by sect. 126 of the Towns Improvement Act, 1847: (Anthony v. The Brecon Markets Company, 26 L. T. Rep. N. S. 980. Ex. Ch.)

INSPECTION OF DOCUMENTS CORRESPONDENCE WITH AGENTS-PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS. The plaintiff, to whom cattie had been carried by the defendants' railway, wrote to the general manager of the line complaining of the late delivery and bad condition of the beasts, without, however, threatening legal proceedings. The manager replied that inquiries would be made. Correspondence ensued between the goods manager of the defendants, and servants also in their employ, and those of other railway companies who had assisted to forward the cattle, relating to the times and mode of carriage. An action having been afterwards brought by the plaintiff for the above-mentioned causes of complaint: Held, that the documents and reports of which the correspondence between the officials

cargo, but he is not bound to part with the cargo unless the distance freight for the part of the voyage performed and other expenses have been paid or secured. Whilst the master of the vessel was at Gibraltar, the consignees required him to proceed or to transship at his own risk and expense. This the master refused, offering, however, to transship against a reasonable reduction of freight, which offer the plaintiffs would not accept. Held, that as the master was entitled by the German law to his distance freight and expenses, the demand of the plaintiffs was not such a legal demand within the meaning of that law as compelled the master to transship: (The Express, 26 L. T. Rep. N. S. 956. Adm.)

BANKRUPTCY LAW.

ISLE OF MAN.

of debts in the Isle of Man, irrespective altogether of baakruptcy.

It provides for an order of arrest against the property of a defendant in a suit for debt, not appearing when duly summoned. It adopts, in substance and effect, the Scottish decree in absence; which, however, has not yet been imported into England, but which the Judicature Commission in their second report, issued the other day, have strongly recommended for adaption.

In the County Courts of England until the cause is called on for hearing, the plaintiff generally has no means of knowing whether or not it is to be defended; so that, unless the case comes within the exceptions of the County Court Act 1856, or sect. 2 of the Act of 1867, he is compelled to be prepared with proof of his debt; and the going through these formal proofs occupies unnecessarily the time of the court, keeps other parties and witnesses waiting, and creates unnecessary inconthis respect England is still behind both Scotland and the Isle of Man.

MARITIME LAW.

NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. MARINE POLICY-UNSEAWORTHINESS-PLEA OF- PARTICULARS BARRATROUS MASTER

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LEAVE TO PLEAD.- - An action having been brought on a marine policy against an under writer, the defendant obtained a master's order granting leave to plead several matters, inter alia "That the vessel when she set sail on the insured voyage was not seaworthy for the same," upon condition that particulars of the plea should be delivered. The defendant consequently gave the following particulars, viz., "That the master of the B. when she set sail intended to scuttle the said ship on her said voyage." Thinking that these particulars did not fulfil the condition, the master of the court discharged his order: held that, as the evidence offered in support of the plea could be limited by the particulars, the plea should be allowed. But quære, whether the fact stated in the particulars would be admissible as

proof of unseaworthiness: (Ionides v. Pender, 26 L. T. Rep., N. S. 970. Bail Court.) DAMAGE TO CARGO-WAR-RISK OF CAPTURE REASONABLENESS OF DELAY EXCEPTED PERILS.-By both English and North German law, risk of capture, such as to justify a master whose vessel is carrying a cargo under a charterparty and bills of lading, containing the exceptions, "Queen's enemies, &c.," in putting into and remaining in an intermediate port during the continuance of that risk, need not amount to an actual operative restraint (almost a blockade), but must be that risk which would induce a reasonably prudent man, exercising due discretion and fortitude, not to expose the vessel to capture. Semble, that where the chances of escape and capture are equal, the master would be justified in remaining in port. By a charter-party in the English language entered into at Constantinople between the master of a North German vessel,

and North German merchants there resident, it was agreed that the vessel should load a cargo and proceed therewith to Falmouth, Plymouth, or Queenstown, for orders for a safe port in the United Kingdom, or on the Continent between Havre and Hamburg, Queen's enemies, &c., excepted. The cargo was laden, and the master signed bills of lading in accordance with the charter-party, also in the English language, but with an endorsement in German, and the cargo was therein consigned to consignees resident in England. Held that the law to be applied to the

execution of the contract was the North German

law. The vessel sailed, but her master learning on his voyage that war existed between France and Germany, and fearing capture by French cruisers, put into Gibraltar. During the war there would have been great risk of capture off that port and off the ports of call if the vessel had continued her voyage; her master in consequence remained there until the end of the war (nine months). He then sailed, and arriving at a port of call was ordered to an English port. The cargo was damaged by the delay. In a claim by the consignees, Held, that by both English and North German law the master was justified in putting and remaining in port, and that the shipowners were not responsible for the damage caused by the delay. By the North German law, when, subsequent to the commencement of the voyage, a war has been declared, in consequence of which the vessel or the goods shipped therein under the contract of affreightment, or both, can no longer be considered free or would be liable to risk of capture, either party may withdraw from the contract without being liable to damages. On such dissolution of the contract the master is bound, if necessary or if required, to transship and forward the cargo at the expense of the owner of

THE ISLE OF MAN BANKRUPTCY ACT 1872. Recovery of Debts in the Island. THE Manx Bankruptcy Act 1872, is an adoption substantially of the Scottish system of bankruptcy, imported into England by the English Bankruptcy Act 1869, so that that important branch of the law of the Isle of Man is now almost identical with that of Great Britain; and, assuredly, this is the greatest step in useful law reform, in the relation of debtor and creditor, which has ever been taken in the island.

The Isle of Man has a Parliament of its own, and subject to the approval of her Majesty in council, all laws affecting the island are passed by the Manx Legislature, and, with the royal assent, practically become British Statutes.

The Manx Parliament is composed of the governor, the governor's council, which consists of the Bishop of Sodor and Man; the AttorneyGeneral, the two judges called deemsters, the clerk of the rolls, the water bailiff, the archdeacon, the vicar-general, the clerk of the council, who is also secretary to the governor; and the House of Keys, consisting of twenty-four members. In all, the Parliament of the Isle of Man is thus composed of thirty-four persons.

The Manx Bankruptcy Act 1872 provides for discharge of the bankrupt from future liability the recovery and division of the estates, and the for past debts-in all respects the same as under the English Bankruptcy Act of 1869.

For the more convenient administration of justice, the Isle of Man is divided into two districts, over which preside two judges called deemsters; the one in the northern, and the other in the southern division. To those two judges is committed the administration of bankruptcy under this Act, and the clerk of each deemster is to act as registrar of the court in bankruptcy proceedings.

Any person aggrieved by an order of a deemster may appeal to the Court of Chancery of the island of which the governor is chancellor, and from the decision of that court an appeal may be preferred, not to the Chief Judge in Bankruptcy, as in England, but to Her Majesty in Council.

The governor, with the advice and assistance of the deemsters, may from time to time make, revoke, and alter general rules for the effectual execution of the Act, and the regulation of the practice in bankruptcy.

Differing from the English Bankruptcy Act, 1869, but in uniformity with the Scottish Bankruptcy Statute, a debtor may present a petition to the court praying that he may be adjudged a bankrupt, and alleging as the ground for such adjudication his inability to pay his debts. But any such debtor must be, at the time of presenting his petition, a prisoner for debt, or must have had his usual place of abode within the island for at least twelve calendar months immediately preceding the presentation of his petition.

The proceedings in the petition whether contested or not, the appointment of a trustee and committee of inspection, the property divisable amongst the creditors, the power of the trustee, with the sanction of a special resolution of the creditors to accept a composition, and the discharge of the bankrupt, are all identical with the provisions of the English Bankruptcy Act 1869.

If a member of the House of Keys is adjudged bankrupt, he is to remain during one year from the date of the order of adjudication, incapable of sitting and voting in that House, unless within that time either the order is annulled or the creditors who prove debts under the bankruptcy are fully paid and satisfied.

For the purpose of liquidation by arrangement, not in bankruptcy, and composition with creditors, these are, in substance, the same provisions as in the English Bankruptcy Act 1869.

Besides all the necessary provisions for realizing and dividing the estate among the creditors, there is a remarkable provision which does not occur in any bankrupt statute in the United Kingdom, which is this: sect. 106 provides for the recovery

LEGAL NEWS.

THE MAGISTERIAL FRACAS AT NORWICH.charge of asault, arising out of the recent magisterial fracas upon the Norwich bench of magistrates, was proceeded with at Norwich, on Monday, before the Mayor (Mr. R. Chamberlin) and other justices. The complainant was William Youell, landlord of a publichouse in Norwich; the defendant was Mr. R. W. Blake, one of the city magistrates. Mr. Sparrow, solicitor, Norwich, was for the complainant; Mr. Chittock, solicitor, for the defendant. Mr. Serjeant Sleigh attended to watch the case on behalf of Major Bignold, with whom Mr. Blake, the defendant, had an altercation and an encounter, on the 27th ult. Mr. Serjeant Sleigh said he attended to watch the case on behalf of Major Bignold, whose name would probably be mentioned in the course of the proceedings. The Mayor said Major Bignold had no locus standi upon the present occasion. case had been referred to a higher authority. Mr. Serjeant Sleigh said he had only sought to address the Bench from a feeling of respect, and in order had occurred on the 27th ult. Major Bignold had to express the regret of Major Bignold at what been betrayed into what occurred on that occasion after he had been repeatedly insulted, and finally struck. William Youell, the complainant, deposed that he kept the Golden Star public house, in St. Michael's, Norwich. He was present at the general annual licensing meeting held by the Norwich Bench on 27th ult. He caused an application to be made to the Bench on his behalf. This application was granted; it related to opening between 5 and 6 o'clock in the morning. After the Mayor

The

had left the chair witness had occasion to remain in the room for a certificate. Other persons waited also. Witness saw Mr. Blake, Major Bignold, Mr. Bolingbroke, and Mr. Brown on the bench. Witness saw Mr. Blake and Major Bignold commence a

scrimmage," and fall upon the ground. Witness saw Major Bignold knock Mr. Blake down. Mr. Blake got up again and knocked Major Bignold against the magistrates' desk. Witness went round the room into the space reserved for the Bench. When he got into the Bench space Major Bignold was lying upon the ground and Mr Blake was in front of him. Witness prevented Mr. Blake from rushing on Major Bignold again. Mr. Blake said to witness, "What do you do here?" and struck him with his left hand on the jaw. Witness did not strike Mr. Blake again, but he retired from the Bench space. The blow was of some violence, and witness felt its effect for some days. Witness, when he went round to the Bench space, did not know whether Mr. Blake was killing" Major Bignold or whether Major Bignold was " killing Mr. Blake. Cross-examined: Witness said he did not know whether Mr. Blake voted against his application. Two witnesses gave confirmatory evidence. Mr. Chittock then addressed the Bench for the defence. Mr. Blake, he said, expressed regret that the altercation with Major Bignold should have occurred, and that Youell had been struck. This admission made, the only questions were whether Mr. Blake was justified in striking the blow, whether Youell was justified in laying his hand upon Mr. Blake, and whether Mr. Blake had any fair ground for assuming that Youell was going to act as a partisan of Major Bignold. When Youell appeared upon the scene the affray had practically ceased, and there was no reason to suppose that it would be renewed. There was, then, no fair ground for any interference. Youell, again, had given no notice to Mr. Blake of his intention to prevent a breach of the peace before he laid his hands upon him. Mr. Blake was, therefore, justified in concluding that Youell appeared as a partisan, and in resisting him to the utmost. Mr. Chittock cited authorities in support of his argument. There was no necessity for Youell's interference, as Mr. Bolingbroke and Mr. Kennett had

already interfered successfully to suppress the unfortunate affray. What Mr. Blake really said to Youell was, "How dare you touch me?" not "What do you do here?" After he had said to Youell" How dare you touch me?" Mr. Blake was justified in striking Youell in self-defence. Mr. Blake had voted against the application made by Youell during the licensing meeting. The appearance of Youell in the Bench space might very naturally, under these circumstances, have led Mr. Blake to suppose that he appeared as a partisan. The case for the defence really was that Mr. Blake was first assaulted by Youell, and that he was justified in what he did afterwards. The Mayor, in deciding, said it was admitted that a blow had been struck, and as the magistrates did not consider the evidence justified the blow, they must fine the defendant 40s. with 19s. 6d. costs. The decision of the magistrates was received with loud cheers by a large crowd outside the Guildhall, and Mr. Blake on leaving was received with strong expressions of dissapproval. The Home Secretary having received from the Norwich magistrates an official statement as to the late fracas upon the local bench, has called upon Major Bignold and Mr. Wiffen Blake for an explanation of their conduct.

CORRESPONDENCE OF THE

PROFESSION.

NOTE. This Department of the LAW TIMES being open to free discussion on all professional topics, the Editor is not responsible for any opinions or stateinents contained in it.

THE NEW BASTARDY ACT.-With reference to this subject, I wish to draw attention to what appears to be a very grave omission on the part | of the Legislature. By the conjoint effect of the 2nd section and the first schedule of 35 & 36 Vict. c. 65, the 2nd section of 7 & 8 Vict. c. 101 is repealed, "except so far as may be necessary for the purpose of supporting and continuing any proceeding taken before the passing of this Act.' And by sect. 3 of 35 & 36 Vict. c. 65, the privilege of making an application for a summons upon the alleged father is given only to " any single woman who may be with child, or who may be delivered of a bastard child after the passing of this Act." The royal assent was given on the 10th Aug. Three applications for summonses have been made in my petty sessional division for summonses where the children have been born before the 10th August 1872, and the applications for summonses have been made since that date. I see no provision made for these cases, and therefore no alternative for the justices but to decline to entertain them on the ground of want of jurisdiction. If any of your readers can refer me to any enactment enabling justices to make an order in such cases it will remove what will otherwise be a great hardship in the cases referred to. A JUSTICES' CLERK.

29th Aug. 1872.

Allow me to call the attention of the Profes sion to the report of a case before Mr. D'Eyncourt, at Marylebone police court, which appeared in the Morning Advertiser of Monday, Aug. 26, in which case, as appears by the report, the woman was delivered of the child on the 26th July last, so that the new Act, which came into operation on the 10th inst., did not apply to the case in question, as the words of the 3rd section are, that any single woman who may be with or who may be delivered of a bastard child after the passing of this Act," may, &c. The Act, therefore, only applies to a woman either with child, or who has been delivered after the 10th Aug. The

words in the former statute "or who has been delivered of a bastard child within the period of six calendar months before the passing of this Act" having been intentionally or otherwise omitted from the last Act. It does appear to me that the Act did not apply to the case referred to, and that the order made was wrong.

WALTER H. FULLAGAR.

THE LICENSING ACT.-The letter signed "Lex," and copied into your journal of last week, was evidently written without a fair perusal of the several sections relating to the annual value of the property in respect of which licences are now or are hereafter to be granted. He states that the interpretation put upon these two sections (44 and 45) is, that all licensed houses which are not of the value of £30 per annum at the annual licensing meeting in 1873 must cease to be licensed. But a careful perusal of the 44th, 45th, and 46th sections will, I think, satisfy him that the owners of the 800 licensed houses in his town need have no fear of the "fearful confiscation" he anticipates, and that the House of Commons, whatever other errors it may have made in the new Licensing Act, was careful to preserve the existing rights of the owners of public house property. Sect. 45 enacts that premises to which at the time of the passing of the Act no licence under the Acts

recited in the Wine and Beerhouse Act 1869 is attached, shall not be subject to any of the provisions now in force prescribing a certain rent or value as a qualification-that is, I take it, that all new licences shall be granted subject to the new provisions, and this opinion is confirmed by the following words in the same section, "Premises not at the time of the passing of this Act licensed for the sale, &c., thereupon, shall not be qualified to receive a licence authorising such sale unless the following conditions are satisfied." Then follow the conditions named by "Lex." The last paragraph of this section further provides that no house not licensed at the time of the passing of this Act shall be qualified unless such house shall contain two rooms. Sect. 46 refers only to licences to be granted to houses under the Wine and Beerhouse Acts 1869 and 1870, and in these cases "the annual value" is to be regulated by the 3 & 4 Vict. c. 61, s. 1, which fixes the annual value from £8 to £11 where the population does not exceed 500. I think, Sir, from the above quotations, and a careful read, mark, and learn of the Act, those who are at present in doubt upon the real construction of the sections referred to, will be convinced that the new provisions as to the value of licensed premises only apply to licences to be granted after the passing of the Act. F. M.

RECORDERSHIP OF BRISTOL.-Referring to your remarks in last week's LAW TIMES respecting the appointment of Mr. Kingdon, Q.C., to the Recordership of Bristol, will you allow me to point out that one very good reason why the Recorder of Bristol should be restrained from practising at the bar at the Bristol Assizes is that the recorder for the time being is also the Judge of the Bristol Tolzey Court, a local court of record. If, therefore, the recorder is to be like Cæsar's wife, it seems to be undesirable that he should practise at the bar in a city where he sits as a judge both in civil and criminal matters. I know it may be said that the Tolzey Court, in common with all other local civil courts (except County Courts), will probably be shortly abolished; but we are not got so far as that yet, and probably may not for some years to come, Mr. Serjeant Kinglake, when Recorder of Bristol, never practised at the bar there, whether from feelings of delicacy or from having accepted the office with that condition attached to it, I am unable to say. Mr. Bere, Q.C., the late recorder, did not follow the example of his predecessor, Mr. Kinglake, and whether that has had anything to do with the restriction now imposed upon the appointment, I am also unable to say; but I know that the fact of Mr. Bere's practising at the Bristol Assizes whilst holding the appointment of recorder of the city, was animadverted upon in at least one of the local newspapers during the two years he filled the office, and I have reason to believe that the profession in Bristol generally concurred in such animadversions.

A BRISTOL ATTORNEY.

88. BANKRUPTCY ACT 1869-EQUITABLE MORTGAGE.— A. holds the title deeds of freehold property belonging to B., as security for a sum in excess of the value of the property. B.'s estate is being liquidated, and A. has The trustee is satisfied of the utter impossibility of any applied to the trustee to convey to him the legal estate. benefit accruing to the estate from this property, and he is willing to accede to A.'s wishes. Has the trustee the power to do this without consulting the creditors or applying to the court? If not, what is the proper course to be adopted? An application by A. under rule 78 is objectionable, on account of the unnecessary expense and trouble it would entail.

X.

90. MORTGAGES, PLEDGES, AND LIENS.-I should like to be enlightened in regard to the 6th paragraph of the chapter on Mortgages, Pledges, and Liens, sect. 1, contained in Smith's Manual of Equity. The paragraph runs thus: "Where the relation of mortgagor and mortgagee subsists it is hardly possible that an agree ment under which the mortgagee is to hold the land at a rent as an equivalent for interest can be supported; it being considered, independently of the question as to usury in cases under the old law, to be against public policy that such agreements should be permitted to take place between parties, one of whom has an obvious advantage over the other (2 Sp. 630)." Upon reference to the authority mentioned it will be found that, save a slight alteration in consequence of the abolition of the usury laws, the paragraph is an extract from Spence's Equitable Jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery. Upon reading the paragraph carefully through, it seems to me that perhaps a misprint has occurred in Spence, and that Smith has perpetuated the error. I can undermortgagor is to hold the land at a rent as an equivalent for interest; but will anyone explain to me what is meant by a mortgagee holding the land at a rent as an equivalent for interest? Does not the case of Belcher v. Vardon, L. J. N. S. 427, Eq., which is one of three cases on the point quoted in Spence, favour the impres sion that an error has occurred? I have not seen the other two cases. AN ARTICLED CLEEK.

LAW CLERKS' SALARIES.-The present enormous price of provisions, and of every article of domestic use and consumption, is now pressing heavily upon all persons having fixed and limited incomes-particularly the law clerks. Tradesmen and artisans have the means in their power, at such times as these, of bringing about a corresponding increase in their wages by means of "strikes;" but the law clerks are a body in whose vocation and vocabulary the word "strike is unknown. Moreover, they are generally expected to trust to their employers making, unsolicited, any increase of salary which they may merit, or their necessities require. A recent edition of the London City Press mentions a very gratifying instance of the forethought and liberality of an eminent London firm, which well deserves to be made known. The report states that "the solicitors to the Bank of England, Messrs. Freshfield and Co., in consideration of the increase in the price of provisions, have presented to their clerks a handsome bonus to their salaries." This, Sir, is a noble example, and one that I hope will be speedily followed by the whole of the Profession, as there are many law clerks with large families whom these " expensive times" are pinching severely, but who hesitate to make a personal appeal to their employers. The solicitors, as a rule, are very considerate towards their clerks, and I have no doubt, if you will kindly insert these few lines in your valuable paper, the matter will be brought to the notice of the Profession, and we shall soon find that the humane and praiseworthy conduct of the Messrs. Freshfield has been generally adopted. I am sure it would be appreciated by the clerks, and by none more so than the writer,

Manchester, 4th Sept., 1872.

A LAW CLERK,

LEGAL EXTRACTS. IMPEACHMENT OF AN AMERICAN JUDGE. THE New York Herald of the 22nd Aug. has the following article on the impeachment of Judge Barnard and the faults of the American judicial system:

"The impeachment of a judge of one of the highest courts of the state on charges of official malfeasance and corruption so seriously affects the interests of the community as to place the proceedings outside the pale of party politics. Whatever personal or political considerations may have influenced those who first urged on the prosecution of Judges Barnard, Cardozo, and M'Cunn, as soon as the accusations brought against them were found to be sustained by evidence and of a character to demand official inves tigation, the people of New York became the complainants, and were entitled to a full and impartial trial of the issue, as provided by the con

"THE Philosophy of Law" is the title of an article which appeared in the Law Magazine for last August, and therein we find some observations which may be of use to those who take part in the next International Congress. All punishment, we are told, may be regarded as education. The writer follows this up by saying, "Training is the counteracting of the passive force of nature by wise restraint and discipline. It is this that we mean when we speak of education in children. We have got beyond the idea that education is teaching a child to read; we have come to perceive VOL. LIII.-No. 1537.

that it is the elaboration of that cosmos, character, out of that chaos nature; we understand, at last, that it is the subjection of nature in man, the subordination of his senses and his appetites, that is the object of education, and that that is possible only through the negation of the mechanical necessity of nature, the position of the universal and the consequent freedom of the will. Thus we find that all punishment is educational, and that the infliction of penalty is no wrong, as some would have us think, but a right which conduces to the freedom of the individual, to the welfare of the community, and to the absolute attainment of justice." It looks very much as if there were some satire under this philosophy-there ought to be if there isn't. A convict educated by penal servitude, his cosmos, "character," presumably not a good one, being fully elaborated out of his chaos, "nature," in other words, out of his felonious propensities, adds to the welfare of the community" and the absolute attainment of justice." A writer in the last number of the Edinburgh Review refuses in terms to employ the word philosophical as applied to a class of individuals, insinuating that it is used to cover many absurdities. We think we have supplied some evidence that he is not far wrong.

We do not by any means wish to discourage solicitors in their attempts to repress invaders, but we think that some distinction must be drawn between those persons, who, without any qualifications, do the work of lawyers, acting as agents in County Courts and such like, and those who, like accountants in bankruptcy, have a certain connection with the law expressly recognised by the Legislature. A correspondent writes to inform us that at a meeting of creditors which he attended, the majority of those present were accountants, armed with proxy papers, signed by creditors in blank, and he remarks, "an accountant's clerk or sham lawyer, armed with such a document, appears to think that he is competent to conduct the proceedings of a meeting of creditors. I should scarcely think this is what the Legislature intended." Now the object of the Legislature was obviously to allow creditors to conduct the business themselves, and if certain creditors choose to give proxy papers to accountants, and if those accountants are allowed by the other creditcrs to conduct the business of a particular meeting, we are not aware that there is any objection to such a course. The competition must seriously affect solicitors, for it would appear that accountants find it worth their while to attend meetings of creditors on any terms and upon any pretence. Our correspondent tells us that he counted eleven of these gentlemen at one meeting. There is no remedy for this condition of things save an appeal to the Legislature to put accountants under the same laws as solicitors, or to relieve solicitors of the burthens which they are now compelled to bear. Perhaps the better plan would be to relieve the Profession from taxation. In the mean time accountants must be met on their own ground.

OUR Contemporary, the Daily News, devotes a leading article to the important subject of the increase of perjury and subornation of perjury, more particularly in suits coming before the Divorce Court, and the writer concludes that the only remedy for an evil which is becoming prodigious in its proportions is persistently to put in force the criminal law against perjurers, wherever there is a probability of obtaining a conviction. This is all very well as a theory: perjurers ought to be punished, and perhaps punishment ought to follow more surely and swiftly upon their operations in connection with divorce suits than in other causes. But in the absence of a public prosecutor this is not to be looked for. It is sufficiently trying to any nature of ordinary sensibility to incur all the misery of public notoriety in a court for the trial of matrimonial causes, but to follow up failure or success by proceedings at the Old Bailey requires an amount of courage which even the innocent cannot always be expected to possess the innocent, indeed, probably in a less degree than the guilty. Perjury, moreover, is an offence which it is not always easy to bring home to a witness, and an acquittal in such a case would do more harm than no prosecution at all, so far, that is, as the individual interested is concerned. It is undoubtedly a misfortune, as GEORGE ELIOT says in one of her novels, that the Englishman is not an evidence-giving animal, and consequently in every cause there is generally ample occupation for the manufacturer of testimony. As the Daily News points out, in no kind of litigation is the manufacture of evidence easier than in causes in the Divorce Court, and we can only suggest that the QUEEN'S PROCTOR should have power to institute prosecutions for perjury as well as to intervene in cases of collusion. So long as private individuals are left to seek their own redress, perjury will increase and punishment be rare.

Is a registrar of a court of bankruptcy bound to transfer proceedings in accordance with a resolution of creditors, and, if so, what is the proper procedure? This was a question discussed lately before the LORDS JUSTICES, and depends upon the 288th rule. That rule says that the creditors assembled at any general meeting may include in their resolution a direction that the proceedings be transferred to another court than that in which the same were