and if I seem to hint a doubt as to best and most comprehensive measures of law the fact, it is, perhaps, only because our opinion reform ready in my chambers, I should in practice often fails to reach the heights on which they sit. be dependent on the Secretary to the Treasury, If I doubt it as to the Government, I can do no and on such fragments as I could snatch of the more than appeal to legal memories whether, if Prime Minister's time, for any chance of getting this check had had a real existence, many appoint-them understood or recommended to the Cabinet,

men

and of bringing them forward. With the crea tion of a minister of justice all this would disappear. He would have his chance with other ministers; he would be able in the Cabinet to compel attention to his measures; his office would collect about it a school of able and intelligent workmen, and if this year or next year he had to submit to the fate of other ministers, and to postpone his Bills, his time would come, and his Bills would have their turn. Do not let me be misunderstood. I am not speaking in the tone of personal complaint. I have nothing to complain of. I have enjoyed, if not the confidence, at least the friendship of my colleagues, and I have had to do with a Lord Chancellor whose noble and gracious character makes it a privilege to be near him. My fate has been only the fate of former holders of my office, and unless things change, of future holders too. I have made out for you a list of measures which can hardly be called small or unimportant. A minister of justice; a code, if not a code, a codification of certain portions of the law; a system of procedure; a complete jury system; a court of appeal; a reconstruction of our tribunals; a simplification (on the Australian plan) of land transfer these are all measures to which I am quite content to be considered pledgedpledged in this sense, that I have for years thought them desirable; and, as to some of them, I am now ready-as to others, if I saw any chance of success I would get ready to bring them forward; but it would be the idlest vanity, the grossest dishonesty, to lead you to believe that there is any probability of being able to deal with them. It is so easy for men who do not see the working of the machine, to say that this can be done and that can be carried, and the other can be made law. I wish they had to try. In this country, to carry any large and complicated measure you require a great force of public opinion and great public interest. On this subject effective political leverage has yet to be created. Take the subject of legal education. It is an important and interesting one. Nothing, or next to nothing, is now done for it. The Inns of Court, with their great incomes and unequalled advantages, have touched the subject but feebly and slightly. It was taken up in the House of Commons by Sir Roundell Palmer, a man whose position in the House is unique, whose personal weight and influence is enormous, whose eloquence invests everything he takes up with interest. There was full notice of his motion, and the House was hardiy kept up to its complement of forty members during his speech and the subsequent discussion. What is the use of railing against the Attorney-General in the face of facts like this? Mr. Vernon Harcourt, a very able man and a popular speaker, takes up the subject of Law Reform, and but for the spirit unexpectedly thrown into the debate by a most vigorous and uncompromising speech, enough to stir up any House, made by my excellent colleague, that debate, too, would have languished and collapsed. Take the case of the Jury Bill. There is a matter which does excite some public interest, for multitudes, if not classes, are annoyed and oppressed by the present law. It got through a select committee, and was pressed forward with such powers and influence as I possess. It was thrown over-and I admit the necessity-in favour of measures of greater political interest, which all sides of the House were far more eager to discuss. The truth is, law grievances, though they exist, and are quite undeniable, are not grievances which touch either multitudes or classes. How few men, taking England through, ever go to law at all. How very few go often. How very few, indeed, ever get so far as an appeal to the House of Lords. Of these also the great majority are thankful to have it over; they know nothing of their fellowsufferers; they are too glad to get them gone, and to hope that they may never hear the name of law again. I do not say this to delay or to extenuate the grievance. But it is only manly and honest to state plainly the common sense of the matter, and to point out what surely is a simple fact, that nothing great and complicated can be done by a popular Government without a strong pressure of popular opinion. It is also to be remembered that the session of Parliament is limited, that the time at the disposal of the Government is limited, and that the absolutely necessary business of the country-I mean supply and other essential business-take up most of the time which the Government has to

command. More and more the time of the House of Commons is not only consumed, but wasted, not by business, but by debate on all kinds of subjects, which too often begin in nothing and end in nothing but a large consumption of time. Besides, a Government becomes pledged in character and

honour to certain measures which it is then a

the subject of local taxation afford, if thoroughly
dealt with, materials for a session by themselves.
I leave all candid men to judge what is the chance
of any great and disputed measure in the House
of Commons in 1873, if these subjects should be
undertaken by the Government. All I can pro-
mise is to do my best, to leave no opportunity
unimproved, and to seize every chance to advance
one or more of the measures which I have recom-
mended to you to-day. One thing I will not do.
I will not bring forward measures I have no chance
of passing, and I will not be guilty of what I
think the littleness of making speeches for the
sake of a spurious popularity, which can only
take up valuable time, and end in nothing. One
word, and I have done. You and all of us have it
in our power to do something to turn the public
apathy on law reform into active and hearty
sympathy. Let me urge you to do what you can.
See very clearly what is the mischief you would
remove. Do not suffer vague and historical phrases
to stand in the place of practical knowledge. See
very clearly also what is the practical remedy you
would propose. The mischief and the remedy being
very clear to your own minds, it is not very hard to
make them clear to others. So, and so only, you
can really help those in Parliament who are in
earnest in the matter; and when law reforms are
carried, as sooner or later they certainly will be,
the credit of them will be due not so much to
those who have sailed upon the current as to those
who have crested its volume and directed its flow.
Forgive me that I have so long detained you, and
forgive me that I have detained you with what
has so ill-occupied your time.

Lord Napier said that after listening, as the
meeting had, with the deepest interest to the
beautiful, graceful, thoughtful, and earnest re-
marks of the learned Attorney-General, he felt
that although it was not the custom of the society
to propose votes of thanks upon such an occasion
as that, he should be ill-discharging his duty if
he did not informally express to Sir John their ap-
preciation of the address which it had been their
privilege to hear. (Applause.)

INTERNATIONAL LAW.

GENEVA ARBITRATION-THE AWARD. THE following is the text of the Award :—“ Her Britannic Majesty and the United States of America having agreed by Article I. of the Treaty concluded and signed at Washington the 8th of May, 1871, to refer all the claims 'generically known as the Alabama claims' to a Tribunal of Arbitration to be composed of five Arbitrators named-one by Her Britannic Majesty, one by the President of the United States, one by His Majesty the King of Italy, one by the President of the Swiss Confederation, one by His Majesty the Emperor of Brazil; and Her Britannic Majesty, the President of the United States, His Majesty the King of Italy, the President of the Swiss Confederation, and His Majesty the Emperor of Brazil, having respectively named their Arbitrators, to wit: Her Britannic Majesty-Sir Alexander James Edmund Cockburn, Baronet, a member of Her Majesty's Privy Council, Lord Chief Justice of England; the President of the United States-Charles Francis Adams, Esq.; His Majesty the King of Italy-his Excellency Count Frederic Sclopis of Salerano, a Knight of the Order of the Annunciata, Minister of State, Senator of the Kingdom of Italy; the President of the Swiss ConfederationMr. James Staempfli; His Majesty the Emperor of Brazil-his Excellency Marcus Antonio d'Araujo, Viscount d'Itajuba, a Grandee of the Empire of Brazil, member of the Council of His Majesty the Emperor of Brazil, and his Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in France. And the five Arbitrators above named having assembled at Geneva (in Switzerland) in one of the chambers of the Hotel de Ville on the 15th Dec. 1871, in conformity with the terms of the 2nd Article of the Treaty of Washington of the 8th May of that year, and having proceeded to the inspection and verification of their respective powers, which were found duly authenticated, the Tribunal of Arbitration was declared duly organised.

"The agents named by each of the high contracting parties, by virtue of the same Article II., to wit: For Her Britannic Majesty-Charles Stuart Aubrey, Lord Tenterden, a Peer of the United Kingdom, Companion of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; and for the United States of America-John C. Bancroft Davis, Esq.; whose powers were found likewise duly authen ticated, then delivered to each of the Arbitrators the printed case prepared by each of the two par. correspondence and other evidence on which each ties, accompanied by the documents, the official relied, in conformity with the terms of the 3rd Article of the said Treaty.

referred to in Article IV. of the said treaty, were delivered by the respective agents of the two par ties to the Secretary of the Tribunal on the 15th April 1872, at the Chamber of Conference, at the Hotel de Ville of Geneva.

"The Tribunal, in accordance with the vote of adjournment passed at their second session, held on the 16th Dec. 1871, re-assembled at Geneva on the 15th June 1872, and the agent of each of the parties duly delivered to each of the Arbitrators and to the agent of the other party the printed argument referred to in Article IV. of the said Treaty.

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The Tribunal having since fully taken into their consideration the Treaty, and also the Cases, Counter-Cases, documents, evidence, and arguments, and likewise all other communications made to them by the two parties during the progress of their sittings, and having impartially and carefully examined the same, has arrived at the decision embodied in the present award.

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Whereas, having regard to the 6th and 7th Articles of the said Treaty, the Arbitrators are bound under the terms of the said 6th Article, ‘in deciding the matters submitted to them, to be governed by the three rules therein specified, and by such principles of International Law not in consistent therewith, as the Arbitrators shall determine to have been applicable to the case.'

"And whereas the due diligence' referred to in the first and third of the said Rules ought to be exercised by neutral governments in exact propor tion to the risks to which either of the belligerents may be exposed from a failure to fulfil the obligations of neutrality on their part.

"And whereas the circumstances out of which the facts constituting the subject matter of the present controversy arose were of a nature to call for the exercise on the part of Her Britannic Majesty's Government of all possible solicitude for the observance of the rights and the duties involved in the Proclamation of Neutrality, issued by Her Majesty on the 13th May, 1861;

"And whereas the effects of a violation of neutrality committed by means of the construction, equipment, and armament of a vessel are not done away with by any commission which the Government of the belligerent power benefited by the violation of neutrality may afterwards have granted to that vessel; and the ultimate step, by which the offence is completed, cannot be admis sible as a ground for the absolution of the offender, nor can the consummation of his fraud become the means of establishing his innocence;

"And whereas the privilege of exterritoriality accorded to vessels of war has been admitted into the law of nations, not as an absolute right, but solely as a proceeding founded on the principle of courtesy and mutual deference between different nations, and therefore can never be appealed to for the protection of acts done in violation of neutrality;

"And whereas the absence of a previons notice cannot be regarded as a failure in any consideration required by the law of nations, in those cases in which a vessel carries with it its own condemnation.

"And whereas in order to impart to any supplies of coal a character inconsistent with the second rule, prohibiting the use of neutral ports or waters as a base of naval operations for a belligerent, it is necessary that the said supplies should be connected with special circumstances of time, of persons, or of place, which may combine to give them such character:

And whereas with respect to the vessel called the Alabama it clearly results from all the facts relative to the construction of the ship at first designated by the Number 290, in the port of Liverpool, and its equivalent and armament in the vicinity of Terceira through the agency of the vessels called the Agrippina and the Bahama despatched from Great Britain to that end, that the British Government failed to use due diligence in the performance of its neutral obligations; and especially that it omitted, notwithstanding the warnings and official representations made by the diplomatic agents of the United States during the construction of the said Number 290, to take in due time any effective measures of prevention, and that those orders which it did give at last for the detention of the vessel were issued so late that their execution was not practicable;

“And whereas, after the escape of that vessel, the measures taken for its pursuit and arrest were cannot be considered sufficient to release Great so imperfect as to lead to no result, and therefore Britain from the responsibility already incurred;

"And whereas, in despite of the violations of the neutrality of Great Britain committed by the 290, this same vessel, later known as the Confederate cruiser Alabama, was on several occasions political necessity to bring forward. I speak with Britain, instead of being proceeded against as it freely admitted into the ports of colonies of Great out any special information, but it seems to ought to have been in any and every port within me that Irish education, public health, and British jurisdiction in which it might have been local burdens are matters which it is impos. found; sible the Government should not bring for at its first session, the Counter Case and addi- "And whereas the Government of Her Britannic ward next session. The questions arising upon tional documents, correspondence and evidence, Majesty cannot justify itself for a failure in due

"In virtue of the decision made by the Tribunal

diligence on the plea of the insufficiency of the legal means of action which it possessed;

"Four of the Arbitrators, for the reasons above assigned, and the fifth for reasons separately assigned by him, are of opinion that Great Britain has in this case failed, by omission, to fulfil the duties prescribed in the first and the third of the rules established by the Ch Article of the Treaty of Washington. "And whereas, with respect to the vessel called the Florida, it results from all the facts relative to the construction of the Oreto in the port of Liverpool, and to its issue therefrom, which facts failed to induce the authorities in Great Britain to resort to measures adequate to prevent the violation of the neutrality of that nation, notwithstanding the warnings and repeated representations of the agents of the United States, that Her Majesty's Government has failed to use due diligence to fulfil the duties of neutrality:

"And whereas it likewise results from all the facts relative to the stay of the Oreto at Nassau, to her issue from that port, to her enlistment of men, to her supplies and to her armoury with the co-operation of the British vessel Prince Alfred, at Green Cay, that there was negligence on the part of the British Colonial authorities;

"And whereas, notwithstanding the violation of the neutrality of Great Britian committed by the Oreto, this same vessel, later known as the Confederate cruiser Florida, was, nevertheless, on several occasions freely admitted into the ports of British colonies.

"And whereas the judicial acquittal of the Oreto at Nassau cannot relieve Great Britain from the responsibility incurred by her under the principles of international law, nor can the fact of the entry of the Florida into the Confederate port of Mobile, and of its stay there during four months, extinguish the responsibility previously to that time incurred by Great Britain.

"For these reasons the Tribunal, by a majority of four voices to one, is of opinion that Great Britain has in this case failed, by omission, to fulfil the duties prescribed in the first, in the second, and in the third of the rules established by Article VI. of the Treaty of Washington.

"And whereas, with respect to the vessel called the Shenandoah, it results from all the facts relative to the departure from London of the merchant vessel the Sea King and to the transformation of that ship into a Confederate cruiser under the name of the Shenandoah, near the island of Madeira, that the Government of Her Britannic Majesty is not chargeable with any failure, down to that date, in the use of due diligence to fulfil the duties of neutrality.

"But whereas it results from all the facts connected with the stay of the Shenandoah at Melbourne, and especially with the augmentation which the British Government itself admits to have been clandestinely effected of her force by the enlistment of men within that port, that there was negligence on the part of the authorities at that place:

"For these reasons the Tribunal is unanimously of opinion that Great Britain has not failed, by any act or omission, to fulfil any of the duties prescribed by the three Rules of Article VI. in the Treaty of Washington, or by the principles of international law not inconsistent therewith, in respect of the vessel called the Shenandoah during the period of time anterior to her entry into the port of Melbourne.

And by a majority of three to two voices, the Tribunal decides that Great Britain has failed by omission to fulfil the duties prescribed by the second and third of the rules aforesaid in the case of this same vessel from and after her entry into Hobson's Bay, and is, therefore, responsible for all acts committed by that vessel after her departure from Melbourne on the 18th Feb. 1865.

"And so far as relates to the vessels called the Tuscaloosa (tender to the Alabama), the Clarence, the Tacony, and the Archer (tenders to the Florida), the Tribunal is unanimously of opinion that such tenders or auxiliary vessels being properly regarded as accessories, must necessarily follow the lot of their principals, and be submitted to the same decision which applies to them respectively.

"And so far as relates to the vessel called the Retribution, the Tribunal, by a majority of three to two voices, is of opinion that Great Britain has not failed by any act or omission to fulfil any of the duties prescribed by the three rules of Article VI. in the Treaty of Washington, or by the principles of international law not inconsistent therewith.

"And so far as relates to the vessels called the Georgia, the Sumter, the Nashville, the Tallahassee, and the Chickamauga, respectively, the Tribunal is unanimously of opinion that Great Britain has not failed, by any act or omission, to fulfil any of the duties prescribed by the three rules of Article VI. in the Treaty of Washington, or by the principles of international law not inconsistent therewith.

"And so far as relates to the vessels called the Sallie, the Jefferson Davis, the Music, the Boston

and the V. H. Joy, respectively, the Tribunal is unanimousiy of opinion that they ought to be excluded from consideration, for want of evidence.

"And whereas, so far as relates to the particulars of the indemnity claimed by the United States, the costs of pursuit of the Confederate cruisers are not, in the judgment of the Tribunal, properly distinguishable from the general expenses of the war carried on by the United States, the Tribunal is, therefore, of opinion, by a majority of three to two voices, that there is no ground for awarding to the United States any sum by way of indemnity under this head.

"And whereas prospective earnings cannot properly be made the subject of compensation, inasmuch as they depend in their nature upon future and uncertain contingencies, the Tribunal is unanimously of opinion that there is no ground for awarding to the United States any sum by way of indemnity under this head.

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"And whereas, in order to arrive at an equitable compensation for the damages which have been sustained, it is necessary to set aside all double claims for the same losses and all claims for gross freights' so far as they exceed 'net freights;' and whereas it is just and reasonable to allow interest at a reasonable rate; and whereas in accordance with the spirit and the letter of the Treaty of Washington, it is preferable to adopt the form of adjudication of a sum in gross rather than to refer the subject of compensation for further discussion and deliberation to a Board of Assessors, as provided by Article X. of the said Treaty, the Tribunal, making use of the authority conferred upon it by Article VII. of the said Treaty, by a majority of four voices to one, awards to the United States the sum of 15,500,000 dols. in gold as the indemnity to be paid by Great Britain to the United States for the satisfaction of all the claims referred to the consideration of the Tribunal, conformably to the provisions contained in Article VII. of the aforesaid Treaty.

"And, in accordance with the terms of Article XI. of the said Treaty, the Tribunal declares that all the claims referred to in the Treaty as submitted to the Tribunal are hereby fully, perfectly, and finally settled.'

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Furthermore, it declares that each and every one of the said claims, whether the same may or may not have been presented to the notice of, or made, preferred, or laid before the Tribunal, shall henceforth be considered and treated as finally settled, barred, and inadmissible.'

"In testimony whereof this present decision and award has been made in duplicate, and signed by the Arbitrators who have given their assent thereto, the whole being in exact conformity with the provisions of Article VII. of the said Treaty of Washington.

"Made and concluded at the Hotel de Ville of Geneva, in Switzerland, the 14th day of the month of September, in the year of our Lord, 1872. "C. F. ADAMS, "FREDERIC SCLOPIS, STAEMPFLI, "Viscomte D'ITAJUBA."

ELECTION LAW.

NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. ELECTION PETITION-DISQUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATE-NOTICE TO ELECTORS.-N. and T. were candidates for G. county. N. before the nomination day had been adopted as the candidate of the Roman Catholic clergy, who individually and collectively, by threats of spiritual chastisement and temporal injury, coerced the electors to promise their votes for N. A petition was presented against the return of N., and the election judge found that the exercise of such intimidation and undue influence had become publicly known amongst the electors previous to the day of nomination; that on the day of nomination T., the petitioner, had caused a notice to be posted at and in the immediate vicinity of the place of nomination for the said county, and to be advertised in several of the newspapers published in the county, and to be extensively posted in the different polling places for such county,. cautioning electors that M. was disqualified from being elected; that notices were served at each of the polling places (with one exception) on some of the electors previous to their voting, the aggregate of such personal services not amounting to more than a few hundreds; and that numbers of the notices were scattered about the floors of the polling booths, but were all in the English language, whilst many of the electors could not speak English. Held (Monahan, C.J., dissentiente), that the status of N. was destroyed the moment that he or his agents were guilty of undue influence, and that sufficient notice of his disqualification had been conveyed to the electors to cause all the votes given for him to be thrown away. Held further (Monahan, C.J., dissentiente), that T., who obtained 658 votes only, and was in a minority of 2165, was entitled to the seat: Trench v. Nolan, 27 L. T. Rep. N. S. 69. C. P. Ireland.)

SOLICITORS' JOURNAL.

NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. LORD MAYOR'S COURT NEW TRIAL ON MERITS-MANDANUS.-Upon a rule for a mandamus to compel the Lord Mayor's Court to enter judgment for the plaintiff, that court having granted a new trial on the ground that the verdict found for him was against the weight of evidence, the Court of Queen's Bench expressed an opinion that the Lord Mayor's Court had power to grant a new trial on such ground, but, not being clear about the matter, they made absolute the rule for a writ to issue: (Reg. v. Lord Mayor of London; Re Roux v. Merton, 27 L. T. Rep. N. S. 61. Q. B.) TRADE MARK EXCLUSIVE USE OF FANCY NAMES AND TICKETS INJURY TO TRADE REPUTATION INJUNCTION. Where a manufacturer has produced an article of merchandise, calling it by a particular name, and vending it with a particular mark, he has acquired an exclusive right to the use of such name and mark, as his trade mark, and is entitled to prevent all other persons from using such name and mark to denote articles of a similar kind and appearance, notwithstanding he may not be entitled to the exclusive right of manufacturing the article; and if the use of such name and mark has been adopted for the purpose of selling goods of an inferior quality though of a similar appearance, or whereby purchasers may be misled into the belief that they are buying the goods of the original inventor, the injury done to the first inventor is one for which he is entitled to compensation in damages at common law, and to relief by way of injunction in equity: (Hirst v. Denham, 27 L. T. Rep. N. S. 56. V.C. B.)

WILL-CONSTRUCTION-FROFITS OF BUSINESS -INTEREST OF TENANT FOR LIFE IN.-A testator gave his personal estate, including his share and interest in a certain business, to trustees upon trust to sell and convert and to invest the proceeds, and he expressly authorised his trustees, with the consent of his wife during her life, and after her death at their sole discretion, to continue such part of his personal estate in the business as might be employed therein at the time of his death, or to employ any other part of his personal estate in the same business, with power to increase or diminish the amount so employed, and to vary the securities, and he directed his trustees to pay "the annual income of the said trust funds to his wife for life. Held, that the wife was entitled to the whole of the profits arising from the business: (Lambert v. Lambert, 27 L. T. Rep. N. S. 59. V.C. B.)

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HEIRS-AT-LAW AND NEXT OF KIN. BRITTON (Isaac), Sandwich, Kent, gentleman, heir-at-law and next of kin to come in by Oct. 29, at the chambers of the Master of the Rolis. Nov. 11, at eleven o'clock, at the said chambers is the time appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon such claims.

HEWARD (Joseph Elder), Esq., 28, St. George's-place, Hydepark, Middlesex, heir at-law to come in by Nov. 12, at the chambers of V.C. M. Nov. 19, at twelve o'clock, at the said chambers, is the time appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon such claims,

JACKSON (Jane), formerly of White Hart-laue, Tottenham, Middlesex, widow, next of kin to come in by Nov. 2, at the chambers of V.C. W. Nov. 16, at twelve o'clock at the said chambers, is the time appointed for hearing and adjudication upon such claim.

UNCLAIMED STOCK AND DIVIDENDS IN THE BANK OF ENGLAND.

[Transferred to the Commissioners for the Reduction of the National Debt, and which will be paid to the persons respectively whose names are prefixed to each in three months, unless other claimants sooner appear.]

BENHAM (Daniel), Burton-crescent, gentleman, and DUNN

(Susannah Claggett), Ockbrook, near Derby, widow, £26 14s. Id., Three per Cent. Annuities. Claimant said Daniel Benham, "the survivor.

Fox (John), Christian-street, St. George's-in-the-East, undertaker, £50 New Three Per Cent. Annuaties. Claimant, Wm. Frederick Fox, sole executor of Frances Jane Fox, widow, deceased, who was role executrix of John Fox, deceased.

FRANCES (Jas.), servant to Mrs. Archdeckne, of Grosvenorsquare, 25 New Three Per Cent. Annuities. Claimant, said Jas. Frances.

HEARN (John Henry), Esq., Newport, Isle of Wight, and HARDCASTLE (Jos. Alfred), Esq., Whitehall-place, Westminster, and Wittle, Essex. £721 68. 6d. Three per Cent. Annuities; and £177 198. 1d. Reduced Three per Cent. Annuities. Claimant, said Jos, Alfred Hardcastle, the survivor.

APPOINTMENTS UNDER THE JOINT-STOCK WINDING-UP ACTS. CHEMICAL LIGHT COMPANY (LIMITED). Petition for winding up to be heard Nov. 8, before V.C. M. UNITED AUCTION ADVANCE AND INVESTMENT COMPANY (LIMITED). Creditors to send in by Oct. 14, their names and addresses, and the particulars of their claims, and the names and addresses of their solicitors, if any, to J. W. Selby, 23, Gresham House, Old Broad-str et. E.C. Nov. 11, at twelve o'clock, at the chambers of the M. R., is the time appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon such claims.

CREDITORS UNDER ESTATES IN CHANCERY LAST DAY OF PROOF. BRITTON (Isaac), Sandwich, Kent, gentleman. Oct. 1: H. Bush, solicitor, 9, Bridge-street, Bristol. Nov. 11; M. R., at eleven o'clock. CLEASBY (Thomas), Ing-hill, Mallastang, Kirkby Stephen, Westmoreland, yeoman. Oct. 1; T. H. Preston, solicitor, Kirkby Stephen. Nov. 1; M.R, at twelve o'clock, HAMILTON (Edward D. F.), last heard of in the year 1850, when he was at Adelaide, Australia, and was then about leaving that pace for San Francisco, California. Jan. 30, 1873; V.C. W. Feb. 6; V.C. W., at twelve o'clock.

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