LEWIS, ARTHUR, grocer, Hay, Brecon; July 30, at three, at office of Sol., Page, Hay LLOYD, DAVID, grocer, Swansea: July 27, at eleven, at office of Barnard, Thomas, Cawker, and Co., Swansea. Sol., Field, Swansea MERCER, JOHN ALEXANDER, licensed victualler, Portsea; July 24, at four, at office of Sol., King, Portsea MILES, THOMAS, Poor Law officer, Syston; July 30, at twelve, at ROE, JOSEPH, builder, Wetwang; July 27, at twelve, at office of SADLER, THOMAS, pearl button maker, Birmingham; July 26, at eleven, at office ot Sol., Duke, Birmingham SHEPHERD, WILLIAM B VAN, grocer, Mumbles; July 25, at eleven, at office of Sol.. Field, Swansea SHIPWAY, HENRY, timber merchant, Birmingham; July 29, at twelve, at the Great Western hotel, Birmingham. Sols., Jelf and Goule, Birmingham SKINNER, THOMAS, chemist, Sidbury; July 29, at twelve, at office of Sol., Pitt, Worcester SPENCER, JOHN, woollen manufacturer. Halifax; July 24, at twelve, at the counting house of John Spencer, Halifax. Sol., Longbottom, Halifax THOMPSON, FRANCIS WILLIAM, fishmonger, Nottingham; July 19, at twelve, at office of Sol., Belk, Nottingham TILBURY, GEORGE FRANCIS, commercial traveller, Leicester; July 18, at ten, at office of Sol., Owston, Leicester VIBERT, HENRY POPE, watchmaker, Gloucester; July 25, at one, at the Bell hotel, Gloucester. Sols., Messrs. Taynton, Glouces and QUALITY. HARMSWORTH, GEORGE, wine merchant, Surbiton-hill, Kingston, and Teddington TERRY, DAVID, builder, Whitwood, near Castleford HUGHES, JOHN, Leadenhall-st, trading under firm of the Holywell Tin Plate Company, at Holywell The Official Assignees, &c., are given, to whom apply for the Dividends. Baines, W. C. innkeeper, first, 48. 8d. Paget, Basinghall-st.Bowen, S. glass manufacturer, second, 3d. Harley, Bristol.Chambers, T. H. coal merchant, first, 88. 8d. Paget, Basinghall-st. -Curtis, T. shipping butcher, second, 38. 31d. (and 3s. 54d, to new proofs). Paget, Basinghall-st.-Frerton, T. T. importer of fancy goods, first, 44d. Puget, Basinghall-st.-Gambier, G. G. C. gentleman, first. 88. 7d. Paget, Basinghall-st.-Holmes, R. C. adjutant in London Rifle Volunteers, first, 20s. Paget, Basinghall-st.Pool, W. farmer, first, 1s. 6d. Puget, Basinghall-st.-Samels, A. lime merchant, fourth, 4d. Paget, Basinghall-st. Brock, S. farmer, 2. 10d. At offices of Trust., J. E. E. Dawe, 8, Union-ter. Plymouth.- Forrer, Burden, and Phipps, engineers, second and final, 1s. 0jd. At office of J. S. and R. Blease, 15, Lord. st, Liverpool.-Gross, B. L. attorney and solicitor, 2s. d. At offices of Trust., J. B. Geard, 6, Princes-st, Ipswich-Hetherington, J. At Trust., D. C. Hodgson, 3, Old Market-pl, grocer, 3s. 11d. Workington.-Herby, W. C. surgeon, 58. At offices of Burrell and Pickard, accountants, 18, Albion st, Leeds.-Jeffery, J. R., Jeffery. W. S., Jeffery, F. J., Barnard, J., Watts, W. H., and Heard, W. silk mercers, second, 9d. At offices of Trusts., H. Honey and J. A. Josolyne, 23, King-st, Cheapside.-Mure, W. T. H. S. distiller second, Is, sd. At ffice of Trust, E. Moore, 3, Crosby.sq.Murray, M. draper, first, 58. 6d. At offices of Renson, Eland, and Co., accountants, Westgate-st, Newcastle.-Pick, J. carpenter, 10s. At Trust., T. Pick, 11, Goldington-éres. St. Pancras-rd.Simms, G. cordwainer, second, 2s. At house of Trust., H. Wenman, Newbury-st, Wantage.-Simmer, J. shopkeeper, first, 28. At office of Trust, H. L. Jones, Bangor.-Treguna, J. travelling draper, second, 3s. 3d. At office of Trust., G. Wreford, Gandy-st-chmbs, Exeter. BIRTHS, MARRIAGES AND DEATHS. BIRTHS. BUTCHER.-On the 13th inst., at stonham Lodge, New Wimble don, Surrey, the wife of Webster Butcher, Esq., solicitor, of a daughter. DRAKE. On the 10th ult., at Kingston, Jamaica, the wife of Henry Drake, Esq., District Judge, of a daughter. LABILLIERE. On the 10th inst., at 5, Aldridge-road Villas, Westbourne-park, the wife of Francis P. Labilliere, Esq., barristerat-law, of a son. MASSEY.-On the 15th inst., at 41, Tregunter-road, South Kensington, the wife of Thomas Massey, Esq., of 5, Gray's innsquare, of a son. of a son. DEATHS. of every class for immediate use, or to measure. BAGGALLAY.-On the 12th inst., aged 24. Richard Baggallay, of PARTRIDGE AND COOPER ream. "We should direct particular attention to their New Club. house Paper: in our opinion it is the very best paper we ever wrote upon."-London Mirror. INDENTURE SKINS, Printed and Machine-ruled, to hold twenty or thirty folios, 23. per skin, 238. per dozen, 110s. per roll. Illus. trated in dif ferent All sizes in stock or to Illustrated in the Book of styles. order. Fashion! able and and Novel quality. Fabrics. GENTLEMEN'S and YOUTHS' CLOTH ING can be either purchased ready made or made to measure. The Ready-made Stock is entirely of Messrs. Samuel Brothers' own manufacture, and is equal to clothing made to order. For the convenience of Lady visitors special show-rooms are exclusively devoted to the Juvenile Departmet. SECONDS OF FOLLOWERS, Ruled, 1s. sd. each, 198. per dozen, SAMUEL BROTHERS, 50, LUDGATE OWARD'S PURE MEDITERRANEAN By this invaluable natural stimulant, obtained by the evaporation of the deep bine waters of the Mediterranean Ses, residents in towns may obtain at their own home for one penny all the luxury and advantages of a perfect warm or cold Sea Water Bath. Sold only by Chemists and Druggists, in 3lb. and 71b. boxes 29 AND 30, SOUTHAMPTON-BUILDINGS, CHANCERY-LANE, LONDON. MT is known as the " THREE YEARS' SYSTEM" OST PERSONS ARE FAMILIAR with of the Pianoforte Makers, by which anyone who Hires an Instrument and pays the Hire for that period, becomes the ABSOLUTE OWNER OF THE PIANOFORTE. Previously to the introduction of this plan it was almost as difficult for those of limited income to buy a good Pianoforte as to BUY A HOUSE; and persons went on year after year, paying for the Hire of an Instrument, and expended as much money as would have bought the Pianoforte several times over. What will hold good for Pianofortes will hold good for HOUSES; and there are many who would no doubt AVAIL THEMSELVES OF THE OPPORTUNITY, if it was afforded them, of becoming THE OWNER OF A HOUSE in the same way as they have already become the owner of their pianoforte. THE DIRECTORS OF THE BIRKBECK BUILDING SOCIETY HAVE DETERMINED TO AFFORD THE SAME FACILITIES FOR PURCHASING HOUSES As now exist for Buying Pianofortes. A HOUSE being, however, a more expensive article to Pur. chase than a Pianoforte, the "Three Years' System" will not apply, excepting in a very few cases: so that a MORE LENGTHENED PERIOD IS NECESSARY over which the time of Hiring must extend. In pursuance of this resolution THE DIRECTORS HAVE MADE ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE OWNERS OF HOUSES In various parts of London, and its Suburbs, by which they are enabled to afford to the Members of the Birkbeck Building Society AND OTHERS New System of Purchasing a House, MAY BE SUMMED UP AS FOLLOWS: 1. Persons of Limited Income, Clerks, Shopmen, and others, may, by becoming Tenants of the BIRKBECK BUILDING SOCIETY, be placed at once in a position of independence as regards their Landlord, 2. Their RENT CANNOT BE RAISED. 3. They CANNOT BE TURNED OUT OF POSSES. SION so long as they pay their Rent. 4. NO FEES or FINES of any kind are chargeable. 5. They can leave the House at any time without notice, rent being payable only to the time of giving up possession. 6. If circumstances compel them to leave the House before the completion of their Twelve and a half Years, Tenancy, they can Sub-let the House for the remainder of the Term, or they can Transfer their right to another Tenant. 7. Finally, NO LIABILITY or RESPONSIBILITY of any kind is incurred, beyond the Payment of Rent by those who acquire Houses by this New System. The BIRKBECK BUILDING SOCIETY have on their List several HOUSES, which they are prepared to LET on the TWELVE AND A HALF YEARS SYSTEM, and in many cases Immediate Possession may be obtained. The Terms on which Houses can be placed on this Register may be obtained on application to FRANCIS RAVENSCROFT, Manager. A HORACE COX, 10, Wellington-street, Strand, W.C. Now ready, A NEW EDITION (THE SEVENTH) OF HALLILAY'S EXAMINATION QUESTIONS. DIGEST of the EXAMINATION QUESTIONS in Common Law, Conveyancing, and Equity, from the commencement of the Examinations in 1836 to Hilary Term 1879, with ANSWERS; also the Mode of Proceeding, and Directions to be attended to at the Examination. By RICHARD HALLILAY, Esq., Author of "The Articled Clerk's Handbook." By GEORGE BADHAM, Esq., Solicitor. Price 16s., post free. London: HORACE Cox, 10, Wellington-street, Strand, W.C. and in 1858. He was raised to the Bench in 1859. The late Baron unsuccessfully contested Cavan co. in 1855, but he sat for co. Longford in 1856-7, It is anticipated that Mr. Dowse, the Attorney-General, will accept the vacant appointment. FROM an abstract of the Accounts of the Council of Legal Education, for the year 1871-72, we find that the fees received of students for the public lectures was-Inner Temple, £672; Lincoln's-inn, £530 5s.; Middle Temple, £514 10s.; Gray's-inn, £42. The fees paid by students for admission to the private classes was -Middle Temple, £183 15s.; Lincoln's-inn, £157 10s.; Inner Temple, £152 5s.; Gray's-inn, £26 5s.; Hindu Law Reader, £8 8s. The cost of readers, examiners, and studentships has been £3381; and that of the preliminary examination, £241. Ir is said by the Morning Post that if the persons who are to be indicted for misdemeanor in intimidating the Galway electors are acquitted, Mr. Justice KEOGH cannot retain his seat on the Bench. Could anything be more absurd? A learned and able judge makes a report to the House of Commons scheduling certain offenders. The ATTORNEY-GENERAL, on the same evidence as that brought before the Judge, with pain arrives at the conclusion that some of these persons must be prosecuted. Then, because twelve Irish jurymen return a verdict of not guilty, the Judge must resign. The reputation of Irish jurymen does not stand very high at present, and to suppose that such a verdict would have the slightest effect upon Mr. Justice KEOGHI's position is manifestly ridiculous. In our issue of the 13th inst., under the heading "Contracts by Bill of Exchange," we referred to a case decided by the Supreme Court of Constantinople. The facts as to the indorsement of the bill sued upon appear not to have been correctly stated. It will be remembered that the question was as to the operation of this indorsement in bringing foreign law into effect. A correspondent tells us "that the bill on which the action was brought was drawn in Salonica (where English law would rule the liability of the defendant) on a person in Genoa; it was then indorsed in Salonica by the defendant, was sent to Genoa for acceptance, was there duly accepted, and then in course went on to Marseilles for payment at the acceptor's agent's, in accordance with the words "payable at Marseilles,' which had been written as a memorandum at the lower left-hand corner of the bill by the drawer, not by the indorser." It was contended that these words did not form any substantive part of the bill. With these observations we must leave our remarks to be qualified by those who take an interest in the subject. THE practice adopted by Baron BRAMWELL not to address prisoners convicted of capital crimes on the nature of their offence before sentencing them to death, might be advantageously followed by all the judges without exception. Moral reflections from the Bench are supposed to have great effect; and whether they have or not as a matter of fact we do not care to inquire. For all purposes of public justice and public example it is sufficient that the law, by its minister, pronounces the sentence of death. If this sentence does not carry its own lessons to the prisoner, it may be supplemented by the chaplain of the gaol. If any additional teaching is required by the public it cannot come appropriately from a judge above whom presides a Home Secretary and a medical council, prepared on the slightest occasion to revoke the terrible sentence. Draw no hope from my silence" Baron BRAMWELL told a murderer at Maidstone. This is a useful suggestion. It is the silence of the HOME SECRETARY which criminals have to fear-silence which, in the interests of justice, is too often broken. We have to contemplate the possibility of being called upon some day to regulate voting on the question of granting licences to sell intoxicating liquors. It may, therefore, be useful if we state the recent provisions of an United States Act of Assembly. By the first section of this Act it is enacted that on the third Friday in March 1873, in every city and county in this commonwealth, and at the annual municipal elections every third year thereafter, in every such city and county, it shall be the duty of the inspectors and judges of elections in the cities and counties to receive tickets, either written or printed, from the legal voters of said cities and counties, labelled on the outside "licence," and on the inside "for licence" or "against licence," and to deposit said tickets in a box provided for that purpose by said inspectors and judges, as is required by law in the case of other tickets received at said election; and the tickets so received shall be counted, and a return of the same made to the clerk of the court of quarter sessions of the peace of the proper county, duly certified as is required by law, which certificate shall be laid before the judges of the said court, at the first meeting of said court after said election shall be held, and shall be filed with the other records of said court; and it shall be the duty of the mayors of cities and sheriffs of counties, or of any other officer whose duty 66 it may be to perform such service, to give due public notice of such special election above provided for three weeks previous to the time of holding the same, and also three weeks before such election every third year thereafter. By the 3rd section it is provided that whenever, by the returns of elections in any city or county aforesaid, it shall appear that there is a majority against licence, it shall not be lawful for any court or board of licence commissioners to issue any licence for the sale of spirituous, vinous, malt, or other intoxicating liquors, or any admixture thereof, in said city or county, at any time thereafter, until at an election as above provided a majority shall vote in favour of licence. THE recent attacks upon the Judicial Bench, as represented by Mr. Justice KEOGH, have caused a strong revulsion of feeling, and from grand juries and the Bar of Ireland, an almost uniform protest has been put on record against the gross outrages which have been committed. Lord GRANARD has been virtually compelled by force of public opinion to resign the Lord Lieutenancy of Leitrim; and after a careful perusal of the evidence in the Galway case, the ATTORNEY-GENERAL for Ireland has resolved to prosecute twenty-four out of the thirty-six persons named by Mr. Justice KEOGH in the schedule to his report. We are obliged to go to press without knowing what the verdict of Parliament is, but having already ourselves deprecated ministerial censure of Judges, we are glad to find our views shared in by our contemporary the Irish Law Times. Speaking of Recent Assaults on the Independence of the Judicial Bench," the writer says: 'Since the Judges ceased to hold their office during the pleasure of the Crown there has been but one constitutional means of procuring the removal of any of their number, and this is by an address of both Houses of Parliament to the Crown. It is not unnecessary to repeat this rather elementary proposition in constitutional law, because both in England and Ireland we have recently witnessed attempts to bring influences of a different character to bear upon HER MAJESTY'S Judges. Lord Justice CHRISTIAN, rightly or wrongly, censured the proceedings of the Legislature in relation to their passing of the Land Act. The PRIME MINISTER publicly announced in the House of Commons that he and his colleagues had considered the propriety of bringing the matter before Parliament, and had come to the conclusion that they were not called upon to do so. If they had come to the further conclusion that inasmuch as they were not about to employ constitutional measures, they ought to refrain from the use of unconstitutional menaces, they would have acted more worthily of their position. Such occurrences as these are calculated to lower the position and diminish the usefulness of our Judicial Bench. The experience of America ought to afford us warning against subjecting our Judges to the caprice of the public. The Irish, as a nation, have never been wanting in respect to the representatives of the law, and we sincerely hope that it may be long before our country is disgraced by a repetition of scenes such as those upon which we have commented." The MR. SPRAGUE, vice-president of the Society of Actuaries, has published a pamphlet, entitled "Life Insurance in 1872, being a summary and analysis of the accounts of the Life Insurance Companies of Great Britain and Ireland, as now for the first time exhibited by the returns deposited with the Board of Trade, in pursuance of the Life Assurance Company's Act 1872," (London C. & E. Layton.) As an introduction to his tables he has some discriminating observations on the subject of the injustice to policy-holders of the old manner of conducting amalgamations. He observes: "The case of policy-holders handed over to another company without their consent being obtained, or even asked, was a particularly hard one. questions as to the rights of policy holders under such circumstances were new and undecided. It was very doubtful what steps a policy-holder should take to preserve his claim on the shareholders of the company which originally granted his policy; and according to the decisions of Lord CAIRNS in the Albert arbitration, this appears to have been a matter of the very greatest possible difficulty. It has been held by Lord CAIRNS, in the case of a policy holder, that the mere payment of premium to the new company without a formal protest of the strongest kind, and apparently a protest to be yearly renewed, was sufficient to release his claim on the company granting the policy. As regards an annuitant, the mere receipt of the annuity was not held to operate similarly. There can be no doubt that these decisions of Lord CAIRNS are in complete accordance with the principles of English law; but it would have been much more in accordance with justice, if it had been held that the policy holder's claim on the original company subsisted until by some express act he had formally renounced it. It was even doubtful whether a policy holder had any locus standi if he had appealed to the Court of Chancery to prevent an amalgamation by which he had reason to believe his interests would be prejudicially affected. It is true that in some cases the threat of an appeal to the Court of Chancery resulted in an arrangement by which a policy-holder was allowed to transfer his policy on the existing terms to an office of his own selection. In at least one instance, also, application to the Court of Chancery resulted in the breaking off of the negotiation for the transfer of a company to one of those which subsequently amalgamated with the Albert; but in this case the result was probably due more to the fears of the directors than to the action of the court. As a rule, policy-holders exhibited what appears now to be almost an unaccountable apathy. The Act requires that complete publicity shall now be given to the terms of any proposed amalgamation or transfer, and that the persons proposed to be affected by it shall have the opportunity of expressing their opinion on it; and that if persons holding one-tenth of the sum assured object, the amalgamation or transfer shall not be allowed to proceed." Mr. SPRAGUE suggests some amendments to Mr. CAVE's Act. The returns, he " says, give no direct information as to the total sums assured, or the number of policies; but assuming the average premium to be 3 per cent, we get at the approximate sum assured £331,172,167. It is to be hoped that in any future amendment of the Act the companies will be required to furnish information on these points." Again, It appears at first sight that the Board of Trade returns will, in future years, enable us to answer the very interesting question as to whether the practice of life insurance is increasing in the country or not; but on examination it will be found that the information on this point is incomplete. By com paring the returns in successive years we shall certainly be able to see whether the total income and assets of the insurance companies are increasing; but in order to give a correct answer to the above question we should require to know the amount of the new busines transacted in each year, and the returns give no information under this head-an important omission, which it is to be hoped will before long be supplied." RESERVATIONS OF MINES AND MINERALS. WHAT are "minerals," and what are the precise rights conferred by a reservation of minerals as against the owner of the rest of the land, involve questions which have been largely elucidated by the arguments and judgments in the case of Hext v. Gill, decided by the Lord Justices on the 22nd inst., on appeal from the judg ment of Vice-Chancellor Wickens, reported 26 L. T. Rep. N. S. 502. From that report it will be seen that the specific points in dispute were-first, whether a substance called kaolin or china clay was a mineral included in a reservation contained in a grant of the fee from the Duchy of Cornwall in 1799, to the person through whom the plaintiff's seeking an injunction claimed title, and which reservation was as follows: "Excepting, nevertheless, and always reserving unto his said Royal Highness the Prince of Wales, his heirs and successors, Dukes of Cornwall, all mines and minerals within and under the said several and respective premises, or any part thereof, together with full and free liberty of ingress, egress, and regress, to and for his said Royal Highness, his heirs and successors, and his and their officers, agents, and workmen, and to and for the lessee of his said Royal Highness, his heirs and successors, and the agents and workmen of such lessee or lessees, into and out of the said several premises, and every part thereof, with or without horses, carts, and carriages, to dig, search for, and to take, use, and work the said excepted mines and minerals," and, secondly, if this question should be answered in the affirmative, whether the persons claiming under the reservation were entitled "to dig, search for, and to take, use, and work" the kaolin in such a way as to injure, and, if need were, absolutely to destroy, the surface. From the evidence it appeared that kaolin consists of decomposed granite, in which felspar exists in considerable proportions, and that to make kaolin fit for the market, the felspar, which alone is merchantable, has to be separated from the other constituents of granite; that the beds of the said kaolin were found immediately under, or within a few feet of, the surface soil; and that the ordinary method of obtaining the said clay, and that which was prac tically the only available method, was by removing the soil cover ing the clay, and turning a stream of water over the head of the clay when so arrived at, and washing the same forward into channels the pure clay is allowed to run forward over the top of the reservoir into a pit, when it settles down, and is afterwards dried. It further appeared that these processes closely resembled the mining operation known as "streaming for tin," common in the same district, but were even more destructive to the surface, inasmuch as the injury done in clay working to the surface of the land is the total or the almost total destruction of the surface where the excavations are made. On the first question the Lords Justices, in conformity with the opinion of Sir J. Wickens, held that kaolin was 66 a mineral," but to be on the second, and contrary to the opinion of that learned judge, that the reservation gave no right to injure the surface. Lord Justice Mellish, in a judgment which deserves the most attentive perusal, said that "it was unnecessary to go into the question which had been argued, whether the word mines' ought confined to underground workings, or whether it really meant only the veins or seams of mineral, for the word 'minerals' was much more extensive," and "that the result of the authorities seemed to be this, that the word 'minerals' included every fossil substance which could be got from under the earth for a commercial purpose, for purposes of profit, unless there was something in the context, or in the nature of the transaction, which would induce the court to give the word a more limited meaning. . . . The real meaning of the contract was that the surface and all the profit to be got from it were conveyed to the grantee, while all below the surface, and all profit derived from it, were reserved to the grantor. China clay, therefore, was included in the reservation of minerals.'" On the other point, the Lord Justice observed that the words of the reservation were, to say the least, very ambiguous, and gave, as his Lordship thought, only the right to create a temporary obstruction on the surface, not the right to do a permanent injury to it. In reference to the argument derived from the alleged right of the defendants to stream for tin under the words of the reservation, the Lord Justice said that "he did not now wish to express any opinion whether tin streaming was included in the reservation or not. But tin might be got by underground working, and the words used in the reservation did not accurately describe the process of streaming," and that he thought that if the lord meant to reserve the right of destroying the surface he ought to express it distinctly." The decision on the second point illustrates and appears rightly to apply the maxim Verba chartarum fortius accipiuntur contra proferentem, for there can, we think, be little doubt that the words of the exception and reservation are to be taken to be the words of the grantor and that such words do not operate as a regrant. The minerals were strictly an exception, and the right to win them accessory to the exception. And according to the opinion of the Court of Exchequer in Pannell v. Mill (3 C. B. 625), an exception is not a regrant, and cannot be pleaded as such. We think the judgment of the Lords Justices in Hext v. Gill will commend itself alike to the legal and non legal mind. PROSECUTIONS UNDER THE CORRUPT PRACTICES ACTS. Oy Tuesday evening Mr. Butt raised the question in the House of Commons whether the Election Petitions Act gave authority to the Attorney-General to institute prosecutions under the Corrupt Practices Act? The provisions on this head appear to be very plain. By sect. 9 of 26 Vict. c. 29 "where an election committee has reported to the House of Commons that certain persons named by them have been guilty of bribery or treating, and where it appears by the report of any commission of inquiry into corrupt practices at any election made to Her Majesty and laid before Parliament, that certain persons named by them have been guilty of the offences of bribery or treating, and have not been furnished by them with certificates of indemnity, such report, with the evidence taken by the commission, shall be laid before the Attorney-General, with a view to his instituting a prosecution against such persons if the evidence should, in his opinion, be sufficient to support a prose. cution." By sect. 16 of 31 & 32 Vict. c. 125, "the report of the Judge in respect of persons guilty of corrupt practices shall, for the purpose of the prosecution of such persons in pursuance of sect. 9 of 26 Vict. sect 9, have the same effect as the report of the election committee therein named, that certain persons have been guilty of bribery and treating." It is certainly open to observation that these sections refer only to "bribery or treating," and "bribery and treating," and no mention is made of undue influence. It is not easy to account for this omission; but we do not know that it is very material. By sect. 5 of the Act of 1854 (17 & 18 Vict. c. 102), it is provided that every person who shall directly or indirectly by himself, or by any other person on his behalf, make use of or threaten to make use of any force, violence, or restraint, or inflict or threaten the infliction by himself, or by or through any other person, of any injury, damage, harm, or loss, or in any other manner practise intimidation upon or against any person in order to induce or compel such person to vote or refrain from voting, or on account of such person having voted or refrained from voting at any election, or who shall by abduction, duress, or any fraudulent device or contrivance, impede, prevent, or otherwise interfere with the free exercise of the franchise of any voter, or shall thereby compel, induce, or prevail upon any voter either to give or to refrain from giving his vote at any election shall be deemed to have committed the offence of undue influence, and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. Taking the case of the Galway priests and others as that of an ordinary misdemeanor, what objection could there possibly be to the Attorney-General for Ireland instituting the prosecution? Of course it might be argued that expressio unius est exclusio alterius, and that Parliament having given the Attorney-General power to take proceedings for bribery and treating, intended to reserve to itself the punishment of undue influence. But Parliament has recognised the right of private prosecutors to proceed under the Corrupt Practices Prevention Act 1854 for " offence against the provisions of this Act" (sect. 12), by making provision for costs. If a private prosecutor can institute proceedings assuredly it is not necessary that Government should have the consent of Parliament before taking measures to pnnish offenders. Therefore it may be taken that the Attorney-General for Ireland any is quite regular, though he be not expressly authorised by the Acts upon which he relied under the circumstances of this particular prosecution. THE LIEN OF INNKEEPERS. In the case of Threlfall v. Borwick, which we report this week, the doctrine as to the liability of innkeepers might appear to have been very considerably extended. The short facts were that the plaintiff was a music dealer and the defendant the tenant of an hotel. In Dec. 1870, a Mr. Butcher, residing at the time about a mile from the defendant's inn, hired a pianoforte from the plaintiff at 15s. a month, and the pianoforte was delivered to Mr. Butcher. Mr. Butcher removed to the defendant's inn with his wife and sister, and took with him to the inn the pianoforte hired from the plaintiff. Mr. Butcher agreed to pay the defendant, besides a sum for board, a sum of 16s. per week for a private sitting room, in which the pianoforte was placed. Mr. Butcher having left the defendant's inn, leaving his bill unpaid, the defendant kept the pianoforte, and refused to deliver it up to the plaintiff. On an action being brought by the plaintiff against the innkeeper, the jury gave him a verdict, which, however, the court above upset. In so deciding, the court has gone to the utmost extent, namely, that an innkeeper has a lien upon all goods brought upon his premises by a person living in his inn, whether belonging to his guest or to a third person. Originally, it will be remembered, the question of the lien of the innkeeper generally arose with reference to horses which had been baited in the stable, and in Yorke v. Greenough (1 Salk. 388) that lien was held not to extend to agisters and livery stable keepers without a special agreement, or the horse were taken for training. Therefore, it was plainly considered that the horse and the guest were identified, and that a lien upon one might arise out of the liabilities of the other. The growth of opinion in this direction is shown by the case of Turrell v. Crawley (13 Q. B. 47), where it was held that an innkeeper had a lien on a carriage brought to the inn by a guest. Coleridge, J., said: "I think it clear that with reference to the innkeeper's lien there is no distinction between the goods of a guest and those of a third person brought to an inn by a guest. Three judges to one were of this opinion in Robinson v. Walter (3 Buls. 269); and their opinion may be taken as sufficient authority for so reasonable a doctrine. The question, then, is, whether the innkeeper has the same lien on a carriage as on a horse. Surely he has the same lien in either case, and on the same principle. Most of the decisions are with respect to horses. This is obviously explainable by reference to the mode of travelling in former times. New usages have grown up; and, as carriages are commonly used in travelling, the innkeepers' duties and privileges are extended to them. It would be absurd to say that an innkeeper might receive a guest, but refuse to receive his carriage. An innkeeper must now have a room for the carriages of his guests; and he is entitled to charge for the keep and care of them. He is, consequently, entitled to a lien for the keep and care of a carriage in like manner as for the keep and care of a horse." “I There is nothing distinctive in the nature of carriages as there was in that of horses which are fed, and having given the innkeeper a lien on the travelling carriages of his guest it is only logical that that lien should be extended to his other goods; and the further question then arises whether this lien must be held to cover the goods of a stranger. There are two apparently conflicting statements upon this branch of the subject. In Broadwood v. Granara (10 Ex. 417), B. lent a pianoforte to a professional pianist whilst staying as a guest at an inn, the innkeeper well knowing that the pianoforte was the property of B.; and it was held that the innkeeper had no lien on the pianoforte for the bill due from his guest. (The innkeeper, in Threlfall v. Borwick, knew nothing about the pianoforte not being the property of his guest.) need not," said Pollock, C.B., “go through the series of decisions referred to, because the limited ground on which I think the plaintiffs entitled to judgment is this-that there is no case which decides that an innkeeper has a right of lien under such circumstances as these. This is the case of goods not brought to the inn by a traveller as his goods, either upon his coming to or whilst staying at the inn; but they are goods. furnished for his temporary use by a third person, and known by the innkeeper to belong to that person. I shall not inquire whether, if the pianoforte had belonged to the guest, the defendant would have had a lien on it. It is not necessary to decide that point, for the case finds that it was known to the defendant that the pianoforte was not the property of the guest, and that it was sent to him for a special purpose. Under these circumstances, I am clearly of opinion that the defendant has no lien." So Parke, B.: "It is not necessary to advert to the decisions on the subject of an innkeeper's lien, because this is not the case of goods brought by a guest to an inn in that sense in which the innkeeper has a lien upon them; but it is the case of goods sent to the guest for a particular purpose, and known by the innkeeper to be the property of another person. It therefore seems to me that there is no pretence for saying that the defendant has any lien." On the other hand, in Cramer and Co. v. Mott (L. Rep. 5 Q. B. 357; 22 L. T. Rep. N. S. 857) a person who occupied lodgings in the defendant's house at a weekly rent brought a pianoforte with him which he had hired of the plaintiffs. The plaintiff's having sent two men to fetch away the piano, the defendant's wife (acting in this by the defendant's authority) met the men in a passage of the house outside the room where the piano was, and refused to let the piano leave the house unless the amount which was due for rent and board by her lodger was paid. The plaintiffs having brought an action for the conversion of the piano, the defendant justified the detention as a distress, and was held entitled to judgment, the court holding that there might be a distress without actual seizure, and that what had occurred amounted to a seizure. In that case, as in that under discussion, part of the claim was for board. "I think," said Cockburn, C.J., "there need not be an actual seizure to create a distress; it is enough that the landlord or his agent takes effectual means to prevent the removal of the article from off the premises, on the ground of rent being in arrear; and he does this when he declares that the article shall not be removed till the rent is paid." So Blackburn, J.: "I think, both on principle and authority, the refusal to allow an article to leave the premises unless the rent in arrear be paid, amounts to a distress." There being a demand and refusal to pay and no knowledge on the part of the innkeeper when the goods are brought into his inn that they are the goods of a third person, the lien is good. Mr. In conclusion, it is only necessary shortly to quote the expres sions of the Judges in Threlfall v. Borwick. Mr. Justice Mellor said that in deciding such a case the court was bound to consider the changes which have taken place in the usages of society. Justice Lush conceived that the decision of the court stood strictly on the ancient ways. His Lordship said, "I am of opinion that an innkeeper's right of lien on the goods of a guest is not restricted to such things as travelling guests bring with them for their own use in journeying. I find no such limitation laid down anywhere in the books. On the contrary, I find it laid down that it extends to all such things as the guest brings with him, and the innkeeper receives, without any references to their character. It is so laid down in Calye's case (8 Coke 32). If, then, the innkeeper has a right of lien as against the guest, if goods which are not the guest's are brought to the inn as the guest's, and the innkeeper does not know that they are not the guest's, the owner of the goods, in such a state of things, stands in the same position as the guest with regard to the innkeeper's lien." And Mr. Justice Quain most explicitly says, "There is no pretence for saying that an innkeeper's liability in case of loss, and therefore his right of lien, is confined to the case of such goods as are ordinarily brought by a traveller." To this the most ingenious could add nothing. PROXIMATE AND REMOTE CAUSE. AN elaborate judgment has been recently delivered by the Supreme Court of Illinois, on the application of the maxim, Causa proxima non remota spectatur, to cases of fire. All the English and American authorities are reviewed, and we propose to give here the summary of the latter. Referring to the maxim itself, the court say "There are not many of the maxims of the law which touch so closely upon metaphysical speculation. The rule itself is one of universal application, but the difficulty lies in establishing a criterion by which to determine where the cause of an injury is to be considered proximate and when merely remote. Greenleaf, in the second volume of his Evidence, sect. 256, lays down the rule that the damage to be recovered must always be the natural and proximate consequence of the act complained of.' But this seems little more than the substitution of one form of general expression for another. Parsons, in his work on Contracts, vol. 2, p. 456, 1st edit., after alluding to the confusion in which the adjudged cases leaves this question, says: We have been disposed to think that there is a principle, desirable on the one hand from the general reason and justice of the question, and on the other applicable as a test in many cases and perhaps useful, if not decisive in all. It is that every defendant shall be held liable for all of those consequences which might have been foreseen and expected as the results of his conduct, but not for those which he could not have foreseen, and was therefore under no moral obligation to take into consideration.' We are disposed to regard this explanation of the rule as clearer and capable of more precise application than any other we have met with in our examination of this subject, and it is in substantial accord with what is said by Pollock, C.B., in Higby v. Hewitt (5 Exch. 240)." Then as to the American cases, the court says: "If we turn to the American courts we shall find the general current of authorities to be in harmony with the English precedents. A late case, and one in which a cause much more remote than the fire from the locomotive in the case before us was held the proximate cause, is Tweeds v. Insurance Company (7 Wallace, 44). It was an action brought against an insurance company to recover for cotton stored in a warehouse, and insured against fire, except loss by fire caused by explosion, invasion, &c. An explosion occurred in another warehouse, from which explosion fire was communicated to the Eagle Mills, situated on the opposite diagonal corner, and from thence to the warehouse in which the cotton was stored. In the Circuit Court a judgment was obtained against the company on the ground that the immediate cause of the loss was the fire from the Eagle Mills, and the case was not therefore within the exception of the policy. This would seem not an unreasonable view, but the Supreme Court of the United States reversed the judgment, and in delivering their opinion use the following language: One of the most valuable of the criteria furnished us by the authorities is to ascertain whether any new cause has intervened between the fact accomplished and the alleged cause. If a new force or power has intervened of itself sufficient to stand as the cause of the mischief, the other must be considered too remote. In the present case we think there is no such new cause. The explosion undoubtedly produced or set in operation the fire which burned the plaintiff's cotton. The fact that it was carried to the cotton by first burning another mill supplies no new force or power which caused the burning.' That case was far stronger for the plaintiff than the one at bar is for the defendant. "Powell v. Deverey (3 Cush. 300), and Vandenburg v. Truar (4 Den. 464), are cases in which the court went back further for the proximate and responsible cause, than we are asked by the plaintiff to go in the present instance. we "The case of Hart v. Western R. R. (13 Metc. 94), presented precisely the same question with that before us. The locomotive set fire to a shop, and the fire crossed the street and destroyed a dwelling-house. The court held the company liable. In Perby v. Eastern Railway Company (98 Mass. 414), a similar judgment was pronounced upon a similar state of facts. Counsel for appellee seek to weaken the authority of these cases by adverting to the fact that they were decided under a statute of Massachusetts, making railway companies liable for all losses by fire communicated from their locomotives, and authorising them to insure against such risks. But the statute does not in the least degree affect the common law principle under consideration, and was not so regarded by the court in their decisions. It simply makes the companies liable for fires caused by them irrespective of the question of negligence. But if the locomotive was the remote instead of the proximate cause in the sense of the maxim are discussing there would have been no liability under the statute any more than at common law. Upon this question of cause the cases are as much in point as if there had been no statute. The court in the last case, in discussing this very objection that the cause was not proximate, say, The fact, therefore, that the fire passes through the air driven by a high wind, and that it is communicated to the plaintiff's property from other intermediate property of other men, does not make his loss a remote consequence of the escape of the fire from the engine.' And in another part of the opinion we find the follow ing language: If, when the cinder escapes through the air, the effect which it produces upon the first combustible substance against which it strikes is proximate, the effect must continue to be proximate as to everything which the fire consumes in its direct course. This is so, whether we regard the fire as a combination of the burning substance with the oxygen of the air, or look merely at its visible action and effect. As matter of fact, the injury to the plaintiff was as immediate and direct as an injury would have been which was caussd by a bullet fired from the train, passing over the intermediate lots, and wounding the plaintiff as he stood upon his own lot. It is as much so as pain and disability are proximate effects of an injury, though they occur at intervals through successive years after the injury was received. Yet these are called proximate effects, though the actual effects of the injury may be greatly modified in every case by bodily constitution, habits of life, and accidental circum stances.' "In Cleveland v. Grand Trunk Railway Company (42 Venn. 449), a like rule was applied without discussion to similar fires occasioned by locomotives. "Counsel for appellees rely upon three adjudged cases in support of the decision of the Circuit Court. The first is Marble v Worcester (4 Gray). That was a case in which it was sought to recover damages from the city by a person who had been thrown down and injured by a horse that had become frightened, freed himself from the vehicle to which he was attached, and run away. The recovery was sought against the city on the ground that the horse had been frightened by the striking of a vehicle against a defect in the highway. The plaintiff had nothing to do with the horse, and was fifty rods distant. The facts presented the ques tion of proximate cause in a difficult and very debatable form; but it was held by a divided court, that the city was not liable. The case bears but a faint analogy to the present one, and the subse quent case, in 98 Mass., above cited, shows that the decision in Marble v. Worcester was not considered by the court that pronounced it as bearing upon the question presented by this record. "We now come to the two cases chiefly relied upon by appellees' counsel. They are quite in point, but we are wholly unable to agree with their conclusions. One is Ryan v. New York Central Railroad Company (35 N. Y. 214), and the other is Kerr v Pennsylvania Railroad Company, decided by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania at its May Term 1870. [Reported 2 Chicago |