Legal News, 358] These two cases stand alone, and we believe they are directly in conflict with every English or American case as yet reported involving this question. As we understand these cases, they hold that where the fire is communicated by the locomotive to the house of A., and thence to the house of B., there can be no recovery by the latter. It is immaterial, according to the doctrine of these cases, how narrow may be the space between the two houses, or whether the destruction of the second would be the natural consequence of the burning of the first. The principle laid down by these authorities, and urged by counsel in this case, is, that in order to a recovery, the fire which destroys the plaintiff's property must be communicated directly from the railway, and not through the burning of the intermediate property. With all our respect for these courts, we cannot adopt this principle; and it is admitted by the Judges who delivered the opinion to have no precedent for its support, and to be absolutely in conflict with former adjudications. Indeed only one year prior to the decision in New York the same court, in Field v. New York Central Railroad Company (32 N. Y. 345), pronounced a judgment which we cannot reconcile with the later case. “The Court of Appeals in New York, and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, seeni, from their opinions, to have attached great weight to an argument urged upon us by the counsel for appellee, and indeed that argument seems to have been the chief reason for announcing a rule which both courts struggle in vain to show is not in conflict with all prior adjudications. That argument is, in brief, that an entire village or town is liable to be burned down by the passing of the fire from house to house, and if the railway company whose locomotive has emitted the cinders that caused the fire, is to be charged with all the damages, these companies would be in constant danger of bankruptcy, and of being obliged to suspend their operation. We confess ourselves wholly unable to see the overpowering force of this argument. It proceeds upon the assumption that if a great loss is to be suffered, it had better be distributed among a hundred innocent victims than wholly visited upon the wrong-doer. As a question of law or ethics, the proposition does not commend itself to our reason. We must still cling to the ancient doctrine, that the wanton wrong-doer must take the consequences of his own acts, whether measured by a thousand dollars or a hundred thousand. "Our position on this subject is briefly this: We do not desire to impose on the railway companies unreasonable obligations, or to subject them to unreasonable danger of great pecuniary loss. We do not wish to make them insurers against all damages by fire that may result from the passage of their trains without reference to the question of remote and proximate cause. But, on the other hand, we do insist on applying to them the same rule that has been held through all the administration of the common law with the exception of the two cases upon which we have been commenting. As already stated, we understand the doctrine of those two cases, and the position of counsel for appellee to be that if fire is communicated from a locomotive to the house of A., and thence to the house of B., it is a conclusion of law that the fire sent forth by the locomotive is to be regarded as the remote and not the proximate cause of the injury to B., and the railway company is, for this reason alone, to be held not responsible. This rule we repudiate as in the teeth of almost numberless decisions, and as unsupported by that reason which is the life of the law. We hold, on the contrary, as we held in reference to this same fire, in the case of The T. P. & W. R. R. Co. v. Pindor (53 Ill., 451), that it is in each case a question of fact to be determined by the jury under the instructions of the court. Those instructions should be, in substance, what we have already stated. If the fire is the consequence of the carelessness of the railway company, and the question of remote or proximate cause is raised, the jury should be instructed that so far as the case turns upon that issue, the company is to be held responsible, if the loss is a natural consequence of its alleged carelessness, which might have been foreseen by any reasonable person, but is not to be held responsible for injuries which could not have been foreseen or expected as the results of its negligence or misconduct. "In the case before us, owing to the distance of the plaintiff's building from the one first set on fire, this question might not have been one of easy determination. The defendant, however, thought it better not to take the risks of this issue, but, by a demurrer to the evidence, to rest his defence upon the theory that even admitting all that the evidence tends to prove, there is still no liability. In this court the counsel for the company have not discussed the evidence. They place the case on the single ground that the company is free from liability, because the plaintiff's house was set on fire, not immediately by cinders thrown from the locomotive, but by the burning of another house. Their position is that this alone exonerates the company, without any reference whatever to the question whether the second house was so near the first that in the then state of the wind and weather its destruction was a natural consequence of the burning of the first, which any reasonable person could have foreseen and would have expected. This question they have not discussed. On the legal question upon which appellee's counsel thus rest the case, we cannot adopt their views. On the demurrer to the evidence, we must hold it tended to prove that the fire escaped through the carelessness of the defendant, and that the destruction of the plaintiff's house was its natural consequence, which any reasonable person could have foreseen." A DIGEST OF PATENT LAW CASES. (By CLEMENT HIGGINS, Esq., B.A., F.C.S., Barrister-at-Law.) UNPATENTABLE INVENTIONS. Principle. Boulton and Wett v. Bull. May 16, 1795.-Rooke, J.: The term "principle is equivocal; it may denote either the radical elementary truths of a science, or those consequential axioms which are founded on radical truths, but which are used as fundamental truths by those who do not find it expedient to have recourse to first principles. Heath, J.: The Marquis of Worcester discovered, in the last century, the expansive force of steam, and first applied it to machinery. As the original, he was clearly entitled to a patent. Would the patent have been good applied to all machinery, or to the machines which he had discovered? The patent decides the question. It must be for the vendible matter, and not for the principle. Another objection may be urged against the patent, upon the application of the principle to an old machine, which is, that whatever machinery may be hereafter invented would be an infringement of the patent, if it be founded on the same principle. If this were so it would reverse the clearest positions of law respecting patents for machinery, by which it has been always holden that the organisation of a machine may be the subject of a patent, but principles cannot. Indeed it seems impossible to specify a principle, and its application to all cases which furnishes an argument that it cannot be the subject of a patent" (p. 483.) Mr. Justice Buller: "The very statement of what a principle is, proves it not to be a ground for a patent. It is the first ground and rule for arts and sciences, or in other words the elements and rudiments of them. A patent must be for some new production from those elements, and not for the elements themselves" (p. 485.) Chief Justice Eyre: Undoubtedly there can be no patent for a mere principle, but for a principle so far embodied and connected with corporeal substances as to be in a condition to act, and to produce effects in any art, trade, mystery, or manual occupation, I think there may be a patent." (2 H. BI. 463; 1 Carp. P. C. 117; Dav. P. C. 162.) Jupe v. Pratt. 1837.-Alderson, B., said: "You cannot take out a patent for a principle; you may take out a patent for a principle coupled with the mode of carrying the principle into effect, provided you have not only discovered the principle, but invented some mode of carrying it into effect; but then you must start with having invented some mode of carrying the principle into effect; if you have done that, then you are entitled to protect yourself from all other modes of carrying the same principle into effect, that being treated by the jury as piracy of your original invention." (1 W. P. C. 146; 8 Rep. Arts. 4th S. 112.) Neilson v. Harford. 1841.-Alderson B.: I take the distinction between a patent for a principle and a patent which can be supported is, that you must have an embodiment of the principle in some practical mode described in the specification of carrying the principle into actual effect, and then you take out your patent, not for the principle, but for the mode of carry"There is no difference between ing the principle into effect"-p. 312. (claiming) a principle to be carried into effect in any way you will, and claiming the principle itself" p. 355. (1 Web. P. C.; 8 M. & W. 803.) The Househill Company v. Neilson. 1813.-Lord Justice Clerk Hope: "A patent cannot be taken out solely for an abstract philosophical principle for instance, for any law of nature, or any property of matter, apart from any mode of turning it to account in the practical operations of manufacture, or the business, and arts, and utilities of life. The mere discovery of such a principle is not an invention, in the patent law sense of the term. Stating such a principle in a patent may be a promulgation of the principle, but it is no application of the prin ciple to any practical purpose. And without that application of the principle to a practical object and end, and without the application of it to human industry, or to the purposes of human enjoy ment, a person cannot in the abstract appropriate a principle to himself. But a patent will be good, though the subject of the patent consists in the discovery of a great, general, and most comprehensive principle in science or law of nature, if that principle is by the specification applied to any special purpose, so as thereby to effectuate a practical result and benefit not previously attained. . . . It would be very strange and unjust to refuse the same legal effect, when the inventor has the additional merit of discovering the principle as well as its application to a practical object. The instant that the principle, although discovered for the first time, is stated, in actual application to, and as the agent of, producing a certain specified effect, it is no longer an abstract principle; it is then clothed with the language of practical application, and receives the impress of tangible direction to the actual business of human life." A claim for all modes of applying the principle to the purpose specified, according to or within a general statement of the object to be attained, and of the use to be made of the agent to be so applied, is no objection whatever to the patent. That the application or use of the agent for the purpose specified, may be carried out in a great variety of ways, only shows the beauty and simplicity and comprehensiveness of the invention. But the scientifie and general utility of the proposed application of the principle, if directed to a specified purpose, is not an objection to its becoming the subject of a patent. That the proposed application may be very generally adopted in a great variety of ways, is the merit of the invention, not a legal objection to the patent. . . I state to you the law to be, that you may obtain a patent for a mode of carrying a principle into effect; and if you suggest and discover, not only the principle, but suggest and invent how it may be applied to a practical result by mechanical contrivance and apparatus, and show that you or modification, or are aware that no particular sort apparatus, is essential, in order to obtain benefit from the principle, then you may take your patent for the mode of carrying it into effect, and are not under the necessity of describing and confining yourself to one form of apparatus. If that were necessary, you see what would be the result? Why, that a patent could hardly ever be obtained for any mode of carrying a newly discovered principle into practical results, though the most valuable of all discoveries. For the best form and shape or modification of apparatus cannot, in matters of such vast range, and requiring observations on such a great scale, be attained at once; and so the thing would become known, and so the right lost, long before all the various kinds of apparatus could be tried. Hence you may generally claim the mode of carrying the principle into effect by mechanical contrivance, so that any form of sort of apparatus applied in the way stated will, more or less, produce the benefit, and you are not tied down to any form:" (1 Web. P. C. 683.) Crossley v. Potter. N. P. 1853.-The title was for "certain improvements in weaving figured fabrics." The patentee in his specification says: "My improvements in weaving figured fabrics, apply to those particular kinds of fabric which have a terry or raised looped surface, such as coach lace, Brussels carpeting, velvets, and other woven goods having terry or raised surfaces, either plain or figured." The evidence went to show that, without additional parts, which were not mentioned, the machine described in the specification was capable of making coach lace, but not of making either carpet or velvet goods. Pollock, C.B, in directing the jury said: 66 The truth appears to me to be this, that the patent is very much like what has often been attempted, viz., to take out a patent for a principle, which the law will not allow. Any man who takes out a patent must take it for a manufacture. It is very true that patents are continually taken out for what are called 'methods,' or processes;' but the real object of the patent, the real end that is secured by the statute, the matter that is alone mentioned in it capable of being made the subject of a patent, is a new manufacture; and everybody who takes out a patent under the name of a process, really takes it out for that which is the result of the process, for the thing that is manufactured, or the process by which it is produced. There is a sort of struggle apparently between lawyers and patent agents. The patent agent is constantly endeavouring to get a patent for a principle; the lawyer is interposing and saying, you cannot do that.' It is a matter of clear and distinct law that you cannot have a patent for a principle. Whatever principle you have invented or applied, you must have it embodied in some machine or manufacture distinctly, in order that other ingenious and enterprising members of the community may distinctly know what it is they are prohibited from doing." (Macrory's P. C. 239.) NOTES OF THE WEEK. COURT OF APPEAL IN CHANCERY. July 18 and 19. tations. (Before the LORDS JUSTICES.) Waste-Cutting down timber-Tenant for life and due from him to the plaintiffs should be paid out any Act of Parliament, the lessee should be en- Q.C., and W. W. Streeten, for the appellants. The Solicitor-General (Sir G. Jessel, Q.C.). Greene, Q.C. and Kekewich, who appeared for the lessee, appellants, relied upon Frith v. Forbes (4 De G. Sir Richard Baggallay. Q.C., and Speed, for the F. & J. 409; 7 L. T. Rep. N. S. 271.) Miller, Q. C. (with him Southgate, Q. C.), for the defendants. Lord Justice MELLISH was of the same opinion. Appeal accordingly dismissed with costs. Solicitors for the appellants, Taylor, Hoare, and Taylor Solicitors for the respondents, Stocken and Jupp July 20 and 22. Fischer, Q.C. and Key, for the appellants. Eddis, Q.C. and Marten, for the plaintiffs. Lord Justice JAMES said that the injunction Lord Justice JAMES said that the Vice-Chanmust be maintained in respect of the waste com- cellor could not have made any other order than Trustee-Investment of trust funds on mortgage mitted since the death of the tenant for life. But he did. £35,000 had been awarded to the plain-of hotel-Insuficient security-Value of licence. there were two conclusive answers to the claim in tiffs for the purchase in fee of the property. They respect of waste committed during the life of the were ready to convey and the lessee to join in the tenant for life. First, as there could be no in- conveyance. They had nothing to do with the junction in that respect, there could be no ac-award to the lessee, and his lordship had never count, and, secondly, the claim was barred by the heard that a person conveying to a railway comStatute of Limitations, which ran from the time pany was bound to indemnify them against any when the right of action accrued. thing. The appeal must therefore be dismissed with costs. Lord Justice MELLISH was of the same opinion. Solicitors: Field, Roscoe, and Francis; Bell, Brodrick, and Gray, for Rodgers and Thomas, Sheffield. Lord Justice MELLISH was of the same opinion. and Co. THIS was an appeal from a decision of Bacon, V.C. The suit was one for the administration of the estate of Michael Gummow, who died in 1845, having by his will, given his trustees power to invest the trust funds on the security (amongst other things) of real estate, and having directed one of his trustees, who was a solicitor, to be em ployed in all legal matters concerning his estate, the trustees lent £1400 of the trust funds on receiving remuneration for his services. In 1855 mortgage of certain freehold houses at Broadstairs, formerly used as a ladies' boarding school, and since 1853 occupied as a hotel, at a rent of hotel keeper failed, and his successor failed after £120 per annum. About the end of 1855 the less than a year's occupation. The hotel then reRailway company-Compulsory sale-Award to Consignor and consignee-Bills of exchange drawn mained closed till 1860, when it ceased to be used lessor-Claim by lessee for injury to trade. against cargo-Lien on cargo. as an hotel, and was let at £50 a year. The conseTHIS was an appeal from a decision of Wickens, THIS was an appeal from a decision of the Master quence was a loss to the estate of £2114. Before V.C. On the 1st June 1860 the plaintiffs granted of the Rolls. The plaintiffs were engineers carry advancing the money the acting trustee (the a lease of the Grand Junction wharf, at Black- ing on business as a limited company at Lincoln. solicitor) had employed a London surveyor, who friars, to one Harvey, for a term of thirty-one In 1869 one Frederick C. Brown was their agent in his report valued the property at £1900, with years, determinable at seven, fourteen, or twenty- at Ibraila, in the Danubian Principalities, for the an additional £800 as the value of the licence one years, at his option. The lease provided that sale of their goods. The bill alleged that in Nov. attached to the house. There was no evidence as if any part of the premises should be taken under that year, Brown agreed that a sum of £830 then to the surveyor's competency at the time he made Friday, July 19. Saturday, July 20. the report, and the acting trustee made no affidavit as to why he made the investment. The ViceChancellor held that the trustees were not liable to make good the loss to the estate, as they had taken proper precautions by employing a surveyor to inspect the property. (See 26 L. T. Rep. N. S. 683.) From this decision the cestuis que trust appealed. Eddis, Q.C. and Waller for the appellants. Lord Justice MELLISH was of the same opinion. July 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, and 22. Conveyance-Reservation of mines and minerals- tained a covenant by the plaintiffs that they Cotton, Q.C. and Dauney for the appellants. Lord Justice MELLISH Concurred. Tuesday, July 23. ALEXANDER v. CAMPBELL. Marine insurance-Mutual Insurance Society any THIS was an appeal from a decision of Bacon, V.C. One Vivian effected an insurance on the ship Pilgrim, in March 1868, in the Alliance Ship Insurance Association, a mutual society, one of whose rules (which were incorporated in the policy) was that "no member, mortgagee, or assignee, the whole or any part of whose share in a ship insured in this association shall, at the time of entering or afterwards, be mortgaged or assigned to any person or persons, shall have assignee of such policy have a claim to any loss claim by virtue of this policy, nor shall any or damage. . . unless previous to .. such China clay on a moor adjoining the plaintiff's loss or damage such member, mortgagee, or property, and upon land claimed by the plaintiff. assignee, shall have delivered to the manager an Thereupon this suit was instituted to restrain the undertaking whereby he shall covenant defendants from working the clay. On behalf of with the manager to pay all sums due, &c. the plaintiff it was contended that China clay was The ship was lost in April 1868. In Aug. 1869 an not a mineral within the meaning of the reserva-application was made to the association on behalf tion, and that, if it were, the reservation did not of the plaintiff, who claimed to be entitled to the give the defendant a right to work it so as to insurance money as assignee by deposit of the destroy the surface. For the defendants it was policy. The association refused to make any contended that China clay was a mineral, and payment to the plaintiff as he was not a member, that, having regard to the fact that the customary and the rule above set forth had not been commode of working mines in the neighbourhood, at plied with. Thereupon the plaintiff instituted the time of the grant, was wholly destructive of the present suit against the committee and mathe surface, the right to work reserved by the nagers of the association, and the assignee of deed carried the right to destroy the surface if Vivian (who had become bankrupt), claiming the necessary. The Vice-Chancellor having held that benefit of the policy. The Vice-Chancellor having the defendants were entitled to work the clay, held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover, and and having dismissed the bill with costs (see 26 made a decree accordingly, the defendants apL. T. Rep. N. S. 502), the plaintiff appealed. pealed. Manisty, Q.C., Eddis, Q.C., and Boger, for the appellant. The Solicitor General (Sir G. Jessel, Q.C.) Karslake, Q.C. and Phear, for the respondents. Swanston, Q.C., Miller, Q.C., and Maidlow for the appellants. Kay, Q.C., and Marten for the plaintiff. Lord Justice JAMES said that the plaintiff was Lord Justice MELLISH, in delivering the jung of the rule incorporated in the policy made it clear an equitable assignee of the policy, and the words ment of the court, said that their Lordships were of that he could not recover unless he gave the opinion that china clay was a mineral within the meaning of the reservation, but that the defen-undertaking mentioned in the rule. If he was not dants could not work it as it was impossible to do so without destroying the surface. The plaintiff was therefore entitled to a perpetual injunction in the terms of his prayer. Solicitors: Bell, Brodrick, and Gray, for Beeves and Boger, Stonehouse, Devon; S. T. Gill. Monday, July 22. SIMPSON v. INGLEBY. Mining lease-Sleeping rent-Covenant to work effectually-Breach of covenant. THIS was an appeal from a decision of Malins, V.C. The suit was instituted to restrain an action of ejectment. The plaintiffs were the lessees for a term of twenty-one years, under a lease dated the 10th Oct. 1865, of the coals and certain sand and clay under a piece of land at Bucknall, in Staffordshire. The sleeping rent reserved by the lease was £150. The lease con an assignee of the policy, the evidence proved Lord Justice MELLISH was of the same opinion. ROLLS COURT. July 15 and 23. AMBLER v. BOLTON. Unassignable contract-Valuation. assets, and if so, in what manner it was to be behalf of the defendant that it was merely a part- Southgate, Q.C. and Ince for the plaintiff. Fry, Q.C. and Daniel Jones for the defendant. Lord ROMILLY held that the contract formed part of the partnership assets, and that as it was inalienable, it was impossible to adopt the ordinary course of selling it as a going concern, and therefore the defendant would take the contract, and its value would be ascertained in chambers, and in taking the accounts the defendant would be charged with the value of it, and the estate of the deceased partner would be credited with the amount of his share therein. His Lordship also held that the reversion of the superior lease formed part of the partnership assets and must be dealt with accordingly. Solicitors: Thos. Donnithorne; Allen, Colley, and Edwards. - Tuesday, July 23. Injunction. THIS was a suit, instituted by the plaintiff, who is the proprietor and publisher of a book entitled "The Birthday Scripture Text Book," to restrain the defendants from publishing a work called The "The Children's Birthday Text Book." Birthday Scripture Text Book is a printed diary, interleaved with writing paper so arranged as to give a blank space for writing upon opposite to each day in the diary, and underneath each date is a text of Scripture, with a verse of a hymn. The preface stated that the work was intended to serve a threefold purpose; besides its general use for daily texts, it was so arranged that it might be made a book of autographs and a record of the birthdays of friends. It was to be handed by its owner to friends, that they might inscribe their names on the blank leaves opposite to the page bearing the date of their respective birthdays, so that on these occasions they might be especially remembered in prayer. The defendants published the Children's Birthday Text Book arranged upon the same plan as the publication of the plaintiff, differing only in the selection of texts and verses appropriated to the several days of the Re BICKNELL'S SETTLED ESTATES. THIS was a petition under the above Act, praying were headed, "In the matter of the Leases and Sales of Settled Estates Act," instead of In the matter of an Act passed in the 19th and 20th years of her present Majesty, entitled An Act to facilitate Leases and Sales of Settled Estates' which was the title of the petition. In the advertisements also the application was stated to be made "In the matter of Premises in High-street, Bognor, Sussex," while the petition was entitled "In the matter of a dwelling house and shop situate in the High-street of Bognor in the parish of South Barsted, in the county of Sussex, late in the occupation of Emily Tomsett (formerly Emily Bicknell), butcher, deceased, part of the Settled Estates of Henry Bicknell, of Bognor, aforesaid, deceased. place for securing to him repayment of the prin- time the contractor was to maintain the dock in cipal, and interest owing to him on the security good working order. The contract further proof those presents, and then upon trust for vided that the contractor should enter into a C. J. K. Tynte, his executors, administrators, bond for the proper performance of the works. and assigns. By the same indenture Tynte The plaintiffs became the sureties of Mr. Russell, demised the said real estate to Thomas for and accordingly executed a bond in the usual 120 years, if he (Tynte) should so long live, with form, the penal sum being £8000. In April 1866 power to Thomas to pay the premiums due on the Mr. Russell became involved in pecuniary diffi. policies out of the rents thereof. The deed con- culties, and partly in consequence of that, and tained no power of sale. There were several sub-partly owing to other causes, the dock was not sequent incumbrancers on the real estate, but completed within the period limited. It was, they had no charge upon the policies in question. however, finished in the course of the year, and Thomas had notice of these intermediate charges, sent out to the island, but before it had been and subsequently made further advances to the there six months, it sank, while taking in a mortgagor, secured only by judgments entered up steamer, and after lying for three years and a against him. This was a petition for the purpose half at the bottom of the sea, it had been of ascertaining who were entitled to the policies, raised, and was now at work. The question after satisfying Thomas's claim under the mort- was whether, under these circumstances, the gage. On behalf of subsequent incumbrancers, sureties were liable, and, if so, to what exThe VICE-CHANCELLOR made the order without it was submitted that Thomas could tent. An action had been brought against requiring further advertisements. tack his judgment debts to the mortgage, and them by the company, and they had thereSolicitors: Robinson and Preston, agents for that the assets ought to be marshalled. On upon filed this bill. It was contended on their Johnson and Raper, Chichester. behalf of Colonel Tente it was contended that, behalf that the designs were defective, and that inasmuch as there was no power of sale in the the dock was not properly constructed; secondly, mortgage deed, as soon as the mortgage debt was that the company had virtually, if not ostensibly, paid off, the policies must be kept up for his taken the dock into its own hands, and that the benefit out of the rents of the real estate, as all operations were so mismanaged by the company's subsequent incumbrancers took subject to the engineers that they were responsible for the niticharge of paying the premiums. On the other mate disaster; and, thirdly, that variations had hand, on behalf of Thomas, it was contended that been made by the engineers of the company in the Thomas was entitled to consolidate his charges. details of the plan. Kay, Q.C. and Woodroffe were for the petitioner, a puine incumbrancer. Woodroffe, in support of the petition, contended that the errors in the advertisements being slight, might be disregarded. V.C. BACON'S COURT. Re THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN TELEGRAPH director of the above-named company, and twenty. shares. Kay, Q.C. and Macnaghten, were for the official liquidator. not Amphlett, Q.C. and Kingdon for persons in the J. M. Fletcher for the first judgment creditor. Solicitors: W. A. Ford; G. F. Smith; Baker, Tuesday, July 23. GIBBS v. GIBBS. Eddis, Q.C. and Waller, were for Mr. Fowler. The VICE-CHANCELLOR held that Mr. Fowler was rightly on the list of contributories in respecting the several annuities. Two of the annuitants of the whole forty-five shares, and dismissed the summons with costs. Solicitors for the official liquidator, Lewis, Munns, Nunn and Longden. Solicitors for Mr. Fowler, R. and W. B. Smith. Re TAYLOR'S SETTLED ESTATE. Practice-Leases and Sales of Settled Estates Act (19 & 20 Vict. c. 120)-Conso idated Order XLI., rule 20-Examination of married women, THIS was an application that a petition under the Leases and Sales of Settled Estates Act (19 & 20 Vict. c. 120), might be set down for hearing within the twenty-one days limited by rule 20 of General Order XLI. from the date of the last advertisement. The last advertisement was inserted on the 15th July, and the twenty-one days would not expire until after the court rose for the long vacation. Cozens Hardy asked, upon the authority of Re Adam's Devised Estates (6 L. T. Rep. N. S., 604; and Re Bower's Settled Estates, 23 L. T. Rep. N. S. 358), that the petition might be set down for the last petition day of the sitting. He also asked that the examination of certain married women might be taken in court at the same time. The VICE-CHANCELLOR allowed the petition to be set down for the last petition day of the sitting, and consented to take the examination of the married women in court. Solicitors: Sharpe, Parkers, and Pritchard. Kay, QC. and Kekewich for the plaintiff, the widow, submitted that on the death of the annuitants she became entitled for life to the dividends which formerly went to pay their annuities, and that she was also entitled to interest at £4 per cent. on the value of the reversionary interest at the time of the death of the testator. Swanston, Q.C. and Roupell for the defendants. The VICE-CHANCELLOR held that the widow was not entitled for life to the dividends, but that they must be invested, and the income paid to her for life, and that the reversionary interest must be valued as at the time of the testator's death, and interest at £4 per cent. on that value paid to the tenant for life. Solicitor for the plaintiff, J. T. Simpson. V.C. WICKENS' COURT. Sir Roundell Palmer, Q. C., Greene, Q. C., and F. C. J. Millar for the plaintiffs. Bristowe, Q. C., Rowcliffe, and Charles Bowen (of the Common Law Bar) for the company. Bagshawe, Smart, and Kekewich for other parties. The VICE-CHANCELLOR decided against the plaintiffs, and dismissed the bill with costs, to be paid to all the defendants. Co. Solicitors: J. J. Darley; Freshfields; Smith and Monday, July 22. Re THOMPSON'S TRUSTS. Trustee Relief Act-l'ayment of money into court under-Liability of trustees for costs. THIS case came on by way of three petitions praying for the payment out of court of a share of a trust fund which had been paid in by trustees under the Trustee Relief Act. The main question was as to the costs of the payment of the money into court by the trustees, and of the petitions to get it out again. It was argued against the trustees that it was well settled that a trustee had no right out of mere caprice to pay trust money into court. The Trustee Relief Act was passed not to relieve parties from discharging the duties they had undertaken, but simply to relieve them in cases where difficulties existed. In the present case so far from there being any difficulty the affidavit filed by the trustees, on the payment into court, showed clearly that there was none. Under these circumstances it was submitted that the trustees had improperly paid the money into court, and ought to pay the costs occasioned by their own wrongful act. Dickinson, Q.C., Karslake, Q.C., Lindley, Q.C., Marten, Chitty, Leeson, and W. W. Karsluke, appeared on the several petitions and for respondents. The VICE-CHANCELLOR said that except as to one share there was no ground to justify the payment into court, and therefore on the first petition the trustees must pay the costs of their application. With regard to the costs deducted on paying the money into court, there was no authority to order that to be repaid except on a bill filed. It must, however, be subject to a set-off. Solicitors: J. Crowdy; Rogers and Ford; Gold and Son; Sherman Crossman. COURT OF PROBATE. Tuesday, July 23. (Before Lord PENZANCE.) In the Goods of SCARLETT. Will-Sole executrix declared a lunatic--Adminis tration to the committee of the person who was the next of kin-Passing over the committee of the estate-73rd sect of Probate Act. GENERAL Sir James Yorke Scarlett, late of Burnley, in the county of Lancaster, died 6th Dec. 1871, leaving a will duly executed, bearing date 24th June 1852, by which he appointed his wife, Dame Charlotte Ann Scarlett, his sole executrix and sole legatee. Lady Scarlett did not take out probate, but on 22nd March 1872 she was declared lunatic by inquisition. Her sister and next of kin, Eleanor Thursby, and her husband, the Rev. W. Thursby, were appointed committee of her person, and their son, Col. Thursby, was appointed committee of the estate. Dr. Spinks now moved that administration with the will annexed of the estate of General Scarlett be granted to Mrs. Thursby, the next of kin of Lady Scarlett, and the committee of her person. As questions were likely to arise in the Court of Chancery, under the will of Lady Scarlett's father, as to what belonged to General Scarlett's estate, and what belonged to Lady Scarlett's, it was desirable that the committee of the estate should be passed over, and he had consented, as he had separate interests. The grant would, therefore, go under the 73rd section. Lord PENZANCE.-It is a very proper application, and the grant may go. Solicitors: Shaw and Tremellen. LEGISLATION AND JURIS- HOUSE OF LORDS. SUMMARY JURISDICTION BILL. THE report of amendment on this Bill was received and agreed to. STATUTE LAW REVISION (NO. 2) BILL. The LORD-CHANCELLOR, in moving the second reading of this Bill, said that under it the second revision of the statutes would be brought down to 1810. The Bill was read a second time. Tuesday, July 23. MASTERS AND WORKMEN (ARBITRATION) BILL. Lord KINNAIRD, in moving the second reading of this Bill, expressed his regret at the absence of a noble and learned lord (Lord St. Leonards), who took a great interest in the question, but who, owing to age and infirmity, was not able to be present on this occasion. In 1866 or 1867 Lord St. Leonards introduced a measure called the Concili. ation Act, the object of which was to enable masters and workmen to submit their differences to arbitration. But that Bill provided more for the present and the past, and its machinery was so complicated that it had not been found to confer those benefits which otherwise would have arisen from its operation. Lord St. Leonards had seen the present amended Bill and approved it. It would make better provision for the future than the Bill of the noble and learned lord had done. Its object was to enable masters and workmen to agree to go before a court of arbitration, and when they had so agreed they were to be bound afterwards by the decision of the arbitrator. In 1869 a commission was appointed to inquire into the working of trades unions, and that commission recommended a court of arbitration, but that it should be voluntary. This Bill carried out that recommendation, because it was altogether permissive, and every precaution was adopted to insure that neither masters nor men should be taken by surprise. It was accordingly provided that the conditions upon which the parties should go to arbitration should be placed in the hands of every man concerned, and he was to have forty-eight hours to make up his mind on the subject. The question of wages was not touched by the Bill of Lord St. Leonards, but under this Bill both the hours of labour and the wages to be paid questions which were now exciting so much public attention-might be arranged. In short, any subject of difference might come before the arbitrator, and when he had settled it by this Bill the parties on both sides would be bound. In the ironworks in the north of England the greatest benefits had arisen from courts of arbitration, both to masters and workmen ; questions of wages had been amicably settled, and no strike had occurred for a long time. The men themselves were most anxious for a measure of this kind to enable them to meet their masters upon equal terms, without resorting to a strike. At a very large meeting of Cleveland miners at Nottingham, a resolution was passed declaring that boards of arbitration and conciliation were the only reasonable way of settling the disputes that inevitably arose between capital and labour, and they most earnestly urged on the Cleveland mine owners the desirability of establishing these boards. He firmly believed that if their lordships passed this measure it would put an end to strikes. He begged to move the second reading of the Bill.-The Bill was read a second time. GRAND JURIES (MIDDLESEX) BILL. Lord CAIRNS, in moving the second reading of this Bill, said that under the present system gentlemen were summoned on grand juries for Middlesex for no practical purpose, and having nothing whatever to do. Under the Bill, the second reading of which he now begged to move, it would not be necessary to summon persons bound to serve as grand jurors, unless notice was given of some business to be brought before them. -After a few words from the LORD CHANCELLOR and Lord CHELMSFORD in support of the motion, the Bill was read a second time. HOUSE OF COMMONS. IMPRISONMENT FOR SMALL DEBTS. In reply to Mr. BASS, Mr. GLADSTONE said he had consulted the Solicitor-General with regard to the appointment of a committee next Session to inquire into the present state of the law in regard to imprisonment for small debts, and there would be no difficulty in appointing such committee if the House desired it; but, at the same time, the Government would rely on the energy, ability, and perseverance of the hon. member for the conduct of the inquiry. (Laughter.) LEASES OF CROWN MINERALS. In answer to Mr. HEADLAM, Mr. BAXTER said it was intended next Session to introduce a Bill to extend the term of years for which the Commissioners of Woods could grant leases of minerals belonging to the Crown. CHAIRMEN OF IRISH COUNTIES. In answer to Mr. STACPOOLE, Lord HARTING TON said the question as to increasing the remuneration to the Chairmen of Irish Counties had been under the consideration of the Lord Chancellor and his right hon. and learned friend the Attorney-General for Ireland, and it was hoped some settlement would have been arrived at during the present session; but a committee having been appointed by the House of Lords to inquire into the constitution of the Landed Estates Court, the Government did not think it right to take any definite step as to the salaries of the Chairmen when the whole constitution of the court might have to undergo alteration. There was no probability now that the subject could be settled before next year. Wednesday, July 24. he must have paid on or before the 20th July all the rates made and allowed after the 5th Jan. of the preceding year, and which have become payable up to the 5th Jan. of the qualifying year. The enactments which thus limited the large words of that section are, by virtue of sect. 56 of 30 & 31 Vict. c. 102, made a context to the latter Act, by which the large words of sect. 3, sub.above quoted from sect. 27 of 2 Will. 4, c. 45', are sect. 4 of that Act (corresponding to the words also limited. The words, therefore, of sect. 3, that have become payable by him in respect of sub.-sect. 4 of 30 & 31 Vict. c. 102, "all poor rates the said premises up to the preceding 5th day of Jan.," must be taken as limited to "all rates made and allowed after the 5th day of Jan. of the year preceding the qualifying year, and payable up to the 5th Jan. of the qualifying year." No excusal of such rates, whether made before or after the commencement of the qualifying year, can be pleaded in lieu of a disqualification arising from their not having been in fact paid or tendered before the 20th July in the qualifying year. At the registration in 1871 A. applied to have his name inserted in the register as a voter for the borough. He claimed, as an occupying householder, under sect. 3 of 30 & 31 Vict. c. 102, and was in every respect entitled to be registered, unless he was disqualified by reason of his not having paid two rates, which had been made respectively on 30th April. and 30th Oct. 1869, and to which he was duly rated in respect of the qualifying premises. Held, that A. was not thereby disqualified. Abel v. Lee (23 L. T. Rep. N. S. 844; L. Rep. 6 C. P. 365) distinguished: (Cull v. Austin, THE DEBTORS (IRELAND) BILL. THE POOR LAW (SCOTLAND) BILL. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT. Mr. Mr. GILPIN made his usual speech in moving the second reading of a Bill to abolish capital punishment.- -The rejection of the Bill was moved by Mr. LEWIS (seconded by Mr. ScOUR. FIELD), who held that the first thing to be shown was that juries were deterred by the existence of capital punishment from finding verdicts of guilty; and, while admitting that there was something in the argument of uncertainty, maintained that it went rather to an alteration in the legal definition of murder than to an abolition of capital punishment.--Mr. HENLEY supported the Bill, arguing the question solely on the ground that capital punishment had no deterrent effect, which he showed by an exhaus. tive examination of criminal statistics. RICHARD, Mr. WHALLEY, Mr. YOUNG, and Sir C. O'LOGHLEN also supported the Bill on practical grounds, the last-mentioned member asserting from his legal experience in Ireland that the punishment impeded the course of justice. This, however, was emphatically denied by the ATTORNEY-GENERAL for IRELAND, who maintained that if juries did disagree in Ireland it was no argument for abolishing the punishment. On the contrary, he asserted that in Ireland the punishment of crime did deter men from crime; and he raised a laugh by appealing to every gentleman present to say what punishment would have most deterrent effect on himself individually, -Mr. T. CAVE and Mr. TIPPING were opposed to the abolition of capital punishment, both being convinced of its necessity by their experience of Italy, where it did not prevail; and the latter deplored earnestly the mawkish sentimentality, the relaxation of moral fibre, and the tendency to shirk unpleasant duties to which he attributed this demand.- -Mr. NEWDEGATE animadverted on the manner in which the prerogative of mercy is exercised by the Home Office.- The ATTORNEYGENERAL examined the criminal statistics to show that they did not bear out Mr. Henley's conclusions, and, with regard to the main question, was of opinion that it would be wrong to part with Mr. BRUCE defended the principles on which the this deterrent agency for the worst cases.prerogative of mercy is administered, and on a division the Bill was thrown out. ELECTION LAW. NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. REGISTRATION-BOROUGH-PAYMENT OF POOR RATES.-The general words in sect. 27 of the Reform Act of 1832 (2 Will. 4, c. 45), that no occupier shall be entitled to be registered as a voter, unless (among other things) he shall have paid, on or before the 20th July in the year in which he makes his claim, all the poor rates which shall become payable from him in respect of the qualifying premises previous to the 6th April then next preceding, have been by sect. 75 of 6 Vict. c. 18, and 11 & 12 Vict., c. 90, restricted to this, that THE BALLOT. THE Vote by Ballot is now established by law. It is at this moment in full operation, and it is applicable alike to municipal and to parliamentary elections. The very next election for a town councillor in any city or borough must be held under the provisions of this new statute, which really effects a far greater revolution in our representative system than anything done since the first Reform Act. As it may now be called into requisition anywhere at any moment, our readers will desire to possess, in a form for ready reference, the details of the new mechanism for elections, and we cannot do better than take the very excellent one that has been published by the Daily News. DUTIES OF THE RETURNING Officer. The duties of returning officer in connection with nomination proceedings are for the future of a very responsible nature. In counties which are divided for electoral purposes, the sheriff may appoint a deputy, who may in any electoral division act as returning officer, and as a natural consequence a writ will be sent for each electoral division of a county. The old form of proclamamation as to notices of election is abandoned. In the case of a county election, the returning officer must give due notice within two days after the receipt of a writ; in the boroughs notice must be given on the same, or at the latest, on the following day, and in each case, between the hours of nine a.m., and four p.m. It must be remembered that in boroughs the maximum interval between notice and nomination has been reduced. All the notices required by the Act must be given by advertise ments, placards, handbills, or any method of that kind which may be most convenient; and it is the duty of the returning officer to fix the time and place of nomination, the time and place at which nomination papers will be supplied, and the day of the poll. Notices may, in the case of county elections, be forwarded through the post. The place of nomination is to be some convenient room in the town where the nomination has been held before, or in some town to be fixed In the interval between the day of giving notice by the returning officer ascording to his discretion. and the day of nomination, the returning officer must supply forms of nomination papers to electors during any two hours between 10 a.m. and 2 p.m. that he may select-a regulation that will demand the utmost rapidity in providing printed forms of nomination papers, after the receipt of the writ. On nomination day it is essential that the returning officer should attend at the appointed place during the two hours fixed for the business to receive nominations, and for one hour afterwards to receive objections. The returning officer takes no oath for the future, and the persons entitled to attend the nomination proceedings are the returning officer, and the candidates, with their proposer and seconder, and one other person selected by them; but no other person is entitled to attend, except for the purpose of assisting the returning officer. This official will |