MAGISTRATES' LAW.

NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. THAMES EMBANKMENT-LANDS INJURIOUSLY AFFECTED-COMPENSATION.-The plaintiff was the lessee of a certain house and premises, abutting on the river Thames at Whitehall, for the residue of a term of 99 years. Part of the premises in question consisted of a causeway leading from the garden of the house, and running out into the river at low water mark. This causeway had for a long period been used for landing and embarking goods. The defendants, under the powers of the Thames Embankment Act (25 & 26 Vict. c. 93) constructed an embankment, and in the course of so doing took away the causeway and a landing place connected with it, and direct access from the plaintiff's premises to the river was cut off by a public roadway. The plaintiff thereupon gave the defendants, under the Lands Clauses Act 1815, notice of arbitration and claim for compensation, stating in his notice that he was owner of the causeway, as lessee, and entitled to the use of the landing place, and claiming compensation for their removal and for the depreciation in value of the house and lands, and otherwise injuriously affecting them. The arbitrators referred the question of amount to an umpire, who eventually awarded £8325 to the plaintiff. This sum the defendants refused to pay, and an action on the award was brought. Among other pleas, the defendants pleaded that the sum awarded included damages and compensation in respect of which neither the arbitrators nor the umpire had any jurisdiction whatever. At the trial the defendants called the umpire as a witness, who stated that among other items he had awarded £5000 for diminution in value of the house, and that in fixing the amount he had taken into consideration the loss of privacy and other "amenities" by reason of the defendants' works: Held, first (affirming the judgment of the Exchequer Chamber): That the umpire's evidence was admissible to show what matters were considered by him, and generally the course of the proceedings up to the making of the award; but not to show the considerations which affected the umpire's mind in determining the quantum of compensation. Secondly (reversing the judgment of the Exchequer Chamber): That the plaintiff's property was "injuriously affected" by the interposition between it and the river of an embankment to be used as a public highway; and that the umpire was, therefore, authorised both by the special Act and the Lands Clauses Act, to give the plaintiff compensation. Per Lord Cairns: The plaintiff was, as a riparian proprietor, entitled to compensation for depreciation in the value of his property arising from a deprivation of the right to water frontage. The cases of Hammersmith Railway Company v. Brand (21 L. T. Rep. N. S. 238; L. Rep. 4 H. L Cas. 171) and Glasgow Union Railway Company v. Hunter (L. Rep. 2 Sc. App. 78) commented on. (Duke of Buccleugh v. Metropolitan Board of Works 27 L. T. Rep. N. S., 1. H. of L.)

sect. 13 of that Act with having sold certain sheep trates, my respectful thanks for the very gratiin a place (the hall above mentioned) other fying resolution unanimously adopted at the than the market, not being his own dwelling- meeting held yesterday. I highly value this place or shop, but the magistrates dismissed the expression of the confidence and esteem of information: Held, that the place where the the Bench and their appreciation of my sersheep were sold was not the dwelling-place or vices as their clerk, and shall ever reshop of M., and, therefore, the magistrates were member with gratitude their constant courtesy wrong in not convicting him. Sect. 50 of the and kindness. It is a source of great pleasure to 21 & 22 Vict. c. 98 provides that "no market or slaughter-house shall be established in pursuance slightest misunderstanding between any member me to feel that at no time has there been the of this section so as to interfere with any rights, of the Bench and myself, and that the greatest powers, or privileges enjoyed within the district harmony and the most entire absence of party by any person, chartered, joint-stock, or incorpo- feeling have characterised the proceedings of the rated company, without his or their consent:"| magistracy. Allow me to take this opportunity, Held, that M. did not, before the establishment as I shall not have any other, of expressing my great of the market in 1871, enjoy any right, power, or obligation to the professional gentlemen, whether privilege within the meaning of this section: resident in Leicester or elsewhere, who have ap(Fearn v. Mitchel, 27 L. T. Rep. N. S. 33. Q. B.) peared as advocates before you, especially to Mr. BASTARDY ORDER-APPLICATION BY MOTHER Haxby, Mr. Owston, and Mr. Fowler, whom I men-HER DEATH BEFORE SUMMONS HEARD-EVI- tion by name as having been most frequently in DENCE-CROSS-EXAMINATION-7 & 8 VICT. C. your court, for the uniform respect which I have at 101.-A woman having been delivered of a bas- all times experienced, and for their submission, as tard child personally applied for and procured an far as was compatible with their duty, to the view I affiliation summons to the putative father, under have taken of the law applicable to the various 7 & 8 Vict. c. 101, but died before the hearing of cases in which they have been interested. This the case: Held, that in consequence of the death has materially contributed to my personal comof the mother, no valid affiliation order could be fort, and to smooth a sometimes difficult path, made, for that the statute required her to give whilst it has tended greatly to the maintenance of evidence on oath as to the paternity of the child, order and decorum in the court. My successor and, by so doing, to submit herself to cross- having been appointed, I retire from office with a examination: (Reg. v. Armitage and Beaumont, deep sense of gratitude to yourself and to the 27 L. T. Rep. N. S. 41. Bail.) other magistrates of the borough.-Believe me, my dear Sir, yours very truly, SAML. STONE. John Stafford, Esq., Mayor."

RESIGNATION OF THE LEICESTER TOWN CLERK.-A meeting of the borough magistrates THE LICENSING ACT.-The Act has occasioned was held in the town library on the 3rd Septem- some excitement at Weymouth, where the hours ber, at which the following magistrates were specified in the measure are adopted, notwithpresent:-The mayor in the chair, Messrs. Hodges, standing the late arrival of trains. The magis Burgess, Richard Harris, Hunt, Crossley, Wheeler, trates are determined to carry it out in its Bowmar, Viccars, Howcutt, Geo. Banes, Angrave, integrity. Sir H. J. Selwin-Ibbetson, in speaking A. Cooper, and Paul; and the following reso- at the Harlow licensing sessions on the Licensing lutions were unanimously adopted :-Moved by sessions on the Licensing Act, said that if he were Mr. Richard Harris, and seconded by Mr. How- interpreted in the spirit in which it had been cutt, "That the magistrates much regret the re-framed-if the publicans showed a desire on their signation of their esteemed friend Mr. Stone, who part to comply with the Act, and do as they always has so long and so ably acted as their clerk, and had done, try and work a very difficult trade in a hereby tender to him their high appreciation of proper manner, they would find that the law was his services, and they desire to express the hope not quite so unworkable as some persons had that he may speedily recover his health, and that stated it to be. It only required a little common he may feel the satisfaction that he possesses the sense on the part of those who carried out the confidence and esteem of the whole Bench." law, and a willingness on the part of those who Moved by Mr. Burgess, seconded by Mr. An- carried on the trade. The two things combined, grave, and carried:-"That in the opinion the Act would not only prove workable, but be a of the magistrates now assembled, it is de- great improvement on the existing state of things. sirable that the payment to their clerk be He had noticed that in one or two cases a diffi. made by a fixed salary instead of fees as here- culty had arisen in regard to the qualifications of tofore, and that the necessary steps be taken to houses. Magistrates had decided in many insecure this object as early as possible." Moved stances that when the applicants came up next by Mr. S. Viccars, seconded by Mr. Bowmar, and year for their licences they would have to come carried:-"That as Mr. Stone wishes to be re- prepared to show that their houses complied with lieved from the duties of the office, Mr. Alfred the requirements of the Act. His impression was Paget be requested to act in that capacity pro that it only applied to new houses. He knew that tem." Moved by Mr. R. Harris, seconded by Mr. was the feeling of the House of Commons at the Hodges, and carried :-That the foregoing resolu- time the Bill was passed. The Act, he added, was tions be communicated to Mr. Stone and Mr. passed with no hostility to the trade, but with a Paget." We understand that Mr. Alfred Paget desire to bring about something like uniformity will probably accept the office of clerk to the in the law, and not only with a view to stopping justices under the above resolution; and that the drunkenness, but to stopping an agitation which Mayor has since received the following letter from was disturbing a large amount of capital. Mr. Mr. Stone: "Stonygate, near Leicester, 4th Sept. Glyn said, according to the wording of the Act, 1872.-My Dear Sir,-I lose no time in requesting the licences could not be renewed next year unless you to accept, and to convey to the other magis- the houses come up to the required annual value.

Borough.

BOROUGH QUARTER SESSIONS.

When holden.

Friday, Oct. 11 Friday, Oct. 11 Wednesday, Oct. 16. Wednesday, Oct. 16.. Priday, Oct. 18 Monday, Oct. 14 Thursday, Oct. 17. Saturday, Oct. 19

MARITIME LAW.

NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS.

W. T. Greenhow, Esq... W. Cope, Esq.

5 days

14 days

J. Deedes, Esq.

J. Johues, Esq.

H. T. Cole, Esq., Q.C....
Simms Reeve, Esq.
S. Warren, Esq., Q.C....
H. T. Cole, Esq, Q.C....

consideration. He did not give the required undertaking, but in fact paid and discharged all payments in respect of the ship and her insurance. The ship was lost: Held, that the plaintiff was entitled to the proceeds of the policy. In a proposal for a policy the shipowner in answer to the question" When and where last metalled?" stated Liverpool, 1867." It appeared from Lloyd's register that the ship was last metalled in 1865, but it was proved that in 1867, amongst other repairs, the metal sheathing was overhauled, thoroughly repaired, and replaced with new where necessary. Held that there had been no such misrepresentation as to vitiate the policy. By the rules of the association all matters in dispute relative to any claim in respect of an insurance were to be referred to arbitration as a condition

precedent to any action at law or suit in equity. Held, that questions of law were not affected by the arbitration clause, ard that the jurisdiction of the court was not excluded: (Alexander v. Camp bell, 27 L. T. Rep. N. S. 25. V.C. B.)

COMPANY LAW.

SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA. ADAM DIETRICH. PENNSYLVANIA A. R. R. Co. Contract by ticket-Forfeiture of rights by breaking journey. First, a railroad ticket "good for one seat from Philadelphia to Pittsburgh" entitles the holder to one continuous passage from Philadelphia to Pittsburg in the train into which he enters to be carried, and not by train after train and by broken stage day after day: Secondly, if the passenger chooses voluntarily to leave the train before reaching his destination, he forfeits all his rights under the contract: Thirdly, one who buys a ticket is bound to inform himself of the rules and regulations of the company in running its trains: Having left the train in which he started, the fact that he subsequently entered another train, and travelled over a portion of the route without being required to pay fare by the conductor in charge of the train, will not prejudice the company or renew the contract. ERROR to the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County. May Term 1872.

|

46 New Hampshire Rep. 312, and cases there cited; The State v. Overton, 4 Zabriskie, 435; The Clev. Col. and Cin. R. R. Co. v. S. H. Bartram, 11 Ohio St. Rep. 457; Chenney v. The Boston and Maine R. R. Co. 71 Metcalf, 121.) With the same qualifications of reasonableness it is also well settled that one who buys a ticket is bound to inform himself of the rules and regulations of the company governing the transit and conduct of its trains. Thus he must ascertain the train in which he is to go, the time of its departure and arrival, its stopping stations, his right to get off and get on, to resume his trips, &c. See the cases sup. If the law were otherwise a railroad company could not regulate the running of its trains to suit the interests of the public or of themselves. For this purpose some trains must be fast with few stoppages, others must be slow with frequent stoppages, some must be through trains and others local. It is very clear that a passenger with a through ticket cannot require a local train to carry him through. Nor can he require a through train to stop at a way station not in its time-table. His even having a stop-off ticket would not increase his right to require the train to stop at a station not in its time table. It is evident that if in such cases the holders of tickets can compel the trains to alter regulations, they would be governed by the passengers and not by the company. An excursion party on this principle, stopping off at will, would overcrowd a subsequent train to the discomfort of the proper passengers, and to the prejudice of the interests of the company. The authorities, as well as the reason of the thing, show that the company must make its own regulations, and that passengers purchase their tickets subject to these reasonable rules, and that it does not lie on the company to bring home notice of them in order to establish the terms of the contract of carriage. In this case the testimony of the plaintiff himself clearly shows that his ticket did not entitle him to stop off at Lancaster, and if notice were necessary that he knew that fact. This brings us now to the question, whether the face of the ticket, by its terins imports a right to stop off. The first noticeable and very obvious thing is, that the terms on the face of the ticket are very restrictive. It is expressed to be a "Drover's ticket." It cannot be used by any other than a drover. Then it is not good on the Philadelphia Express; "it is good only in the hands of Mr. A. Dietrich;" no one else can use it-then," this ticket is good only until March 16th, 1867." It is, therefore, not good after that day. It is restrictive from the beginning to the end, and is wholly unlike a general ticket, which any holder may use, within any reasonable time; and yet even as to such tickets the authorities are clear-the right to stop off at intermediate unnamed points does not exist unless by means of stop-off tickets, or the customary rules of passage. The express terms of a drover's ticket being all restrictive without exception, it gives no countenance to an implied right to stop off. The reason is obvious also the ticket is sold at less than half-price-that is, this was for five dollars instead of eleven. Its purpose is special, and the restriction in time (until the 16th March) was to prevent abuse of the benefit intended to be conferred on a particular class of persons. With all these restrictions on the face of the ticket, and in full view of the purpose of the ticket, it is obviously impossible to interpret the words, "good only until March 16th," into an enlargement of the contract, so that it shall read, contrary to the regulation of the company, "good to travel every day, from day to day, from the 11th to the 16th March, by as many trains from and to every station at which the trains stop, and by as may stages as A. Dietrich may elect to make." Then when we come to the marrow of the ticket, to wit: "Good for one seat from Philadelphia to Pittsburgh," it does not change the purpose and the restrictive character of it. There is nothing in the words "one seat which enlarges the meaning so that the holder may take seat after seat, train after train, day after day, and from station to station, especially in contravention of the known regulations of the company as to the travel on such tickets. necessarily follows that the contract for seat from Philadelphia to Pittsburgh must mean in the train which the holder of the ticket enters to be carried, and not by train after train, and by broken stage day after day. That this is the true interpretation of the contract is decided in State v. Overton (4 Zabriskie, 438); Cl. Col. § Cin. R. R. v. Bartram (11 Ohio St. Rep. 462); Johnson v. Con. R. R. Co. (46 N. H. 213); and Chenny v. Bos. & M. R. R. Co. (11 Metcalf, 121); Angell on Carriers (Ed. 1808, § 609). No cases are cited to the contrary, and we remember none.

Opinion of the court by AGNEW, J.-This was a judgment of nonsuit, and the question is, whether the plaintiff's evidence disclosed a case for the jury. Dietrich, the plaintiff, was a drover, residing in Lancaster county. On the 11th March 1867, he purchased a drover's ticket from Philadelphia to Pittsburgh, and took passage on the fast line on the defendants' railroad. At Lancaster he got off, and next day (the 12th) he resumed his journey. When the conductor, Young, came along collecting fares, he declined the plaintiff's ticket on the ground that he had "stopped off," and informed him that such were his orders. Young told him he must get off at Landisville, after passing Landisville, finding him still on the train, Young told him he must get off at Mount Joy. At Mount Joy the brakesman put him off, but Young, who observed the brakesman taking him across the track, halloed to him not to put him off in that way; and told Dietrich to get on again. He was then carried to Altoona, where Young's portion of the route ended. After leaving Altoona, Hankins, the conductor from Altoona to Pittsburg, came around, and the plaintiff exhibited his drover's ticket. Hankins refused it, and put him off at Gatlitzin, at the next end of the mountain tunnel. The plaintiff got on without leave, and Hankins again refused his ticket, the plaintiff paid his fare from Altoona to Pittsburgh. On his cross-examination, the plaintiff stated that Hankins was not rude or unkind, and told him it was his duty to collect the fare or put him off. Dietrich said to him, "I want this tested and I want you to put me off gently." The question is, therefore, simply upon a breach of the contract for carriage, and depends on its terms. Before examining the terms of the ticket, it is proper to clear the case of some immaterial matters. Stress is laid on the statement of Wimer, that the restriction as to stopping off was not intended for such men as he, who shipped stock over the road every week. This clearly has no influence what. ever in ascertaining or interpreting the terms of the ticket he afterwards purchased from the proper ticket agent. Wimer was a mere freight agent, whose duty had no relation to the sale of tickets, but was confined to giving the required certificate to entitle Dietrich to a drover's ticket. When Dietrich went to Franciscus, and asked him to make the ticket so as to stop off at Lancaster, Franciscus said, No, sir." Ho admits that he knew of the restriction as to stopping off, which his request implies, and that he had seen Young refuse another drover's ticket for this cause, and that in consequence he had been in the habit of buying a ticket from Philadelphia to Lancaster, when he wished to stop off. The restriction, and his knowledge of it, if this were necessary, are plainly proved by himself. It is evident, therefore, that the plaintiff is thrown upon his ticket and the terms it imports or recognises, as the evidence of his right of transit over the defendant's road. The ticket is in these words: "Drover's ticket. Not good on the Philadelphia Express. Good only in the hands of Mr. A. Dietrich for one seat from Philadelphia to Pittsburgh. This ticket good only until March 16th, 1867. Issued March 11th, 1867. S. H. Wallace, agent." On the back is stamped "Penn'a R. R., March 11th, 1867, Philadelphia." Such tickets are evidence of the payment of the fare, and of the right of the holder or party named, as here, to be carried according to its terms. So far as they are expressed the terms are binding of course, but such tickets are not the whole contract, which must be gathered, so far as not expressed, from the rules and regulations of the company in running its trains. This is the generally received doctrine; with the qualification, however, that these rules and regulations must be

reasonable and not contrary to the terms expressed (See Johnson v. The Concord R. R. Co.,

66

It

one

The language of Green, C. J., on this point, in State v. Overton, is so much to the purpose we quote it. "The question (he says) is obviously a question of contract between the passenger and the company. By paying for passage and procuring a ticket from Newark to Morristown,

the passenger acquired the right to be carried directly from one point to the other without interruption. He acquired no right to be transported from one point to another upon the route at different times and by different lines of conveyance, until the entire journey was accomplished. The company engaged to carry the passenger over the entire road for a stipulated price. But it was no part of the contract that they would suffer him to leave the train and resume his seat in another train at any intervening point upon the road." "If the passenger chose voluntarily to leave the train before reaching his destination he forfeited all rights under his contract. The company did not engage, and were not bound to carry him in any other train, or at any other time over the residue of the route." This is the clear legal effect of the contract between the company and the passenger in the absence of any evidence to the contrary. If the passenger insists that under his contract, by virtue of general usage or the custom of the road, he is entitled to be carried at his pleasure, either by one or different trains the burthen of proof was upon the State, that is to say on a passenger, the case being an indictment against a conductor for a battery in putting off a passenger unlawfully. In adopting this language of the learned Chief Justice of New Jersey, we should not omit to guard our meaning, by saying there may be exceptions, where, from misfortune or accident, without his fault, the transit of a passenger is interrupted, and where he may resume his journey afterwards. In the present case the ticket of Dietrich gave him no right to stop off, and the company, when he took his seat in the train at Philadelphia, having entered upon the performances of its contracts, had a right to continue its execution without interruption. Another reason is that fare covers the ordinary luggage of the passenger, entitling it to be checked through to the point of destination. But if the passenger may stop off he may demand his baggage at each stoppage, or if it go on he will not be at the end of the journey to receive it. The contract was therefore broken by Dietrich himself when he stopped at Lancaster without permission. When he came upon the train the next day, he began a new journey, and on refusing to pay his fare he became a trespasser, and was rightfully put off at Mount Joy. But it is argued that as he was permitted by Young to re-enter the train and was carried to Altoona he acquired a right to be carried to Pittsburg. This is erroneous. When Dietrich stopped at Lancaster his right of transportation under his ticket ended, as we have seen. Con-equently, when he began a new passage the next day he was bound to pay his fare. He knew this, and that he was put off at Mount Joy because he would not pay it. Therefore Young, as conductor, being bound by the rules of the company, not only had no authority, but acted against his orders in permitting him to return upon the train without payment of his fare. The ticket having lost its title to be recognised, all that Young did thereafter was unauthorised, and the plaintiff knew this. Clearly no title to be carried through to Pittsburg could be acquired by Young reoffering him to ride without payment of his fare. Young could not carry him, and could not, by his omission to collect the fare, send him forward without payment of any. violation of duty in carrying a passenger with out payment of fare clearly could not bind his successor upon the remainder of the route. It is very clear that when Hankins took his place on the train, between Altoona and Pittsburgh, it was not only his right, but his duty to demand the fare between those place. He found Dietrich without a ticket imparting a right of passage and without any evidence of payment of the fare. The fact that the company had lost the fare from Lancaster to Altoona, by Young's violation of duty, conferred no right of further transporta tion, while Dietrich, at every step afterwards, was travelling without right, and with full notice that he was doing so. As remarked in Beebe v. Ayres (28 Barbour, 278), the conduct of one conductor in violating the rules of his employers could not prejudice another employee, more faithful than himself, who has adhered to his instructions and discharged his duties under them. The judgment of the court below is therefore affirmed.

BANKRUPTCY LAW.

His

NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. ATTORNEY-BANKRUPTCY-ACTION BROUGHT WITHOUT AUTHORITY-ORDER TO PAY COSTS— LIABILITY INCURRED BY MEANS OF FRAUD SECT. 49 OF BANKRUPTCY ACT, 1869 (32 & 3 VICT. C. 71).—Where an attorney has brought an action in another's name without any retainer or authority from him, and has in consequence been ordered by the court to pay the defendant's costs of the action, his liability to pay these costs is

liability incurred by means of fraud within the meaning of sect. 49 of the Bankruptcy Act 1869 (32 & 33 Vict. c. 71): (Jenkins v. Fereday, 27 L. T. Rep. N. S. 37. C. P.)

COLCHESTER BANKRUPTCY COURT.
Aug. 24 and 27.

(Before J. S. BARNES, Esq., Registrar.)
Re JOHN GEORGE DAY.

Act of bankruptcy-Filing petition. THIS was a sitting for the hearing of a petition in bankruptcy which had been presented against Mr. John George Day, a farmer, of Lamarsh, by Mr. Wm. Alexander, banker, Ipswich, the grounds of the petition being that Mr. Day was indebted to the petitioner and the other members of the

firm of Alexanders, Maw, and Co., bankers, Ipswich and Sudbury, in the sum of £191 16s. 5d., and that the act of bankruptcy was that the debtor had filed in the County Court a declaration admitting his inability to pay his debts. On the 8th July last the debtor convened a meeting of his creditors at which a resolution was agreed upon to accept a composition of 10s. in the pound, payable within seven days of the coufirmation of the resolution. At a second meeting on the 17th July the resolution was confirmed, but as the composition was not paid within seven days of that time, the present petition in bankruptcy was presented, and the debtor gave formal notice of his intention to dispute the adjudication prayed for, as well as the petitioning creditor's debt, and the alleged act of bankruptcy.

Philbrick appeared for the petitioning creditors. Jones represented the debtor, who was present. At the outset Philbrick applied to the Registrar for permistion to amend the petition by adding that the alleged debt of £194 16s. 5d. was due from the debtor to Messrs. Alexander and Co. "for money lent and advanced, and interest, and usual banker's charges."

Jones objected to any amendment being allowed.

In the course of an argument upon the point, Philbrick said that in a statement which had been filed in the liquidation proceedings the debtor admitted that there was £185 due from him to Messrs. Alexander.

The REGISTRAR said that was evidence against him so far.

Jones said he objected on this ground: the creditors had accepted the debtor's proposal to pay a composition, and it would have been carried out but for this petition being presented-but for the act of the agent of the petitioning creditors who, at a sale of the growing crops which the debtor arranged for the purpose of raising money to pay the composition, attended and made statements, the effect of which was that intending purchasers were afraid to buy, and so the debtor could not sell his crops. Under these circumstances Mr. Jones contended that no sort of favour should be shown to a creditor who went behind the back of the other creditors and presented a petition in bankruptcy.

The REGISTRAR said if the debtor had sustained any injury by reason of anything done by the petitioning creditors or their agents, he would have his remedy against them; but he did not think it was a valid objection against the petition being amended, as asked. The court had power to

amend.

A discussion then arose as to which side had to begin first, the registrar contending that it was Mr. Jones. The latter, however, said it was for the petitioning creditors first to prove their debt, as it might turn out that the money had been paid. The point was ultimately decided in Mr. Jones's favour.

Jones said that he considered the conduct of the petitioning creditors in this case so extraordinary that he should take every possible objection to the proceedings, and not do anything to afford them the slightest convenience.

lent and advanced, and usual interest and bankers' charges.

Jones, in cross-examination, asked witness how he knew that amount was still owing. Witness said he knew it from having seen the books on the previous day, and also from the promissory note for £150. He believed that the debtor had paid money into the bank since Feb. 1871, but he was not certain of it.

By Philbrick.-The debtor did not pay the composition; before the petition was presented against him he was applied to for payment of the composition.

In reply to the Registrar (for Jones), witness said one of the clerks from the bank, by his composition. orders, applied to the debtor for payment of the

Q. Do you know whether the debtor made endeavours to raise money for the purpose of paying the composition ?-A. That is a very awkward question to answer, for the explanation makes it "yes or no," as you choose to take it.

Q. You know whether or not you knew he made endeavours?-A, I don't know that he did; but I believe he did. I know that he had a sale by auction, or endeavoured to sell by auction his growing crops, but that was after the time for paying the composition had expired.

Jones (to the Registrar): Will you ask him if he does not know that endeavours were made by the debtor to raise some money by a joint note of hand before the time for paying the composition had passed?

The REGISTRAR asked the question.

Witness: Am I justified in saying that I know note, when that information came to me from a he endeavoured to raise money on a promissory source on which I don't place any reliance? Jones: Will you ask him what that source was? I suppose he refers to me.

The REGISTRAR put the question. Witness.-From Mr. Jones, the debtor's solicitor. In the course of a conversation, he told me that he proposed raising money by obtaining a joint name on a promissory note.

Jones wished the witness to state whether the debtor's solicitor (himself) did not express his willingness to sign a joint note?

Witness replied in the affirmative; and in answer to another question repeated that he sent one of the clerks to apply to the debtor for payment of the composition.

The REGISTRAR said that point could be easily cleared up by asking the debtor, who was present. The debtor was then called by Philbrick and tendered as a witness; but, acting under Jones's advice, he refused to be sworn.

Mr. J. Lee, the Registrar's managing clerk, having produced the proceedings in liquidation which had been filed in court,

the adjudication. The first objection he took, Jones addressed the Registrar in opposition to and on which he asked that the petition should be dismissed was, that the petition was presented by William Alexander alone, whereas the debt was alleged to be due to the firm. He quoted various authorities in support of this objection, and pointed out that one partner might sign a petition on behalf of himself and co-partners, but this had not been done in the present case. He next objected to the alleged act of bankruptcy on the ground that no declaration of liability had been filed in the manner prescribed by the Bankruptcy Act 1869; and in giving the Registrar authorities upon the point he incidentally mentioned that this matter had been pointed out to one of the registrars of the Court of Bank. ruptcy, who was clearly of opinion that the alleged act of bankruptcy could not be supported. The Chief Judge in Bankruptcy had settled upon a form of petition for adjudication where an abortive petition for liquidation had been presented. He then argued on the authority of a decided case, that when the composition was not paid within the specified time the creditors were remitted back to their former position, and could sue for their whole debt; and he contended that the debtor was also remitted back to his former position.

from defendant to them.

back to his former position, nor put in possession of property he might formerly have held. Consequently the power of the creditor to sue for the whole debt was valueless, and he could only recover by petitioning the Bankrupty Court.

In sup

The REGISTRAR, in giving judgment, said in this case the debtor is John George Day, who, on 10th of June last, in this court, filed a petition for liquidation, and on 8th of July a meeting of creditors was held when it was resolved to accept a composition of 10s. in the pound, payable within seven days of the confirmation of the resolution. Default was made in such payment of composition, and on 12th Aug. Messrs. Alexamder and Co., of Ipswich, bankers, presented a petition in bankruptcy against the said John George Day, on which Day gave notice of his intention to dispute the validity of such petition. Such petition coming on for hearing an application was made by Mr. Philbrick, on behalf of Messrs. Alexander and Co., under rule 208, to amend the petition, and an amendment of such petition was made by ordering the following words to be inserted, "for money lent and advanced by this deponent and his co-partners to the said John George Day, at his request, and for interest and commission, and other usual bankers' charges." port of the objection to the petition, Mr. Jones, on the part of Day, contended that inasmuch as the petition was only signed by William Alexander, one of the members of Alexander and Co., without adding the words, " on behalf of himself and partners, the petition was defective, and called on the court to dismiss it; and Mr. Jones further contended, in reply to the allegation in the petition that "he filed in the County Court of Essex holden at Colchester, in the manner prescribed by the Bankruptcy Act, 1869 a declaration admitting his inability to pay the debt," that such was not the case, inasmuch as there had been no such declaration filed, but simply the petition according to the form 106, and that the ground upon which the petition was presented was in consequence of the declaration in the petition presented by Day, "that he was unable to pay his debts, and that he was desirous of introducing proceedings in liquidation." In fact the question for the opinion of the court was whether such declararation amounted to an act of bankruptcy. Now objection rather-I think that an amendment can as far as regards the first amendment-or the first be made; that is that Mr. Alexander, who signed the petition, may be allowed to add the words as required by the form of the Act of Parliament. I cannot but look at the intention of the Act, which provides by the 82nd section as follows:-"That no proceedings in bankruptcy shall be annnlled by any formal defect unless the court is of opinion that substantial injustice has been caused by such defect;" and seeing that no substantial injustice has been caused to the party in consequence of this defect, I consider that section and rule 208, In any proceeding before the court the court may allow any amendments which in the judgment of the court or registrar ought to be allowed on such terms as may be ordered," clearly were framed for the purpose of enabling cases like this to be met. Reading the cases Re Jones, as reported 9 County Court Chronicle, 69, and Ke Bissell and others, 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 286, it appears to me that the conclusion is irresistible that the filing by Day of the petition is an act of bankruptcy. Therefore I feel myself bound by these cases to determine that the petition signed by the bankrupt himself, or rather I should say by Day himself, amounted to an act of bankruptcy, and he not having performed the conditions of the composition as agreed to by resolution, I think the case of Re Hatten (16 Solicitors' Journal 574), gives the creditor all his former rights. Because in that case the Lords Justices-and, mind you, it is no decision of the Chief Judge in Bankruptcy merely-their lordships in that case were very precise in their decision. They stated that the original rights of the creditors reverted to them and that they could not be debarred. The injunction then before their Lordships was discharged. It was an injunction to stay proceedings of creditors. Therefore I feel myself bound by these cases to hold-first, that there was an act

be

bankruptcy, in consequence of the non-compliance with the terms of the composition deed, was suffcient to justify the present position. With respect to the amendment sought I think I am bound-believing that no injustice can done to Day-to give leave to amend. I don't think I have power to put "under conditions," because other creditors might complain. That must be a matter of arrangement between the parties themselves to come and ask for the dismissal of the petition on terms agreed to. I cannot see any injustice that is likely to arise to the parties by allowing the amendments, whereas great injustice might be done to the creditors were I to dismiss the petition and not allow it to be amended. Therefore I no hesitation in granting the application Philbrick to amend the petition, more

Jones: And you don't adjudge the debtor a bankrupt?

The REGISTRAR: No, but that he has committed an act of bankruptcy. I am bound by those cases. The Registrar further ordered that in the event of an appeal being made, and the decision upon that appeal being favourable to the debtor, he would be entitled to his costs; in the event of no appeal no order made as to costs. The case was then adjourned.

COUNTY COURTS.

NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. COUNTY COURT ACT (28 & 29 VICT. c. 99), s. 9 SUIT IN PROGRESS "TRANSFER OF SUIT TO COURT OF CHANCERY-JURISDICTION-REGULATION OF PROCEDURE.-An equitable plaint was filed in a County Court by the creditors of a testator for the administration of his estate, and it stated that the value of the property did not exceed £500. On the plaint coming on for hearing, it was proved by the defendant that the property exceeded £500 in value, whereupon the judge ordered the suit to be transferred to the Court of Chancery, under the 9th section of the County Court Act. Held, that the suit was "in progress" within the meaning of the section, and that the order was consequently right. The value of the property being under £700, the ViceChancellor directed the suit to be continued in chambers, as in the case of a common administration summons, and to proceed as if the plaint had been filed on the day of transfer to chambers. (Birks v. Silverwood, 27 L. T. Rep. N. S. 18. V. C. M.)

LEGAL NEWS.

THE CITY OF LONDON COURT.-By 35 and 36 Vict., cap. 86, the same fees are to be taken in the City of London Court as are taken in the County Courts.

LARGE additions to the Irish magistracy have been made by the Lord Chancellor, who has made appointments in the counties of Monaghan, Kildare, Limerick, Carlow, Louth, Londonderry, Tipperary, Cavan, and Mayo.

MR. BISHOP, in his First Book of the Law,"

speaking of the natural qualifications necessary for the study and practice of the law, says: "A man with a contracted moral part may sometimes make a good physician, or even a good minister of the Gospel, but he can never become a good lawyer."

LORD PENZANCE.-We regret to hear of the continued illness of Lord Penzance. He was confined to his bed for three weeks, and has been unable to leave the house since the 26th of July. As soon as he can do so, he will fix a day for making the decrees absolute which are now standing over in the Divorce Court.

BOROUGHS AND LOCAL COURTS.-One of the last statutes of the late session was passed to amend the law relating to borough and other local Courts of Record. Her Majesty may direct certain enactments of 1 & 2 Will. 4, to be extended to the courts mentioned. Two or more courts may be held at the same time, either for the trial of issues or for the ordinary proceedings of the court, with power to send writs of execution to bailiffs of County Courts. The powers conferred are set forth in the schedule annexed to the Act, the judge to determine the fees to be taken, and may alter the same from time to time.

A WESTERN lawyer was accused of being the owner of a dog which had attacked a testy old gentleman, and bitten him in the calf of the leg. Expecting an action for damages, the wag drew up the following articles as the ground for its defence-First, by testimony in favour of the general good character of my dog, I can prove that nothing would make him so forgetful of his dignity as to bite a calf; secondly, he is blind and cannot see to bite; thirdly, even if he could see to bite, it would be utterly impossible for him to go out of the way to do so, on account of his age, fatness, and severe lameness; fourthly, granting his eyes and legs to be good, he had no teeth; fifthly, my dog died six weeks since; sixthly, I never had a dog.

THE Manchester Examiner states that in view of some further legislation in the next session on the subject of hours of labour in factories, a meeting of delegates, representing fifty societies of factory workers in the four counties recognising Manchester as a centre, was held at Blackburn on Monday night. A resolution was adopted declar

CORRESPONDENCE OF THE

PROFESSION.

A SOLICITOR.

that would be yielding a part of the local district, which is without the borough. Sect. 24 might be similarly applied, if the borough is to be treated as only within a rural sanitary district. But, in the meanwhile, what confusion! The property and liabilities of the local board are by the Act transferred to the new sanitary authority; but it is not at present discovered what that authority is. There will be undoubtedly other difficulties in the working of the Act. While I am upon this subject of hasty legislation, let me call attention to one of the effects of the Married Woman's Property Act 1870. The husband is not to be liable for the wife's debts contracted before marriage; but the wife's separate estate is to be liable. In the usual case the wife has not any separate estate. What is the remedy in such a case? Ubi jus ibi remedium. Why are not practical country solicitors more consulted in matters of legislation? Must they not know more of the effect and working of the laws than any other class? You mentioned last week the case under the Affiliation Act of the last session, as to the child born on the 10th Aug. last. A short time since I had to refer to the Factory and Work. shop Acts, with a view to learn the restrictions on certain establishment. The whole morning was Saturday afternoon employment of females in a necessarily employed, for the Acts begin at 42 Geo. 3, c. 73, and end at 34 & 35 Vict. c. 104 (unless there have been a few more statutes on the subject in the present session). My authority had been able to refer to a codified edition, I was ultimately found in an 1867 statute. If I should have found in five minutes what I wanted, under the head "Factories and Workshops." Of course, under our present system of legislation, a law in discovering how much of an Act is repealed vast amount of time is lost by the searcher for and how much remains. Surely our laws should might from time to time have, at least, some be speedily codified, so as that amendments reference to existing law.

APSLEY PETRE PETER.

THE ACCOUNTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE IN CHANCERY.-More than twenty years ago, viz., on 9th Aug. 1852, the accompanying letter from me was published in the Times. After several useful but small reforms by different Lord Chancellors, Parliament has, by a recent Act, abolished the Accountant-General's office, and transferred

its duties to an office to be called the office of the

Paymaster-General for Chancery business. The Legislature may at last have considered that (as I wrote in 1852) "it would be labour in vain to requisite to pull down and build anew from the do repairs in a case where it would assuredly be foundation." The new office is to be regulated by General Orders to be made by the Lord Chancellor, with the advice and assistance mentioned in the Act, and I respectfully venture to trouble you with this letter (and the accompanying copy) for the purpose of suggesting that the hundred holidays (or rather more) which have been hitherto taken every year by the Accountant-General, be yond what any Government office, or the Bank of England, or any private banker or stockbroker ever thinks of taking, should henceforth be for RECENT LEGISLATION.-Your issue of Aug. ever discontinued. If not the greatest, they are 31 contained some very fair comments on the certainly the most absurd and odious reproach difficulties created by the Licensing Act 1872, and which still sticks to the Court of Chancery. It is you have from time to time pointed out imperfec- inevitable that the funds of the suitors adminis tions in it. In our own borough a difficulty has tered or dealt with by a court of equity must be arisen as to who will be the licensing authority much reduced in amount by the costs and exhere. We are thus circumstanced:-The mayor penses of the court, and surely the suitors are and ex-mayor are the only borough justices, and entitled to expect that every facility shall be the ex-mayor is disqualified, as a spirit merchant, afforded to them at all times for receiving what from acting. Apparently the old law would is left of their property, as soon as the court has govern such a state of things, unless a third ordered it to be paid to them. Is not this obvi borough magistrate be appointed. The case-ously a matter of right? And is there any diffi though one which cannot be rare-does not seem to be provided for by the statute. Then, under the Public Health Act 1872, take the following state of facts:-The existing local go vernment district at D is not coincident in area with the borough of D, nor is the whole of the borough included in such local district. Thus the borough and the local board seem each to be prevented from becoming the exclusive sanitary authority, and it is questionable whether a borough thus situated would not, though it has a council and a local board, be within a rural sanitary district. It may be said that the schedule to sect. 4 starts by saying that the council, in the case of a borough, is to be the urban sanitary authority; but sub. sect. 2 of the same section appears to imply that, as opposed to a local board, the council is only to be the (exclusive) sanitary authority when the borough is coincident in area with the local district. The effect may, notwithstanding the expressed object of the Act to lessen the number of sanitary authorities, be to create concurrent jurisdiction in the council and the board? If that be so, one cannot find that there would be any course open to the council under the Act other than an application to the Local Government Board, under sect. 22, to dissolve the local board district, and merge it in that of the council. But

culty in the way, as the Act provides that the Paymaster-General may do all things authorised by it through a deputy or deputies appointed by him in writing under his hand? It is, I submit, impossible to state any valid reason why the office of the Paymaster-General for Chancery business should not be open from ten till four, all the year round, just as the other offices of the Paymaster-General are. GEORGE BILLER. 9, The Terrace, Tavistock-road, Westbournepark, 4th Sept. 1872. [COPY.]

THE ACCOUNTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE IN CHANCEEY. (To the Editor of the Times.) SIR,-I have a poor re'ation who is entitled under an order of the Court of Chaucery, to an annuity of about £40, payable half yearly, on the 24th Feb. and the 24th Aug., but for the payment which becomes due on the 24th Aug. she has every year to wait till the 2nd Nov. I have also a cousin who is entitled to a rent of £250, which the Accountant-General was some years ago, ordered to pay him by quarterly payments, on the four usual days, but he has always to wait till the 2nd Nov, for the payment which becomes due on the 29th Sept. I am myself entitled to the dividends of some reduced an nuities, which, if the fund were not in Chancery, I could receive at the bank on the 10th or 12th Oct., but now I must wait till the 2nd Nov. before I can get them. There are many thousands of suitors subjected to these and similar inconveniences, which are surely unjust and

oppressive, unless the public good requires them. Yet the only reasons which the Lord Chancellor gives for their continuance are such as it is impossible to listen to with respect, or even with patience. They are in truth an outrage upon common sense and common decency. Every year his lordship issues a general order for closing the Accountant-General's office, from the 19th Aug. till the 28th Oct. (which for all purposes of real business means the 2nd Nov., the first day of Michaelmas Term), and the reasons for issuing such order are stated on the face of it in the following recital: "Whereas it is proper that the accounts kept by the Accountant-General of this court should be examined and compared, in order to settle the same. And whereas it will require considerable time to perfect such examination, and it is necessary that a time should be appointed for closing the books of the AccountantGeneral for the purposes aforesaid." Now, sir, the Accountant-General (except that he cannot misapply, or of himself dispose of the funds, and cash placed in his name), is neither more nor less than the banker and stockbroker of the suitors of the court. It is no doubt necessary that his books should be accurately kept, and their accuracy ascertained; and most splendidly, not to say enormously, does the public pay for having this done. But can it be requisite or proper to shut up the office entirely for ten weeks for this purpose? Fancy, if you can, the Bank of England or any private banking house, or any firm of stockbrokers, giving notice to their customers that their offices will be altogether closed for ten weeks, to enable them "to examine and compare in order to settle," their accounts for the current year. Would not any persons that could issue such a notice be considered fit to become inmates of Bethlehem or St. Luke's? Yet this is the course of the Court of Chancery; a part of that admirable system of dispensing justice "under which, says Lord St. Leonards, the country has arrived at an unparalleled degree of prosperity." But the matter is worse even than this. The Accountant-General and his clerks are bad enough in all conscience, but they are not quite such imbecile creatures as the Lord Chancellor's order would make them appear. They do not require ten weeks every autumn to examine the year's accounts; and, in fact, they scarcely consume three weeks out of the ten in any such dull work. The rest of the time they are to be found, not in Chancery-lane or Threadneedle-street, but at country seats, at watering places, and on the Continent. As Mr. Dickens writes it, they are "on the canals of Venice, at the second cataract of the Nile, in the baths of Germany, and sprinkled on the sea sand of the Eng. lish coast.' The recital I have copied above is only a pious fraud, an annual work of fiction with which we poor suitors may entertain ourselves while we are kept out of our money, in plain English, a lie, intended to deceive that many-headed but unthinking dupe, the public, and signed by the Lord Chancellor only as a matter of course! If written with candour and truth it would be expressed in some such terms as the following: "Whereas, this court thinks fit that its Accountant-General and his clerks should have many holidays, and that they should all take their holidays at But this would be seen to be too bad. The court is therefore driven to the hard necessity of making the Accountant-General and his clerks seem even worse than they are, in order to enable them to steal away for six weeks or two months' holidays under the false pretence that they are all the while examining accounts in Chancery-lane. In the middle of the nineteenth century, this is an administration of equity, this is our public morality! It is, I conceive, impossible to be guilty of a contempt of court in writing or speaking of these matters. Whatever amount of contempt, public or private, such abuses may call forth there can surely be no guilt in it. The offices of the Court of Chancery have long been a disgrace to the country, and the Accountant-General's office is a disgrace to all the rest. It is possible that this may have been the Lord Chancellor's view when he did not abstain from signing the order I have mentioned. His Lordship may have considered that it would be labour in vain to do repairs in a case where it will assuredly be requisite to pull down and build anew from the foundation. If, indeed, his Lordship will for only one morning give the Accountant-General's office that sort and degree of attention which a prudent man pays to his own immediate interests (and one may be pardoned for suggesting that this will be no more than his duty), it will be impossible for that office to exist for six months longer in anything resembling its present state. The post office had its Rowland Hill. Has the country no Rowland Hill for the Court of Chancery?—I am, Sir, your very

once."

obedient servant,

COGITANS.

LEGAL PROFESSION IN CANADA.-In answer to the inquiry of "Lex," as to the Legal Profession in Canada, my wish being to go out there, I have ascertained that there are many good openings; but whether a duly qualified English solicitor would be obliged to pass any examination previous to being allowed to practise, I am unable to say. I should be glad if anyone could give "Lex" and myself further information on the subject.

M. B. PRACTICE.-In commenting on "C. P.'s" advertisement for evening employment, you express a desire to call the attention thereto "of the proper authorities." I am sure you would be doing the Profession at large and the public also much service if you can say who are the proper authorities. It is impossible you can mean the Law Society, who never attempt any interference except as a club with their own members, nor, in fact, can they interfere. Some authority, doubtless, ought to exist to stop the open touting for business by unqualified practitioners, certainly worse for the junior branches of the Profession than C. P.'s irregular notice. If there be any existing authority, pray enlighten us.

G. M. W.

NOTES AND QUERIES ON

POINTS OF PRACTICE.

NOTICE. We must remind our correspondents that this column is not open to questions involving points of law. such as a solicitor should be consulted upon. Queries will be excluded which go beyond our limits. N.B.-None are inserted unless the name and address of the writers are sent, not necessarily for publication, but as a guarantee for bona fides.

Queries.

93. INCOME TAX.-I am a solicitor, and have recently purchased the succession to a gentleman's practice who is dead. I have been in practice now for about eight weeks, and that for the first time on my own account. To my surprise I am requested to make an income tax return under Schedule D. My reply was that as yet there was no income to return, and that it was impossible to say what my practice might be worth. The surveyor of taxes for the district simply says in reply that my income must be assessed in the usual way. Can I appeal against any assessment for the first year

with a chance of success?

B. A.

94. PROBATE DUTY.-A. grants to B. a building lease for ninety-nine years of a piece of freehold ground; B. erects thereon a house (value over £800); A. afterwards agrees by contract in writing to sell to B. the freehold reversion for £1100, £400 of which was paid on execution of the contract, the balance to be paid on completion. Prior to the date fixed for completion B. dies, giving by his will everything to his wife. Is the value of the lease and house to be included in the estimate for probate, and probate duty paid thereon? or was the contract a sufficient conversion in equity to merge the leasehold and release it from the payment of probate duty? C. C. H.

a

"The following are the chief points of the report of the International Commission which met at Cairo to examine the reforms proposed by the Egyptian Government for the administration of justice in Egypt. The commission was presided over by Nubar Pasha, and the main object of the proposals of the Egyptian Government was principally directed to two distinct points, firstly, the reform of the civil and commercial jurisdiction, and, secondly, of the criminal jurisdiction. The report adopts the views of the Egyptian Govern ment for the establishment of one court both for the settlement of cases between foreigners and natives and also between foreigners of different nationalities. This court ought, says the report, to be composed in such a manner that in those cases which concern foreigners only the majority of the magistrates should be foreigners. Also the decisions of the Courts of First Instance should be delivered by three judges, two of whom should be foreigners and the third a native. In the Courts of Appeal five judges, three of whom should be foreigners, should decide the cases brought before them. In commercial cases brought before a Court of First Instance two judges, one foreigner and the other a native, chosen by election, should be added to the number of sitting judges. The appointment and selection of the judges should, the report considers, be left with the Egyptian Government, but it should allow itself to be guided in the selection by the views of foreign Governments. At the same time the judges should be irremovable. In reference to the guarantees offered by the Egyptian Government the report says: "The Government has offered a certain number of guarantees, which it will be sufficient to sum up in a few words. Infraction of the penal law will be transferred to those tribunals which them selves have the right of ordering their prosecution. The police cannot arrest, and the authorities cannot issue a warrant of arrest, except in the case of a flagrant offence, public disturbance, &c. A person arrested must be taken before a judge of instruction within twenty-four hours of his arrest. Accused persons will always have the right of producing witnesses either during the preliminary examination or the public trial. The arrangements relative to the examination of witnesses and the appointment of official advocates will act as a protection for the defence of the accused person. Finally, the principal guarantee will be found in the establishment of trial by jury, the accused persons thus being certain of being tried by their peers.' The Commission, however, was unable to give any opinion as to the sufficiency of the guarantees offered by the Government before a penal code shall have been drawn up, as has been promised to be done very shortly. Finally, the conclusions arrived at by the Commission as to reforms required in the administration of criminal'

LEGAL OBITUARY.

W. HANMER, ESQ.

THE late William Hanmer, Esq., F.S.A., barristerat-law, of Bodnod Hall, Denbighshire, who died on the 26th Aug., in the eightieth year of his age, was the youngest son of the late Sir Thomas Hanmer, Bart., of Hanmer, Flintshire, and uncle of Sir John Hanmer, the present baronet; his mother was Margaret, eldest daughter of the late George Kenyon, Esq., of Peel, Lancashire, and he was born in the year 1792. He was educated at Rugby, under Dr. Ingles, and afterwards at Queen's College, Oxford, where he graduated B.A. in 1815, and proceeded M.A. in 1817. was called to the Bar by the Hon. Society of the Inner Temple in 1819, but he had for many years ceased to practise. Mr. Hanmer, who was a magistrate and deputy-lieutenant for the county of Denbigh, married in 1820 Euphemia Maria, only daughter and heiress of the late John Forbes, Esq., of Bodnod Hall, and by her, who died in 1871, he had issue four sons and five daughters.

He

He was

J. G. DOBINSON, ESQ. THE late James George Dobinson, Esq., solicitor, who died at his residence, 46, Ladbroke-road, Notting-hill, on the 20th Aug., in the sixty-sixth year of his age, was a member of the firm of Dobinson and Geare, of 57, Lincoln's-inn-fields. born in the year 1806, and was admitted a solicitor in Michaelmas Term 1829. He was a commissioner for the administration o oaths in Chancery, and also a commissioner in the Court of Queen's Bench, Common Pleas, and Exchequer. One who knew him well writes: "His loss will be felt by a large circle of acquaintances, both in and out of the Profession, to whom he had endeared himself by the high principles of honour and integrity which guided the whole of his proIn fact, we cannot but be fessional career. sensible that in him the Profession has lost a member of great ability and sterling worth.”

R. G. WELFORD, ESQ. THE late Richard Griffiths Welford, Esq., judge of the Birmingham County Courts, who died somewhat suddenly on the 2nd inst. at his residence, Parkfields, Allesley, near Coventry, Warwickshire, in the sixty-eighth year of his age, was the son of the late Richard Welford, Esq., solicitor, of Marlborough, Wilts. He was born at Marlborough in Dec. 1804, and was educated at the grammar school of his native town, and afterwards at Harrow school, under Dr. Butler. He was called to the Bar by the Hon. Society of the Inner Temple, in Easter Term 1839, and practised for some time as an equity draftsman and conveyancer, and also attended the Wiltshire sessions. In 1859 he was appointed one of the commissioners for inquiry into the alleged corrupt prac tices at the Gloucester election, when Messrs. Monk and Price were unseated, and the issuing of a new writ was suspended. In Jan. 1865, he was appointed judge of the circuit No. 21, holding his courts at Atherstone, Birmingham, and Tamworth. The deceased gentleman, who was active supporter of the Anti Corn Law League, was the writer of several articles in the League papers, under the signature of " Agriculture,' and he was also the author of a Treatise on Equity Pleadings, published in 1842, and How will Free Trade affect the Farmer? issued in the following year; in 1846 he published The Influence of the Game Laws, and in 1857 A Plan for a Final Reform Bill, and various professional and other pamphlets. Mr. Welford married in 1834, Jane, daughter of William Dibben, Esq., by whom he has left issue. His son, Mr. Richard Welford, is a barrister-at-law of Lincoln's-inn.

an