that the law does not recognise degrees of negligence and it should be taken that to be evidence of barratry the negligence must be culpable, and, thereupon, we approach Lord ELLENBOROUGH's definition of barratry as a crime. Culpable negligence may amount to a crime without any criminal intent, and for this underwriters ought to be held liable under loss by barratry. The American case which has suggested these remarks was curious. Ninety bales of cotton were loaded on deck and jettisoned in a storm. The captain signed a clear bill of lading, an insurance upon which does not cover goods carried on deck. Remonstrances notwithstanding, the captain persisted, and it was sought to recover the value of the cotton jettisoned as a loss by barratry. It appears to us that the court might have decided this case against the plaintiffs on a narrow ground, avoiding the elaborate exposition of the law relating to barratry. The goods on deck were never at the underwriter's risk, and, therefore, not the subject of barratry or general average within the terms of the policy. During vacation we shall, however, reproduce the report as being a clear summary of English and American cases relating to barratry. THE ISSUES FOR THE GENEVA ARBITRATORS. WE last week dealt with the question of due diligence, and will now proceed to consider what acts a neutral state is bound to use due diligence to prevent. According to the American case, a neutral government is bound to use due diligence to prevent the fitting out or arming, or equipping within its jurisdiction, of any vessel which it has reasonable ground to believe is intended to cruise or to carry on war against a power with which it is at peace; and also to use like diligence to prevent the departure from its jurisdiction of any vessel intended to cruise or carry on war as above, such vessel having been specially adapted, in whole or in part, within such period, to warlike use. Under this rule the United States would make Great Britain guilty of an offence every time the Alabama, or the Georgia, or the Florida, or the Shenandoah came within British jurisdiction, and was suffered to depart. A difficulty at once arises on the meaning of the term "specially adapted for warlike use," which, according to the United States, would include any adaptation whatever "for the hostile use of a belligerent, whether that adaptation began when the keel was laid to a vessel intended for hostile use, or whether it was made in later stages of construction, or in fitting out, or in furnishing, or in equipping, or in arming, or in any other way." The comment of the English case is: "In every case in which anything whatever has been done, however slight, to fit the vessel for warlike use (for the language of the United States is framed with studied care to embrace every possible act of adaptation) the obligation, with its attendant liability, attaches on the neutral government . . . . Literally, this duty might even be taken to apply to cases in which the adaptation had taken place for purposes totally unconnected with the particular war, or with either of the belligerents." In this instance, as in others, the Americans seem to have overreached themselves. The British case pithily remarks "It can hardly be necessary to say that this pretended obligation, whereby a neutral government would be bound to seize by force any public armed ship which might enter its ports, and of which there might be reason to believe that she had at any time before received some partial adaptation for war within the jurisdiction of the neutral, is entirely unknown to the law, unsupported by practice, and in direct conflict with the principles which have hitherto governed the admission of public ships of war into the ports of friendly nations." The British case proceeds to argue this point most convincingly, and seems to us to answer completely the American proposition. A vessel which has once escaped from a neutral territory and become an integral portion of the navy of a belligerent power, cannot on any pretence whatever, on returning to the neutral territory, be seized by the neutral government. To use the words of the case, "unless a violation of neutrality had been established in due course of law against such a vessel, while properly subject to the neutral jurisdiction, the question of fact whether such a violation had taken place could not, by any form of proceeding, be investigated between the neutral power, and the belligerent whose flag she bore. And to detain a public ship of war in a neutral port for acts done before she had obtained that character, without any previous notice that she was not at liberty to come in upon the usual terms, would be in itself an act of war, and a plain violation of well-settled rules of international comity." The United States, however, are not without some show of authority on their sides-if speeches in the English Parliament can be regarded as authority. Mr. COBDEN, in one of his speeches, referred to an expressed determination of our Government to stop the Alabama when it came within our jurisdiction, either at Queenstown or Nassau. But it is quite possible some such intention was entertained until the illegality of it was discovered. culty attending any such seizure lies in the absence of any regular proceeding. It would be intelligible if it were said that the Englishmen who had offended against the neutrality laws-supposing they The diffi did so by building war-ships for belligerents, ought to be punishedBut the ship having escaped, its character is changed, it is no longer amenable to the neutral jurisdiction, and it is difficult to see upon what ground a ship so escaping, could be refused hospitality in our ports, when entering them without notice of any unfriendly intention on the part of the neutral government, and in the character of a war ship of a belligerent power with which the neutral government is at peace. The British case recognises the principle that "a neutral power may refuse to admit into its own ports or waters as a public ship of war any belligerent vessel not commissioned in a specified form or manner, as it may impose on such admission any other conditions at its pleasure, provided the refusal be applied to both belligerents indifferently; but this should not be done without reasonable notice." And the effect of commissioning a ship, so as to take her as a subject of arrest and detention from a neutral jurisdiction, is thus described: "The commissioning Power, by commissioning her, incorporates her into its naval force; and by the same act which withdraws her from the operation of ordinary legal process assumes the responsibility for all existing claims which could otherwise have been enforced against her.' An elaborate exposition of the grounds upon which this principle rests, by Ortolan, is then set out. 66 If the arbitrators support the view put forward in the British case the issue will narrow itself down to the question of due diligence in preventing the fitting out, or arming or equipping of ships intending to cruise against one of two belligerents. According to the United States there are three distinct offences-(1) fitting out; (2) arming; (3) equipping-" each constitutes in itself a complete offence.' 'Therefore, a vessel which is fitted out within the neutral's jurisdiction, with intent to cruise against one of the belligerents, although not equipped or armed therein (and vice versa) commits the offence against International law, provided the neutral Government had reasonable ground to believe that she was intended to cruise or carry on war against such belligerent, and did not use diligence to prevent it." On this head the British case makes these remarks which leaves a tolerably wide field for the arbitrators : "It has been already stated to the arbitrators, in the case presented to them on the part of Great Britain, that, in the judgment of Her Majesty's Government and its official advisers, the special adaptation of a vessel to warlike use was among the acts prohibited by the Foreign Enlistment Act, provided there were sufficient pooof that she was intended for the service of a belligerent, although the vessel might not be actually armed so as to be capable of immediate employment for war. The provisions of the Act are not, as has been already observed, to be regarded as declaratory of the law of nations. But Her Majesty's Government agrees that by the second clause of the First Rule it was the intention of the high contracting parties to preclude any question on this point from being raised before the arbitrators with reference to the words 'fitting out, arming, or equipping' in the first clause. Great Britain does not, on this or on any other point, desire to raise or dispute before the arbitrators any doubtful or obscure questions of public law. She desires, on the contrary, that they should be relieved, as far as possible, from the necessity of considering such questions, and she expects from them a fair and just decision on ascertained facts, tried by the application of admitted principles, or of plain and legitimate inferences from admitted principles." CONTRACTS CAPABLE OF PARTIAL PERFORMANCE. LAST week we reported an important decision of the Queen's Bench as to the operation of a blockade in excusing the performance of a contract to carry a cargo to a port so blockaded (Geipel v. Smith, 26 L. T. Rep. N. S. 361.) The contract was to carry to Hamburgh and there deliver the goods to the freighters. Hamburgh was subsequently blockaded by the French fleets and the defendants refused to do anything in pursuance of the contract. It should be mentioned that in the charter-party there was an exception of restraint of princes. The fact of the blockade being admitted, did that amount to a restraint of princes? The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE held that it did. This doctrine must be taken as applicable only to charter-parties, for it has been repeatedly held that blockade, after risk commenced, is not restraint of princes so as to make underwriters liable for a loss (see the cases collected in Arnould on Mar. Ins., last edit., p. 677.) Therefore, for the purpose only of excusing a shipowner from carrying out his contract with charterers, blockade is a restraint of princes. We may here remark that by French law underwriters are held liable for such a loss, while in America the law is in a state of uncertainty. But although the blockade was a bar to the complete fulfilment of the contract, were the shipowners discharged from performing any part of it? It was a part of the contract that before going to Hamburgh they should go to a spout and load a cargo of coals there. She might have done this at least, was the argument of the plaintiffs; then she would have been prepared to enter Hamburgh should the blockade be raised. Was there any duty on the plaintiffs to do this? It could hardly be seriously contended that a ship is to remain idle until a blockade be raised, without any reference whatever to the probabilities of the case. The blockade being likely to last an unreasonable time, the defendants said they were not bound even to start; and the court agreed. Had the ship sailed she could not have earned freight, and it is idle to say that she was bound to sail and take her chance. On the other hand, had the blockade been raised within a reasonable time, the defendants would have been liable. "In the present case," said Mr. Justice Blackburn, "it has happened that the defendants were right in their opinion, the blockade not having been raised within a reasonable time; and it having turned out that they were right in the judgment they formed, there never came a time when the plaintiffs would have the smallest benefit from the contract." And as to the breach of part of a contract the Lord Chief Justice said, "It is contended that the contract is divisible into two parts, and perhaps it is; and if the performance of the whole is impossible, looking at the reason and convenience of the thing, it is quite obvious that that should excuse the performance of the part. The view I take of it is that the contract is an entire one, and that anything which justifies a breach of the whole will equally apply to a breach of part." THE LIQUOR LICENSING BILL. A CONTRIBUTOR who is a magistrate having had very extensive experience in the administration of the existing liquor laws, and who brings that experience to a consideration of the provisions of the Bill now before the House of Lords, sends us the following observations : It is proposed to continue the existing licensing authority, with some restrictions. A committee of justices is to license; but the whole body of justices must approve, and the Home Office must sanction, the grant of a new licence. A licensing committee of justices may be an improvement, because such a body will make it a business to inquire fully into the case; but it should suffice for the committee to report to the justices at a special sessions held for the sole purpose of licensing. The sanction of the Home Office is purely mischievous. In prac tice it will never institute an inquiry, and the interposition of another authority will encourage laxity among the licensing justices. If it were to become a reality it would be a monstrous burden upon a department already overladen, and a host of commissioners would be required to make the necessary investigations. If it is to be only a sham, it will be only a mischief. We turn now to the offences for which penalties are provided. And here we must protest against the multitude of new offences and new penalties which every session of Parliament is adding to the statute book. The present session threatens an unprecedented increase of this retrograde legislation. The Ballot Bill creates upwards of twenty new crimes. The Bill before us is almost equally severe; other pending measures constitute their quota, and if all should become law, the people of this country will be subjected to something like a hundred new penalties. Any briefless barrister would do good service to the public by adding up the new penal laws of each session during the last ten years. The total would astound the reader, and might induce some pause in this meddlesome law making. Every dreamer and schemer nowadays not only desires to impose his own crotchets upon other people, but to enforce them by penalties. The sale of intoxicating liquor without a licence is to subject the seller to a penalty of £50 or a month's imprisonment; for a second offence to a penalty of £100 or three months' imprisonment, and disqualification from being licensed for five years; and for a third offence to a penalty of £100 or six months' imprisonment, and disqualification from ever after holding a licence. And any such person may be apprehended by any person without a warrant. Penalties of such extravagant severity invariably defeat their own object. The defendant has with him the sympathy of the public. It should be remembered that the character of a crime is not affected by the amount of punishment; no excess of penalty would cause the public to look upon the selling of a glass of beer as an offence demanding a greater punishment than pocket-picking, or house-breaking. And to these frightful penalties the occupier of the house is to be liable, although he was not present, and did not sell, unless he proves that he was not privy or consenting to the sale. How is he to prove a negative? By sect. 6 if the purchaser at a house not licensed drinks a drop of the beer in the street near the house, the seller is to be liable to a penalty of £10 unless he proves that it was without his consent. Here, again, the defendant is to prove a negative. The prohibition of sale of spirits to children under sixteen, and the requirement that the sale shall be in standard measures, unless in bottle, are both of them new and excellent. The penalty for drunkenness is increased by clause 13 to 10s., and for being drunk and disorderly to 40s., or to a month's imprisonment. The discretion of magistrates will, doubtless, prevent this from becoming oppressive. But drunkenness, per se, is not a subject for legislation, which deals, or ought to deal, only with offences by one subject against another, and not with offences of a man against himself. Permitting drunkenness or riotous conduct on the premises, or selling liquor to any drunken person, subjects the holder of a license to a penalty of £10. Here again the punishment is excessive, and therefore unwise. The provisions against adulteration are excellent in their aim, but in practice they will be found either worthless or oppressive. The offence is, of course, knowingly selling adulterated liquor. The burden of proof of knowledge will be upon the informer. This is not as in crimes where the act implies guilty knowledge, unless the contrary is shown. The vendor of adulterated beer and spirits cannot be presumed to know that they are such from the mere fact of possession. He is rarely the brewer or distiller. Is the latter to be called for the purpose of ruining his customer, perhaps his tenant? We may be sure that ingenuity will speedily devise a means by which the stringency of the law may be evaded. All attempts to suppress adulteration by statutes have hitherto failed ignominiously. This is not likely to be more successful than its predecessors. The hours of closing are to be further restricted. Seven in the morning is too late an hour for the labourer in the country filling his can for his day's work, and for travellers departing by early trains. The closing for the whole day before one on Sunday, Christmas Day, and Good Friday is practically inconvenient. The middle and working classes dine at one o'clock. In the country they fre quently live a mile or more from the public-houses. If they cannot procure their beer till one, the dinner must be deferred till half-past one. Twelve or half-past twelve should be the hour for opening. THE MAYOR'S COURT, LONDON. but upon As the Mayor's Court is, by its peculiarities, its ambition, and its anomalous position, attracting the attention both of lawyers and the public, it may be well to put together, clearly but briefly, what is to be said in favour of its abolition, or, at least, its reform. The Mayor's Court is proud of its antiquity; this point it may be remarked that, having had its origin in times when there were no other than local courts, it was necessarily a local court, and there has been nothing done since to make it otherwise. Being a local court, it must be an inferior court, that is, under the jurisdiction of the Superior Courts of the country. It has always been subject to writs of mandamus and prohibition, and lately it has been suggested that it has no power in itself to grant a new trial on the merits. These facts and decisions un doubtedly prove the Mayor's Court to be both a local and an inferior court; and its sounding title of the "Court of Her Majesty the Queen holden at Guildhall" is merely in accordance with the theory that all justice flows from the Sovereign, and is executed in her name. The fact of its having been for so long a time a close court, where all the business was done by a favoured few who had purchased their privilege, is another proof, if more be needed, that the Mayor's Court is, and always has been, nothing more than an inferior and a local court, under the sole management of the corporation, and established for the benefit of the citizens of London. Now, this being so, how can its present powers be supported and its popularity explained? The greatest power is that of foreign attachment, which, though founded entirely on a custom, is carried out in direct contradiction to the very terms of that custom, and by treating as dead fictions all those facts which were the only reasons for, and foundations of, that custom. The long record in cases of foreign attachment is one mass of absurdity and falsehood. Nothing is done that is said to have been done; and all the solemn calling of the defendant, which was the only justification of the court's power, is of course omitted. With regard to ordinary causes, the Mayor's Court greatly increased its business by oppor tunely opening its rotten borough to the whole Profession, and obtaining an ingeniously-drawn Act of Parliament, which confers more ample powers than was probably supposed at the time. The popularity of the Mayor's Court is very easily explained. It is a plaintiff's court. Everything done there is done to encour age plaintiffs and to discourage defendants. The fees are low, the costs are high. Court days are frequent, trials are speedy, executions easily removable, and committals cheaply and quickly obtained. For the defendant all is very different, and under the ingenious Act just referred to, he is hampered in his defence and puzzled in his pleading. Then, again, the practice of foreign attachment is very popular among certain creditors; it does get them their money, and that quickly. Besides, what can be more simple. Upon the merest, the barest, and perhaps even the falsest affidavit of debt a creditor can stop his debtor's money in the banker's hands, clog his business, ruin his credit, and leave him to dispute the matter as best he can hampered by the old forms of the court, which, for him, still retain much of their cumbrous antiquity. With regard to the necessity for abolishing the Mayor's Court, Iwe will quote from the report presented by the commission appointed to inquire into the state of the County Courts in 184. The commissioners, speaking of local courts of record, which term would include the Mayor's Court, say: "These courts have a jurisdiction concurrent with that of the County Courts. The effect of this state of the law is that where a defendant is resident within the local jurisdiction the plaintiff may sue him either in the County Court or in the local court of record. In the former court the proceedings are simple and inexpensive, in the latter complicated and costly. If the plaintiff exercise his option by suing in the latter court the defendant is compelled to pay a heavy and disproportionate amount of costs. The ancient mode of proceeding is preserved in these courts, not for the benefit of the public, but for the profit of those who practise there, and who gain by the increased amount of costs incurred. It certainly is desirable that such an anomalous state of the law should not continue. We think that the encouragement now held out to the practitioners in those courts by the amount of costs created by proceedings there should be discontinued." How much has been done in accordance with this strong recommendation given in 1854, and how much longer are we to wait before it is acted upon? It is manifestly the tendency of every local court managed by local authorities to stretch its jurisdiction to the utmost, to do many things to increase its business, and to become a close court where the work falls into the hands of a few. These tendencies are bad for the public, for the Profession, and especially for the future prospects of the County Courts. THE STOCK MARKETS. CITY, THURSDAY, MAY 9. FOR Some days it has been probable that this week would not be passed without our reaching a higher level in the value of money, and to-day the Bank rate has been raised to 5 per cent. The general acknowledgment that the tendency in the discount rates was upwards has perhaps served to no small extent to hasten the advent of the change, as there can be very little doubt that large number of bills have a been sent in to the Bank for discount this week, the proceeds of which are merely made available against contingencies. The rise having been, it may be said, generally anticipated, its effect upon the markets had been for the most part discounted, as proved to-day by the tone all round improving on the announcement of the change. It is hardly possible, however, that under these new monetary circumstances the value of public securities can rise to any extent now that the deposit rates are 4 per cent. at seven and fourteen days' notice. On the contrary, considering that prices generally are high, we should think that sales of many descriptions must follow especially of those not yielding more than about 4 per cent. The British Funds have fallen to per cent. since last Thursday; Exchequer Bills, 6s. ; and India Five and a Half Per Cent. Stock, 1. On the other hand Bank Stock on the improved prospect of increasing its profits, has risen 1. In the American market, although the Alabama wound seems to be as far of healing as ever, not much heed is given to it pending the explanations which are looked for next Monday in the House of Lords. The United States Funded Loan is 1 lower for the week; Atlantic and Great Western Bonds and Debentures, 2; Eries, ; The Ten Forties, ; and the Five Twenties of 1862, . The fall for the week in home railway stocks during the week has been rither severe. North-Eastern is 4 lower; London and North-Western, 3; Great Western, and Lancashire and Yorkshire, 2; Caledonian and SouthEastern, 2; Great Eastern, London and South-Western, Manchester and Sheffield, North British, and South-Eastern Deferred, 1; Great Northern, Ditto A, and London, Chatham, and Dover, 1; &c. The goods traffic receipts which have been announced has not sufficed to support prices in the face of the certainty of a rise in the value of money which has been hanging over the markets. To-day, however, there has been a rally in some of the leading stocks, but it is not to an extent which augurs any materially higher level under existing circumstances. Grand Trunk of Canada stock 14 lower, and Great Western of Canada 1 lower for the week. With the exception of a rise of in Peruvian per cents. of 1865 for the week, the movements are all adverse in the Foreign Market. Those more prominently lower are Turkish, at a fall of 14 in all descriptions; Egyptian per cents. of 1868 are 1 lower; Paraguay, 1; Peruvian 6 per cents. o 1570. 11; Brazilian New 5 per cents, Spanish, Mexican, and Italian ; and the French Morgan and ditto National, 4. In Telegraph Shares Anglo-American is 2 lower for the week, and the others chiefly dealt in about 4. In Miscellaneous Shares, Telegraph Construction are 1 lower; Phosphate Sewage 5, and Native Guano 1. From the Quinquennial Report of the Prudential Assurance Company it would appear that in every department of the business very great pro gress has been made, and, notwithstanding exceptionally heavy expenditure during the period, the profits have been large. The comparison of the position of the Company on the 31st Dec. 1866, and on the 31st Dec. 1871, is as follows:-At the latter period the annual premium income was £348,975 15s. 6d.; at the former period, £154,162 16s. 11d.; showing an increase of £194,812 18s. 7d. At the latter period the assurance fund was £383,110 0s. 2d.; at the former period, £147,058 19s. 1d.; showing an increase of £236,051 1s. 1d.; at the latter period the new premium income was £148,904 6s. 10d.; at the former period, £62,264 16s. 5d.; showing an increase of £86,639 10s. 5d. The directors are empowered, by the deed of settlement, to divide the whole of the surplus now shown to exist, or to set aside any portion thereof to meet contingencies, and they have resolved to transfer the sum of £16,096 to a contingency fund, and divide the sum of £60,000. A new project is the Llynvi, Tondu, and Ogmore Coal and Iron Company (Limited). The united properties are said to comprise one of the largest and best coal and iron concerns in the kingdom, and being contiguous and intermingled, can be worked under one management with great advantage. By the terms of purchase, two-thirds of the consideration is payable in shares and debentures, and the vendors give a guarantee that the net profits shall amount to 50 per cent. of the called-up capital within the first five years, or a shorter period being equal to a minimum of 10 per cent. per annum. Among mining enterprises we also notice The New Zealand Kapanga Gold Mining Company (Limited), with a capital of £100,000, in 20,000 shares of £5 each (16,000 of which are at present offered for subscription), formed for the purpose of purchasing and working an exceedingly valuable piece of auriferous ground in the Coromandel district, province of Auckland, New Zealand, upon which the well-known mine called the "Kapanga" is situated. It is intended to commence the operations of the company by the purchase and erection of suitable pumping, hoisting, crushing, and amalgamating machinery, with a view to work the mine vigorously. Also to open up the several lodes or veins existing on the property, to which end contracts have been entered into with the eminent engineers, Messrs. Harvey and Co., of Hayle, Cornwall, for the supply of the necessary machinery for pumping, winding, crushing, stamping, &c., which is now in course of completion, and will be shipped with all possible speed. The plans for erection of the requisite buildings for the reception of the machinery have already been sent out to New Zealand so as to lose no time in getting it into working order. The large withdrawal of £440,000 from the Bank yesterday, accompanied by a very heavy demand for discount, is followed to-day by the influx of £115,000 in bars, and only a moderate demand. The latest quotations for British Funds are as follows: Consols, for money, 923 to 923; ditto June Account, 923 to 93; Reduced, and New Three per Cents., 903 to 91; Exchequer Bills, 2s. dis. to 2s. prem.; India Five per Cent. Stock, 110 to 110; ditto Four per Cent., 102 to 1034; ditto Enfaced Paper Four per Cent., 96 to 97; ditto Five and a Half per Cent. 108 to 108; Bank of England Stock, 242 to 244; Metropolitan Three and a Half per Cent., 96 to 974; and French Rentes in this market, 53 to 54. In the market for American Securities, the United States 5-20 Bonds of 1882 are marked 89% to 89,; do. 10-40 Bonds, 88 to 89; Atlantic and Great Western Bonds, 38 to 39; ditto Debentures, 48 to 49; Eries, 54 to 55; Illinois, 109 to 110; and United States Funded Loan, 89 to 894. In the Railway Market the prices are:-Caledonians, 112 to 113; Great Eastern, 51 to 52; Great Northern, 135 to 136; ditto, A, 156 to 1563; Great Western, 108 to 109; Lancashire and Yorkshire, 154 to 155; London and Brighton, 81 to 813; London, Chatham, and Dover, 26 to 26; London and North-Western, 148 to 148; London and South-Western, 105 to 1063; Manchester and Sheffield, 74 to 74; Metropolitan, 65 to 66; ditto District, 30 to 31; Midland, 145 to 145; North British, 64 to 64 North Eastern Consols, 166 to 166; South-Eastern, 100 to 101; ditto deferred, 78 to 78; Grand Trunk of Canada, 20 to 21; Great Western of Canada, 213 to 213; Antwerp and Rotterdam, 19 to 20; Great Luxembourg, 18 to 183; and Lombardo Venetian, 17 to 17. :: The prices of the principal Foreign Stocks are as follows: Argentine, 1868, 97 to 98; do., 6 per cent., 1871, 92 to 93; Brazilian, 5 per cent., 1865, 95 to 964; do., 5 per cent., 1871, 95 to 95; Egyptian, 7 per cent., 1868, 87 to 871; do., Viceroy Loan, 91 to 93; do., Khedive Mortgage Bonds, 78 to 78; French Morgan per cent. Loan, 97 to 974; do. National 5 per cent. Loan, 4 to 4 pm.; Italian of 1861, 663 to 67!; Mexican, 14 to 151; Paraguay 8 per cent. Loan, 90 to 91; Peruvian, 5 per cent. 1865, 101 to 102; do. 6 per cent. 1870, 803 to 811; Russian 5 per cent. 1871, 91 to 92; do. Nicolai Rail. Bonds, 74 to 75; Spanish 3 per cent. 29 to 29; do. 3 per cent. 1871, 29 to 29; Turkish, 5 per cent. 1865, 524 to 52; do. 6 per cent. 1865, 71 to 71; do. 6 per cent. 1869, 60 to 60; and do. 6 per cent. 1871, 70 to 701. In the Telegraph Market, Anglo-American Stock is quoted at 116 to 118; Anglo-Mediterranean, 182 to 185; British Australian, 9 to 9; British Indian Extension, 113 to 121; ditto Submarine, 103 to 11; Chinas, 8 to 9; Cubas, 7 to 8; Falmouths, 11 to 11; Great Northern, 14 to 15; Marseilles, Algiers, and Malta, 9 to 93; Mediterranean Extension, 6 to 7; Reuter's, 10 to 111; French Cables, 214 to 22; and West India and Panama, 6 to 6. In miscellaneous shares the prices are as follows:-General Credit and Discount, 24 to 2 pm.; International Finance, dis. to pm.; Hooper's Telegraph Works, 1 to 2 pm.; Hudson's Bay, 103 to 10; India Rubber and Gutta Percha, 43 to 45; National Discount, 13 to 13; Telegraph Construction, 32 to 33; Native Guano, 18 to 20; Phosphate Sewage, 26 to 29; New Sombrero Phosphate, 7 to 8; and Phospho Guano, 11 to 111. NOTES OF THE WEEK. COURT OF APPEAL IN CHANCERY. (Before the LORDS JUSTICES.) NARRAWAY v. BEATTIE. THIS was an appeal from a decision of Malins, Cotton, Q.C. and Kekewich for the appellants. Glasse, Q.C. and Macnaghten for the respondents. Lord Justice JAMES was of opinion that the evidence was not sufficient to bring the case within the exception, in favour of a partner carry. ing on distinct trades, from the general rule that a partner cannot prove against the estate of his own firm so as to come into competition with his own creditors. The evidence was quite consistent with its having been part of the original partnership arrangement that the balance of the current account should be allowed to remain with the London firm to form its capital. The appeal must, therefore, be dismissed with costs, without prejudice to a new application on fresh evidence. Lord Justice MELLISH Concurred. Handson. THIS was a suit for the specific performance of an agreement to purchase the house and premises known as No. 157, Queen's-road, Bayswater. In Dec. 1870, the plaintiff advertised the premises for sale by private contract, stating them to be suitable for a coach-builder, or any business requiring space. In Jan. 1871, after several interviews between the plaintiff and the defendant, who required the premises for the business of a coach-builder, in which the plaintiff had stated that the defendant might build on the forecourt to within 5ft. of the road, and in confirmation thereof had pointed to the opposite side of the road where shops had been brought out to that extent, an agreement was entered into by which the defendant agreed to purchase the premises at the price of £2700. Nearly two months afterwards, the plaintiff, at an interview with the defendant and his surveyor, produced a plan which showed that the building to be erected on the forecourt could not be of a greater height than 12ft., and on the defendant ascertaining that fact, he immediately repudiated the contract, he having understood, as he alleged, that the main building could be brought forward to the building line, and if that was not the case, the premises were not suitable for the purpose for which he required them. It appeared that by the Metropolis Local Management Act 1862 no building can be erected or alteration made in any existing building, without the consent of the Metropolitan Board of Works, and that the consent of the Board to bring out the buildings to within 5ft. of the road had been obtained r stricting such buildings to the height of 12ft., and that the shops on the opposite side of the road, to which the plaintiff had referred, were of not more than that height. Fischer, Q.C. and W. Barber for the plaintiff. Southgate, Q.C. and C. Hall for the defendant. Lord ROMILLY held that as the defendant entered into the contract on the belief that he could build over the whole property, he could not enforce the contract against him, and dismissed the bill without costs. Solicitors: Church, Sons, and Clarke ; Walker and Martineau. Saturday, May 4. Re THE GENERAL ROLLING STOCK COMPANY Lord ROMILLY held that he was bound by the PHILLIPSON v. TURNER. gagee. THIS was a petition by the mortgagee of the life- Fry, Q. C. and Watson for the petitioner. parties. Lord ROMILLY refused to make any order on Solicitors, Newman, Dale, and Stretton. V. C. MALINS' COURT. SHACKLOCK v. JARVIS. Construction of will-Devise to children and their issue. WILLIAM SHACKLOCK by his will, dated the 10th Cottrell, for the petitioners, contended that the | W. Pearson, for the issue of one of the testator's children who had since died, contended that under the will the children of the testator took estates tail in his realty, or else estates for life with remainder to their children. Chapman Barber, for other parties. W. Phipson Beale, for the railway company. The VICE-CHANCELLOR held that the children of the testator, who all survived him, took absolute interests in his realty as tenants in common in fee. Solicitors: Burt; Beale, Marigold, and Beale. Amalgamated companies-Voluntary winding-up THIS was an adjourned summons on an applica- The Solicitor-General (Sir G. Jessel), Pearson, Q.C., and George Murray for Henderson. Sir Roundell Palmer, Q.C., Glasse, Q.C., and Millar for the liquidators of the British Nation. Higgins, Q.C., for some annuitants. The Vice-Chancellor held that he had power under the Act to remove the liquidators of the British Nation. But under the circumstances of the case, and inasmuch as the application for their removal was opposed by all the shareholders except Henderson, he should not exercise the power. The application was therefore refused. Solicitors, Mercer and Mercer; Lewis, Munns, and Longden. V. C. BACON'S COURT. Construction of settlement - Domicile-Jurisdic tion. IN Jan. 1867 William Rainy, who was, as he stated, not a domiciled Englishman, married the plaintiff. Shortly before the marriage he executed two settlements in England, by the first of which he transferred to trustees mortgages of freeholds in Sierra Leone, and granted freeholds in Australia upon trust, with the consent of himself and wife, to sell the same and hold the proceeds and the rents and profits until sale, upon trusts declared by the second settlement, which was of even date. The first settlement provided that until sale the defendant and his wife should be allowed to reside in and enjoy the premises or any part thereof rent free. The second settlement recited the first, and declared the trusts of the purchase-money in favour of the wife for life for her separate use, but contained no express trust of the intermediate rents and profits. Separation took place shortly after the marriage. The plaintiff filed her bill, alleging that the defendant Rainy claimed to be entitled to the rents and profits until sale, and by refusing his consent to a sale to take them for his Amphlett, Q.C. and Crossley for the defendant, for an injunction, and for a receiver. The bill prayed Salmon for the trustees. The VICE-CHANCELLOR held that the domicile of the defendant, whether English or not, was immaterial on the question of the jurisdiction of the court. And being of opinion that upon the construction of the settlement, there was no resulting trust for the defendant of the intermediate rents and profits until sale, but that the plaintiff was entitled to them for her separate use, made a declaration accordingly, and granted an injunction to restrain the defendant from interfering with the receipt of the rents and profits, and appointed a receiver. Solicitors: James, Curtis, and James; Lambert, Burgin, and Petch. Thursday, May 2. THIS was a creditor's suit for the administration of the testator's estate. A decree directing the usual inquiries was made in Dec. 1870. The mons. Yate Lee was for the defendants. The VICE-CHANCELLOR said that the defendants should have filed their affidavits before they cross-examined the plaintiff; but that, under the circumstances, he would allow them to use the affidavits and give the plaintiff liberty to file other affidavits in reply, as if the cross-examination had not taken place. Solicitors for the plaintiff, Monckton and Co., agents for Sankey, Son, and Flint, Canterbury. Solicitor for the defendants, J. Henry Jones. V.C. WICKENS' COURT. cate-Costs. for an injunction to restrain the defendant Park Sir Roundell Palmer, Q.C., Hawkins, Q.C., and reference only to meetings at which votes were Attorney for the prosecutor, John Scaife. Wednesday, May 1. SECOND COURT. SKINNER (app.) v. USHER (resp.) Plying for hire elsewhere than at an appointed stand-Public place-1 & 2 Will. 4, c. 22, s. 23 -6&7 Vict. c. 86, s. 33. THE appellant, who was a servant of J. T. Clipson, a cab proprietor and occupier of a public house, opposite the railway station at Putney, was convicted at the Wandsworth police court for unlawfully plying for hire with a hackney carriage elsewhere than at some standing or place appointed for that purpose. The appellant was a The VICE-CHANCELLOR said the plaintiff's licensed driver of a hackney carriage, and drove motions failed altogether. He had not under the standing upon an open piece of ground, which one of his master's cabs. These cabs were kept agreement any right to the specific shares as was Mr. Clipson's private property, and not apsuch, but only to an interest in the ultimate profits arising out of the working of the mine.pointed by the Commissioners of Police to be a cab The defendant Park was here as an agent of the stand. Being hailed by a person at the railway United States Company, and it was his duty to station, appellant brought his cab across the sell the shares, and remit the purchase money to street, picked him up and drove him away. It was contended for the appellant that 6 & 7 Vict. his principals. Part of the money so remitted belonged to the company as profit, and an aliquot made it an offence to ply for hire elsewhere than c. 86, s. 33, taken with 1 & 2 Will. 4, c. 22, s. 23, portion of the profit was the property of the at some appointed stand, only in a public place, plaintiff. The court was now asked, on account of the plaintiff's remote interest in the shares and not upon private ground like this. He relied to disturb by injunction the possession of upon Case v. Storey (L. Rep. 4 Ex. 319.) The the defendant Park. The contract magistrate convicted upon the authority of Clarke American one, and all the parties to it were v. Stanford (L. Rep. 6 Q. B. 357); and Allen v. domiciled in America. If, indeed, there had Tunbridge (L. Rep. 6 C. P. 481), which were cases been any suggestion of fraud in the case, the upon 32 & 33 Vict. c. 115, s. 4. court might, perhaps, have interfered, or if there had been any fear of damage or danger to the shares. There was, however, nothing of that sort in the case. Indeed, the plaintiff had been most fairly, openly, and deliberately dealt with throughout. Both motions must, therefore, be refused with costs. was an Solicitors: J. R. Gole; Hargrove, Fowler, Blunt. Tuesday, May 7. and PICKERING v. STEPHENSON. Re THE LONDON AND MEDITERRANEAN BANK containing imputations on the directors. Thereupon that this suit was instituted. Lindley, Q.C. and Westlake for the plaintiff. The VICE-CHANCELLOR held that the payment COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH. Monday, April 29. REG. v. STRACHAN. The appeal was argued on Wednesday, 24th Edward Clarke, for appellant: and Attorney for respondent, the Solicitor to the NORRIS (app.) r. BARNES (resp.) Nuisance-Smoke from manufactory of ores-18 & 19 Vict. c. 121, s. 44-29 & 30 Vict. c. 90, ss. 14 and 19. THE appellant, who was the proprietor of a manufactory of the produce of ores and minerals, had been convicted by justices under the 19th section of the Sanitary Act 1866, for sending forth black smoke in such quantity as to be a nuisance, from the chimney of a house, not being a private house. By sect. 14, part 2 of this Act is to be construed as one with 18 & 19 Vict. c. 121, and 23 & 24 Vict. c. 77. 18 & 19 Vict. c. 121, "the provisions of this Act By the latter part of sect. 44 of shall not extend or be construed to extend to mines of different descriptions so as to interfere with or obstruct the efficient working of the same, or to the smelting of ores and minerals, or to the manufacturing of the produce of such ores and minerals." Manisty, Q.C. (with Beresford) for the appellant, contended that his manufactory was by the Act of 1855, exempted from the provisions of the Act of Stamp Act (33 & 34 Vict. c. 97) sched.-Voting paper Act was clear, and that the words of the 44th Greene, Q.C. and Smart for the second. RULE nisi for a quo warranto. Holker, Q.C. (with him Edge), for the prose C. Russell, Q.C. (with him Haslefoot), for the cent Stamp Act (33 & 34 Vict. c. 97), which The COURT (Cockburn, C.J., Blackburn, Lush, section of the first were not necessarily to be read with sect. 19 of the second Act. Judgment for appellant without costs. Attorneys for appellant, Emmett and Co. Attorney for respondent, Chester and Urquhart. ELLIOT (app.) v. MAJENDIE (resp.) Gunpowder-Store magazine without lightning conductor-Forfeiture and fine-24 & 25 Vict. c. 139, ss. 2 and 4. THE appellant, a gunpowder manufacturer, had been convicted at petty sessions for a breach of the last regulation contained in sect. 2 of 23 & 24 Vict. c. 139 (the Gunpowder Act 1860); and the justices had ordered the powder in his store house to be forfeited, and fined him. The said last regulation is, "Every maker of gunpowder shall |