in

with more work than it can dispose of with ordinary dispatch must be rejected. In the next place, appeals from interlocutory orders ought not to be done away with. The Court for the Consideration of Crown Cases Reserved, or some similar tribunal having jurisdiction over questions of fact as well as law, must be retained as part of our judicial system. Or if all intermediate courts of appeal are to be abolished we must have a supreme court capable of representing the courts which we sweep away. Lord WESTBURY put the necessities of the case shortly and forcibly. "If there is one thing that is required to establish the House of Lords in the respect and full esteem of the country, it is that the House of Lords as a Supreme Court of Appeal should adequately supply the wants of our vast empire. It is necessary for that purpose that that court should sit more frequently the year, and should be capable of dividing itself into two or more chambers to meet the exigencies of the case. It is necessary that you should have a body of judges accustomed to consider every part of the law which prevails throughout your vast empire, and capable therefore of constituting a court in such a manner as shall answer any emergency that may arise." With such a judicial force as this, it would matter little whether it were connected with the House of Lords or not; and if there is any force in the arguments in favour of retaining the judicial functions of the House of Lords, might not life peerages be conferred on eminent lawyers not members of the House, SO as to create a court without destroying a jurisdiction? Lord WESTBURY doubts whether any satisfactory reform of the appellate courts can be effected until it has been determined whether there shall be any alteration in the jurisdiction and condition of the inferior courts. We do not share this doubt, because whatever our courts of first instance may be, appeals must lie to the Superior Courts in banco, from which appeals would be carried to the Supreme Court. The very doubts which exist, prove, however, the wisdom of the course which has been adopted, notwithstanding the delay which must necessarily ensue.

OUR law of evidence is universally admitted to be by no means perfect. It comprises various provisions which, even if they do not often exclude, are far from securing the ascertainment of the truth. The rules of evidence in civil and criminal cases differ, and on the whole, the law is in a most unsatisfactory state. Changes have been introduced gradually. The system has been pruned and, trimmed from time to time. Almost every session of Parliament for the last twenty or thirty years has witnessed the introduction of a Bill "to amend" the law of evidence. No sooner is an error or omission, or what is deemed to be such, in the law of evidence brought to light, or some hardship is believed to have been experienced in any trial that attracts the public attention, than someone or other instantly proposes the introduction of a Bill to amend the law on the particular point, and a Bill is accordingly introduced. Some of these have become law, and are to be found in our statute books, while others have fallen through. Doubtless the changes thus introduced were urgently needed, and have done much good. All these attempts to reform the law are made by persons who are prompted by the best motives. But is this constant patching and repairing of flaws desirable? Is it worthy of us as a nation? Would it not be far better that the work of revision should be entrusted to able and competent hands, who would be able to submit such a measure to the Legislature as would place the law of evidence, so far as circumstances would permit, beyond impeachment ? A Bill has been introduced into the present session of Parliament to amend the law of evidence. In its scope it is wider than any Bill on the same subject_we remember, and it aspires to the position of a "code." The second reading of this Bill has, however, been deferred to such distant day as will render it morally impossible for it to become law this year. Nor is this to be regretted. Much as we wish for a thorough reformation of the law of evidence, and much as we disagree and disapprove of many of the existing rules of evidence, we are not anxious that this Bill in its present state should receive the sanction of the Legislature, for it would retard that thorough inquiry into the law which is so desirable, and which it is to be hoped will not be postponed much longer. It is not our intention to criticise this Bill now. With many of its provisions we entirely concur, and others of them could be easily altered so as to meet the requirements of judicial procedure. But it is far too crude, and has not been sufficiently matured. Parliament should first of all be thoroughly instructed in the matter before it proceeds to legislate. Our law of evidence consists, says Mr. PITT TAYLOR, of over 2000 decisions or dicta. This mass should be thoroughly sifted. And this can only be done by an inquiry before a commission appointed by Parliament. The commission having ascertained all that can be ascertained on the subject, the matter of codification could then be entrusted to competent persons; and when their task would be completed, Parliament could give its sanction and authority to a code which would do us credit. The system of patching can only retard this most desirable law reform, and hence it is we are of opinion on the whole that the Bill now before the House of Commons should not become law.

THE ISSUES FOR THE GENEVA ARBITRATORS. We have now before us the American Counter Case which supplies any defect as to the issues which might have existed before; but it advances the legal questions very little, adding, however, some explanations on disputed matters of fact.

In the previous article we discussed the position taken up by the United States respecting the duties of Great Britain as defined by its municipal laws, and the expressed opinions of judges and jurists authorised to consider the subject of international law. The next important point has reference to the question of what is due diligence. The propositions put forward by the United States on this head are these:

1. That a neutral is bound to use due diligence to prevent the fitting out, arming, or equipping, within its jurisdiction, of any vessel which it has reasonable ground to believe, is intended to cruize or to carry on war against a power with which it is at peace.

2. That a neutral is bound to use due diligence to prevent the construction of such a vessel.

3. That a neutral is bound to use like diligence to prevent the departure from its jurisdiction of any vessel intended to cruize or carry on war against any power with which it is at peace; such vessel having been specially adapted, in whole or in part, within its jurisdiction, to warlike use.

4. That a neutral may not permit or suffer either belligerent to make use of its ports or waters as the base of naval operations against the other.

5. That a neutral is bound to use due diligence in its ports or waters to prevent either belligerent from obtaining there a renewal or augmentation of military supplies or arms for belligerent vessels, or the recruitment of men.

The British case first goes into the question what acts a neutral power is bound to use diligence to prevent, and afterwards proceeds to discuss what is due diligence. The United States enter into a most elaborate disquisition on the meaning of culpa-culpa lata and culpa levis, which is tolerably well understood by all lawyers Of course, the point is, can a neutral be held liable where the evidencee fails to show affirmatively that there has been insufficient care and diligence? The British case avoids the strict legal discussion, observing, "HER MAJESTY'S Government will not follow the Government of the United States through the observations which it has presented to the arbitrators on the nature and degrees of negligence, but will notice only the definition which, at the close of those observations, it has attempted to supply." This definition runs thus: "The United States understand that the diligence which is called for by the rules of the treaty of Washington is a due diligence; that is, a diligence preportioned to the magnitude of the subject, and to the dignity and strength of the power which is to exercise it a diligence which shall, by the use of active vigilance, and of all other means in the power of the neutral, through all stages of the transaction, prevent its soil from being violated; a diligence that shall in like manner deter designing men from committing acts of war upon the soil of the neutral against its will, and thus possibly dragging it into a war which it would avoid; a diligence which prompts the neutral to the most energetic measures to discover any purpose of doing the acts forbidden by its good faith as a neutral, and imposes upon it the obligation, when it receives the knowledge of an intention to prevent it."

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The British case, it will be observed, characterises this as an attempted" definition; and having cited the definition, it somewhat severely observes, "HER MAJESTY'S Government has been unable to collect from this definition the information which it is doubtless intended to convey." And the sarcasm runs on thus: It may readily be conceded that the care exerted by a Government to prevent violations of its neutrality should bear some proportion to the probable consequences of such offences. It may be conceded also that the responsibility incurred by failing to prevent an offence must naturally depend on the power which the Government possessed of preventing it. So far as this the British Government concurs with the Government of the United States. But HER MAJESTY'S Government cannot admit that the measure of diligence due from neutral powers ought to be proportioned in any way to their relative degrees of dignity: it knows of no distinction between more dignified and less dignified powers! An argument is rather raised in favour of Great Britain, on the ground that the vast extent of her mercantile marine presents a greater difficulty to the perfect fulfilment of the obligations of a neutral than would be met with by powers of inferior position. And it is then said "The assertion that due diligence means a diligence which shall prevent the acts in question and shall deter men from committing them, if taken literally, can only signify that no Government can be held to have done its duty which has not been completely successful. If not taken literally, it can contribute nothing to a serious discussion."

On this point, without admitting the smallest feeling of partiality in favour of Great Britain, it seems to us that the American view is a pleader's view, and that the English view is that of a statesman who is also a jurist. The diligence in such a case cannot be judged of by narrow and inflexible rules of law, and the English case points out the extreme difficulty of estimating vigi

ple, as the mere procuring for belligerent purposes from the yards of a neutral shipbuilder, whose ordinary business it is to build ships of all kinds for customers of all nations, a vessel with some special adaptation for war." And it must be agreed that "there is nothing in the relation of a neutral to a belligerent to cast on the former the duty of exercising within its own territory a constant and minute espionage over ordinary transactions of commerce and the protection of the latter."

This question of estimating diligence by the extent of the emergency, a doctrine which the United States emphasize by means of italics, is really of great importance, and the rule to be laid down by the arbitrators must be looked forward to with some anxiety. The Americans say that no diligence would be "due" which fails to be commensurate with the emergency or with the magnitude of the results of negligence. We cannot assent to this, because any judgment formed upon such diligence must be ex post facto. It is easy enough to assess damages for injuries resulting from negligence as proved, but to estimate the extent of the negligence by the results is a process which must be peculiar to the American intellect. Due diligence must, beyond dispute, be taken to mean reasonable diligence. To take an illustation from marine risks. In a wellknown case, some cocks in the machinery were left open, and the sea water entered the ship through a waste pipe, and damaged the cargo. There was carelessness no doubt, but because the cargo wes exceedingly valuable and the damage resulting from the negligence very great, can it be said that the degree of negligence was thereby raised? The effect of the want of diligence can have nothing to do with the character of such diligence.

Throughout the American case there appears to be a desire to bring the subject matter of the arbitration within decided cases and acknowledged principles, but there is an obvious difficulty in doing this. For example the amount of money damages to be paid by a neutral nation for alleged want of care in preserving her neutrality, cannot be governed by what has been decided in suits disposed of by ordinary municipal tribunals. The American lawyers refer to the decisions of the Prize Court of the United States, but the English case distinctly objects to recognise the authority" of any municipal tribunal" however respectable.

We shall next have to deal with the acts which it is the duty of a neutral Government to prevent, a subject on which the arbitrators will have some difficulty in reconciling the views of the two countries.

EXTRADITION TREATIES.

It was stated in the House when the question was asked as to the woman DIBLANC, that the French Government represented it was their invariable practice when asked for extradition of a criminal not a French subject, to refer the matter to the country of the criminal's birth. If so, they have fallen into a great error, which shows that the French jurists are not what they were when, in the last century, they had acquired such celebrity. They not only err as to the sense of the treaty, the terms of which expressly require the extradition of "any person accused, but they ignore an elementary principle of jurisprudence, which lies at the foundation of all claims of extradition, whether by treaty or otherwise. That principle is, that by virtue of the local allegiance due by residence the criminal is quoad hoc to be deemed the subject of the country where the crime was committed. It is only by virtue of this principle that the courts of all countries try foreigners for acts within their jurisdiction. It was by virtue of this principle CROMWELL hanged Don PANTALEON SA, the brother of the Portuguese Ambassador, for murder. It is by virtue of this principle that-as Lord COKE lays down-aliens residing here are liable to be tried for treason: (2 Inst. 18; Calvin's case, 7 Reports.) It is on the same principle, beyond a doubt, the French or any other Government would deal in the same way with Englishmen resident in France who should conspire against them. It is by virtue of that principle the French or any other country would condemn and execute an Englishman for murder. Pro hac vice they would consider him a French subject; and rightly so. On that principle, before extradition treaties, extradition was constantly granted. In the last century it was held that we might send to Holland a Dutchman guilty of piracy; and in 1811 the Court of Common Pleas laid it down "that wheresoever a crime had been committed, the criminal is punishable according to the lex loci of the country against the law of which the crime has been committed, and by the comity of nations the country in which the criminal has been found, has aided the police of the country in which the crime was committed in bringing the criminal to punishment: (Mure v. Kay, 4 Taunt. Rep. 43.) This comity of nations, anterior to any extradition treaties, was based upon the principle to which we have referred. And a few years afterwards the same doctrine was recognised in the Court of King's Bench (Ex parte Scott, 9 B. & C.), and Lord Tenterden intimated that foreign countries frequently had the benefit of it. That being so, it follows that DIBLANC, at the time she committed the act (assuming that she did commit it), was an English subject; and as flying from justice is an offence by the law of this and of every other country, it follows that upon general

principles, quite apart from the terms of any treaty, extradition can be claimed of any country in which she may happen to be; that any inquiry into the country of her birth is irre levant, and any reference to that country improper. As it appears she has been delivered up, the question ceases to be of practical importance in the present instance, but the principle is of great importance, and a false principle may lead to inconvenience on future occasions. It may be added that the case of MULLER was not, properly speaking, a case of extradition at all, certainly not by treaty; for he was actually arrested before he landed, and on board a British ship. But the American police were directed to co-operate, no doubt, upon the very principle we have adverted to, that, quoad the particular act, he was to be deemed an Englishman, although a Prussian by birth.

GIFTS MORTIS CAUSA AND INTER VIVOS.

IN the leading case of Ward v. Turner (2 Ves. Sen. 431), Lord Hardwicke, speaking of donationes mortis causâ, said that "it was a pity the Statute of Frauds did not set aside all these kinds of gifts." The formidable amount of litigation which these gifts have created during the 120 years since Lord Hardwicke uttered the above dictum, fully justifies it. Let anyone who doubts refer to the authorities collected in the last edition (1866) of White and Tudor's Leading Cases, and to those which have been subsequently decided. As a general rule a donatio mortis causâ means a law suit or a Chancery suit, or both; and where actual litigation is avoided, the position of the personal representative of the deceased is always an embarrassing one. He has to determine, and usually from oral testimony-frequently that of interested parties, and which may be otherwise doubtful or conflicting-testimony which he has no adequate means of sifting:-First, what the real intention of the deceased actually was; whether or not there was the animus dandi:-Secondly, whether such animus, if it existed, pointed to an immediate and irrevocable gift, or to a gift conditional on the death of the donor :-Thirdly, whether the subject of gift was one that the law will permit to be so given:-Fourthly, whether the deceased has made such transfer or tradition of the gift as the law requires to render it effectual.

The difficulties in arriving at the true solution of these questions are obviously considerable. The first and second are questions of fact, and the difficulties are inherent in the nature of the subject, and must subsist so long as these gifts are permitted by law. The third is a question of law, and the fourth a mixed question of law and fact, and the difficulties here mainly arise from the fluctuations in the current of modern decisions. On the third point there never was any doubt that personal chattels might be the subject of such a gift-the contention has been whether a chose in action might be the subject. Modern decisions have here considerably extended the law beyond the opinion entertained by Lord Hardwicke, who, while admitting that a bond or other specialty might be the subject of a donatio mortis causa, because no one could (at that day) bring an action or a bond without a profert in curiam, evidently thought that the delivery of a note payable to bearer, which is only evidence of the contract, would be insufficient. The case of Duffield v. Hicks (1 Dow. N. S. 1) conclusively established the correctness of Lord Hardwicke's opinion as to specialties, and showed that the law remained the same, although the necessity for profert had been abolished; that case also showed that when the specialty debt was secured by a mortgage of real estate, the real and personal representatives of the donor were trustees for the donce to make the gift effectual.

On the other hand the opinion of Lord Hardwicke, that a simple contract debt could not be the subject of a donatio mortis causâ, has not been maintained, for the contrary may be considered as established by the cases of Moore v. Darton (4 De G. & Sm. 517), Veal v. Veal (2 L. T. Rep. N. S. 228; 6 Jur. N. S. 527), Witt v. Amis (1 B. & S, 109; 4 L. T. Rep. N. S. 283), Amis v. Witt (33, Beav. 169), where it was decided or whence it may be inferred that the delivery to the donce mortis causâ of a written promise made to the donor by a third person, or of the primary or proper documentary evidence, whether it be a negotiable instrument or not, of a debt or other liability of a third person to the donor, is effectual in law.

In this respect there is a clear distinction between a delivery which would be efficacious as a gift inter vivos, and one mortis causâ; in the former case Lord Hardwicke did not consider such a delivery, even in the case of a bond, sufficient, and the law seems to be the same at the present day. At law and inter vivos the gift of a bond, accompanied by delivery, passes the paper or parchment (Barton v. Gainer 3 H. & N. 387); but the general rule, that a chose in action is not assignable, remains unaltered, and the right of suit to recover the money continues in the donor; the legal right so remaining, equity will not interfere in favour of the donee as against the donor or his representatives, by completing an incomplete gift, though when the donor constitutes himself a trustee, equity will enforce the trust. Whether the gift be complete or incomplete, and if incomplete at law, whether a trust has been established in equity, are, of course, questions fruitful of litigation, and which have resulted in a perfect jungle of conflicting

decisions.

The law, however, may now be considered to be as stated by the late Lord Justice Turner in Milroy v. Lord (7 L. T. Rep. N. S. 178), who says, "I take the law of this court to be well settled, that in order to render a voluntary settlement valid and effectual, the settlor must have done everything which, according to the nature of the property comprised in the settlement, was necessary to be done in order to transfer the property, and render the settlement binding upon himself. He may, of course, do this by actually transferring the property to the persons for whom he intends to provide, and the provisions will then be effectual; and it will be equally effectual if he transfers the property to a trustee for the purposes of the settlement, or declares that he himself holds it in trust for these purposes, and if the property be personal, the trust may, as I apprehend, be declared either in writing or by parol. But in order to render the settlement binding, one or other of these modes must, as I understand the law of this court, be resorted to, for there is no equity in this court to protect an imperfect gift. The cases, I think, go further to this extent, that if the settlement is intended to be effectual by one of the modes to which I have referred, the court will not give effect to it by applying another of those modes. If it is intended to take effect by transfer, the court will not hold the intended transfer to operate as a declaration of trust, for then every imperfect instrument would be made effectual by being converted into a perfect trust." We may further add, that for the purposes of the present discussion, a gift is not the less complete because the donor retains in his own custody the instrument of gift, or because knowledge of the gift is not communicated to the donee (Re Way's Trusts 11 L. T. Rep. N. S. 495), or because the donor, where he has only an equitable estate or interest, gives no notice to the trustee or legal owner: (Donaldson v. Donaldson Kay, 711; Re Ways Trusts, ubi sup.).

In regard to gifts mortis causâ of choses in action, delivery of the instrument or evidence supporting the donor's right, has, as we have shown, been held sufficient. A cheque drawn by the donor on his banker is not an instrument within the above category, and cannot be delivered as a donatio mortis causâ. It, or rather the money which it represents, may be the subject of a donatio inter vivos, but being in itself a mere authority or mandate, it is revocable by the donor, and is revoked ipso facto on his death. In the very recent case of Beak v. Beak (26 L. T. Rep. N. S. 281), Sir James Bacon considered this point as covered by authority. The case is only remarkable as an ingenious, but hopeless, attempt to support the donation on the ground that the donor had handed over the banker's pass-book to the donee simultaneously with the cheque.

As we understand the law, the documentary evidence, the delivery of which is permitted to operate as a sufficient delivery of the chose in action which is the subject of gift, must be such evidence of the contract itself as under the well-known rule would exclude the admission of oral testimony. The delivery of such evidence may fairly be considered, not as the delivery of a mere symbol, which Lord Hardwicke considered insufficient, but as delivery of what is essential to the maintenance of an action for the recovery of the chose, the means for obtaining possession of it, analogous to the delivery of the key of a place where bulky goods are stored. A most dangerous extension would be given to these donations if the delivery of scraps of collateral evidence were allowed to be of any efficacy. It would be wild work indeed, if, as was contended in Beak v. Beak (ubi sup.), the delivery of a pass-book, a mere statement of account, could be allowed to operate as a valid donation of the balance standing to the donor's credit, or of any part of it.

The gift of a promissory note, drawn by the donor himself, was supported by Vice-Chancellor Stuart, in Lloyd v. Chune (3 L. T. Rep. N. S. 366; 6 Jur. N. S. 1365), a case which, we cannot help thinking was wrongly decided, since it is clear that the donor's representatives might plead nudum pactum if sued on such au instrument.

the

The case is somewhat deprived of weight from the erroneous view entertained by the Vice-Chancellor in Dawson v. Kearton (3 Sm. & Giff. 186), relied on in the argument, a case which is probably supportable under its special circumstances, but in which Sir J. Stuart cites with approbation dictum of Chief Justice Mansfield in Lee v. Muggeridge (5 Taunt. 45), "that it has long been established that when a person is bound morally and conscientiously to pay a debt, though not legally bound, a subsequent promise to pay will give a right of action." We may instance several other cases, in which, as it appears to us, the same Vice-Chancellor in his anxiety to effectuate the intention of the donor has, as we are inclined to think, strained the law beyond it proper limits. Thus in Airey v. Hall (27 L. T. Rep. O. S. 196; 3 Sm. & Giff. 315), a voluntary assignment by way of settlement of a sum of stock standing in the settlor's name, not perfected by transfer, was supported as a declaration of trust. In Kiddill v. Farnell (29 L. T. Rep. O. S. 324; 3 Jur. N. S. 786), a transfer of stock under a power of attorney and after the death of the donor, the bank being in ignorance of such death, was held a good gift. This case was compromised on appeal : (5 W. R. 793.) In Bromley v. Brunton (18 L. T. Rep. N. S. 628), a cheque given by A. to B., and presented without delay, but

the payment of which was refused by the bankers, who doubted the signature, was held to entitle the donee to claim the amount from the representatives of the donor. In the last named case, the Vice-Chancellor appears to have acted on the notion, which was repudiated by Lord Loughborough in Tate v. Hilbert (2 Ves. Jun. 111), that the donation of a cheque operated as an appointment or appropriation of so much money in the banker's hands in favour of the person put in possession of the cheque. In Morgan v. Malleson (23 L. T. Rep. N. S. 336; L. Rep. 10 Eq. 475), the owner of a bond, without handing it over, signed a memorandum by which he purported to "give and make over" the bond to a donee, and Lord Romilly held the memorandum a good declaration of trust-a decision which goes to the utmost limits of the law as laid down in the passage we have cited from Lord Justice Turner's judgment in Milroy v. Lord, if it does not exceed those limits.

The above-cited are fair specimens of the very hard cases which are so apt to give rise to very bad law.

MODE OF VALUING LIFE ASSURANCE POLICIESHOLDICH'S CASE.

THERE is no moot point at present before the Court of Chancery of such wide and immediate importance as that involving the proper mode of valuing policies in insolvent Life Assurance companies. Considering the number of these policies which have been dealt with during the last three or four years it is certainly curious that any doubt should rest as to the grounds on which their value has been estimated. Yet such is the case. The matter stands thus: When the International and Hercules Companies were ordered to be wound-up, the question as to the proper mode of valuing the policies seems to have been discussed in one or two of the earlier causes that arose in the proceedings, but no definite decision was arrived at. In one of the first cases, however, which arose in the Albert liquidation-Bell's (L. Rep. 9 Eq. 706)—the point was discussed very fully before Lord Justice James, who was then a Vice-Chancellor, and he decided that a policy holder was entitled to prove for the sum which would be required by a solvent assurance office, having the same rate of premiums and the same extent of proprietary capital as the company in liquidation, to be paid, in order to give the policy holder a policy of the same amount, under the same conditions, whether ordinary or special, at the same premium. So far as reported decisions go, this is still the rule under which the amount of proof should be estimated in cases of Life Assurance companies being wound-up in the ordinary way by the

court.

When, however, Lord Cairns was appointed under the special Act sole arbitrator of the Albert Company without any appeal from his decisions, the point was raised before him in Lancaster's csse, and after a very careful examination of the various grounds on which an estimate of the value of a policy should be based, Lord Cairns declined to follow the rule in Bell's case, and adopted that founded on the "pure premium valuation." This is that the present value of the reversion in the sum assured is to be ascertained, and from this the present value of the future premiums, taking into consideration the pure premiums only without the "loading is to be deducted, and the balance is the amount for which proof should be made. It is in accordance with this rule that the value of the enormous mass of policies in the Albert and its amalgamated companies has been estimated.

The effect of this decision of Lord Cairns was very awkward. On the one hand we had a rule very favourable to policy holders supported by the authority of Lord Justice James, and which, until reversed by some superior tribunal, must obtain in the Court of Chancery. On the other hand we had a rule very beneficial to shareholders supported by the great authority of Lord Cairns, and which was governing by far the largest existing number of policies requiring to be valued. It is evident that such a conflict could not long continue. Indeed it was most desirable that the very first opportunity should be seized of having the point considered again by the Court of Chancery. It is therefore a matter for congratulation that it was raised in Holdich's case before the Master of the Rolls on Wednesday.

Lord Romilly, in this case, very carefully discussed the rules in Bell's and Lancaster's cases, and the grounds on which they rested. He pointed out that the omission of all consideration as to the state of the health of the policyholder in Lord Cairns' rule operated most severely against his interest, as it prevented his gaining what he was entitled to-the enhanced value of his policy arising from accident or disease to himself. On the whole, therefore, the Master of the Rolls determined to adhere to the rule in Bell's case. Lord Romilly also stated that, considering the great importance of the point at issue, it could only be definitely settled by the House of Lords, and that no doubt it would be brought there, So far, therefore, as Holdich's case goes, the conflict between the law of the Court of Chancery and that of the special tribunal created by the Albert Act, has been rendered more glaring, but that increased glare gives us hopes that the question may soon receive a solution from the court of ultimate appeal.

But Holdich's case, and the point involved in it, possesses jus* now an interest independent of its value as a mere legal

cedent. It most strongly supports the arguments against the establishment of special and independent tribunals like that of the Albert arbitrator and the similar court sought to be formed in the case of the European Company. These arguments generally were lately urged with very great force in two most able letters to the Times, signed, "An Actuary." But the evils of a course which creates a court not bound by decisions of the ordinary Judges of the realm, and whose decisions do not bind any other court, are rendered very evident by the conflict of opinion revealed in Holdich's case. If the European Arbitration Act becomes law, it is quite probable that Lord Westbury will adopt altogether a different rule as to ovaluing policies from that either in Bell's case or in Lancaster's case. At all events he must adopt some rule, and that too before the point can possibly be brought before the House of Lords, even should it be done in the shortest way--by appealing from Lord Romilly's judgment of Wednesday. We shall then be in the very unsatisfactory position of having a most important question submitted to the House on which three out of the four law lords who are likely to sit, and whose judgment on an equitable point like this will carry weight, will have already given their opinions. This might be urged with force as an argument against employing retired Lord Chancellors as arbitrators.

A

CITY, THURSDAY, MAY 2. BUSINESS in these markets has been confined within comparatively narrow limits since last Thursday, owing chiefly to the occurrence of the usual holiday on the 1st May, when the Bank of England transfer offices are closed, soon after the conclusion of the fortnightly settlement. The brilliant weather has considerably thinned the attendance at the Stock Exchange since the close of the past week, aud there has consequently not been much doing. firm tone has, notwithstanding, prevailed in all departments, the reasons for which are not far to seek. An important feature at this season is the reports from the provinces as to the progress of the wheat plant, and the slow sales at Marklane are sufficient indications of the prospects in this respect at the moment; secondly, we are led to hope that the Alabama dispute is really in a fair way of settlement at last; and, thirdly, the money question is not likely to disappoint at present those whose operations are based on the current rates for three months' bills, which may be stated at 3 to 37. A slight freshening in the discount demand is experienced as we write, but this arises from the approach of the 4th of the month, after which there will be a renewal of ease, as there is no demand for bar gold for any quarter; the silver market is flat, with declining prices, and the arrivals that may come to hand will therefore, probably, go into the Bank, added to which, eagles are looked for from America.

The British Funds have risen 3, the price being supported by the prospect of Government purchases on sinking fund account. Bank Stock has risen 1; and Metropolitan Three and a Half per Cents 4.

In the American market, 5-20 and 10-40 Bonds are to better; and the Funded Loan higher. As regards Eries, the rise to 69 at New York caused some little commotion here last Saturday, and the price went to 56 at one time, but it is not maintained, although there has been some very active buying. The change in price for the week is a fall of.

With one or two exceptions, such as Metropolitan stock, which is lower, and South-Eastern, which is 1 down owing to disappointment at the small amount of ordinary stock converted, there is a general rise for the week in this market, in which North British takes the lead at a rise of 24, followed by Great Northern, Midland, and Caledonian, at an advance of 14; Great Western, London and Brighton, London and North-Western, Manchester and Sheffield, and North-Eastern, at a rise of 1, &c. More

attention is being directed to these stocks by investors since the movement for extending travelling facilities to third-class passengers, in which the Midland Company has taken a commendable initiative. Grand Trunk of Canada stock has risen 14 for the week; and Great Western of Canada, 1. In Foreign stocks the greater number of changes for the week are also favourable, including Spanish, the believers in the ultimate regeneration of this State's financial position finding a new incentive to buy in the futile efforts of the Carlist insurgents, as shown in their easy dispersion by the Government troops. Some of the Russian, Peruvian, Turkish, and Argentine stocks are to 1 per cent. higher; but the French National is lower. In Telegraph Stocks Anglo-American is 2 higher; and Anglo-Mediter. ranean 4; and in Miscellaneous Shares Native Guano have improved 2; Telegraph Construction 1; and Hudson's Bay .

The bullion operations at the Bank this day comprises the influx of £38,000; and the efflux of £27,000, of which £7000 is for South America, and £20,000 for the Cape. The demand for money has been active at the Bank in connection with the 4th of the month.

The latest quotations for British Funds are as follows: Consols, for money, 93 to 93; ditto June Account, 934 to 933; Reduced, and New Three per Cents., 913 to 91; Exchequer Bills, 4s. to 9s. prem.; India Five per Cent. Stock, 110 to 110; ditto Four per Cent., 102 to 1034; ditto Enfaced Paper Four per Cent., 96 to 97; ditto Five and a Half per Cent., 108 to 109; Bank of England Stock, 241 to 242: Metropolitan Three and a Half per Cent., 96 to 974; and French Rentes in this market, 54 to 55.

The last quotation for French Rentes received from Paris was 54f. 40c., market firm.

In the market for American Securities, the United States 5-20 Bonds of 1882 are marked 901 to 902,; 10-40 Bonds, 894 to 89; Atlantic and Great Western Bonds, 40 to 41; ditto Debentures, 50 to 51; Erie Railway Shares, 55 to 55; Illinois, 109 to 110; and United States Funded Loan, 90 to 903.

In the Railway Market the prices are:-Caledonians, 115 to 115; Great Eastern, 53 to 53; Great Northern, 136 to 137; ditto, A, 157 to 158; Great Western, 111 to 111; Lancashire and Yorkshire, 157 to 157; London and Brighton, 823 to 83; London, Chatham, and Dover, 27 to 274; London and North-Western, 151 to 1512; London and South-Western, 107 to 107; Manchester and Sheffield, 75 to 761; Metropolitan, 67 to 67; ditto District, 31 to 31; Midland, 146 to 1474; North British, 66 to 66; North Eastern Consols, 171 to 171; South-Eastern, 103 to 103; ditto deferred, 79 to 80; Grand Trunk of Canada, 21 to 221; Great Western of Canada, 22 to 22; Antwerp and Rotterdam, 19 to 20; Great Luxembourg, 18 to 18; and Lombardo Venetian, 17 to 18.

The prices of the principal Foreign Stocks are as follows: Argentine, 1868, 973 to 981; do., 6 per cent., 1871, 92 to 93: Brazilian, 5 per cent., 1865, 95 to 961; do., 5 per cent., 1871, 95 to 96; Egyptian, 7 per cent., 1868, 88 to 883; do., Viceroy Loan, 91 to 93; do., Khedive Mortgage Bonds, 79 to 793; French; Morgan 6 per cent. Loan, 97 to 97; do. National 5 per cent. Loan, 4 to 5 pm.; Greek 5 per cent., 22 to 23; Italian of 1861, 67 to 67; Mexican, 153 to 15; Paraguay 8 per cent. Loan, 92 to 92; Peruvian, 5 per cent. 1865, 101 to 101; do. 6 per cent. 1870, 822 to 82; Russian 5 per cent. 1871, 91 to 92; do. Nicolai Rail. Bonds, 76 to 77; Spanish 3 per cent. 30 to 304; do. 3 per cent., 1871, 29 to 30%; Turkish, 5 per cent. 1865, 531 to 531; do. 6 per cent. 1865, 73 to 731; do. 6 per cent. 1869, 61 to 61; and do. 6 per cent. 1871, 714 to 72.

The Peruvian Loan of 1872 is quoted at 7 to 1 pm.; and the Russian at 1 to 13 pm.

In the Telegraph Market, Anglo-American Stock is quoted at 118 to 120; Anglo-Mediterranean. 182 to 185; British Australian, 9 to 9; British Indian Extension, 11 to 12; ditto Submarine, 10 to 11; Chinas, 8 to 91; Cubas, 7 to 8; Falmouths, 11 to 11; Great Northern, 15 to 15; Marseilles, Algiers, and Malta, 9 to 9; Mediterranean Extension, 5 to 6; Reuter's, 10 to 114; French Cables, 213 to 22); and West India and Panama, 6 to 6.

Another impulse is about to be given to the progress of mining enter prise in the Cardiganshire district. The Aberystwith silver-lead mines, are about to be purchased and developed by a public company which has been established, with a very moderate capital, for the purpose of turning their resources to profitable account. The prospectus has been issued, and affords evidence of encouraging prospects.

In miscellaneous shares the prices are as follows :-General Credit and Discount, 2 to 2 pm.; International Finance, dis. to pm.; Hooper's Telegraph Works, 2 to 2 pm.; Hudson's Bay, 11 to 114; India Rubber and Gutta Percha, 42 to 44; National Discount, 13 to 13; Telegraph Construction, 33 to 341; Native Guano, 19 to 21; Phosphate Sewage, 31 to 33; New Sombrero Phosphate, 8 to 8; and Phospho Guano, 11 to 11.

NOTES OF THE WEEK.

HOUSE OF LORDS. June 29, 1871; Feb. 15, and April 30. DUKE OF BUCCLEUCH v. METROPOLITAN BOARD

OF WORKS.

the depreciation in value of his house and lands, and otherwise injuriously affecting them. The arbitrators referred the question of the amount of compensation to an umpire, who eventually awarded £8325 to the appellant. This sum the award was brought. Among other pleas the respondents refused to pay, and an action on the respondents pleaded that the sum awarded included damages and compensation for things in respect of which neither the arbitrators nor the umpire had any jurisdiction whatever. At the trial the respondents called the umpire as a wit ness, who stated that, among other items, he had awarded £5000 for general depreciation in value of the appellant's house and premises, as a nobleman's or gentleman's residence, by loss of privacy, prospect, and other "amenities," by reason of the works of the respondents. The Court of Exchequer Chamber affirmed the judgment of the Court of Exchequer in favour of the admissibility of the umpire's evidence, but reversed, by a majority of four to three, the decision of the court below that the appellant was entitled to the