cause to be erected or provided good and sufficient thunder rods or lightning conductors in connection with every store magazine where gunpowder is kept by him, for the protection of such magazine from the effects of lightning." By sect. 4 "All gunpowder made in any place where under this Act it is not lawful to make gunpowder, and all gunpowder in any mill, press-house, corning-house, drying-house, dusting-house or other place, exceeding the quantity which for the time being may lawfully be therein, shall be forfeited; and every person making or causing to be made any gunpowder contrary to this Act, or keeping or causing to be kept in any such mill or place any gunpowder contrary to the provisions hereinbefore contained, shall for so doing, in addition to such forfeiture as aforesaid, forfeit for every such offence any sum not exceeding two shillings for every pound of gunpowder so forfeited."

Lopes, Q.C. (with Bradford) for the appellant, urged that sect. 4 did not apply to the regulation with the breach of which the appellant was charged.

The respondent did not appear. The COURT (Blackburn, Mellor, and Lush, JJ.) held that the words of the Act did not support the conviction. Judgment for appellant. Attorneys for appellant, Wedlake and Letts.

Thursday, May 2.

WELLS v. ABRAHAMS. Trover-Felony by defendant-Defendant's appli▪ cation to set verdict aside.

THIS was an action for trover tried before Lush, J. at the last Liverpool assizes. Plea: Not guilty. The verdict was found for the plaintiff for £150, the value of a diamond brooch, which was the subject of the action. A rule had been obtained

on behalf of the defendant for a new trial on

the ground that the facts proved had established a felony by the defendant; and on the ground that, subsequently to the verdict, criminal proceedings had been instituted against the defendant. The arguments upon the rule came on by way of

motion.

Aspinall, Q.C., for plaintiff, showed cause.
Torr, Q.C. supported the rule.

The COURT (Cockburn, C.J., Blackburn, Lush, and Quain, JJ.) held that these were not grounds for setting aside the verdict upon application of the defendant. Rule discharged.

Attorneys for plaintiff Wright and Vean, for J. Blackhurst, Liverpool.

Attorneys for defendant Chinery and Aldridge, for M. Nordon, Liverpool.

Friday, May 3.

MARTINEAU V. KITCHEN. Vendor and purchaser-Transition of propertyWarehouseman-Buyer's risk—Insurance. ACTION to recover the price of a certain quantity of sugar sold by the plaintiffs to the defendants. The plaintiffs were sugar refiners, and the defendants were brokers whose business consisted in their buying sugar from the refiners to re-sell the same to wholesale grocers. The course of dealing was as follows: The brokers having no warehouses were allowed by the defendants, from whom they bought sugar, to leave it for two months on the premises of the refiners until delivery should be made to the sub-vendees. At the end of that time the refiners were accustomed to give notice to the brokers that the goods would thereafter remain at the risk of the latter, but the sugar was not weighed until about to be delivered. The refiners were in the habit of insuring their whole stock, sold or unsold, by floating policies always kept up for that purpose. In the months of Jan. and Feb. 1870 the plaintiffs sold to the defendants 1000 sugar loaves at 47s. per cwt. on the usual terms, and marked them. In the course of a month after the sales payment was made according to an approximate estimate of the weight, and the difference was, according to the practice, to be paid on weighing. Delivery orders were given for a portion, but about 900 of the loaves remained after the expiration of the two months, and after actual notice to remove had been given as to part. About the end of April a fire on the plaintiff's premises consumed all the stock. Twelve thousand sugar loaves in their warehouses were destroyed, including the thousand sold to the defendants. The sum for which they were then insured did not cover the whole of their own unsold stock. The amount insured was paid to

them.

Holker, Q.C. and Greenhow for the plaintiffs. J. Brown, Q.C., Thesiger, and Bremner for the fendants.

The contention on behalf of the defendants was that as something remained to be done to the goods, viz., they had to be weighed, the property in them had not passed; or if they had become the goods of the purchasers, they were entitled to have a proportionate part of the money paid by the insurance office set off against the price.

The COURT Cockburn, C.J., Blackburn, Lush,

and Quain, JJ.), held that the property had passed to the defendants, and that as the insurance effected by the plaintiffs did not suffice to cover the value of the unsold sugar destroyed on the premises, the defendants had no right to any part of the sum recovered for the insurance.

Judgment for the plaintiffs.

CRESSWELL v. CROWDY. Contract in restaint of marriage. DECLARATION on an agreement by the defendant to pay the plaintiff an annuity in consideration that the latter would not marry a certain lady. Demurrer. Manisty, Q.C. (with him Wood Hill), for the plaintiff.

J. Brown, Q.C. (with him F. M. White), for the defendant, argued that the contract being in restraint of marriage, was void on the ground of public policy.

The COURT, without calling upon the counsel for the plaintiff to support the declaration, held that it was good as the agreement did not operate as a general restraint on marriage.

Judgment for the plaintiff.

and 48.

THIS was a rule for mandamus obtained on behalf of the Rev. J. H. Eld, Fellow of St. John's College, Oxford, calling upon the Vice-Chancellor and the Hebdomadal Board of the University of Oxford to show cause why Mr. Eld's name should not be restored to the register of the congregation of the University. It appeared that Mr. Eld occupied rooms in his college, and was also vicar of a living about nine miles from Oxford, where there was a parsonage in which he slept. He had certified to the council in the words of 17 & 18 Vict. c. 81, s. 48, which defines "residents that he was a member of Convocation, who had resided twenty weeks within one mile and a half of Carfax during the year preceding the making of the register. By sect. 16 of that Act "the congregation of the University of Oxford shall be composed of the following persons only, the said persons being members of Convocation." Amongst the persons mentioned are all residents."

Manisty, Q.C., and Kemplay, Q.C., for the defendants, showed cause.

Adams, Q C., supported the rule.

The COURT (Cockburn, C.J., Mellor, Lush, and Quain, JJ.) considered that the Act required an actual, and not merely a constructive, residence in Oxford, and that the prosecutor did not fulfil that requirement.

Rule discharged.

Attorneys for prosecutor, Wood, Street, and Hayter.

Attorney for defendants, J. Philpot for Morrell and Son, Oxford.

KERSHAW V. CHANTLER.

Rule against a County Court Judge-Nonsuit without plaintiff's consent.-19 & 20 Vict. c. 108, s. 43. A RULE had been obtained under 19 & 20 Vict. c. 108, s. 43, calling upon a County Court Judge, and the defendant to show cause why the judge should not proceed with the trial of this and during the defendant's case the judge, with cause. It was tried at Warrington before a jury, out the plaintiff's consent, and notwithstanding his protest, nonsuited the plaintiff.

A. L. Smith showed cause for the judge, and contended that he had not refused to do any act relating to the duties of his office, and that this rule was not the proper remedy under the circum

stances.

in support of the alleged promise of marriage, or why a new trial should not be had upon the ground that the damages were excessive. This was an action for breach of promise of marriage tried before Bramwell, B. at the last assizes for Somersetshire, when a verdict was returned for the plaintiff with £600 damages, leave being reserved to the defendant to move to enter a nonsuit. The evidence of the plaintiff herself was clear as to the promise of marriage on the part of the defendant, and the only question upon this part of the case was, whether or not such promise was corroborated. The 32 & 33 Vict. c. 68, s. 2, which makes the parties to any such action competent to give evidence, provides "that no plaintiff in any action for breach of promise of marriage shall recover a verdict unless his or her testimony shall be corroborated by some other material evidence in support of such promise." The plaintiff in her evidence stated that although the defendant had repeatedly promised her marriage, she had not accepted him, and they were not therefore engaged until the month of October 1870. The corroborative evidence consisted of the evidence of a Mrs. Score, whose husband kept an inn at Bridgwater, to which house on market days the defendant, who was a farmer, would sometimes bring the plaintiff in his gig, who stated that on tiff how long it would be before she changed her one occasion, before Oct. 1870, she asked the plainname, and that he replied, "Oh, not long first," and that upon another occasion also, before the above date, as defendant was buttoning on the glove of the plaintiff upon her wrist, she, the witGotfrey a pair to which he replied, "Oh, so she ness, asked the plaintiff why she did not knit Mr. will when she is my wife." To this the plaintiff replied, "Suppose I won't have you, Tom," upon witness also said that the plaintiff and defendant which the defendant said, "Oh yes you will." This behaved to each other like lovers. Mr. Score, the husband of the last witness also proved that the two conducted themselves towards each other as lovers, that Miss Wilcox was his sweetheart, and that and that he had heard defendant say several times this conduct continued for three or four years, from 1867 to 1870. The defendant broke off the engagement in May 1871. Upon an objection taken at the trial by the defendant's counsel, that there was no corroborative evidence, Bramwell, B., after consulting with Martin, B., held that there was some evidence. No evidence was called for the defendants, and the jury returned a verdict for £600, whereupon the foregoing rule was ob

tained.

Cole, Q.C. and T. W. Saunders showed cause, and contended that there was corroborative evicorroboration of the promise may consist as well dence within the meaning of the statute, for that of facts before the engagement as of facts after

wards.

Edlin Q.C. and Collins, in support of the rule, argued that to constitute corroboration under the statute it must be of facts subsequent to the engagement, for that there can be no corroboration of a promise before the engagement was entered into.

The COURT (Martin, Bramwell, and Pigott, BB.) were of opinion that in such a case facts which take place before the engagement may equally corroborate the subsequent promise, as facts which take place after; and that in this case there were such facts. They thought, however, that under the peculiar circumstances of the case the damages were too high, and therefore it was arranged that the rule should be discharged upon 400. the plaintiff's consenting to reduce the damages to

Rule discharged accordingly. Attorney for the plaintiff, H. Loveland, Bridgwater. Attorneys for the defendant, Reed and Cook, Bridgwater.

Saturday, May 4.

SECOND DIVISION OF THE COURT. BRADFORD AND ANOTHER. WILLIAMS. Charter-party-Action for breach of Partial breach of contract by one party-Rescission of contract in consequence by the other-Pleadings -Demurrer.

THIS was a rule to enter a verdict for the defendant pursuant to leave reserved, and it came on to be argued together with a demurrer to the fourth plea. The action was for the breach of a charter-party dated 26th May 1871, set out in the declaration, whereby it was agreed between the captain of the defendant's ship Ark, trading from Bridgwater, and the plaintiffs, that the said ship should proceed to a loading berth at Bullo Pill. near Gloucester, and there load a full cargo of coals, and therewith proceed to Highbridge or Dunball, and deliver the same. Freight at 2s. 9d. per ton to be paid on unloading and right delivery of the cargo. "The vessel to load with Gollop and Co. or Goold and Co. till end of September, at Captain's option; after September all Goold and Co." Penalty for nonperformance of the

law they were bound to find a verdict for the defendants.

Cave, for the respondents, was not called upon. The COURT (Martin and Pigott, BB.) were of opinion that there was ample evidence of negligence on the part of the defendants to go the jury; for that the opening of the carriage door, and the calling out of “ All out for Huddersfield," which may have been understood as an order to get out of the carriage, together with the taking off of the break, which increased the speed of the train, were facts proving negligence which could not have been withdrawn from the jury.

Judgment for the respondents. Attorney for the appellants, James Blenkinsop. Attorney for the respondents, Chester and Co.

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS.
Friday, May 3.

TICHBORNE v. MOSTYN.
Practice-Ejectment-Stay of proceedings until
payment of costs in previous action-Common
Law Procedure Act 1852, s. 202.
THIS was an action of ejectment.

Hawkins, QC. (Matthews Q.C., and Purcell with him), applied for a rule calling on the plaintiff to show cause why the proceedings in this action should not be stayed until the plaintiff had paid the costs in an action of ejectment, brought by him against one Lushington. In that case the next friend of an infant had defended the action; the title of the plaintiff to recover was the same as that put forward in the present case, and the whole question, would in this case, as in the other, turn on the identity of the plaintiff with one Roger Tichborne who it was alleged by the defendant had been lost at sea. In the present case, also, the same infant, by his next friend, was defending the action. The present action had been commenced

at the same time as the action of Tichborne v. Lushington. In the latter case, the jury, having heard the counsel for the defence, and a few of his witnesses, expressed so strong an opinion against the plaintiff that the plaintiff elected to be nonsuited. The defendant, in this case, had then served the plaintiff with a twenty days' notice, under the 202nd section of the Common Law Procedure Act 1852, to proceed to trial at the next sittings. Defendant was willing to waive this notice rather than have the present application refused. Defendant claimed in the alternative to have security given by the plaintiff for the costs of the present action under sect. 93 of

the Common Law Procedure Act 1854.

H. Giffard, Q.C., showed cause in the first instance. He urged that the parties in the present case were not the same within the meaning of the rule which enables the court to stay proceedings until security for costs is given. [Per curiam.That is so.] He further urged that the defendant was not entitled to a stay of the proceedings until the costs of the other action had been paid, espe cially after giving notice to proceed; that that rule only applies when the second action is vexatious, and that it was not so in the present case was shown by the fact that the evidence given by the defendant in the first case, which had mainly influenced the jury, was such that if a verdict had passed for the defendant the plaintiff would have been entitled to a new trial on the ground of surprise.

The COURT (Bovill, C.J., Byles, Brett, and Grove, JJ.), made the rule absolute for a stay of the proceedings until the costs of the first action should have been paid; at the same time extend ing the time for going to trial to six months. Rule accordingly. Attorney for plaintiff, F. G. Gorton. Attorneys for defendant, Cullington and Slaughter.

Jan. 20 and May 4.

FOWLER v. Lock.

Master and servant-Negligence.

April 23 and May 4. PHILLIPS v. ROUTH. Practice-Discovery-Privilege-Informa tion received by defendant after action brought for the purposes of his defence.

Murphy moved to vary an order of Willes J. at chambers. The action was brought to recover the difference between the price which the defendant had given for some bacon, and the price which defendant had charged plaintiff for the same, the defendant being the plaintiff's agent to buy the bacon. Plaintiff interrogated defendant as to the price he had paid for the bacon, and the defendant said he did not know. Plaintiff then sent out a commission to New York to examine the defendant's partner (who had been the actual buyer of the bacon in America), as to the price paid; but this person, though he admitted that the books of the firm would tell the price, refused to allow the books to be referred to, or to give the information himself. The plaintiff then further interrogated the defendant very stringently as to his knowledge or means of knowledge of the sum paid. To this interrogatory the defendant answered that before the commencement of this action he had no knowledge on the subject; but that since, with a view to his defence to the action, he had received information on the subject from his partner at New York. This information he claimed to be privileged in witholding. A summons was accordingly taken out calling on the defendant to show cause why he should not make a further before a master on the subject. The summons answer to this interrogatory, or else be examined was heard before Willes J., who declined to make any order. This motion was made to reverse this

decision.

Cur. adv. vult.

May 4th.-The COURT (Bovill C. J., Keating, Brett, and Grove JJ.) held the information privi. Rule refused. leged.

Attorneys for plaintiff, Cox and Sons.

Wednesday, May 8.

DE GENDRE v. BOGARDUS,

-Practice.

Common Law Procedure Acts—Addition of plaintiff THIS was an application referred to the court by order of Byles, J., (on appeal from an order of Master Kaye) to add the name of one Crossland as co-plaintiff in an action for dilapidations to a furnished house. The plaintiff was cestui que trust, and Crossland was the trustee under the plaintiff's marriage settlement. Defendant had left England, and was in Peru.

Pritchard, for defendant, contended that if the order were made, a fresh defence might have to be set up by the defendant. He referred to Common Law Procedure Act 1852, s. 34, and Common Law Procedure Act 1860, s. 19.

A. L. Smith, for the plaintiff, contended that the master had power to make such an order. The COURT (Bovill, C.J., Brett and Grove, JJ.) discharged the rule, being of opinion that if they did not make the order the same effect could be produced by the plaintiff entering a discontinuance, and commencing an action de novo, as would result from adding the plaintiff's name;

tion having been presented. It was subsequently discovered that Maxwell was a trader within the city of London, and was there carrying on business under an assumed name, and notice accordingly was given to the sheriff not to part with the goods or proceed with the sale. Maxwell was adjudi. cated a bankrupt on 17th Oct., described as a gentleman. The 59th section of Bankruptcy Act 1869, provides that if the person sought to be adjudged a bankrupt carries on business or resides within the London Bankruptcy Court, the "court" shall mean the Court of Bankruptcy in London; but if the person does not carry on busi ness or reside in the London Bankruptcy district, then the court shall mean the County Court of the district in which such person resides. The learned judge reserved leave to move to enter a verdict for the defendant, and a rule was granted on the grounds that the court in which the debtor was adjudicated a bankrupt had no jurisdiction. W. G. Harrison and Roland Williams showed

cause.

Powell, Q.C. (Morgan Howard and Stone), in support.

The COURT (Bovill, C. J. Byles and Grove, JJ.; dissentiente Brett, J.), were of opinion that the County Court had jurisdiction to adjudicate Max. well a bankrupt, and that by the 10th section of the Bankruptcy Act, the notice in the London Gazette of the bankruptcy is conclusive evidence of the adjudication, so as to prevent the court going behind it and inquiring into matters of fact. Attorneys for plaintiff, Brooksbank and Galland, Gray's-inn-square.

Attorney for defendant, J. Rae.

COURT OP PROBATE.
April 23 and 30.

In the Goods of MARY A. HARDING. Legacy to married woman who died before it be came payable-Chose in action not reduced into possession-Husband survived his wife, but died without taking out administration to her estate -Their son required to take out a double administration.

ED. TAYLOR, late of Smallwood, in the county of Chester, died 3rd March 1847, leaving a will, by which he gave to his daughter, Mary Anne Taylor, the sum of £400, to be paid her after the death of his wife, who survived him. This sum was to be raised by the sale, or the disposition otherwise of a certain freehold. Mary Anne Taylor, the daughter, married Isaac Harding, and died intestate 21st May 1850, leaving her husband her surviving. He died intestate on 4th Aug. 1871, without having taken out administration to his wife, and without leaving any property of his own. The widow of Ed. Taylor, in whom was the life interest in Mary Ann Taylor's legacy, died 14th Jan. 1871.

Dr. Tristram moved the court on behalf of Amos Taylor Harding, the son of Isaac and Mary Anne Taylor, to decree to him letters of administration of the estate of Mary Anne Taylor, without im. posing on him the necessity of taking out

administration to the estate of his father. The legacy was a chose in action which the husband had never reduced into action, and therefore it did not form part of his estate. He cited In the Goods of Gill (1 Hagg. 341); In the Goods of Pountney (4 Hagg. 289); Williams on Executors, 339,

owner to recover compensation for personal injuries sustained by him through the viciousness of a horse supplied to him by the defendant. The first count alleged that the defendant, knowing the horse to be vicious, &c., gave him to plaintiff to drive; the second count was on a contract, by which, in consideration that plaintiff would drive defendant's cab, defendant promised to supply plaintiff with a proper horse. Verdict for the defendant on the first count, and for plaintiff on the second. A rule nisi was obtained to set this verdict aside and enter a nonsuit or verdict for the defendant, on the ground that the plaintiff appeared to be the servant of the defendant, and that the accident happened in the course of his employment. It appeared that the arrangement between the plaintiff and the defendant was, that the defendant should supply the plaintiff with a cab and horses, and the plaintiff engaged to pay over to the defendant a certain sum of money every day. This sum was arranged on a

the former course.

Rule discharged.

Attorney for plaintiff, Scarborough. Attorneys for defendant, Ellis and Crossfield.

May 3, 6, and 7. REVELL V. BLAKE.

Bankruptcy Act 1869 (32 & 33 Vict. c. 71)-Trader and non-trader-Inrisdiction of County CourtAdjudication binding. THIS was an interpleader issue tried before Byles J., when a verdict was found for the plaintiff, the trustee in bankruptcy of one Maxwell, against the sheriff of Kent, who was the defendant, and who had seized Maxwell's goods under a writ of fi. fa. A petition to the Greenwich County Court was presented on the 29th Aug., praying that Maxwell, who was described of The Glen, Sydenham, Kent, might be adjudged a bankrupt; and on 6th Sept. notice was given to the sheriff of a bankruptcy peti

Cur. adv. vult. April 30.-Lord PENZANCE.-The court took time to consider in this case whether double The deceased administration was necessary. died intestate, in May 1850, and she left her husband surviving her, who died without having taken out administration to her. She was entitled to a legacy of £400 under the will of her father, payable at the death of her A motion was made to mother, who died in 1871. to grant administration of the estate of Mary Anne Harding to her son, and to this it was replied that she having died first the legacy It was replied that if it had been realised that might be so property, but it was a chose in action which had never been reduced into possession, and therefore did not pass to the husband. No doubt there are choses in action belonging to a wife which will pass to her next of kin if she survives her husband, unless her husband, by the force of his marital right, has reduced them into possession during his lifetime; but there is no law applicable to the case where a wife dies before her husband. The matter was dicussed in Partington v. Parting ton, in the House of Lords. That case arose on the right of the Revenue to a second stamp duty as on a second succession. The question was whether the devolution of the property was not to be governed by the law of the foreign country, but it was never doubted that if the matter were governed by English law, whatever the wife possessed, or was entitled to, passed to the husband on her death. Administration must, therefore, be taken out of the husband's estate. Solicitor, Hicklin.

Tuesday, May 7.

(Before Lord PENZANCE.) In the Goods of WAKEHAM. Will-Daughter appointed executrix of property not disposed of-Administration with will annexed. WM. WAKEHAM, late of Torquay, in the county of Devon, died 14th Dec. 1871, having made his will, bearing date 27th Aug. 1866. In it, after leaving certain specific bequests to various persons, including bequests and devises to his daughter, Sarah Anne Wakeham, he directed that if his daughter Sarah Anne Wakeham should marry and have children, his property at her death should be divided between them; but in the event of her dying without children, then his property was to go between his own and his wife's relations, and the will concluded thus: " And I nominate and appoint my daughter herein before named to be my executor for all the property whatsoever and wheresoever not named in the aforsesaid will, and also that John Bradide, of Tor, builder, and Edward Summons, of Torquay, grocer, be joint trustees of my will. At the testator's death his daughter Sarah Anne Wakeham was unmarried. The widow was also living, and there were numer ous nephews and nieces both of the testator and his wife surviving.

Dr. Tristram moved for probate to Sarah Anne Wakeham, as executrix. [Lord Penzance.-She is only named executrix of what is not disposed of.] By that the testatrix only meant to say that she died intestate as to that particular property. Lord PENZANCE.-You cannot take as executrix. You may take a grant of administration with the will annexed as a legatee interested in the residue which is undisposed of. But you must get the consent of the widow and the other next of kin. Proctor, Brookes.

LEGISLATION AND JURISPRUDENCE.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Monday, May 6.

APPELLATE JURISDICTION.

Lord CAIRNS moved the appointment of the Select Committee on Appellate Jurisdiction, and proposed the following names: The Lord Chancellor, the Lord President, the Duke of Somerset, the Duke of Richmond, the Marquis of Salisbury, the Earl of Derby, Earl Stanhope, Earl Powis, Earl Grey, the Earl of Morley, Earl Beauchamp, Lord Brodrick, Lord Redesdale, Lord Rosebery, Lord Chelmsford, Lord Lyveden, Lord Westbury, Lord Houghton, Lord Romilly, Lord Colonsay, Lord Cairns, Lord Penzance, Lord Acton, Lord O'Hagan, and Lord Blachford.It was pointed out by the LORD CHANCELLOR and Lord GRANVILLE that out of the twenty-five peers selected by Lord Cairns, fourteen might be regarded as unfriendly to the Lord Chancellor's proposal, and only eleven in its favour.--Lord HATHERLEY further adverted to the caricature of the Bill drawn by Lord Cairns, to the party complexion of his speech, and the state of the Opposition benches during that debate. These imputations were vigorously resented by the front opposition bench.

Lord DERBY reminded the Lord Chancellor that the matter referred to the Select Committee was not limited to the Lord Chancellor's Bill, but comprised the whole subject of the appellate jurisdiction. The Duke of RICHMOND protested against the imputation of party motives, merely because the Opposition peers had come down to throw out what they regarded as a bad Bill.Lord SALISBURY said their Lordships were not to pack their juries because a certain result was desired; whereupon Lord GRANVILLE retorted that this was exactly what the Government complained of.-Lord CAIRNS asked whether Lord Penzance and Lord Houghton were not to be reckoned among the Ministerial peers on the committee, and avowed his belief that there were not twenty peers on the Ministerial benches who approved the Bill.Lord RIPON rejoined that it was not necessary for the friends of the Government to defend the Bill, as the Lord Chancellor, at an early stage, expressed his willingness to refer it to a committee upstairs.Lord CHELMSFORD disclaimed going into the committee with any party motives. Ultimately the Select Committee was nominated, with the addition of Lord Ossul

ton's name.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.
Friday, May 3.

LAW OFFICERS OF THE CROWN.

Mr. FAWCETT rose to call attention to the relations of the law officers to the Crown and the House of Commons, and move a resolution that it is desirable that some new arrangements should be adopted in order to secure for the public the undivided attention of those who are primarily responsible for introducing measures of law reform, and for tendering legal advice to the Government.

Nothing was further from his intention than to make any personal attack on the law officers. It was the system, not persons, that he attacked. He believed the present law officers had done nothing which had not been done by their predecessors, and nothing which would not be done by their successors, unless Parliament intervened. The present system was so cumbrous, so inconvenient, and so ineffective, that the greatest possible evils resulted from it. The Lord Chancellor was a member of the Cabinet, and gave his advice on legal matters directly to the Government; but the Attorney and Solicitor-Generals were not members of the Cabinet, and could only give their advice circuitously. With regard to the Attorney. General and Solicitor-General, was it not the fact that the time which they had at their disposal for the discharge of their public duties varied in an inverse ratio to their forensic ability and reputation? All the time which a very eminent AttorneyGeneral and Solicitor-General had for the discharge of their public duties was that which was left after satisfying the demands of private clients. The Attorney-General and Solicitor-General were primarily responsible for the introduction of measures of law reform, and yet was it not notorious that there was no country in the world where the legal system was so complicated, and where justice was so slow and so dear. Only yesterday the hon. and learned member for Taunton declared to him that if a merchant of the City of London had a suit at Guildhall, he would guarantee by using the delay which the law placed at his disposal to prevent the case from being decided for four years. It often happened in civil suits for the recovery of a sum of money that far more money than the sum in dispute was rapidly consumed in legal costs, and the parties found that they were only engaged in throwing good money after bad. There were great legal reforms waiting for accomplishment, and until they were carried into execution every man, woman, and child in the country might be considered to suffer. What chance would the present administration have had of passing any one of those measures on which they prided themselves if those who were responsible for them had had their time otherwise occupied ? The passing of the Irish Church Act was mainly due to the mastery of details and the perfect knowledge of the subject displayed by the Prime Minister. No one would deny the Prime Minister was as eminent for his financial skill as the Attorney-General or Solicitor-General for legal knowledge; but, supposing he allowed his financial ability to be competed for, would there not be many persons in the City anxious to avail themselves of his services; and if, were he to give his services to them what chance would there be of his again introducing another great measure into Parliament, and of exhibiting a perfect mastery of the case? If this was true with respect to the Prime Minister, was it not also true with respect to the law officers of the Crown, and why should it be less intolerable that those who were at the head of law and justice should give up their time to private practice? The law officers of the Crown were not only primarily responsible for measures of reform, but for tendering legal advice to the Government. There was scarcely any measure introduced by the Governplicated legal question, and yet at any moment the Government might be deprived of their assistance and guidance in consequence of the whole of their time being absorbed in some private suit. What had been witnessed during the present session? As the Ballot Bill was passing through committee, was it not found night after night that some clause required legal interpretation? Hon. members thereupon applied to the law officers of the Crown, and up rose the Solicitor-General, and in one moment confusion was worse confounded. (Laughter.) The other day when the measure in troduced by the hon. baronet the member for the county of Clare, relative to the mortmain laws, was under discussion there were no law officers of the Crown present to give the House an authoritative opinion as to its legal effect, and on turning to the Times of the following day he had found that the Attorney-General had been engaged on that occasion in the Court of Queen's Bench arguing a case of Skinner v. Usher, connected with the hiring of a cab from a railway station, which arose out of a cumbrous and invalid Act conflicting with other Acts, which was passed in 1869, when that hon. and learned gentleman was one of the law officers of the Crown. (Hear, hear, and a laugh.) What security was there that in time to come the law officers of the Crown would be sufficiently disengaged to be able to give the Government prompt advice, which might save us from another set of Alabama claims? Again, much evil arose from those who were to a certain extent the public prosecutors being engaged in private practice, as was shown in the case of the prosecution of the directors of Overend, Gurney, and Co., where the Solicitor-General had been engaged for the defence, and in the prosecution of the claimant in a recent action in which the

ment which did not raise some difficult and com

Attorney-General, after being opposed to him in the civil action, was about to prosecute him in a criminal trial. Referring to the patent fees, the hon. member characterised them as an unjust and an obnoxious tax upon genius and industry, imposed with the view of supplying the funds for paying the Attorney-General £7000, and the Solicitor-General £6000 per annum, for which the public received in return only the snippings of time squeezed out of their private practice. Sketching shortly the changes he proposed, he said that in the first place the political and judicial functions of the Lord Chancellor should be separated. Then there should be in the House of Commons a minister of justice charged with the department of law and justice, primarily responsible for law reforms, and ready to answer any question of a legal character. There would be no difficulty in obtaining the services of such a man for £8000 a year; and as to the Attorney-General and Solicitor-General, the Government should retain counsel when they wanted counsel, paying only for work done. It had been said that the well-being of a cominunity might be estimated by the extent to which justice was cheap and expeditious. Judged by this test, England at present could certainly not be ranked among the most happily-situated nations in the world. (Hear.)-The ATTORNEY-GENERAL admitted that the question was one of practical importance, but his hon. friend had been singularly unsuccessful in arriving at the true facts, and his speech and motion were alike founded on a singular misapprehension. As far as the present law officers were concerned, nothing could be more inaccurate than the statement that grave public inconvenience was occasioned by their devotion to private practice. This was a serious imputation, not only upon them, but upon the long line of illustrious men who had filled the office. No law officer of common honour and honesty did, could, or would dare to undertake these delicate, difficult, and responsible duties, and discharge them in the hap-hazard, chance-medley fashion which was suggested. Speaking for himself, he would say it was absolutely incorrect. The duties might have been badly done, but they had not been carelessly or indolently done, or subordinated to private practice; and what he had said of himself he could say of others, of Sir R. Collier, for instance, Sir J. Karslake, and Lord Cairns. His hon. friend had made it a matter of complaint that filling the position which he did in a late remarkable case, he should fill a position also in a case arising out of it. But the House should remember that that

was not of his own seeking, that the prosecution was directed by the judge, and the duty of conducting it imposed on him by the judge in the face of the public. (Hear.) It was quite true that the public time and his own had for weeks and months been absorbed in the case referred to, but that was a case notoriously without parallel, and the like of which, as far as could be judged, in all human probability, would never occur again. What had suffered in consequence of that case? He could truly say not the public business, nor

the business of the Government, but the whole or almost the whole of his own private practice. (Hear.) His hon. friend had spoken about the remuneration of the law officers of the Crown. Some time ago, when it was suggested that a new arrangement should be made, he was holding the office of Solicitor-General, and the Government consulted him, telling him that he might speak his mind freely, because, as he had taken office under different circumstances, he could not possibly be affected. He suggested some modifications, and stated that he was willing they should be applied to himself, but the Government did not think fit to accept them, and so the matter dropped. He would ask what the House wanted in the law officers? The very best and highest members of the profession who could obtain a seat in the House, men of position and experience at the Bar, and who, when they delivered an opinion, must not be overborne by the weight of greater legal authority in the House itself. (Hear.) His hon. friend had said that they should be prepared to relinquish their private practice upon accepting office. But he would tell his hon. friend that it was impracticable, and that proposition was even absurd. (Hear, hear,) Since the accession of William IV. there had been twenty Attorney-Generals-the Solicitor-Generals had been more numerous. That gave a duration of office on the average of a little more than two years, and did any man in his senses believe that a man at the head of his profession would take upon such terms as his hon. friend proposed an office so precarious as the experience of the last forty-two years had shown it to be. Would any physician or engineer of eminence do anything of the kind? (Hear.) The law officers in accepting office made considerable sacrifices. A member of the common law bar gave up his circuit. He could never regain all the practice which he had given up. The man who was nearly his equal when he accepted office, became greatly his superior after two or three years' continued practice

in his absence. If the position of law officer were offered to him on the terms suggested by his hon. friend, he should absolutely and peremptorily decline it. By becoming a law officer he had lost between a third and a half of his private practice. Of the thirty judges, from the Lord Chancellor, with £10,000 a year, down to the judge of the Admiralty Court, with £4000 a year, only thirteen, including law officers, had been in Parliament; the other seventeen had never been in Parliament. So that a lawyer who was desirous of attaining a seat on the bench was as sure of obtaining his object by remaining out of Parliament and refusing office as by coming into Parliament and by accepting office. His hon. friend said that the position and salary of the law officers, contrasted favour ably with the salaries and position of men of the highest possible distinction in other branches of the services of the State, and that was perfectly true. But there was no kind of parallel between the cases. A statesman gave up nothing on taking office. Most frequently he either had or would succeed to an estate. But a lawyer was a person who could not be indifferent to money. The resolution of his hon. friend stated in effect that law reform was in a bad condition because of the position of the law officers, and that it was the duty of the law officers to introduce law reform and tender legal advice to her Majesty's Government. As a rule, it was the duty of the Lord Chancellor to initiate measures of law reform. The law officers were not members of the Cabinet. Although law reform had not progressed as rapidly as he could have wished, since 1868 the law officers with reference to measures of law reform had not been idle. One of the great difficulties encountered in carrying measures of law reform through that House was the far greater interest which the House took in questions of party politics. The hon. and learned member for Richmond, with all his eloquence and his high character, could barely keep together a House to discuss the subject of legal education. Moreover, in the other House of Parliament, measures of law reform had before now been turned into party questions, and the contention there sometimes was as much about who should carry those measures as about the measures them selves. Those were serious practical difficulties in the path of any earnest legal reformer. In conclusion, he thought the motion of his hon. friend ought to receive no favour at the hands of the House, because it was an unfounded, an unpractical, and a mischievous one, and if adopted would only tend to lower the character of the profession, and weaken the power of the Executive Government. (Hear, hear.) Mr. PERCY WYNDHAM complained of the frequent absence of the law officers of the Government from the discussions in that House; and although believing the Tichborne claimant to be one of the greatest impostors ever known (a laugh), thought it was to be deprecated that the leading counsel against the claimant in the late civil suit should be employed to prosecute him in the forthcoming criminal trial. The SOLICITORGENERAL, after defending himself from the charge of creating confusion or adding to existing confusion in the minds of hon. members by the answers he gave in that House, denied that nearly the whole of his time was devoted to private practic. When office was offered to him he decided on giving up, and had actually given up, more than two-thirds of his private practice. No inconvenience arose to the public as far as he was concerned from his attention to private practice, because he had made it a rule to give a preference to public business. His private practice certainly did not occupy half his time, and certainly his official duties could not be discharged if he devoted the greater portion of his time to private practice. The hon. member had an erroneous idea of the true position of law officers. The initiation of law reform did not rest with them, but with the Cabinet, and it was their duty to give assistance and advice when asked for it. The reason why law reform did not progress was that important political measures left no time for law reform. Important measures of law reform had been prepared and printed and laid aside in former sessions, and it would be useless to suggest new measures until the old ones had been disposed of. The primary duty of a law officer was to act as counsel for the Crown, and to conduct its litigious business in the courts, and in order to be qualified to do this he required continuous practice. -Mr. VERNON HARCOURT wished the Attorney-General had adhered to his professed intention to argue the question upon general grounds, instead of introducing personal considerations. As a member of the legal profession he desired to protest against one phrase used by the hon. and learned gentleman when he spoke of the distinction between law officers and other political ministers accounting for the difference in their remuneration. He said that no man could occupy a great office of state who did not possess an independent fortune. He hoped that was not true, for such a statement was one of the most mischievous and revolutionary

that could go forth from the Treasury Bench. The hon. and learned gentleman said men who were not lawyers did not enter the House to make money by statesmanship. On the part of the legal profession he protested against that profession being made an exception to the rule, and he protested against the statement that there was any class who entered the House to make money by statesmanship.--The ATTORNEY-GENERAL, in explanation, said the distinction he drew was between persons who gave up professional practice and persons who gave up nothing.--Mr. VERNON HARCOURT, in continuation, questioned the state. ment that a law officer could not return to the practice which he had abandoned on taking office, and said that if the Attorney-General left the public service his services would immediately be in great requisition. Another protest he had to make was against the Solicitor-General's disclaimer of the responsibility of the law officers for the initiation of law reform. True, they did not belong to the Cabinet, but, if they were not responsible, from whom would the House of Commons receive the views of the Government on the question of law reform? In the address which had been so severely criticised, by which he certainly never meant to give offence, he ventured to suggest that there should be a member of the Cabinet specially charged with the question of law reform, and if there were the House would not witness the spectacle of the two principal law officers of the Crown getting up and washing their hands of all responsibility of it. Did not that account for the melancholy collapse with respect to law reform, which had been witnessed during the last four years? Measures with the object of reforming the laws were brought into the House of Commons, and they were coldshouldered by the Attorney and Solicitor-General of the day, who said "They are no child of mine." Now, he considered that the first duty of the law officers of the Crown ought to be to attend to legislation in that House, and he himself, if no more competent would undertake, would pledge himself to call attention before long to the whole condition of law reform in this country which at present afforded a spectacle of legislative impotence which reflected discredit on hoth Houses of Parliament. (Hear, hear.)- -After a few words from Mr. SCOURFIELD, Mr. LOCKE took occasion to say that his experience led him to beiieve that, while there was a great deal of cry about law reform in this country, very few in reality seemed to want it. His hon. and learned friend who had spoken last but one talked a great deal about the subject, but he did nothing. The hon. and learned gentleman was one of those who sought to set everybody right, but it would, he thought, be as well if he would first right himself. (A laugh.) If he would only do something worthy of his great abilities in the direction of law reform, the House, he had no doubt, would entertain a better opinion of him than it did at present.—Mr. NEWDEGATE pointed out, as one of the reasons why law reform had of late made no progress, that the Government did not seem disposed to proceed on those old constitutional principles on which alone the country desired that any such reform should be based.--After a few words from Mr. MACFIE the subject dropped.

one

Wednesday, May 1.

Mr. A. BASS (for Mr. Bass) obtained leave to bring in a Bill to abolish imprisonment for debt.

Mr. V. HARCOURT obtained leave to bring in

accepted such retainer; and the plaintiff requested him, and it became his duty, to cause the bill to be registered as a lis pendens. Breach that the defendant neglected to register the same, whereby D. was enabled to sell the lease to another company, and the plaintiff lost his four-tenth shares. Plea, traverse of the request to register. On demurrer: Held, that it was the duty of the defendant to know that the suit should be regis tered, and cause it to be so without any request, and that the plea, being an immaterial traverse, was bad: (Plant v. Pearman, 26 L. T. Rep. N. S. 313. Q. B.)

NEGLIGENCE--ACCIDENT FROM GAS EXPLOSION.-The defendants, a gas company, contracted to supply the plaintiff with a proper and sufficient service pipe for the conveyance of gas from their main in the street outside to the gas-meter inside the plaintiff's premises. The pipe having been accordingly laid down by the company's workmen, gas escaped therefrom into the plaintiff's shop, and a workman, in the employ of the gasfitter employed by plaintiff to lay down pipes in other parts of the premises, happening to be at work there at the time of the escape, upon becoming aware of it, went into the shop in order to ascertain whence the escape was taking place. Having a lighted candle in his hand, an explosion of gas was the immediate consequence of his entrance into the shop, and damage was thereby done to the plaintiffs stock and premises. Thereupon the plaintiff brought an action against the defendants for a breach of contract, in failing to supply a proper and sufficient service pipe, at the trial of which the jury found-first, that the escape of gas was owing to a defect in the service pipe, existing therein at the time it was supplied by the defendants; and, secondly, that there was negligence on the part of the gasfitter's workmen in taking a lighted candle into the shop to discover the leak in the pipe; and they also expressed an opinion that the defendants were negligent in not sending their own foreman to test the new pipes. Held, upon these findings, by the Court of Exchequer Chamber (Cockburn, C.J., Willes, Blackburn, Mellor, Brett, and Grove, JJ.), affirming the judgment of the Court of Exchequer (Kelly, C.B., and Martin, Channell, and Pigott, BB.), that the action was maintainable, and the plaintiff entitled to recover substantial damages, the defendants not being relieved from liability by the negligent act of the workman employed by the gasfitter: (Burrows v. The March Gas and Coke Company (Limited), 26 L. T. Rep. N. S. 318. Ex. Ch.) WILL - CHARITABLE BEQUEST - DIRECTION FOR REPAIR OF GRAVESTONES.-Testator, after certain directions as to the graves of himself and his niece, desired his executors to pay to the trustees of the Tailors' Institution, Haverstockhill, £1000 for the following use, that is, to pay the required amount for painting and keeping in repair the gravestone or gravestones in Kensalgreen Cemetery or elsewhere, for the 15th June yearly, if required, and to divide the balance that may remain into two equal parts," to be applied as therein mentioned for the benefit of the pensioners in the institution. Held, that there was a good gift of the whole sum of £1000 to the charity, discharged from any obligation to repair the gravestones: (Hunter v. Bullock, 26 L. T. Rep. N. S. 349. V.C. B.).

BANK OF ENGLAND.

SOLICITORS' JOURNAL.

NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. NUISANCE HEAT NOISE - VIBRATION DELAY-DAMAGES-21 & 22 Vic. c. 27, s. 2.-The defendant, in Jan. 1865, erected a steam engine in a shed adjoining the stable, belonging to the plaintiffs, by which the stable was rendered unfit for horses, and some inconvenience occasioned in the plaintiffs' dwelling-house. No complaint was made by the plaintiffs until June 1870. Under the circumstances, the court refused to grant an injunction to restrain the defendant from working the engine, but directed an inquiry as to what damages should be awarded to the plaintiffs in respect of the injury to the dwelling-house and stable: (Gaunt v. Fynney, 26 L. T. Rep. N. S. 308. M. R.)

SOLICITOR-DUTY OF-REGISTRATION OF LIS

[Transferred to the Commissioners for the Reduction of the National Debt, and which will be paid to the persons respectively whose names are prefixed to each in three months, unless other claimants sooner appear.] JOLLIFFE (Hedworth Hylton), Esq.. Tilgate Forest, Sussex, and Bowyer (Rev. W. Henry Wentworth Atkins), Rector of Clapham, Surrey, one dividend on the sum of £5326 48. sd. Reduced Three per Cent. Annuities, claimant said Hedworth Hylton Jolliffe.

HEIRS-AT-LAW AND NEXT OF KIN. LACY (Edward), Engenie-villa, Ravenscourt-park, Hammersmith, and the Bedford Arms Tavern, Pont-street, Belgrave-square, Middlesex, and elsewhere, licensed victualler, heir-at-iaw, or next of kin, to come in by May 1, at the chambers of the M. R. June 15, at twelve o'clock, at the said chambers, is the time appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon such claims.

CREDITORS UNDER ESTATES IN CHANCERY. LAST DAY OF PROOF. CHADWICK (Jas.), Manchester, cotton waste dealer. June 5; W. H. Hewitt, solicitor, 8, Marsden-street, Manchester. June 17; V.C, W., at two o'clock. Down (Major Gen. Jas. S.), 46, Priory-road, Kilburn, Middlesex. May 31; G. R. Puddicombe, solicitor, 3, Furnival'sinn, E.C. June 10; V.C. W., at twelve o'clock. EDWARDS (Anne J.). Fron, Dolgelley, Merioneth. June 11: G. J. Williams, solicitor, Dolgelley. June 18; V.C. B., at twelve o'clock.

Angell Park-road, Brixton, Surrey. miller. May S; E. P. Philpot, solicitor, 61, Cheapside, E.C. May 23; V.C. W.," at twelve o'clock. GOBLE (Iden), 48, High-street, Borough, Southwark,

Surrey. June 4; Champion and Co., solicitors, 17, Ironmonger-lane, E.C. June 18; V.C. W., at twelve o'clock. HAMMOND (Joshua), Handsworth, Warwick, land surveyor. June S: Sanders and Smith, solicitors, Birmingham. June 21: V.C. W., at twelve o'clock.

HILL (Jas.), The Rookery. Streatham, Surrey, and 176, queray-Willaume, solicitor, 34, New Broad-street, E.C. Shoreditch, Middlesex, tobacconist. May 20; T. B. Tan

May 25: V.C. M., at twelve o'clock.