precaution, they must, in the absence of a fraudu. Îent intention on the part of the passenger, have recourse to the common law rights to recover payment.-K. L. S."

MAGISTRATES AND EDUCATION.-At the Staly. bridge Borough Court, before a full bench of magistrates, Jonathan Schofield was on Tuesday summoned for a breach of the by-laws of the School Board in neglecting and refusing to send his daughter, eight years of age, to a public elementary school. Mr. Taylor, clerk to the board, appeared in support of the information. Mr. Schofield was undefended, although he was aided in his defence by Mr. Charles Buckley, solicitor, and the Rev. Joseph Raynor Stephens. The court was crowded. In opening the case, Mr. Taylor said he believed the defendant's objection to comply with the Elementary Education Act was that he considered himself sufficiently well educated to instruct his child, but he was at work in a mill all day up to six o'clock in the evening, and it would be for the Bench to say whether after that toil he was in a fit state to give instruction, or whether he was competent to undertake such work as was required from a certificated teacher. The girl was engaged all day in nursing an infant, and it was questionable whether her mind was sufficiently composed in the evening to receive in struction. The breach of the by-law was admitted. The girl had gone to school until the birth of the infant mentioned. In his correspondence with the School Board, and in his statement to the board's officer, the defendant objected first of all to the action of the Board in requiring the attendance of his child at school on the grounds that it was an undue interference with his parental rights, and that there was some law pre-eminent to that of the law of the land which governed this case; and he refused to obey the law of the land because he said he was bound to obey the law of a higher nature. The magis. trates, however, had to administer the law as they found it. The plea that the child was receiving sufficient instruction should be well considered before the magistrates arrived at any conclusion, because it was a question which would affect the education of many children in the borough. After some conversation on the bench, the defendant proceeded to read a long defence. He stated that his defence was that he had a "reasonable excuse" for acting as he had done, and that excuse was expressly set forth for his justification and protection in the very by-law, No. 2, which he was accused of having broken. He was not indifferent to the education of his daughter. He continued: "On the contrary, for many years before this statute came into operation I had provided for the education of all my children. I acted in accordance with my right; and I take the same stand to-day, to claim the right to have and to hold my own little girl, to keep her on my own hearthstone, under my own roof, there to have her so brought up that, if she should in after life be sought by another, as her mother was sought by me, she might be to that husband what her mother has been to me, a loving, obedient, and happy Eng. lish workman's wife. There are several persons in waiting whose testimony will fully bear out every statement I have made, and convince your worships that I have efficiently done what every parent has a right to do, if he possesses the ability-namely, to educate his children himself, as the Word of God commands him to do, training them up in the nurture and admonition of the Lord.' I will not insult you gentlemen, by imploring you to refuse to give your sanction to the allegement that the statute before the court was designed to enable gentlemen to use their mansions as schoolhouses and prohibit labourers from teaching in their lowly cottages." Witnesses having spoken to the good education of the defendant, and deposed he was able to instruct and did instruct his children in the evening when he had left the mill, the little girl was examined by the Bench in reading, writing, and arithmetic. Her answers were considered satisfactory. The magis. trates retired, and after an absence of half an hour they returned, when the mayor said they were satisfied that the girl was under efficient instruction, and the case would consequently be dismissed. The decision was received with loud cheers and clapping of hands, and much excitement was manifested throughout the town generally.

PRISONS CONGRESS.-The Law Magazine, in reference to the proceedings of the recent International Prison Congress, held in the Middle Temple Hall, says: "The reports of the discussion which sppeared in the newspapers were extremely meagre, and gave, as a rule, the most generally interesting and, therefore, the most stupid part of what was said. The truth is that the subjects themselves were of so technical a character that they were not generally interesting, and when an American lady representing a prison committee talked philanthropy, every word was welcomed as a godsend by the reporters. We must, however, protest against the fashion which is growing up, and of which, in connection with

this congress, there have been several examples, of newspapers furnishing leaders by men who not only know nothing whatever of the subject, but who have not taken the slightest trouble to make themselves acquainted with the facts. The worst example that we have met with occurs in the Examiner, of July 13th, in an article headed The International Prison Congress.' Whereever a statement is made in this article it is as curiously opposed to the fact as it can possibly be. Everyone who was present at the Prison Congress knows that the following sentence is just simply the reverse of what took place: Thus we see, too, that while foreign members of a prison congress exert their efforts chiefly to ascertain what is the proper view to be taken upon what is called crime, English members can speak of nothing but the number of lashes to be administered to English criminals, the number of prisoners to be kept in an English gaol, and the number of inspectors to be appointed for the supervision of English prisons; as if the English parish, the English cat," and the two English inspectors supervising two hundred gaols were universal institutions without which no country or society could exist.' The truth is, that the distinguished and eminent persons,' at whom this writer sneers, each of whom is probably more distinguished and eminent for his knowledge on the subject than the unknown and undistinguished writer, were mostly hard-headed prison officials, men who have to deal with practical facts, and out of whom it was impossible to get anything like sentiment. This writer intimates that they ought to have discussed general principles.' If they had, he, and the school to which he is trying to belong, would have talked about platitudes,' solemn gossip ending nothing but talk,' and the like. Their object was to compare experience. A gathering of experts in all questions relating to the prevention and repression of crime, each member of which has probably thought out the general principles of prison treatment before the writer of the article in our contemporary was born, was likely to spend its time in the discussion of something in advance of the general-principle stage. Perhaps, however, the oddest part of the article in question is that in which this writer indicates his own general principles.' His first statement is as follows: The progress that physiology has made within the last fifty years has demonstrated that man is almost a mechanical production of surrounding circumstances.' Then he adds: 'People are beginning to understand that the criminal is not more guilty of his crime than the consumptive or the madman is guilty of consumption or madness. All three alike have been brought into the world with certain predispositions upon which surrounding circumstances have acted in a certain way and produced certain results. Therefore, all three must be dealt with in a similar manner.' This, then, in the opinion of the writer, is one of the questions which a congress of prison experts should have spent time in discussing. The writer may be right or wrong in his theory. A man may be a criminal, because nature has made him one. But the question which the Congress had to consider was, how can crime be prevented (an insoluble problem, if this writer's theory be correct); and how can the number of those who are already criminals be diminished? We claim to think that the discussion of such a question as that of the relative merits of the cellular, the Crofton, or the aggregate system of treatment-if the writer knows what these mean-was one which sensible men, and all but very young men who are learning to think by writing newspaper articles on any subject which may be allotted them, will regard as of infinitely more value than a discussion on the question; 'Is a man a mechanical product of surrounding circumstances?'"

COMPANY LAW.

CONTRIBUTORY

NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. COMPANY WINDING-UP PAST MEMBER-SETTLING LIST B-PRACTICE.All persons who have been members of a company within twelve months prior to the date of the winding-up are liable to be placed on the B list as soon as it is apparent that the contributories on the A list are exhausted: (Re Land Credit Com936. Rolls.) pany of Ireland, Humby's case, 26 L. T. Rep. N. S.

LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANIES.-An Act was passed in the last session to amend the Life Assurance Companies Acts of 1870 and 1871. The deposit by a company into the Court of Chancery upon the incorporation of the company is to be deemed to be part of the assets of the company. The Board of Trade may make rules with respect to the payment or repayment of the money. There is to be a separation of the life funds. The "next investigation" mentioned in the recited Acts is to be deemed the first investigation after the passing of the Act. The Board of Trade is to lay before Parliament the statements or abstracts of reports

made by life assurance companies, and the winding. up of the subsidiary company is to be ancillary to the winding-up of the principal company. "Where a life assurance company is being wound-up by the court, or subject to the supervision of the court, or voluntarily, the value of every life annuity and life policy requiring to be valued in such winding. up shall be estimated in manner provided by the first schedule to this Act; but this section shall not apply to any company the winding-up of which has commenced before the passing of this Act, unless the court, having cognisance of the winding-up, so order, which order that court is hereby empowered to make, if it think it expedient so to do, on the application of any person interested in the winding-up of such company." By another provision it is declared that where a company, either before or after the passing of this Act, has transferred its business to or has been amalga mated with another company, no policy-holder in the first-mentioned company who shall pay to the other company the premiums accruing due in respect of his policy shall by reason of any such payment made after the passing of this Act, or by reason of any act done after the passing of this Act, be deemed to have abandoned any claim which he would have had against the first-mentioned company on due payment of premiums to such company, or to have accepted in lieu thereof the liability of the other company, unless such abandonment and acceptance have been signified by some writing signed by him or his agent lawfully authorised. The Act is to be construed as one with the recited Life Assurance Companies Acts.

MERCANTILE LAW,

LIVERPOOL SUMMER ASSIZES. Friday, Aug. 23. (Before Mr. Justice BRETT and Special Juries.) CUNNINGHAM AND OTHERS 2. THE MERSEY

DOCKS AND HARBOUR BOARD.

THIS was an action brought for the recovery of damages in respect of sixty tons of guano, alleged

to have been stored in the defendants' warehouses at Birkenhead.

Benjamin, Q.C. and W. H. Butler were for the plaintiffs.

Butt, Q.C., Gully, and Walton Merewether were for the defendants.

The cargo, of which the sixty tons in question formed a part, consisted of 1819 tons 3 qr. 15lb. of Malden Island guano, consigned to the plaintiffs in the Sulina. With the exception of 187 tons which were discharged over the ship's side into lighters, and taken away by the purchasers, the whole of the cargo was stored in the defendants' warehouses. The deficiency of sixty tons upon delivery was not disputed, and the only question was as to the cause of that deficiency. The plain. tiffs alleged negligence on the part of the defendants, through which the sixty tons had been wrongly delivered.

It was contended for the defendants that the loss was owing to evaporation during the ware housing, in support and confutation of which theory a mass of scientific evidence was adduced on both sides. Evidence was also adduced by the defendants to prove that there had been consider. able waste from dust, owing to the unusual dry. ness of the cargo.

BRETT, J., in summing up, complimented the learned counsel on the able manner in which the case had been argued on both sides, and The jury found a verdict for the plaintiffs for £291 10s.

FISHER AND OTHERS 2. THE LIVERPOOL MARINE
INSURANCE COMPANY.
Benjamin, Q.C. and Macafee appeared for the
plaintiffs.

Aspinall, Q.C. and R. G. Williams for the de. fendants.

The plaintiffs, who are shippers at Barrow, being about to ship on board a vessel called the Lizzy a quantity of iron rails for New York, of the value of upwards of £6000, in November, 1870, instructed their brokers in London to effect an insurance for the voyage. The risk to the extent of £1000 was accepted by Messrs. Eames and Co., who were the London agents of the defendants, a Liverpool Marine Insurance Company, and Messrs. Eames and Co. initialed a slip for that amount, a copy of which was sent to the defendants. The defendants went into liquidation in December, 1871, and afterwards carried on business only for the purpose of winding-up pending transactions. No policy was issued by the defendants, nor was any asked for until the middle of March last, when the plaintiffs' brokers paid the premium to Messrs. Eames and Co., and asked to have the policy. At this time the Lizzy was overdue, and, in fact, has not been heard of since she sailed. The defendants refused to issue a policy because of the delay which had occurred, and this action was brought in consequence of their refusal.

It was contended on the part of the defendants that they were not liable, no stamped policy having been issued by them; but the learned judge left it to the jury to say whether the defendants had not by accepting the slip undertaken to issue a policy upon the plaintiffs paying a premium, and the jury so finding he directed a verdict for the plaintiffs for £1000, giving the defendants leave to move the court to enter the verdict for them. The learned judge said that the question raised-namely, whether a slip upon which the premium had been paid made a binding contract —was a very important one, and that he was glad it was now likely to be decided.

MARITIME LAW.

BILL OF

NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. DAMAGE TO CARGO-WAR-RISK OF CAPTURE REASONABLENESS OF DELAY-FOREIGN SHIP GOVERNING LAW-CHARTER-PARTYLADING EXCEPTED PERILS.-Where a contract of affreightment contains the exception "Queen's enemies," an apprehension of capture, founded upon circumstances calculated to affect the mind of a master of ordinary courage, judgment, and experience, will justify delay in port during the continuance of the risk; nor is such delay less justifiable in the case of a ship belonging to a belligerent nation, but carrying a neutral cargo. Where a charter-party contains the exceptions "Queen's enemies, restraints of princes," &c., and a stipulation that the master is to sign bills of lading in pursuance thereof "without prejudice to this charter-party," and the bills of lading are signed containing no exception but "dangers of the seas only excepted," the cargo being thereby consigned to consignees named therein, who had notice of the terms of the charter-party at the time it was entered into, the contract is contained in both instruments, and the stipulation in the bills of lading does not supersede the stipulations in the charter-party. By a charter-party in the English language, entered into between British merchants and North German shipowners, it was agreed that a North German ship should load a cargo at V. I., and carry the same to a British port for orders for any port in the United King: dom or on the Continent between Bordeaux and the Baltic (Queen's enemies, &c., excepted); the master to sign bills of lading "without prejudice to this charter-party." The master signed bills of lading referring to the charter-party, but containing only the exception "dangers of the seas only excepted." The ship sailed with her cargo, and was compelled to put into V. for repairs, and there the master learned that war existed between France and Germany, and there being great risk of capture by French cruisers outside the port, from 21st Sept. until 23rd Dec. 1870, he remained there during that period (three months), and the risk being then ended, sailed for the port of call and was ordered to a British port, where he discharged. The cargo was damaged by the delay. The consignees named in the bills of lading had negotiated the charter-party, and so had notice of his terms. In a suit by them for damage to cargo by unreasonable delay: Held, that as the place of performance of the contract was fixed in England, the English law governed the question of delay, and that the shipowners were entitled under the exception of Queen's enemies" in the charter-party to remain in port, although carrying a neutral cargo, so long as the actual risk of capture existed: (The San Roman, 26 L. T. Rep. N.S. 948. Adm.)

COUNTY COURTS. COLCHESTER COUNTY COURT. Friday, Aug. 23. (Before Dr. ABDY, Judge.) OLLARD v. LINES. Disputed ownership of goods—An interpleader case. MR. OLLARD conducted his own case. Jones appeared for Mr. Mead, who claimed the goods.

The facts of the case were these:-Mr. Mead's daughter had the misfortune to marry the defendant Lines, whose goods were, in January 1869, sold under powers of a bill of sale for £350 which he had executed some time previously to Mr. Mead and Mrs. Lines, of London. At the time of the sale Mrs. Lines was near her confinement, and it was alleged that at the sale certain goods, the ownership of which formed part of the consideration in this case, were bought in by a Mr. Sparrow, acting under the instructions of the late Mr. N. Cobb, the auctioneer, for Mrs. Mead the mother of Mrs. Lines, for the latter's benefit, independent of her husband, and that Mrs. Mead became and had ever since continued the owner of those goods. As to other of the goods that were in dispute, the case for Mr. Mead was that they had been purchased by Mrs. Mead, some at Mr. Bedwell's, and

others at Mr. Peachey's, furniture brokers, of Colchester, and by her directions sent by carrier as loans to her daughter at Thorpe. There the property remained undisturbed until a recent date, when Mr. Ollard, the plaintiff in this action, having previously, at the Harwich Court, obtained a judgment against Lines for the rent of a cottage and services rendered, proceeded to take the goods under a warrant of distress, and then Mr. Mead set forward his claim upon the goods, which formed the subject of the action. In support of the claimant's case the witnesses called wereMrs. Mead, who deposed to the purchase of several of the goods mentioned in and inventory produced, including six chairs at Mr. Bedwell's, and a sofa at Mr. Peachey's, and that by her directions the goods were sent by carrier to Thorpe, and that she had only lent them to Mrs. Lines; Mr. Bedwell deposed that when Mrs. Mead bought the chairs she said that they were for the special use of her daughter, Mrs. Lines, and that he sent them as directed. Mr. Sparrow deposed that he made out the inventory for the sale, which took place under the bill of sale at Lines's, and was paid by the late Mr. Cobb, the auctioneer, by whose directions he bought in, as he understood for Mrs. Mead, the other goods mentioned in the inventory. He had not been paid any commission upon purchasing those goods, nor had he received money for them either from Mrs. Mead or Mr. Cobb; but Wire was the auctioneer's appointed person to receive money for goods sold at that sale, and he could not say whether Wire had ever received payment for the goods. Mrs. Palmer gave evidence that she was put in charge of the goods purchased at the sale for Mrs. Mead, and she produced what purported to be a receipt for the goods which she said she received either on the day of the sale or a day or two before, but which from some cause unexplained on the side of the claimant, bore date in May 1869, whereas it was proved from the auctioneer's book that the sale took place as previously stated in Jan. 1869. Two documents were put in during the progress of the case, and were relied upon somewhat as proof of Mr. Mead's claim. One of them was from Mrs. Mead as follows: "By the wish of your father I write to say we wish you to keep the bed we gave you. He also wishes you to keep the blankets and sheets to keep yourself and the dear children warm. to other things no doubt he will find among his numerous friends some who will buy them in for him." The other document was a letter from Mrs. Lines in which she stated that the things were her mother's, and to be charged to her

mother's account.

As

It was argued by Jones that never was there a more bonû jide case brought into a court of justice than this, and that a more straightforward and honest transaction could not be. He spoke in strong terms of the bad character of Lines, and his conduct to his wife, and asked whether, under the circumstances, Mrs Mead was not perfectly justified in buying in and otherwise purchasing goods and lending them to her daughter for her use and the exclusive benefit of herself and her six little children. If friends and relatives were not to assist in a case of such extreme misfortune he knew not who would; enemies would not, and only those who were closely connected with the person in misfortune could be hoped to do so. He contended that upon the evidence it was clear that all the goods were bought openly, and that Mr. Mead's claim to them was made out.

During the hearing of the case a somewhat unpleasant and personal altercation occurred between Mr. Ollard and Mr. Jones, arising out of the latter's remarking that Mr. Ollard was described in the summons as a solicitor, and that £2 28. of his account upon which he had obtained judgment at Harwich County Court was for "professional services." In reply Mr. Ollard said he described himself as a gentleman. He admitted that he was not a qualified solicitor, and only a managing clerk to a London firm of solicitors, neither had he claimed for services as solicitor, but he had saved defendant in 1869 from the consequences of a warrant of ejectment from a house he was then occupying, for which service, and expenses necessarily incidental upon several journeys from London about the business, he had charged the £2 2s., and the remainder of his claim was for rent.

His HONOUR also fully vindicated the character of Mr. Ollard from any wrongful suspicion connected with the proceedings in the Harwich County Court. As to the too general practice of many parties in other cases than this of employing others than solicitors, because they hoped to get the services of such persons cheaper, his Honour expressed a strong opinion deprecatory of that practice. The proper person to be employed was one who understood law and who was acting under the authority of a society who could punish him for misconduct. Employing other persons to transact legal business never did save money, and parties who employed them must blame themselves if their business went wrong, whereas, if a solicitor was employed and anything

went wrong parties had their remedy. They might lay their case before him, and he would bring it before the proper court. Jones thanked his Honour for his observations, which he hoped would have a good effect.

As accounting for Mr. Ollard's description in the summons being that of "solicitor," it was explained that it arose from an inadvertence on the part of one of the under officers of the court.

His HONOUR, having attentively listened to the case throughout, adjourned his decision until the end of the sitting, when, after consultation with the registrar, he stated that in his opinion there was nothing to show that Mrs. Mead intended to make a loan of the things to her daughter for her daughter's and her children's sole use, and as they were under the ordinary supervision and direction of the husband, he and his wife being together, and no effort having been made, until a very recent time, to indicate that the intention of the mother-in-law was to take them away from the husband, the plaintiff was in law entitled to regard them as the defendant's goods. The two letters failed to show that the intention of Mrs. Mead was to lend the goods to her daughter for her sole and exclusive use apart from her husband, and as to the alleged authority produced by Mrs. Palmer he considered it clear that that document was made months after the sale and for the purpose of helping the husband and wife to keep the goods. Had it been made at the time of the sale it would have been important, but having been drawn up months afterwards it was an after thought and did not support the bona fides of the case set up for the claimant. Under all circumstances his Honour therefore decided for the plaintiff, allowing costs of himself (Mr. Ollard) as execution creditor and two witnesses, as well as the officers of the court's fees.

BANKRUPTCY LAW.

NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS.

ACT OF BANKRUPTCY-ASSIGNMENT OF WHOLE OF DEBTOR'S PROPERTY TO SECURE PAST DEBT AND SMALL PRESENT ADVANCE-PRIOR AGREEMENT TO GIVE SECURITY FOR ADVANCES CONSTITUTING PAST DEBT-RELATIVE AMOUNT OF PAST DEBT AND PRESENT ADVANCE.-Where a trader assigns all his property to a creditor as security for a past debt and a present advance, the smallness of the fresh advance does not necessarily invalidate the bill of sale, but it creates a strong presumption that the object of the parties was to secure the repayment of his past advances to the creditor making the fresh advance. The rule that where a sum of money is advanced on the faith of a promise that a bill of sale shall be given, such sum is to be treated as a present advance on the security of a bill of sale, will not protect transactions where the giving of the bill of sale is purposely postponed until the trader is in a state of insolvency, in order to prevent the destruction of his credit, which would result from registration of the bill of sale, such postponement being regarded as evidence of an intention to commit an actual fraud against the general creditors. At various times in the first half of the year a friend advanced to a trader sums of money, amounting in the whole to £600, on condition that if he required it at any time, the trader would assign to him his business premises and effects as security for the advances. In October of the same year the trader pressed his friend for a further loan, and the latter agreed to advance a further £100 on the trader promising that if the £100 was not repaid in ten days he would execute an assignment to the lender of his business premises and effects (being the whole of his property, and being of the value of £718) to secure both the past advances and the £100. The £100 not being repaid, the trader executed the assignment early in November of the same year, and was adjudicated bankrupt in the following December. Held (reversing the decision of the Chief Judge in Bankruptcy), that the assignment was an act of bankruptcy, and void as against the trustee under the bankruptcy: (Ex parte Fisher; Re Ash 26 L. T. Rep. N. S. 931. Ch.)

LIVERPOOL COUNTY COURT.
Tuesday, Aug. 13.
(Before Mr. Serjt. WHEELER, Judge.)
Re SLEE.

Bankruptcy-Reputed ownership-Factor. THIS was a motion heard on behalf of Messrs. Clay, of Dewsbury, for an order upon the trustee to deliver up fifty-seven bales of wool, their property, lying in the bankrupt's name, forty bales in Wapping Deck, and seventeen bales in a warehouse in Ducksfoot-lane, London.

Mybergh was counsel in support of the motion; Gully against it.

HIS HONOUR, in giving his decision, said: As respects the forty bales in the Wapping Dock,

NOTES AND QUERIES ON

POINTS OF PRACTICE.

NOTICE.-We must remind our correspondents that this column is not open to questions involving points of law such as a solicitor should be consulted upon. Queries will be excluded which go beyond our limits. N.B.-None are inserted unless the name and address of the writers are sent, not necessarily for publication, but as a guarantee for bona fides.

Queries.

77. SPECIAL JURORS-Can any of your readers oblige by informing me what is the qualification for a special juror in London, and what course a duly qualified person should take to ensure the insertion of his name in the list of persons from whom special juries are selected ? A. W. DEACON.

78. THE BASTARDY LAWS AMENDMENT ACT 1872.-Is there not some doubt as to the remedy a mother of a bastard child now has against the putative father towards the maintenance of a child born before the 10th Aug., in a case where she has not taken any proceedings (sect. 3.); and is there still the same power to issue warrant for arrears under an order under 7 & 8 Vict. c. 101, s. 2? S. L.

79. INHERITANCE.-A. bequeathed to her brother by will all her hereditaments and premises to be by him and his children, share and share alike, freely possessed and enjoyed. What estate would the brother have after testatrix's death? and after her death he wanted to mortgage the property for a period of 500 years, and the children joined. Why should they do 80 ?

82. BANKRUPTCY.-C. a bankrupt obtained his order of discharge many years ago. C. had previously to his bankruptcy mortgaged certain property. The mortgagees have lately realised their security and a vesting order was deemed necessary by the purchaser, and was obtained from the judge of the County Court. The registrar now claims to file the original vesting order and to give me an office copy. I say that the vesting order is my muniment of title, that it operates as a conveyance to my client and as such will have to bear an ad valorem stamp, and on its production my client can claim to be admitted tenant (the property is copy hold). Is the registrar right, and, if so, must I impress the office copy with an ad valorem stamp ? B. B. B.

83. WILL.-A., by his will, made in 1860, gave the whole of his property to B., his wife, for life, and after B.'s decease equally between C., D., and E. (three of their sons), as tenants in common. C. died before A. intestate and unmarried. A. died, leaving another son (F.), besides D. and E. B., the tenant for life, is still living. Was there an intestacy as regards the onethird to which C. would have become entitled in remainder? If so, how does this one-third now devolve, subject to B.'s life estate-first, as to real estate; secondly, as to personal estate?

DUBIUS.

84. COVENANT.—A in 1845 covenanted to surrender copyhold lands to B to secure £200 and interest. The

deed contained the usual mortgage covenants and powers, but no surrender was ever made to B. Soon after executing the deed A became bankrupt and absconded, and it is not known where he is. B took possession of the property, and has received the rents for upwards of twenty years without interruption and without accounting to anybody: (Vide 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, s. 29.) First, can B now be considered as having a safe title as de facto owner in fee? secondly, have the customary heirs of A any chance of recovering the property after A's death? thirdly, how could B. obtain admission upon the court rolls so as to perfect his legal title? DUBIUS.

Answers.

(Q. 69.) COMMON-PLACE BOOKS.-In answer to the query inserted by "J. A. T." in the LAW TIMES of August 17, I would inform him that after studying for several examinations, I have come to the conclusion that a prudent use of common-place books will produce satisfactory results. A mere analysis of a work which is the subject of study will often prove of more harm than good-preventing reference to the original, but yet not giving full information. In the case of divisions book particularly useful; a tabulated form generally leaving a more distinct impression on the mind. The notes should be as condensed as possible; the great advantage here being that the reader, in order to reduce what he has studied to notes, must have come to some determinate conclusion about the meaning of a passage. To one inclined to superficial or slovenly reading I should especially recommend the use of a common-place book. ST. MAUR. N.B.-The danger is that the student may rely too much on the fact that the information is in the common-place book, and may consequently neglect to store it in his memory.

and sub-divisions of a subject, I have found a note

(Q.75.) AGREEMENT.-Before a satisfactory answer can be given to the question proposed by "E. H. P."

several additional particulars are required. "E. H. P." will find all the information he requires in Shackleton v. Smith, LAW TIMES, vol. lii., p. 466. C. L. C.

Replications.

(Q. 62.) PROOF IN BANKRUPTCY.-In the answer last week read, in line 11, "If B.'s claim is not a debt provable," &c. C. L. C.

(Q. 63.) DESCENT.-The answer of "K. T. A. " to this query is quite erroneous. John (not Paul) was the purchaser of, and therefore the root of title to, the first; and Paul was the purchaser of, and therefore the root of title to, the second. John's estate descended to Paul, who died intestate and without issue; therefore all John's daughters by his two wives succeed as coparceners, and their issue take their mothers' share by right of representation. Paul's estate, on the contrary, after his decease as aforesaid, descends to his sisters, viz., the daughters of John by his second wife, as coparceners-postponing the half blood, viz., the daughters of John by his first wife. According to "K. T. A.," Paul's sisters and half sisters would all succeed equally to the estate of which he was the purchaser, contrary to Rule 7 in the chapter on "Descent in Williams's Real Property, an attentive perusal of hazy ideas on the subject. which chapter might assist " K. T. A." in his somewhat

LEGAL EXTRACTS.

G.

LEGAL EPIDEMICS. (From the Saturday Review.) READERS of the newspapers must often have been struck by the way in which particular forms of crime or eccentricity seem suddenly to become prevalent. Now there is a series of peculiarly brutal murders; then all sorts of imbecile and incapable people go out in boats in squally weather, and get drowned; for the next few weeks drunken husbands take to setting nagging wives on the fire to cool their tempers; and after that, by way of a change, we are horrified by the news that our neighbours on all sides have acquired an uncomfortable habit of filling their houses with large pythons, boa-constrictors, apes, baboons, ourang-outangs, and other ugly or malicious seclusion, and wander out into the streets. During monsters, who occasionally get tired of domestic the next few weeks we shall, no doubt, have the usual dose of accidental shootings. A fool sees a gun in a corner, assumes that it cannot possibly be loaded, points it in fun, and kills somebody, his mother or sweetheart perhaps. This is an everyday story of the autumn months. If the tender-hearted persons who are so troubled about dickybirds and acrobats would take up this much more serious question, they might possibly do some good. A sound flogging would be a mild penalty for the abominable folly of pointing a gun at any one "in fun." Disease has its fashions like bonnets and crinoline, and it would appear that the humours of the mind have a similar tendency to become epidemic. It cannot have escaped observation that for some time past the papers have been full of trials for libel and breach of promise of marriage. It might almost be supposed from the reports of the law courts that everybody had been seized with an uncontrollable passion for libelling everybody else, and that all the unmarried male adults in the country had given themselves up madly to flirting and jilting. We have not the slightest intention of discussing any of these cases, or of questioning the justice of the verdict in any particular instance. We refer to them merely as evidence of the curious tendency of such things to come in a rush. It is difficult to say whether it is only an epidemic of violent litigiousness, or whether libelling and jilting have really become more prevalent in English society; but, on the whole, we cannot help thinking that the former surmise is the correct one. It is difficult in reading the cases which are reported day after day to resist an impression that the strain which is now being put on the law of libel and slander, and also on that of breach of promise, is rather more than they can be expected to bear. We have certainly no sympathy with backbiters and slanderers, or with faithless swains. It is quite right that people should be taught to keep a watch upon their tongues, to eschew idle gossip, and to be very careful how they speak ill of their neighbours, and also that promises of marriage should not be allowed to be lightly broken. But it may be doubted whether it is desirable that a civil action should be twisted from its natural and legitimate purpose, and be made the means of inflicting punishment for small and not very easily defined offences. There is also an obvious danger in encouraging a spirit of excessive litigiousness, and in leading people to imagine that they are either bound or entitled to seek legal redress for everything that can be construed into an injury to their feelings. What is vulgarly called "taking the law" of a man may be a pleasant revenge for those who can afford it, and who, even if they fail to get a verdict, may have the satisfaction of knowing that their adversary had been subjected to much anxiety and expense; but it can hardly

be supposed that reckless litigation is calculated to promote social harmony and good feeling.

The

It was predicted, when plaintiffs in breach of promise cases were allowed to appear in the witness-box, that defendants would certainly have a bad time of it; and the results of trials would seem to show that there were good grounds for this belief. It will be remembered that in the memorable case of Bardell v. Pickwick Mrs. Bardell was borne fainting into the court, with her darling boy kicking and howling in sympathy behind her; and if she had been permitted to go into the box, her counsel's famous speech would probably have been superfluous. It is difficult to imagine the defendant in an action of this kind, who, on the most favourable construction of his conduct, has made a fool of himself and fallen a victim to the designs of an artful woman, presenting an interesting and preposessing appearance before a jury. If he looks soft and ashamed of himself, the jurymen feel that he is letting down their sex before the world; if he is bold and defiant, it is accounted heartlessness, and is pretty certain to be punished by heavy damages. Everything is against him. There may be good reasons why he is justified in endeavouring to escape from a marriage with a woman who has perhaps in many ways imposed on him; of whose want of delicacy, sensibility, refinement, or honesty, he has become painfully aware; whose parrot talk, sham graces, and false hair he has seen through as soon as the first glamour passed off; but then it is difficult to bring these things seriously and impressively before a jury. They are things hard to prove from the witness-box, although they are probably things which an impartial person of the least discernment could not be five minutes in the plaintiff's company without discovering. smart flashy woman, who can droop her eyes and make good play with her handkerchief, and who is just the sort of person to lay a clever trap for a simple fellow, is also admirably adapted to produce an effect when giving her evidence in court. Speculative attorneys, with an eye to a profitable case, may be trusted to take care that their client has sufficient schooling beforesenational passages which hand in the niceties of her part, and in those are supposed to be most telling with juries, and to be not altogether thrown away upon judges. It appears that a dead set has lately been made on the farmers. In nine out of ten recent breach of promise cases the defendants belonged to this amiable class, and perhaps it is not less significant that the plaintiff's have usually been barmaids or young persons in a light fancy business. From of old the bucolic heart has been proverbially soft and tender, and the farmers of to-day are no doubt as susceptible as the shepherds of early times. After a brisk forenoon at market, and a comfortable dinner at the "ordinary," Strephon is just in the mood for a chat with Chloe in the bar, or a little philandering with Daphne at her counter, and is probably not too guarded in his simple prattle. The result is that he finds himself one day depicted in thrilling language as a gay and ruthless deceiver, and has to pay over a snug little fortune to the shrinking dove with whose gentle heart he has so cruelly trifled. There are, no doubt, cases in which it is possible to form a reasonable estimate of damages for breach of promise, as, for instance, where the plaintiff has given up a situation, or spent money in preparations for the wedding, or where her counsel take their ground solely on the material advantages she would have enjoyed if the defendant had married her, and ask compensation for so many gowns and dinners of which she had been defrauded. But if lacerated feelings are to be paid for, it would be interesting to see the account mado out in detail. It is tolerably obvious that the sort of women who do not shrink from the exposure of their love affairs in a public court, and the publication of the more ridiculous passages of their correspondence in every newspaper in the country, are not, as a rule, the most sensitive of their sex.

It is usual for judges in cases of this kind to warn the jury against giving what are called vindictive damages; but it would seem that they are not always indisposed to connive at verdicts which are intended to punish the defendant, although at the same time it is admitted that the plaintiff is not entitled to compensation. In a recent breach of promise at Chester, the jury said they desired to give just enough damages to carry costs. The only meaning which can be attached to a verdict of this kind is, of course, that the jury do not see that the plaintiff has suffered any real injury, but they think the defendant acted imprudently, and should be made to smart for it a little. The same fundamental misconception of the meaning of a civil suit underlies most of the verdicts which are delivered in actions for libel. The person libelled rarely obtains more than a few shillings or a few pounds, which is as much as to say that he is none the worse for the hard things which have been said of him; but still, as a matter of social

discipline, the defendant must pay a fine. The practice of allowing costs to suitors who have practically failed to make out their case is a dangerous encouragement to speculative actions. It may sometimes be necessary for a man to vindicate his character by an action for libel; but, as a rule, suits of this class only give a wide currency to observations which would otherwise have been quickly forgotten, and which in all probability never did the person to whom they were applied any substantial injury. It is seldom that anyone resorts to this kind of protection who does not feel that his character is already in a questionable condition. It would appear that in the case of libels a reaction has set in against the over-straining of the law to which some of the judges have been in the habit of lending themselves, and it is not improbable that something of the same kind may happen before long in regard to actions for breach of promise. The only legitimate ground for a civil action is that an injury has been done for which compensation can be assessed in money, and if it cannot be fairly assessed in this way, the jury have no right to look beyond the claims of the plaintiff, and to consider whether the general interests of society require that the defendant should be punished. It is not desirable that the law should be administered in such a manner as to encourage frivolous or speculative suits. Some of the judges require to be reminded, as Dr. Carpenter reminded the philosophers at Brighton, that common sense is, after all, the basis of their science. They are too apt to forget that the object of the law is rather to make peace than to foster litigation and provide incomes for sharp attorneys. A strong judge who had the courage to take in hand tricky or trivial cases, and to laugh them out of court, as the late Mr. Justice Maule used to do, would render eminent service at the present time.

LAW REFORM.

The following letter was addressed to the Times a few days back:

"Sir, Notwithstanding the disheartening speech of the Solicitor-General in the recent debate, the article in the Times of to-day and a few days back on the subject of law reform are well calculated to give some hope to those who take an interest in it, and, what is more important, to those who are suffering from the present system. Sir, notwithstanding the remarks of the Solicitor-General, I venture to assert that great numbers are suffering very severely, and that it is only because they are not men who indulge in agitation that they do not make their wrongs heard, and prove to the Solicitor-General the need of considerable changes, and that even the practice of the Court of Chancery is not so perfect as he seems to consider it.

"The Solicitor-General emphatically denies that the present system is either dilatory or inefficient, and he adds, Alter the judicature as you may, there will never be any substantial difference as regards expense.' The high position in which the eminent abilities of the Solicitor-General have placed him may well make him satisfied, but I venture to suggest that some consideration is due to the suitors as well as to the distinguished advocates, and I think that the Solicitor-General must have spoken without due consideration.

"I will not enter into details, but actual facts are of more value than abstract opinions. I can refer the Solicitor-General to a suit instituted inthe Court of Chancery about five years ago, not involving any conflict of evidence, and in which, when about to be heard after four years of preparation, it was found that the costs already incurred amounted, upon a moderate estimate, to at least £15,000. No one will be surprised to hear that the parties were at length frightened and were driven to a compromise, and the case was thus disposed of without any hearing or discussion in court. Does the Solicitor-General think this satisfactory or necessary? If no alteration can lessen such an expense as this, those who take an interest in law reform may indeed despair. But I venture to assert that under the system recommended in the first report of the Judicature Commission, the costs of deciding the question to which I have referred would not upon the most liberal estimate have amounted to £500.

"I could give other instances also, within my own personal experience, in which the litigants have been put to enormous costs with no result, and in which they have been driven to compromises rather than submit to endless delay and ruinous expense. But, without going into details, I would venture to ask if the Solicitor-General really believes that it is necessary or expedient to have those printed bills and answers, with which he is so familiar, frequently extending to hundreds of folios in length, and sometimes to thousands of folios, for the purpose of stating in a preliminary and technical manner the nature of the contention of the respective parties, and then to be followed by voluminous affidavits, not worded in the language of the witnesses, but drawn up at vast

expense by counsel or solicitors in terms which the witnesses are induced to adopt, but which they are frequently compelled, on cross-examination, to admit are not accurate. Does the Solicitor-General think it conducive to the discovery of the truth that this cross-examination should generally be conducted in a private room, and that the supposed effect of the answers given by the witnesses should alone be taken down and brought before the judge, whose province it is to decide to whom to give credence, and who has no means of knowing the hesitation and prevarication shown by the witness when pressed by the cross-examining counsel?

"Again, does the Solicitor-General think it right that when a suit comes before the judge for hearing it should, as to many important questions, be referred to chambers, and should there be dealt with in driblets at long intervals by a chief clerk, then from time to time referred to the judge in chambers, by him adjourned to be argued in court because he only sits in chambers for a short time at the end of the day twice a week, and consequently has not time to hear the matter argued; that such cases, when thus adjourned, should then, in the name of 'adjourned summonses,' be in the paper for hearing at intervals of a week for several months, and then argued by an array of counsel, and of course at vast expense, and perhaps ultimately sent back to be decided in chambeis as not being adapted for discussion in court?

"I by no means suggest that the common law system is perfect, but as respects the matters to which I have referred, I beg to remind the Solicitor-General that analogous matters in the common law courts do not ordinarily cost as many shilling as they do pounds, and do not occupy as many hours as they do days, in the Court of Chancery.

"It is clear from the speech of the SolicitorGeneral that he has never read, or if he has read he has forgotten, the report of the Judicature Commission to which he referred, and which he altogether misquoted. I venture to say that until he made his recent speech no one had suggested that the changes proposed were not substantial. The objections had been that they were too great and sweeping.

"It is really extraordinary that the suitors, and especially the mercantile community, submit as quietly as they do to the present state of things. It is true that complaints are heard from Liverpool; but allow me shortly to call attention to the state of things in London.

There are in each year but three sittings of the courts in the city of London for the trial of the important mercantile causes to be tried there, and these sittings are limited by Act of Parliament, so that practically each of the three courts of Common Law sits in the city only for about twelve days after each term-not including Easter Term. This period affords time for the trial of but a small percentage of the causes entered, and the rest are made 'remanets,' or the parties are compelled to compromise, or to leave the matter to be decided at vast expense by a briefless barrister, or they are driven to that still more costly and dilatory creation of modern times known as a special case.'

"If the Solicitor-General will refer to the cause lists at the last Guildhall sittings, he will find that in the Courts of Queen's Bench and Common Pleas there were together about 200 special jury causes entered for trial, and of these I believe that only about one-tenth were tried. The rest are put off until December, when in all probability some only will be tried, and the others will be postponed until February, and perhaps July, and of course there will be no probability of any actions arising in the meantime being tried. Let it be borne in mind that many of these cases involve large pecuniary sums and others questions of character and general importance.

"The impossibility of getting cases promptly tried in London leads to another extraordinary result. The parties are driven to take London causes to the assizes at great inconvenience and much additional expense. At Croydon, Guildford, and Kingston from 100 to 200 London causes are frequently entered for trial to the great inconveniences of everybody concerned.

"Does the Solicitor-General really think that these things do not require change? If he does, he differs from the present Lord Chancellor, from the present Attorney-General, and from many other eminent men who signed the report of the Judicature Commission.

"But the Solicitor-General says that the Government brought in two Bills to carry out the report of the commission and failed to pass them, and he adds that when the recommendations of the commission were submitted to the judges of the Superior Courts they met with universal disapprobation.

"Here again the memory of the SolicitorGeneral must have failed him. He must have forgotten that those recommendations were signed by the Lord Chancellor, by Lord Cairns, by Lord

Penzance, by Lord Justice James, by Sir William Erle. by Baron Bramwell, Mr. Justice Blackburn, Sir Montagu Smith, Sir Robert Collier, Mr. Justice Quain, and by Sir Robert Phillimore. To these judicial names may be added those of Sir Roundell Palmer, Sir John Karslake, Mr. Ward Hunt, Mr. Ayrton, Mr. Childers, and others of great practi cal experience.

"Where is the evidence of universal disapproba. tion? I believe that the Times and every profes sional periodical approved the suggestions. It is true that the Bills brought into the House of Lords by the Lord Chancellor were not approved, but the objection raised was that they were mere skeleton Bills, and did not define the changes proposed, but left everything to be settled by future rules, and on this ground-and this ground only-were the objections publicly made based.

Shortly after the commencement of the late session, the Lord Chancellor stated in the House of Lords that he had, with the assistance of certain members of the Judicature Commission, prepared a Bill, supplying the omissions of which complaint had been made; but for some cause not explained, the Bill was not brought into Parlia ment, and the Bill with respect to the appellate iurisdiction of the House of Lords was substi tuted.

"That Bill was not founded upon the report of the Judicature Commission, and the opposition it met with seems to afford no justification for the argument of the Solicitor-General, and does not support the statement that the Government have unsuccessfully endeavoured to carry out the report of the commission.

"I venture to assert that no serious attempt has been made to do so, and I think that the eminent men whom I have named, and many of whom have devoted an amount of time which few would credit to the subject, have some ground of complaint that their disinterested exertions have thus been disregarded by the Government, and are wholly ignored by the Solicitor-General.

"The recent debate, and the articles in the Times, however, give some hope that something may yet be done to relieve the unfortunate saitors. It is well known that the Lord Chancellor is sincerely desirous of seeing the proposed changes carried out, and when we find that he and Lord Cairns, and so many eminent public men of different political opinions, are agreed, it is incomprehensible why nothing is done.

"It is easy to start objections, and to say, as some do, begin with the Court of Ultimate Appeal, or, as others do, begin with the County Courts or the Courts of First Instance. If we are to wait until everyone is agreed upon all changes, and upon a perfectly complete judicial system, we may, I fear, wait long enough; but no one who will give any serious and candid attention to the subject can doubt that a great boon would be con ferred upon the suitors if the changes which have been agreed upon by so many leading and influen tial men were carefully considered and energeti cally carried out, and in the hope, that through the Times, public attention may be directed to this important subject, I venture to trouble you with this, I fear, unreasonably long, but necessarily incomplete, letter. A LAW REFORMER."

MARRIAGE LAW IN CALIFORNIA. THE Supreme Court of Maryland decided not long since that no marriage is valid in that State without some kind of a religious ceremony, and a communication published in the Alta a week a two ago, commenting on this decision, suggested a doubt in regard to the validity of marriage ceremonies performed without ecclesiastical help in "other States," with no exception of California. A correspondent inquires of us whether there is any reason to doubt the law of this State on that point. In most of the States marriage is a civil contract, and Maryland is, we believe, the only exception; and even there the Orphans' Court decided that it was in that State also, but this decision was reversed on appeal. In Californis our statutes leave no room for doubt. The first Legislature passed an Act providing that "marriage is considered in law a civil contract, to which the consent of the parties is essential," and authorising every judge and justice of the peace, clergymen of any denomination, or licensed preacher of the Gospel," to perform the ceremony. The civil officers are named here before the clergymen. It has repeatedly been decided in our courts that marriage might be presumed in certain cases-as, for instance, in case a woman claims to be the widow of a man with whom she has cohabited-without any documentary or official proof that the ceremony of mar riage had ever been performed. The facts that the parties lived together, and recognised each other as husband and wife, and were so re cognised by their neighbours, were sufficient. But this kind of evidence would prove marriage only in a certain class of cases, not in all. The actual marriage ceremony, for instance, must be proved on two occasions to sustain an indictment for