A GENERAL INDEX, Vols. 11 to 20 of the LAW TIMES

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The Law and the Lawyers.

Ir is expected that Mr. KINGDON, Q.C., will be appointed Recorder of Bristol, as Mr. H. T. COLE, Q.C., declines the appointment weighted with the restriction that the Recorder of that city shall not practise at the assizes there held.

We have received the Second Report of the Judicature Commission, but unfortunately too late for publication in extenso this week. A summary of it, taken from a contemporary, will be found elsewhere, and from that it will be seen that it deals principally with the County Courts. It, however, touches the_assizes, and on this point some of the commissioners disagree. Indeed, several, and they amongst the most important, members of the Commission, VOL. LIII.-No. 1533.

refuse to sign the report at all, as they cannot agree with its recommendations. We propose to deal more fully with the report at a future time, and next week we shall publish it fully, as it may be of interest to many of our readers.

WE publish elsewhere the Report of the Committee of the House of Lords on Appellate Jurisdiction. It is a most curious compromise between the desire of their Lordships to establish a single appellate tribunal, and their reluctance to abandon their power as the ultimate tribunal of appeal. One proposition is to create life peerages without legislative authority, so that the paid members of the tribunal may be of equal rank with the ordinary peers. It is, however, very doubtful whether such a dignity would be willingly accepted. A man who is capable of administering justice in the highest tribunal of the land is fairly entitled to consider himself in a position to have the rights as well as the rank of a peer. We hope to be able to call attention more fully to this report in our next issue.

WE are glad to see that the Town Council of the Borough, of Warwick are about to take action in the Quarter Sessions held for that borough. In several instances prisoners have been acquitted at these sessions under circumstances which have given rise to grave suspicions that the juries were influenced by motives other than that of the innocence or doubt of the guilt of the prisoners. Warwick is a small place, and it has been suggested that there can be very few cases which are tried at the sessions, and where the offence had been committed by inhabitants of the borough in which some member of the jury is not related or connected with the prisoner who is tried. If this is true, then, the sessions should be abolished; the suggestion of it gives good ground for seeking an inquiry, and we hope that such inquiry will take place.

THE Conclusion of the KEOGH debate last week must have been anticipated by every one. It was impossible to expect that any other result could have been arrived at. Now, it must be admitted that bringing the matter before the House of Commons was a mistake on the part of those who introduced it. That Mr. Justice KEOGH used language in some parts of his judgment which it would have been wiser to have moderated, was admitted long before the question was discussed in the House, and it is to be regretted that his opponents were not content with this admission. During the debate no one was in a position to dispute that on the main question his ruling was justified on his view of the facts, and as this was the only real point in the matter, it would have been more reasonable to have passed over any eccentricities of language in which he might have indulged. To ask for his removal from the bench for such a reason was ridiculous, and to pass censure upon him without removing him was impossible. The debate may perhaps bear some fruit, as it may induce him and others to use more temperate language if similar circumstances should arise. It would have been better if the learned judge had found spiritual intimidation as a fact, without indulging in a light and airy review of the history of the world.

ACTIONS for breach of promise of marriage seem to be even more common during the present assizes than usual. It is a question worthy of consideration whether these actions should be allowed to continue. Under the present system juries are called upon to assess damages for outraged feelings, for loss of caste, and for loss of worldly wealth, all in one case. Surely it is a hard task to place upon unfortunate jurymen to ask them to say how deeply a young lady's feelings are injured. At the Leeds assizes recently, Mr. Justice BLACKBURN very truly said, that as soon as an action is brought for breach of promise the contract of marriage is reduced to a mere commercial transaction. If so, then the juries ought to be asked to decide only what depreciation in the marriage market the plaintiff has sustained by reason of the refusal of the defendant to marry her; and when once a young lady chooses to put herself forward as a marketable article, she is apt, through her very act, to be very much depreciated in value. We are, therefore, inclined to regret she has the chance of so doing. Any woman who brings such an action can have very little self-respect, and any man who breaks his promise in such a case is rather a good riddance than a loss for which a woman should seek a money compensation.

JURYMEN in France seem to be exposed to risks luckily unknown to their fellows in England. The late Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. JULES FAVRE, appears to have memorialised the ProcureurGénéral of Paris on the subject of a juryman of Versailles who objected to try a case in which that learned advocate appeared as counsel, on the ground that he felt such an irrepressible repulsion towards the learned gentleman that he might be unable to give an unprejudiced consideration to the question. The juryman was excused by the president of the court; but M. JULES FAVRE is not satisfied, but demands a prosecution of the juryman for a "denial of justice." We should have thought that the advocate would only have been too glad to have got rid of such a juryman in the

interests of his client, but we presume his vanity was hurt. In this country a Judge has absolute power to excuse a juryman, and if we may judge by the powers usually exercised by a French court, such a power exists there also, and we have no doubt that M. JULES FAVRE will get no further satisfaction than such as he may derive from having brought the matter before the public. Such satisfaction is of a doubtful character, as it very often results in raising a laugh against the complainant.

WE notice that considerable efforts are being made to reform both the civil and criminal law in Egypt so far as it relates to persons not natives of that country. That some reform is necessary we are convinced. At present under treaties with the Porte and arrangements with the VICEROY of EGYPT, England has a consular court in most of the principal towns of the Levant, and she there, in a foreign country, exercises criminal jurisdiction over her own subjects, and in all civil matters in which an English subject is concerned he has a right to proceed in his own consular court. Nor is England the only country possessing this privilege. All the great powers of Europe have similar courts, and it constantly happens that unfortunate suitors are perplexed as to the court in which they may procure a remedy. But this is not the chief objection to the present arrangement, as it seems to us. The existence of such courts in a foreign country implies that we consider that the Government of that country is of too barbarous a character to give any guarantee for the due administration of any system of law, and that we are obliged, on that account, to privide a tribunal on which our fellow countrymen can rely. Surely this cannot be the way in which we should treat such a Government as that of Egypt. It may have been right in the past, but as things now exist, the ruler of that country has a right to ask that the administration of justice shall be in his hands, and it would be only right and fair that England, taking care that such administration shall be well guaranteed, should aid to bring about that result.

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AN evening contemporary takes a legal contemporary to task for gloating over litigious business. It says that "one of our legal contemporary's recording the other day with pardonable satisfaction the fact of a 'good cause list at Guilford,' naïvely remarked on the healthy tone indicated by the existence of 160 litigations, three-fourths of which were set down for special juries,' and thereupon proceeds to call attention to the fact that needy barristers will have a rich feast on the thirteen murders now standing for trial at Liverpool assizes. Respecting this our evening contemporary chooses to say that it is not an agreeable spectacle to watch the avidity with which the printed calendars of criminal business are grasped by eager hands at assizes and quarter sessions, and winds up by the sapient remark that "Briefless barristers, who happen to be also engaged in journalism, might be prevented from giving undue prominence to their very natural professional views.' With great respect to the writer of those remarks we should fancy that he must have been among those whose eager hands were so stretched out, or he would not be so conversant with their proceedings. We hope he is not a disappointed man. It is unfortunate that he cannot see that there is a great distinction between remarking with satisfaction upon increase in civil business and rejoicing over criminal work. Civil business in plenty indicates a healthy state of trade, as there is no time when such business comes so to a standstill as when a panic oppresses the market, and a healthy state of trade indicates prosperity to the country. Increase of criminal business is a matter over which no one would rejoice, although he might have no objection to profit by it if possible in a legitimate way.

THE arrival of Mr. COHEN in Geneva as second counsel for the British Government in the Geneva arbitration has given rise to numerous conjectures with respect to the course taken by the tribunal. It has been suggested that it necessarily implies that a decision adverse to England has been arrived at, and that this country has been held liable for negligence in allowing some of the Confederate cruisers to escape. That such an inference must necessarily be drawn from Mr. COHEN's taking part in the arguments at Geneva we cannot admit. In the first place. it must be remembered that it is almost unreasonable to expect that Sir ROUNDELL PALMER could bear the whole burden of that lengthened inquiry, more particularly when he was opposed singlehanded to three American lawyers, and if anyone was to assist him, Mr. COHEN was the most likely person to be chosen, as he has already been engaged in investigating the claims. Secondly, it must be remembered that England is accused of not having put in force those powers which she possessed under the Foreign Enlistment Acts, and also of having neglected to enact sufficiently stringent statutes to enable her to check the departure of any vessel destined for the use of the Confederates. Mr. COHEN was picked out to investigate the claims, because he was conversant with the practice of the Admiralty Court, and it should not be forgotten that the Admiralty Court is the tribunal to which is entrusted the v of construing the Foreign Enlistment Acts. If any question

has arisen with respect to those Acts, the person who would be best able to assist in their construction would be a barrister practising in that court, and Mr. COHEN, having been previously engaged in the matter, would naturally be selected for that pur pose. That Mr. COHEN would go to Geneva has been long antici pated, and we are unable to see that the fact has any peculiar significance.

AN Act was printed last week which provides that the salaries of Judges of Superior and all other courts shall become payable only from the date of appointmert of the several Judges to their offices, and not from date when the offices become vacant. A rumour was current some time back in Westminster Hall that one of the Judges, whose appointment was made some time after a vacancy had occurred in the court to which he was appointed, had claimed to be paid from the date of the vacancy, on the ground that a sum of money was appropriated by Act of Parliament for the payment of the salary, and for no other purpose, and that the Government had no power to apply it in any other way, but were bound to pay it year by year and quarter by quarter, so long as the Judge's office existed. There is no doubt that one object of such a demand, if it was made, was to compel the Government to fill up vacancies as soon as they occurred, and thereby to prevent any risk of excess of work falling on the other Judges. That such a demand was made is rendered at least probable by the passing of the Act above referred to. It is scarcely probable that the necessity for such an Act would have occurred to the Government without its being brought thus forcibly before them. We have often expressed our opinion upon the necessity of filling up vacancies at once, and even now our Judges are not too numerous, considering the labour they have to perform. It would be a subject of great regret if a vacancy such as there was recently in one of the courts at Westminster should recur, and if this Act was passed for the purpose of enabling the Government to appoint fewer Judges if they should think fit, we shall be unable to see the public advantage gained by the passing of the statute. It is no doubt right that a Judge should be paid only from the date of his appointment, but it is of infinitely more importance that the number of Judges should be commensurate with the amount of work they have to perform.

THE LEGISLATION OF THE SESSION. THE Acts passed during the session of Parliament which closed on Saturday last do not, so far as we are able to judge from those already printed, present any very striking novelty. Up to the present time there are fifty-eight Acts printed, that is to say, fifty-seven in consecutive order, and then a solitary Act, c. 94, printed, we presume, out of turn on account of its universal action. Of the above Acts the greater number relate to particular persons or places, and but few are of any very general interest. Despite Mr. VERNON HARCOURT's manful struggle, there has been no attempt to reform the administration of the law except in comparatively minor matters. Such Acts as are of general interest we will briefly call attention to, not so much with a view of explaining their import, as of indicating that they exist. We propose to deal more fully with the enactments of the session on a future occasion.

Although an Act for the repression of slavery is not strictly speaking a legal subject, yet any Act dealing with such a matter with a strong hand will be a welcome addition to our statute books, and we need scarcely apologise for calling attention to the fact that chapter 19 of the present year has for its object the prevention of outrages on the Pacific Islanders. This was not perhaps slavery in name, but it was slavery in fact, and we can only hope that the provisions of the Act may be found sufficient for the purpose for which it was passed. The next Act of importance in the list is chapter 33, which introduces the Ballot for the first time into English elections. This will no doubt create a great change in the manner in which elections are conducted, and may make great alterations in the results. Whether the change is for good or evil is not for us to say, as to discuss such a question would be nearing the confines of politics, which we conceive it to be our duty carefully to avoid. At the very moment we are writing, the first Parliamentary election under the new system is taking place, and by the time these words are published, some practical knowledge of the new Act will have been gained. It is not very long since that the whole of England was startled by revelations concerning what was known as the baby farming system, and all persons called for some legislation which should better protect infant life. This protection c. 38 of the last session proposes to give, and the principal means adopted to secure immunity from the repetition of the former neglect and crime is to have all persons engaged in the pursuit of baby farming and their houses registered by the police. The next Act we notice is chapter 41, which deals with a matter that also created a sensation quite recently, namely, the winding-up of life insurance companies. Under its provisions, where the business of a company is transferred to another and the principal and subsidiary companies are being wound up, that winding-up is to be one transaction. This we presume is to meet difficulties similar to those which arose in

the winding-up of the several insurance companies which required the assistance of an ex-Lord Chancellor to settle their affairs. Chapter 45 is merely a formal Act, but still of much interest and even importance. It has for its object the carrying out of the provisions of the Treaty of Washington, and expressly enacts that the provisions of that treaty are to have full force, notwithstanding any enactment which may exist to the contrary. It recites that similar statutes have been passed by the several Parliaments of the British Dominions in North America. During the present age of strikes and disputes between masters and workmen, any Act which has a tendency to promote an amicable settlement of such quarrels will be welcomed by the public. And chapter 45 gives certain facilities for the carrying out such arbitrations. Chapter 51 we have already noticed. It is to provide that Judges' salaries shall commence from the dates of their appointments, and we are still more strengthened in our belief in the truth of the supposed rumour by the fact that the Act is made to apply to Judges already appointed at the time of the passing of the Act. In 1869 imprisonment for debt was abolished in England. Why it should have been continued after that period in Ireland it is difficult to say, but now chap. 57 of the present year abolishes imprisonment for debt in that country. The Act is almost the same as the Debtors' Act, 1869, and in fact its title is the same with the addition of the word "Ireland" and the alteration of the date. Lastly, we have to notice the Intoxicating Liquors Act. This give a summary of in another part of our publication. Such Acts must always be experiments, and we can only hope that it may be a successful one.

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Unless among the statutes yet to be printed, something of more general interest should exist, the statutes of the session will not call for much remark at our hands. What naturally would interest our readers and ourselves the most, would be any enactment dealing with the administration of the law; but as we have said, such an Act does not exist, and we can only hope that now that the Judicature Commission has reported as well as the Select Committe of the House of Lords, we may find that in the ensuing or an early session, the House of Commons may be allowed to find time to attend to this subject.

REVISING BARRISTERS' APPOINTMENTS. Now that the Circuits are nearly over, and Her MAJESTY'S Judges have exercised the small amount of patronage which the law gives to them, the question as to whether it is desirable that they should continue to exercise any patronage may fairly be mooted.

The notion that the right of appointment to public office, is a personal right to be exercised for the private benefit of the person in whom the right is vested, has now completely exploded, and public opinion has more than once emphatically declared itself in favour of the doctrine that public patronage is a trust to be exercised solely in the interests of the public.

Nothing has tended more to lower the general respect which has been felt for the Episcopal Bench than the spirit of nepotism so frequently displayed by the bishops in the exercise of their ecclesiastical patronage, and yet can it be said that the Judicial Bench are altogether free from the contaminating influence of the same spirit? One has only to look through the list of Judge's sons and nephews at the Bar to see who are provided with appointments in the gift of the Judges. This, though possibly very natural, is hardly as it should be. It may be that the spirit is in accordance with natural instincts, but then Judges are, or ought to be, far above the promptings of anything so nearly allied to vulgar feeling. At all events, when public attention is called to the subject, it is not a circumstance which tends to increase the respect which all now feel for the Judicial Bench, or to enhance the public idea of its high-mindedness.

If this were the only reason against the Judges being entrusted with patronage it would be almost sufficient, but it is only one among many. The circumstance of a Judge having power to appoint any one to a public office of profit renders him liable to be persecuted by the importunity of the friends of candidates, and to an amount of pressure from persons of influence and position, which must sometimes be very difficult, and sometimes hardly possible, to resist. That Judges should be exposed to any indirect influence is at all times very objectionable, and if once the practice of endeavouring to influence a Judge by private means be established, the evil is almost certain to spread in other directions. But apart from these objections, which would seem to be somewhat personal to the Judges themselves, there is the main objection, which we take to be conclusive, which is, that the Judges are practically irresponsible as regards the exercise of their duty of patronage. A minister may, and often is, called upon to account for the mode in which he performs his duty when he appoints a person to office. The Lord CHANCELLOR, too, may always be required publicly to account in the same way, as was instanced in the cases of Mr. BEALES and Mr. HOMERSHAM COX, but a Judge is practically free from any such liability. The only mode in which he can be made answerable, is too cumbrous to be put in operation, even where the particular matter is of sufficient importance to

justify action. We doubt not, but that the Judges themselves would gladly be freed from the duty of appointing revising barristers, for we can conceive no duty more perplexing and painful to a right minded man than that of deciding between conflicting claims, where all are equally competent, and all equally deserving, and where many must be disappointed and the disappointment entail misery beyond calculation.

Apart from the above the exercise of patronage by the Judges has a deteriorating effect upon the Bar, and if the power now exercised were taken away it would be better both for the Bench and the Bar.

CHARTER-PARTY-CESSER OF LIABILITY CLAUSE. THE construction of charter-parties is a duty cast upon our courts which is by no means easy. These documents are loosely worded, and, for the sake of conciseness, they are frequently made obscure. It is no doubt desirable that a mercantile document should express the intention of the parties to it in as few words as possible; but when those parties do not agree upon the meaning of its terms, the court which has to decide between them may fairly complain that language is not used such as will be free from ambiguity, and where a Judge finds such ambiguity, he will be justified in construing the contract adversely to the party who seeks to be released from liability, because, as was said by Blackburn, J., in Christoffersen v. Hansen (26 L. T. Rep. N. S. 547), "when parties mean to get rid of liability they should take care to use clear and unmistakable language."

The case just referred to was a claim under a charter-party for delay in loading. The declaration stated that it was agreed that the plaintiff's ship should proceed to Sunderland, and that the defendant should there load the ship in regular turn with a complete cargo of coals, and that the ship should thereupon proceed to Kiel, and there deliver the same to the freighter, on being paid freight, and that "the said charter-party being concluded by the defendant on behalf of another person resident abroad, all liability of the defendant should cease as soon as he had shipped the said cargo." The breach of contract complained of, was that the defendant did not load the ship in due time, but delayed her for fifteen days. To this the defendant pleaded that the charter-party was concluded on behalf of another party resident abroad, and that the defendant before the suit shipped the cargo under the charterparty, whereupon, according to the terms of the charter-party, all liability of the defendant ceased. To this plea the plaintiff demurred, on the ground that the clause of the charter-party relied upon did not apply to liabilities accruing prior to or during shipment of cargo, but only to liabilities accruing subsequently to the shipment.

The

It was strongly contended upon the argument of this demurrer that the meaning to be given to these words was their natural meaning, and that they were not to be narrowed to the extent contended for by the plaintiff, and an attempt was made to distinguish the case of Pederson v. Lotinga (28 L. T. Rep. 267). The charter-party in that case contained a clause stipulating that "the charter-party being concluded by N. S. Lotinga on behalf of another party, it is agreed that all liability of the former shall cease as soon as he has shipped the cargo, the owners and the master agreeing to rest solely on their lien for freight and demurrage," and the demurrage was expressly said to accrue due de die in diem. The Court of Queen's Bench there held that the charterer was liable from demurrage before the cargo was shipped. The ground of distinction submitted was that in the earlier case there was a reservation of lien, and that as the demurrage accrued due day by day, the defendant there could not throw off his liability when it had once attached, whereas in the present case, there being no such stipulation, he incurred no liability when once the cargo was shipped. Court of Queen's Bench, however, held that the true construction of the words was that the charterer was liable for all delay before shipment. They decided the case first on the authority of Pederson v. Lotinga, and secondly, on principle. It was admitted by the learned Judges that the language was ambiguous, but it was said that the more probable construction was that the charterer, although willing to be liable for such things as occurred in this country, declined to be liable for anything happening abroad. Lord Chief Justice Cockburn said: "The shipowner would know little or nothing of the parties abroad, although as soon as the cargo was loaded, he would know them to be persons of substance, that is to say, possessing valuable property on board his vessel, but he would, nevertheless, be always under considerable difficulty in proving his case against persons in a foreign country in respect of delay occasioned to his ship while here, and would be obliged to sue them in a foreign court unless under some state of circumstances through which he could sue in this country. Of course, then, the shipowner would much prefer having a person in this country instead of one in foreign parts, or within the jurisdiction only of foreign courts. But I can quite understand, on the other hand, the agent contracting for a foreign principal, saying that he, the agent, was ready to enter into a liability as far as concerned the vessel up to the termination of the loading, but that he would refuse to become

liable for what might or might not be done at the other side of the sea. And that, according to my view, is the true construction to be put on the language used in the present charter-party, looking at the surrounding circumstances and the relative position of the parties." That this decision is dealing out substantial justice as between these parties there can be no doubt, as the shipowner, short of an express stipulation, could have no lien upon the cargo for delay before shipment, and would therefore have no remedy for this delay if the charterer's liability was to cease. There is, however, another question to be considered. It is clear that "all liability" will include liability for delay both before and after shipment, and that there is nothing repugnant to common sense in attaching to those words such a meaning, but rather such a meaning is the plain and obvious sense in which they should be taken, so long as nothing else intervenes to alter it. Then, the question is, did anything occur in this case to alter this meaning? Parties to such contracts are always bound by the plain meaning of the words they make use of, and if the shipowner chose to use these words he was bound by them. Nothing does alter them SO far as the contract appears in the declaration, and we fail to see how the plain words of contract can be altered, merely because a hardship would accrue to one party by such a construction. That party must be taken to have brought this hardship upon himself. Mr. Justice Lush in giving judgment said: If there had been a provision in the charter-party giving the shipowner the advantage equivalent to that given to the defendant, that would be a reason why he should absolve him altogether. But there is no provision whatever, giving him a remedy against the cargo." But if the shipowner chooses to be satisfied with the loading of the cargo and does not choose to make his agreement so clear that the words must mean that he claims against the charterer for the delay before the loading, then where is the necessity for an equivalent. The agreement is in writing, and it ought not to be that words not in the agreement are introduced by a court of law.

The decision may be equitable, but we cannot understand how a construction can be put upon these words other than that which they naturally bear.

COUNTY COURTS ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION. In the recent case of Simpson v. Blues (26 L. T. Rep. N. S. 698), the Court of Common Pleas has decided that the County Courts' Admiralty Jurisdiction Acts (31 & 32 Vict. c. 71, and 32 & 33 Vict. c. 51), although they invest certain County Courts with jurisdiction to entertain and determine a limited portion of the cases which up to the passing of those Acts were entertained and determined only by the High Court of Admiralty, do not give those County Courts any jurisdiction which was not already possessed by the Admiralty Court. The reasons upon which that decision is based are principally two-first, because in construing Acts giving jurisdiction, that jurisdiction must be restrained within the fitness of the matter, and these Acts, having been passed to distribute existing Admiralty jurisdiction, must not be allowed by implication to give a larger jurisdiction; secondly, because if the larger jurisdiction were given to the Acts, the effect would be indirectly to enlarge the jurisdiction of the Admiralty Court, as power is given by the first of the two Acts to transfer all Admiralty causes commenced in a County Court to the High Court of Admiralty. The question arose in a instituted in the Liverpool County Court, by a shipowner against a charterer for breach of charter party for short delivery of cargo, and although the facts at the time of the argument were not very clear, it would seem that both plaintiff and defendant were parties to the charter party. As the conclusion to which the Court then came has been much questioned, we propose to point out the ground upon which the decision is considered erroneous.

cause

In giving the reasons why the County Court cannot be considered to have jurisdiction over such claims, Mr. Justice Brett in delivering the judgment of the Court, appears to have overlooked an important matter. No doubt, in the construction of such Acts, as was there said, "all words, whether they be in deeds or statutes or otherwise, if they be general and not express and precise, should be restrained into the fitness of the matter," and "there should be no implication to extend the jurisdiction," but, with great submission, these principles must be qualified in so far that where words exist in Acts giving jurisdiction to inferior courts, however inconvenient, which words cannot be satisfied without those courts acquire a jurisdiction which did not before exist, then, despite the inconvenience, the statute must have effect. The learned Judge rules that the County Courts can have no greater jurisdiction than the Admiralty Court had previous to the passing of the 32 & 33 Vict. c. 51. If the words of the 2nd section of the latter Act can be satisfied by giving to the County Courts the jurisdiction possessed by the Admiralty Court under the Admiralty Court Act 1861, s. 6, it is manifest that the reasons given for restraining the new jurisdiction within those bounds are convincing. The Admiralty Court derives jurisdiction in all claims for damage to cargo and breach of contract of that nature from that Act alone, and therefore the extent of its jurisdiction depends upon the construction of that Act. By sect. 6, the Admiralty Court has

of

"jurisdiction over any claim by the owner or consignee or assignee any bill of lading of any goods carried into any port in England or Wales in any ship for damage done to the goods or any part thereof by the negligence or misconduct of, or for any breach of duty or breach of contract on the part of the owner, master, or crew of the ship, unless it is shown to the satisfaction of the court, that at the time of the institution of the cause, any owner or part owner of the ship is domiciled in England or Wales." Under that section, a claim may be made in the Admiralty Court by the owner of any goods, the consignee of any goods, or by the assignee of any bill of lading of any goods carried into any port of England or Wales in any ship the owner of which is not domiciled in England or Wales; a claim may be made by any of those persons for damage done to the goods by the negligence or misconduct of the owner, master, or crew of the ship; a claim may also be made for any breach of duty on their part, or for any breach of contract; but, with respect to this latter claim it is probably intended that the claim must be in respect to some actual or constructive damage to goods, as the only persons who can make the claim are the owners, &c., of goods carried into a British port: (See The Santa Anna, 32 L. J. 198, Adm.) Now, a claim for "damage done to goods by negligence or misconduct, is a claim in tort; a claim for breach of duty or contract in this section is a claim arising out of an express or implied condition of the contract entered into for the carriage of goods, as in the case where a master claims to detain the cargo for freight and average, and at the same time refuses to give information so that those claims may be satisfied: (The Norway, B. & L. 226; 2 Mar. Law Cas. O. S. 17.) The words of the Act under discussion are that "any County Court appointed, &c. shall have jurisdic

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tion, &c., to try and determine the following causes: (1) As to any claim arising out of any agreement made in relation to the use or hire of any ship, or in relation to the carriage of goods in any ship, and also as to any claim in tort in respect of goods carried in any ship." The wording of this section gives jurisdiction over three different claims, first (taking them in inverse order). a claim of tort in respect of goods carried in any ship," which, construed strictly according to the principle adopted in the present case, would correspond with the claim for "damage done to goods by negligence or misconduct" in the Admiralty Court Act 1861; secondly, a claim "arising out of any agree. ment in relation to the carriage of goods in any ship" which would in the same way correspond to the claim for breach duty or breach of contract on the part of the owner, master, or crew of the ship," in the Admiralty Court Act; and thirdly, a claim arising out of any agreement made in relation to the use or hire of any ship" for which, it is submitted, there are no corresponding words in the Admiralty Court Act. The obvious meaning of these words, when read with the whole section, is that they give jurisdiction over claims other than those relating to the mere carriage of goods, that is to say, over claims arising out of a breach of an agreement, by which a ship is hired, independently of any goods being laden on board or carried on that ship. They would appear to relate to claims in the nature of breach of contract in refusing to proceed to a port of loading, or in arriving at such a port after the stipulated time for loading a cargo. Unless such a meaning is attached to them they must be wholly inoperative and have no meaning, except such as is to be gathered from the succeeding words of the section. What makes it still more probable that these words were intended to have an operative force is the fact that the County Courts Admiralty Jurisdiction Act 1868 (31 & 32 Vict. c. 71) s. 8, gave jurisdiction to the County Courts for claims for "damage to cargo, and those words would include, if interpreted by the meaning usually attached to them in the Admiralty Court, all the claims that could be made under the Admiralty Court Act 1861, the amount only being limited. If these conclusions drawn from the comparison of the two Acts are correct, it is difficult to imagine how it can be said that the words of the County Courts Act can be satisfied, except by giving a larger jurisdiction than that already possessed by the Admiralty Court, and if it is once admitted that there is a larger jurisdiction, in respect of any one thing, there is no reason why a larger jurisdiction should not

exist in all such matters.

With regard to the particular case it is submitted that the proposition that the Admiralty Court never had jurisdiction over a claim arising exclusively out of a charter-party is a little too broad. Under the wording of sect. 6 of the Admiralty Court Act 1861 the court may entertain any claim by the owner or consignee of goods, independently of his being the holder of the bill of lading. If the owner or the consignee were a party to the charter-party, there seems to be no reason why he should not prosecute a claim in the Admiralty Court for a breach of its provisions so long as his goods were damaged by that breach. The Norway (B. & L. 226; 10 L. T. Rep. N. S. 40; 2 Mar. Law Cas. O. S. 17) only decided that the assignee of a bill of lading could not sue on a charterparty to which he was not a party.

Whatever may be the construction put upon the wording of the County Courts Act, there is little doubt that those who introduced it intended to give the County Courts the largest possible jurisdiction, they being of opinion that certain local