KIMBER, JAMES, cattle dealer, Hungerford; July 23, at eleven, at offices of Sol., Goulter, Hungerford KNOTT, JAMES, glass manufacturer, New-st, Borough-rd, South- LEWTAS, THOMAS, builder, Poulton-le-Fylde : July 23, at half- MARKS, SOLOMON, Optician, Cardiff; July 22, at half-past ten, MCBEAN, WILLIAM, travelling draper, Worcester; July 20, at MOOD, RICHARD JOHN, general dealer, Landport; July 18, at eleven, at office of Paice, accountant, Landport. Sol., Walker, Portsea MOORE, THOMAS, and GRAINGER. JACOB, builders, Albert-grove, Peckham; July 18, at two, at offices of Sol., Longeroft, Lincoln's-inn-fields MYLES, ROBERT, engraver, Preston; July 25, at three, at the Red Lion hotel, Preston. Sol., Duckworth, Manchester NICHOLLS, ALBERT, lighterman, Thomas-ter, Church-st, Old Kent-rd; July 18, at twelve, at 12, Hatton-gan. Sol., Mar. shall, Lincoln's-inn-fields NOWELL, JOSEPH, quarryman, Idle, par. Calverley; July 19, at eleven, at office of Sols., Terry and Robinson, Bradford OWEN, THOMAS, barman, Birmingham; July 20, at eleven, at offices of Sol., Harrison, Birmingham PAGET, RICHARD WILLIAM, sack maker, James-st, Covent-gdn, and Myddelton-st, Clerkenwell: July 29, at three, at office of SOL, Heathfield, Lincoln's-inn-fields PARKER, BENJAMIN, butcher, Chester; July 22, at three, at office of Sol., Cartwright, Chester PLATT, BENJAMIN, upholsterer, Tabernacle-sq, Hoxton July 23, at two, at office of Mr. T. Ager, 3, Barnard's-inn, Holborn. Sol., Roberts, Spring-gdns, Whitehall PRICHARD, CHARLES, brush dealer, Brighton; July 23, at two, at offices of Clennell, solicitor, Great Knight Rider-st, Doctor'scommons. Sol., Brandreth, Brighton RIGBY, SAMUEL HENRY, tobacconist, Barrow-in-Furness; July 26, at twelve, at office of the Registrar, Ulverston. Sol., Taylor, Barrow-in-Furness ROBERTS, JAMES, boot manufacturer, Leeds; July 24, at halfpast three, at office of Sols., Fawcett and Malcolm, Leeds RODGERS, THOMAS, grocer, Burnley; July 26, at three, at offices of Sol., Hartley, Burnley ROSSON, JOHN, innkeeper, Smallwood; July 29, at eleven, at office of Sol., Sherratt, Kidsgrove RUFFELL, SAMUEL, china dealer, London-rd, Bromley-by-Bow; July 19, at two, at office of Sols., Wood and Hare, Basinghall street RUMSEY SAMUEL the younger, innkeeper, Chelmsford; July 22, at eleven, at office of Sol., Blyth, Chelmsford SIMMESTER, JOHN, provision dealer, Darlaston; July 19, at eleven, at offices of Sol., Slater, Darlaston SMALLWOOD, EMMA, wholesale tobacconist, Birmingham; July 18, at three, at the King's Head hotel, Birmingham. Sol., Cresswell, Wolverhampton SMITH, HANNAH, widow, Winchcomb; July 18, at eleven, at offices of Sol., Smith, Cheltenham SMITH, THOMAS, nurseryman, Didcot; July 23, at half-past one, at office of Sol., Bartlett, Abingdon STANWORTH, JOHN, slater, Rochdale; July 19, at three, at office of Sols., Messrs. Roberts, Rochdale STOCKMAN, FREDERICK, chemist, Gosport; July 20, at eleven, at offices of Edmonds, Davis, and Co., accountants, Portsea. Sol., Stening, Portsea TAYLOR, ALFRED, hotelkeeper, Guildford; July 23, at two, at office of Sol., Lovett, Guildford TAYLOR, EDMUND, builder, Worcester; July 18, at eleven, at offices of Sol., Meredith, Worcester TAYLOR, GEORGE AUGUSTUS, tailor, Change-alley, Cornhill; July 23, at twelve, at office of Sols., Townley and Gard, Gresham-bldgs THORPE, GEORGE, commission agent, Stamford-st, Blackfriarsrd; July 25, at two, at office of Sols., Bartlett and Forbes, Bedford-st, Covent-gdn TIDMAN, CHARLES, jun., draper, Norwich; July 25, at twelve, at offices of Sol., Couks, Norwich TIMMS, JAMES PERCIVAL, shoe manufacturer, Hardingstone, and Northampton; July 24, at three, at office of Sol., Becke, Northampton TUNMER, HENRY WILLIAM, estate agent, Guildford; July 22, at two, at the County and Borough Halls, Guildford TURNER, GEORGE, out of business, Rochdale; July 19, at eleven, at offices of Sols.. Messrs. Roberts, Rochdale WALLACE, JOSEPH, porter, Liverpool; July 25, at two, at office of Sol., Hughes, Liverpool WATKINS, JOSEPH, mason, Bristol; July 24, at two, at office of Sol.. Becking, Bristol WILSON, MARY ANN, beer retailer, Birmingham; July 19, at three, at offices of Sols., Wright and Marshall, Birmingham WOOD, WILLIAM, glass engraver, Birmingham; July 30, at twelve, at offices of Reece and Harris, Birmingham. Sol., Baker, Birmingham WRIGHT, WILLIAM, merchant, Leadenhall-st; July 25, at three, at offices of Sols., Helder and Roberts, Verulam-bldgs, Gray'sinn Wrigley, R. builder, first, 3s. 10d. McNeill, Manchester. Arnold, J. cordwainer, first and final, 1s. 4d. At counting-house of Trust., T. Penny, Cheap-st, Sherborne.-Bragg and Stephen, drapers, first, 10s. At Trust, J. D. Viney, 99, Cheapside.-Brown, W. painter, final, 18. At Trust., H. Bolland, 10, South John-st, Liverpool.-Dearing, T. accountant, Is. 10jd. At office of Trust., T. Elworthy, London-rd, St. Leonard's-on-Sea-Forbes, S. draper, third and final, 10d. At Trust., S. C. Parkhouse, 18, Bedford-st.. Plymouth.-Jones, H. ironmonger, first, 2s. 6d. At Trust, J. D Thomas, The Parade, Neath.-Kimber, R. H. farmer, 3s. 5d. At residence of Trust., T. Griffits, the Priory, High Wycombe.-Langston, W. gentleman, 20s. At offices of Sols., Messrs. Langham, Hastings.-McKean, D. draper, first, 28. d. At office of Trust., R. Hannah, 0, Clayton-st, Newcastle.-Michell, J. draper, fourth, 18. 3d. At office of Trust., G. Wreford, Gundy-st-chmbs, Exeter.Parr, E. cattle salesman, 7d. At office of Trust., S. Really, 42, Bond-st, Brighton.-Renshaw, W. jeweller, first, 10d. At office of Trust., W. Stormer, 6, Newland, Northampton.-White, W. grocer, first. 3s. At offices of Sol., E. Hillman, Cliffe, Lewes. BIRTHS, MARRIAGES AND DEATHS. BIRTHS. BARTLETT.-On the 6th inst., at 59, Canning-street, Liverpool, GROVER.-On the 8th inst., of No. 4, King's Bench-walk, Temple, WEATHERHEAD.-On the 6th inst., at Hammersmith, James Thomas Weatherhead, Esq., solicitor, late of Coleman-street City, PARTRIDGE AND COOPER WHOLESALE & RETAIL STATIONERS, 192, FLEET-STREET, AND 1 & 2, CHANCERY-LANE, LONDON, E.C. Carriage paid to the Country on Orders exceeding 20s. DRAFT PAPER, 4s. 6d., 6s., 7s., 7s. 9d., and 9s. per ream. THE NEW "VELLUM WOVE CLUB-HOUSE NOTE, 9s. 6d. per This Society purchases Reversionary Property and Life In terests, and grants Loans on these securities. Forms of REECH LOADERS, NEW and SECOND- Proposal may be obtained at the office. BE upwards. HAND. AW BREECH LOADERS taken in EXCHANGE LAV and PURCHASED. F. S. CLAYTON, C. H. CLAYTON, Joint Secretaries. ANNUITIES AND REVERSIONS. 68, CHANCERY-LANE, LONDON. CHAIRMAN.-Sir W. J. Alexander, Bart., Q.C. DEPUTY-CHAIRMAN.-Alfred H. Shadwell, Esq. Reversions and Life Interests purchased. Immediate and Deferred Annuities granted in exchange for Reversionary and Contingent Interests. Loans may also be obtained on the security of Reversions Annuities, Immediate, Deferred, and Contingent, and also Endowments, granted on favourable terms. Prospectuses and Forms of Proposal, and all further infor mation, may be had at the office. The Directors are prepared to receive applications for ADVANCES on Freehold and other Property, Reversists, Life Interests, and, to a limited extent, on personal security. Ad particulars can be obtained on application to t SECRETARY, 48, St. James's-street, London, S.W. SOLICITOR in the Temple, in limited practice, and having a large set of CHAMBERS (Furnished) will SHARE them and Expenses with another Solicitor. Ground floor and best position. Occasional use for Town purposes may be arranged, or one room subletAddress "A. Z.," Mr. Smith's, Wigmaker, Temple. CORI COR TOURISTS' OUTFITS. NORDING'S WATERPROOFS are the best, and guaranteed to stand all climates. CORDING, 231, STRAND, TEMPLE-BAR. ENCHURCH-STREET. - Capitul OFFICES, on the First, Second, and Third Floors, to be LET, together or separate.-For particular, app to Mr. MURRELL, Auctioneer and Surveyor, Walbrook, City. KINAHAN'S very LL WHISKY. This celebrated and most delicious old mellow spirit is the CREAM OF IRISH WHISKIES, In quality unrivalled, perfectly pure, and more wholesome than the finest Cognac Brandy. Note the words "Kinahan's LL." on seal, label, and cork.-Wholesale Depot, 20, Great Titchfield-street. Oxford-street, W. OINTMENT and PILLS. OUTWARD INFIRMITIES.-Before the discoverT of these remedies many sores, ulcers, &c., were pronounced to be hopelessly incurable, because the treatment tended t destroy the strength it was incompetent to preserve, and to exasperate the symptoms it was inadequate to remove Holloway's Pills exert the most wholesome powers cre unhealthy flesh or skin: thus the constitutional vizour husbanded, while the most malignant ulcers, abscesses, and skin diseases are in process of cure. By this double sanati action recovery is radical; not delusive like drawing a sk over a sore to give the appearance of soundness wh humours and purulence endanger underneath. CARSON'S PATRONIZED BY PAINT. THE QUEEN, THE BRITISH, INDIAN AND COLONIAL GOVERNMENTS, and 7000 of the NOBILITT and GENTRY, For every Description of OUT-DOOR WORK, AS IRON, WOOD, STONE, BRICK, AND COMPO, Lasting twice as long as the best common paints in exposed situations, being man factured expressly for external purposes. ANY PERSON CAN LAY IT ON. 2 cwt. and upwards CARRIAGE FREE TO ALL STATIONS. OILS AND VARNISHES OF EVERY DESCRIPTION. PRICES, PATTERNS, with TESTIMONIALS, on application. THE liability of a debtor to be committed to prison more than once for non-payment of the same debt is about to be raised in an action for false imprisonment against the County Court Judge for Norfolk. The point was discussed at the end of last month at the North Walsham County Court, and it was contended on behalf of a debtor that, as he had expiated his offence by imprisonment for thirty days, the court had no jurisdiction to hear a fresh summons. The learned Judge said that he was of opinion with all the other County Court Judges that a debtor upon proof of means might be sent to prison from time to time indefinitely for any period not exceeding forty days under one commitment. The case was adjourned to await the issue of the trial at the assizes. THE diminution of crime, referred to by Mr. BRUCE at the Prison Congress, is doubted by some journalists, but none know better than the legal profession that this statement is perfectly correct. It is a well-known fact, we believe, that crime is a source of emolument to legal practitioners of both branches of the profession, and whilst the diminution of crime must be a source of gratification to every well regulated mind, there undoubtedly is a number of gentlemen who do not feel unqualified pleasure as they regard the dwindling calendars at Courts of Quarter Sessions, the Assizes, and the Old Bailey. We trust, therefore, that the incredulous journalists will believe those whose pecuniary interests are opposed to the diminution of crime. A properly qualified barrister knows perfectly well the number of prisoners which ought to be arraigned at any particular sessions or assize, and we venture to say that the universal testimony of those attending the assizes going on as we write would accord with that of Mr. BRUCE. THE Court of Admiralty has felt bound to follow the recent decision of the Court of Common Pleas in Simpson v. Blues (26 L. T. Rep. N.S. 697), which decided that the County Courts Admiralty Jurisdiction Acts, although they invest certain County Courts with a jurisdiction to entertain and determine a limited portion of the cases which were formerly entertained and determined only in the High Court of Admiralty, do not by inference and indirect enactment enlarge the jurisdiction of the High Court of Admiralty, or give to County Courts a jurisdiction which the High Court of Admiralty never possessed. The express decision there was that a County Court having admiralty jurisdiction has no jurisdiction to entertain a suit for damages for short delivery of cargo arising out of a charter party, the High Court of Admiralty having no jurisdiction to entertain such claim. A similar case was adjudicated upon by Sir ROBT. PHILLIMORE on appeal from the City of London Court, but, whilst following Simpson v. Blues, his Lordship stated that he could not agree with the conclusions arrived at by the Court of Common Pleas. He gave leave to appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. CONVICTIONS under the penal clauses of the Debtors' Act are increasing, and whilst on the one hand it is perfectly plain that fraudulent transactions by insolvent debtors must be checked with a strong hand, it is equally clear that the Act is so wide in its terms that an innocent transaction may be easily brought within it, the jury being left to find the intention to defraud, or rather the jury having to find a negative, namely, that the debtor had no intent to defraud. There are no less than sixteen acts of omission or commission mentioned in sect. 11 of the Act, which will amount to a misdemeanor if the jury do not negative the fraudulent intent. In the first place if the debtor do not discover fully and truly to the trustee all his property, real and personal; deliver such part of his real and personal property as may be in his custody or under his control; deliver to the trustee all books, documents, &c., relating to his property; if he conceals any part of his property or debts due to him; if he fraudulently removes any part of his property; if he makes any material omission in any statement relating to his affairs; if he fail to discover that a false debt has been proved; if he prevents the production of any book, &c.; if he conceals, destroys, mutilates or falsifies, or is privy thereto, of any book, &c.; if he makes or is privy to making any false entry; if he fraudulently parts with, alters, or makes any omission, or is privy thereto, in any document; if he attempts to account for any part of his property by fictitious losses and expenses; if he obtains by any false representation property on credit, and has not paid for the same; if, being a trader, he has obtained, under the false pretence of carrying on business and dealing in the ordinary way of his trade, any property on credit, and has not paid for the same; if, being a trader, he pawns, pledges, or disposes of otherwise than in the ordinary way of his trade any property which he has obtained on credit and has not paid for; and, lastly, if he is guilty of any false representation or other fraud for the purpose of obtaining the consent of his creditors, or any of them, to any agreement with reference to his affairs, or his bankruptcy or liquidation-he will be guilty of a misdemeanor. Certain of these offences must be committed within a specified period of the commencement of bankruptcy or liquidation. It has been suggested that every fraudulent preference may be made an offence under this Act, but this is not so. To every case of a fraudulent preference must be added this condition-that the goods disposed of have not been paid for; then it is an offence under the Debtors' Act if the transaction take place within four months before bankruptcy proceedings. The distinction is shown by a recent case at the assizes, where a debtor obtained goods on credit in order to enable him to make a fraudulent preference. A fraudulent preference by a transfer of a debtor's own goods cannot be within the Debtors' Act, and is void only as against the trustee. THE Judge of the Bath County Court has been called upon to decide the effect of service of a garnishee summons upon the property of a debtor who becomes bankrupt. The creditor obtained judgment against the defendant (the debtor) on the 27th July last year, and immediately issued a garnishee summons, and served it upon the garnishees, who were auctioneers, who sold the household furniture of the debtor, and had the proceeds in their hands. On the 26th July the debtor had filed a petition for liquidation, under which, on the 16th Aug., it was resolved, at a general meeting of the creditors, that the debtor's affairs should be liquidated by arrangement. The question was, whether the proceeds of the sale vested in the trustee or belonged to the judgment creditor? The court held that the service of the garnishee summons had not the effect of a seizure by the sheriff so as to bring the judgment creditor within the meaning of sects. 12 and 16 of the Bankruptcy Act 1869, on the ground that "the mere service of the summons on the garnishee does not give the creditor any mortgage, charge, or lien." We think there can be no doubt that the learned judge was right. Had the garnishees paid the judgment creditor under the summons, they would probably have been protected (Wood v. Dunn, 15 L. T. Rep. N. S. 411; L. Rep 2 Q. B. 73); and in Holmes v. Tutton (5 E. & B. 65), cited in Wood v. Dunn, it was decided that an order of attachment does not conclusively vest the debt in the judgment creditor as against the assignees of the judgment debtor. Under sect. 184 of the Act of 1849, a judgment creditor under such circumstances would have been a secured creditor," but that section being repealed, and there being no lien in him, he loses the benefit of his judgment. This is another consequence of the repeal of that section. THE International Prison Congress brought its proceedings to a close on Saturday last. Those proceedings are regarded as in every respect satisfactory. The PRINCE OF WALES and Mr. Secretary BRUCE, by their presence, gave the highest possible sanction to the objects of the International Committee, whilst delegates were sent by courts of quarter sessions and magistrates, and the Incorporated Law Society. Perhaps the most noteworthy result brought out by the Congress is the new field thrown open to woman's labour. It being recognised as essential to successful prison management that a gaol should contain a considerable number of prisoners, the operation of any new influence will be concentrated and proportionately beneficial. The report of the International Committee, we observe, concluded by stating that in the general question of reclamation, the influence of women devoted to such work was of the highest importance, "and the committee rejoiced that the Congress had had the advantage of the presence and counsel of many ladies whose practical acquaintance with prisons and reformatories had given weight to their words, and whose example furnished hope for the future." The great question, punishment or reformation? is one upon which opinions differ. There are many who consider that the criminal population is not susceptible of kind treatment or education, and that the only remedy for their " diseases," as some philosophers term criminal propensities, is the infliction of severe punishment. Mrs. CARPENTER said that "there had been one feeeling of unanimity pervading the Congress in reference to the treatment of prisoners so as to prepare them for a re-entry into the world.” As regards female convicts, this is possibly a hopeful prospect, with the aid of women's influence. But experience does not teach us to hope much from adopting a humanitarian system in the treatment of the great bulk of male convicts. The Congress, however, being in favour of it, it is to be hoped that it will work well. Ax important question as to County Court jurisdiction in salvage cases has been decided by Dr. STEPHEN, Judge of the Louth County Court. That court has not admiralty jurisdiction, being within the district of the Grimsby County Court, to which that jurisdiction was given. On a suit to recover an amount of £17 2s. for salvage services being brought before the learned Judge, the question of jurisdiction was raised, and his honour held that the jurisdiction given to County Court Judges by the Merchant Shipping Acts in salvage cases where the sum claimed is below £200, or the value salved is below £1000, still remains. The only point is whether the authority given by the earlier Acts is taken away by sect. 5 of 31 & 32 Vict. c. 71. That section says that "from and after the time specified in each order in council under this Act appointing a County Court to have admiralty jurisdiction within any district, as the time from which this Act shall have effect in and throughout that district, no County Court, other than the County Court so appointed, shall have jurisdiction within that district in any admiralty cause." By the 3rd section of this Act, salvage suits are admiralty causes up to £300 amount of claim, and £1000 value of property saved. The logical conclusion, reading these two sections together, is that none but a County Court having admiralty jurisdiction shall have jurisdiction over a claim for salvage. Dr. STEPHEN, however, came to the conclusion that the intention of the 5th section "is to provide for changes in the local jurisdiction of County Courts by successive orders in council." We cannot concur in this; the Act is brought into operation by orders in council, which, therefore, have the force of Acts of Parliament, and cannot be taken as merely directory. In any future legislation we think it would be advisable to make all the courts of particular districts on the sea coast admiralty courts, for it is manifestly absurd that, as in the case of the Louth and Grimsby courts, that Dr. STEPHEN should be able to exercise a jurisdiction at Grimsby which he could not exercise at Louth. In the present instance he got over the difficulty by, as we conceive, evading the plain words of a statute. PROFESSIONAL RULES OF THE BAR. WE last week published some communications which raise important questions connected with the future position of the Bar. Law is at present sufficiently costly: it costs a great deal more than many people like to pay. But to pay for that which is not received at all, or for which something of a totally different kind is substi tuted, is entirely opposed to modern ideas. We have to recognise the fact, however, that it is little use attacking one weak point in a system which requires entire remodelling. The relations which now exist between solicitors and barristers, and between members of the Bar inter se, are not to be supported upon any ground of policy or expediency. In our leading columns in our last number, we gave vent to a complaint by a solicitor concerning the present custom of holding conferences in a room at Westminster-hall. This is doubtless very inconvenient, and if a solicitor's offices are close to the court, and there is no time for a conference in the counsel's own chambers, there ought to be no difficulty in the way of counsel going to the attorney. The etiquette which prohibits it is simply absurd, as all the rest of the etiquette is which induces barristers, whose connection is made, to keep strangers at ad istance, and any offence against which is visited by the virtuous with all the horrors of the "cut direct." There was a time, perhaps, when etiquette of the most starched kind was useful; but that must have been a period when there were no men at the Bar with loose ideas, when there where no men at the Bar whose necessities made them for getful of anything but getting on. It is not so now. With a considerable section of barristers the competition does not consist of a trial of patient industrious waiting, but of pushing and driving, and fly-throwing; it is a contest of influence, of interest, of loudmouthed declamation, and in some few instances we believe of mean jealousies spurring to meaner actions as regards their fellows. The honourable, hardworking, meritorious members of the Bar must for their own protection scatter existing etiquette to the winds, for whilst they are retiring and observant of the unwritten rules, the unscrupulous aspirant, regardless of all rules, pushes himself into notoriety. It may be said that such success must be fleeting, but this is by no means invariably the case. This is the principal argument which we put forward in support of the contention that rules of etiquette should be no longer recognised, every member of the Profession acting as becomes a gentleman, but, whenever possible, accommodating himself to the wishes and requirements of those who intrust business to his care. This being settled as regards the relations of the Bar with solici tors and the public, we go on to the relations of the members of the Bar inter se. In the Courts of Equity we believe no barrister does the work of another without being remunerated. At the Common Law Bar the aspiring junior will hold briefs under all possible circumstances, without any compensation whatever. Now if this practice were abolished, if it were generally agreed that one barrister should not ask another to hold a brief for him, without transferring a portion at least of the honorarium, we venture to think that " devilling" would become far less common, and if the grievance of which Mr. GIBSON complained in these last week did not wholly disappear, it would be very considerably diminished. We must not be understood to suggest for a moment that the practice of jilting the client is to be justified." It is entirely and utterly unjustifiable; but so long as the junior Bar are content to work for their leaders for nothing, so long will leaders take more work than they can possibly discharge and do justice to their clients, trusting that at the last moment somes obliging and anxious junior will be ready to make a wild attempt to perform the functions of an experienced Queen's Counsel who is supposed to have mastered his instructions. pages As we have before remarked, it lies with solicitors themselves to inaugurate the reforms in the Profession. Not until the example set by Mr. GIBSON is extensively followed, and such treatment as he experienced is strongly resented, will the Bar do anything to reform its own practices. At the Parliamentary Bar, we believe, no barrister is allowed to hand his briefs over to a brother barrister. If he cannot do his work he returns his brief and his fee to the attorney who instructs him. And this is the rule which prevails in other professions. No medical man would venture without full notice and consent of his patient to send a substitute. This should be the rule and practice of the Bar. We believe Mr. GIBSON is quite right when he says that the prevailing system is calculated to do infinite injury to the Bar. Lord Justice MELLISH, a little while since, regretted that the high honour men of the Universities are no longer to be found constituting the majority of successful barristers. Whatever may be the cause, this is the fact. Whilst, therefore, the influx of only partially educated and uneducated men to the ranks of the Bar is so great, efforts proportionately strong should be made to secure strict honesty and integrity in the Profession. If this course be not taken, the decline of the influence and position of the Bar must certainly and inevitably ensue. ON THE GIFT OF THE RESIDUE OF A FUND, AFTER PROVIDING FOR AN OBJECT ILLEGAL OR UNATTAINABLE. THE law on this subject seemed to Mr. Jarman uncertain in 1861 (Wills, p. 339, 3rd edit.), and later decisions since then have not made it less so. Does the subsequent gift fall together with the prior illegal or impossible one? And if so, why should it? In Fowler v. Fowler (33 Beav. 616), the bequest was of £500, to repair a vault in a churchyard, the surplus to the rector of Baldock for his own use; and there was a residuary bequest. A gift to repair a church, or a monument in a church, is a good charitable gift (Hoare v. Osborne, L. Rep. 1 Eq. 588), but a gift to repair a grave or vault not within the church is bad (ibid.); and, accordingly, in the above case, Mr. Tudor, who was of counsel for the rector, properly admitted that the first trust was void. But the amount required for the repair was held by the Master of the Rolls to be unascertainable, and the uncertainty defeated the subsequent gift. "It might," he says, "have been originally supposed that the residue of a particular specified fund might have been put on the same principle as the residue of an estate; where (sic.) what is not or cannot be applied for the primary object goes to augment the secondary object, that is, the particular residue subsequently disposed of." We think it should be so. If the prior trust, in the case of the particular residue, be void, surely it should be disregarded as if it had never been before the mind of the testator; and the fact that it would have been impossible to execute it, if it had been legal (e.g., by reason of the amount required for it being unascertainable) must be immaterial, if the trust itself be void. "But," he goes on, "the contrary seems to be quite settled," and the whole gift was declared void. Then came Fisk v. AttorneyGeneral (L. Rep. 4 Eq. 521), which seems to put the law on a broader and sounder footing, and would have probably led the Master of the Rolls to a different decision in Fowler v. Fowler, and given the poor rector of Baldock his £500, if it had been the earlier of the two cases. There the bequest was to the rector and churchwardens of £1000 Consols, in trust to apply the dividends to repair a grave in a churchyard, and to pay the residue of the dividends to the poor of a parish; and there was a general residuary clause. One question for decision was, whether, if the fund necessary for the repair could not be ascertained, the whole gift of the £1000 failed; and the present Lord Chancellor held that it did not; but that, the trust as to the grave being void, the whole fund went to "the poor," freed of the void charge. In Hunter v. Bullock (L. Rep. 14 Eq. 45) Vice-Chancellor Bacon, though pressed with Fowler v. Fowler as undistinguishable from it, supported the trust, which was this: "A general devise to F. H., after paying debts and legacies, and after her death a legacy of £1000 stock to the Tailors' Institution; then a provision for other things, then pecuniary legacies, and a general bequest of the residue; lastly, a further bequest of £1000 to the institution to repair a grave in a churchyard yearly, if required, and to divide the balance between the pensioners of the charity. The Vice-Chancellor considered the further bequest as a gift to the institution, with an honorary trust attached; and that it was certain in amount, subject only to the fulfilment of that trust. Passing by the remark that it seems difficult to understand what the Vice-Chancellor meant by calling it an "honorary trust," for it seems as imperative on the trustees to have repaired, if the state of the grave required it, annually, and if the gift had been valid, as to fulfil any other part of their trust-we would ask what was the difference between the case before him and Fowler v. Fowler? It is true the bequest occurred in a different order in the latter case. First came the gift for the grave; then the overplus to the rector; then the general residuary clause; whereas, in Hunter v. Bullock, the residuary clause came before both the invalid gift and the gift of the balance which depended upon it. But why this made any difference, or why the gift for the repairs was at all more certain in its amount in the one case than in the other, we fail to perceive. The Vice-Chancellor had discarded evidence of the amount required to repair; and therefore it must be taken that the amount was unascertained, and, according to Fowler v. Fowler, unascertainable. It would have been well if the Vice-Chancellor had based his decision avowedly, as probably he did in reality, on the broad ground on which Fisk v. Attorney-General allowed him to put it, viz., that, notwithstanding the illegality of the prior gift, and the difficulty of ascertaining the amount required for it, if legal, the subsequent gift might be supported. One deduction, however, it appears to us, must be made from the value of Fisk v. Attorney-General as a piece of judicial reasoning. The Lord Chancellor bases his decision in it upon the case, before the House of Lords, of the Magistrates of Dundee v. Morris (3 Macq. 134), in which the exact point applicable to the case before the Lord Chancellor was, whether the court would refuse to execute a trust for a charitable purpose on the ground that the testator had not specified the amount of the fund, and that it could not be clearly ascertained. There the testator had expressed a wish to establish in Dundee a hospital, to be managed like Heriot's Hospital in Edinburgh, with a preference to natives of Dundee, only 100 boys were to be admitted, and the structure was to be less than Heriot's Hospital. There was no disposition of residue. The result was the will was held to furnish sufficient means of ascertaining the amount of the legacy. But all that the House of Lords decided (as was well pointed out by Mr. Amphlett in Hunter v. Bullock) was, that in that particular case the amount was ascertainable, but it did not add to our stock of law, or enunciate any new principles, or alter the state of the law, to which we have adverted, in that class of cases in which the amount is unascertainable. It seems difficult, therefore, to understand how the Lord Chancellor could rest upon it, as an authority which was to be 'followed" by him in a case like Fisk v. Attorney-General, in which he was (as we think) for the first time laying down new propositions of law, and, we would venture to say, sounder doctrines and rules of construction than those which had previously prevailed in cases of uncertainty as to the subject of disposition. 66 OPERATION OF WAR UPON CONTRACTS OF ARISING Out of the recent war between France and Germany there have been several cases before our courts which have raised questions as to how far a state of war operates as a dissolution or modification of contracts of affreightment, and as we conceive that in these cases the contracts have received a more liberal construction in favour of the shipowners than they would have received had they been decided at the beginning of the present century, during the great European_wars, we propose to discuss the grounds of those decisions. Before, however, we enter upon those questions, it may not be uninteresting to consider how it is that so important a question has been so little considered in the courts of this country, which has been so long the greatest maritime power in the world. There are a certain number of decisions on such subjects, but it is rather remarkable that until the recent case of Geipel v. Smith (26 L. T. Rep. N. S.; 1 Asp. Mar. Law Cas. 268), it has never been formally decided that a blockade of the port of destination excuses a shipowner from the performance of his contract. The reason of this would appear to lie in the fact that in former great wars England has almost always been one of the belligerent powers, and therefore it has been illegal for English ships to trade with enemies; and, moreover, as this country was in these wars mistress of the seas, it was next to impossible for the fleet of any foreign power to blockade any port with which ships from this country traded. Again, the Legislature in those days took active measures to protect our commerce in time of war, and it was made illegal for any British ship to sail without convoy, and this had the effect of rendering the instances of British ships delaying in port through fear of capture very rare; consequently questions of breach of charter in not proceeding direct to the port of destination did not frequently occur. Since the wars of the earlier part of the present century, other nations of Europe have greatly extended their maritime commerce, and many of them have acquired a considerable mercantile marine. Prussia especially has become a great carrying power, and it frequently happens that English goods are carried in Prussian bottoms. Out of this change in the position of European commerce arose several questions connected with contracts of affreightment during the late war, the decisions upon which have considerably illustrated the law of England upon the subject. To begin with the latest case on the subject, that of Geipel v. Smith (sup.); in that case the defendant had entered into a charter-party, by which he undertook to send his ship to an English port and there load a cargo, and thence proceed to Hamburg, a North German port, and there discharge, restraints of princes excepted. After this charter-party was entered into, and before the time for the execution arrived, war broke out between France and North Germany, and the port of Hamburg was blockaded by the French, and the parties had notice of this blockade. The defendant thereupon refused to allow his ship to proceed to the English port to load his cargo, alleging as an excuse that by reason of the exception of restraints of princes, he was not bound to attempt to deliver at a blockaded port, and as his contract was an entire contract to load and deliver, if he was not bound to perform one part he was excused from performing the other. The Court of Queen's Bench held that the contract was for a single adventure, and that the defendant was therefore justified, if he brought himself within any exception in the charter-party, in refusing to load at all, and that a blockade of the port of destination was a restraint of princes, and that the defendant could not be considered bound to perform his contract if the blockade did not terminate within a reasonable time. This case was decided on demurrer to the defendant's pleas, setting up the defence as we have stated it. Now, it cannot be questioned that if the defendant is to be considered excused from delivery he cannot be compelled to load, as that might involve not only the loss of the use of the ship for a long time, but even the destruction of the goods laden on board, as they could not be improved by lying in the close hold of a ship. Nor can it be doubted that a blockade of the port of destination is a restraint of princes and rulers. The point that seems to us doubtful is the effect that this exception has upon the charterparty; does it dissolve the contract, or does it only suspend its performance? No doubt, as the Court of Queen's Bench put it, it is more convenient to hold that the shipowner is only bound to wait a reasonable time for the removal of the obstacle, and that he is entitled to say at once if there is no prospect of that removal within a reasonable time that he will not perform his contract. But then the difficult question is what is a reasonable time? It is one of those vague periods of which it is next to impossible to form any accurate idea. If the blockade were to last two years it might be very justly said that that would be an unreasonable time to wait, but it could scarcely ever be contended that a delay of a month would put an end to the contract. Moreover, there is always the possibility that by any mishap to the blockading fleet the blockade might be unexpectedly terminated, and then, if the shipowner had refused to perform his contract, and had sent his ship on another voyage, he would be liable for non-performance of his contract. This shows at once how difficult it is to lay down a rule so hard and fast as that in Geipel v. Smith. There is no reason why in a case which is decided on demurrer a defendant should not get a judgment before a reasonable time has elapsed, and in spite of his judgment he might still be bound to perform his contract. It is quite true that the question of reasonable time might still be tried afterwards before a jury, but in the mean time, owing to the uncertainty, the shipowner has employed his ship elsewhere. If, on the other hand, it were held that the only effect of the blockade were to suspend the performance of the contract, the shipowner would be at liberty to employ his ship elsewhere in the mean time, subject to the risk of having to compensate the shipper for any loss he might sustain in case the ship was not ready to load and proceed at once on the raising of the blockade. The contract being one, the shipowner would only be bound to proceed to the loading place at such time that he could perform his whole contract free from the restraint of princes. 66 The uncertainty of a reasonable time is nowhere better illustrated than in those cases where a ship puts into port through fear of capture. In Pole v. Cetcovich (9 C. B., N. S., 430), it was held that a ship was not bound to run certain risk of capture, and that she might put into an intermediate port to avoid it, so long as she remained there only a reasonable time, and three days was held to be reasonable delay. a In the Heinrich (25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 914; 1 Asp. Mar. Law. Cas. 79) eighteen days was held a not unreasonable delay for a German ship in a channel port, whilst French cruisers were in the Channel; and in the Wilhelm Schmidt (25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 34; 1 Asp. Mar. Law. Cas. 82), under similar circumstances, the ship was held justified in delaying for two months; and two cases have been recently decided in the Admiralty Court, in which it was held that six and nine months are not too long a time to delay during the existence of actual risk of capture. With regard to these cases the ground upon which the ships were held justified in delaying is that the charter-parties contained the exception of Queen's enemies," which amounts to a provision against the acts of the enemies of the country to which the ship belongs. The real test in these cases is whether the danger from "Queen's enemies" is so certain that the ship would be captured if it put to sea, for it would be no excuse that there was mere risk, and as long as that certainty of danger exists the vessel would not be obliged to put to sea. The effect of this exception, as will be seen from the above cases, is to suspend the performance of the contract, not to put an end to it altogether, and we conceive that it would have the same operation whether the ship was loaded or was proceeding to her port of loading. Now, the usual exceptions in a charter-party or bill of lading are, "the act of God, Queen's enemies, restraints of princes and rulers, and all and every other dangers and accidents of the seas, rivers, and navigation of what nature and kind soever during the said voyage, excepted." From the wording of these exceptions there is no reason why the operation of one should dissolve a contract any more than the action of another. It has never been contended, that because a ship is prevented from proceeding by ice, that the contract is at an end; nor has a long continuance of adverse winds, rendering it impossible for the ship to arrive for a long time after the intended period, been held to be more than a suspension of the contract during that time. We cannot see that there is anything in the nature of a blockade which is so interminable, or of so different a nature, to an "act of God," or to "Queen's enemies," that whilst the latter suspends only, the former dissolves a contract. We said, at the beginning of these remarks, that we did not believe that the Courts at the earlier part of this century would have put such a construction on the contract, and we have little doubt that it would have then been said, that if the shipowner wished to put an end to the contract on the blockade of the port of destination, he should have so expressly stipulated in his contract, and that so long as it was possible for the contract to be in any way performed, the Courts would not hold it dissolved, but suspended, during the existence of the obstacle to its performance. Nothing short of the impossibility of performance, by reason of "the act of God," or Queen's enemies," acting on the ship, so as to put it out of the shipowner's power to carry his cargo, absolves him, and we venture to submit that, in the same way, restraints of princes should operate so as to create an absolute impossibility, before they dissolve the contract. THE BALLOT IN PRACTICE. THE Ballot Bill is practically determined. In a few days it will be law. It has been the fashion with leading article writers and persons who have had no actual experience in the business of elections, to treat it as if it were a mere change in the machinery for taking votes at the poll, substituting a quiet for a noisy voting. But this is greatly to misconceive the nature and operation of the new scheme. It is in truth an entire revolution in the conduct of elections, as all our experienced readers will acknowledge now that they have to deal with it, not as a dream of speculative reformers, but as a reality, to be faced and dealt with practically. It must be obvious to them that they will be required to change the entire system of electioneering. They must proceed henceforth on two assumptions inconsistent with all present practice; first, that they will not know how a vote is given; secondly, that it will be either impossible to obtain a promise for a vote, or that, if obtained, no reliance can be placed upon its fulfilment. More than this, it is doubtful whether it will be permitted to ask for a vote, for to do so will probably be looked upon by the voter as an attempt to violate the secrecy which the law has given to him, and any resentment thus caused might be gratified at the poll by giving the vote the other way; therefore canvassing, in its present form, at least, must cease. No candidate could venture to ask the promise of a vote; he could do no more than solicit. Canvassing books and accounts will be utterly worthless, and it will be impossible to calculate the chances of success before going to the poll. So far, the management of an election will be greatly simplified, and the larger portion of the solicitors' services will be dispensed with. Bribery will, of course, be immensely facilitated, because of the almost impossibility of detection. It has been traced hitherto by noting that SMITH, who was always a Conserva tive, suddenly voted for a Radical, or that BROWN, who had promised A., voted for B., and their bribable propensities being known, the detectives were set to work to obtain the necessary proofs. But when it is not known how SMITH and BROWN voted, it is nobody's interest to investigate, for every candidate would fear that he might be attacking his own man. It has been contended that no candidate would bribe when he could not secure the vote he had bought. But this is a great error, as our experienced readers know well. The bribable portion of a con stituency are men who have no political proclivities. They do not care which party wins, and have no personal preference for either candidate. It is with them wholly a question of pocket. The man who pays best will secure their votes. They are too sagacious to spoil the future market by breaking their bargain. Besides, it is familiar to all electioneerers that persons who deem it no wrong to take a bribe usually deem it very wrong to cheat the briber. Here and there a case might occur of a man taking a bribe and voting secretly the other way; but it may be safely calculated that nine out of ten who take a bribe will honestly per form their part of the bargain. Moreover, bribery will now be conducted, as in America, by dealing, not with individual voters separately, but with the foremen of shops, clubs and societies who bargain for a payment conditioned on the return of a particular candidate. But these are future results of the ballot which our many readers having the management of elections will require to con sider hereafter. The present and most urgent question before them-one that must be determined instantly, for the work of registration has begun-is this: What is the prudent course to adopt under the new state of things with respect to this registra tion? The solicitors, who conduct the registrations throughout the country, are asking anxiously if they should proceed, as hitherto they have done, to put in claims and make objections, seeing that, after they have placed an elector upon the register, they can have no assurance of the vote they have incurred labour and cost to establish, and by objections may be cutting off votes that would have been given for them. There is the further danger with objections, that if they fail they will certainly be avenged in the ballot box. Would it not be the more prudent course, in these circumstances, for the candidate and his friends to interfere as little as possible, and leave the electors to take care of their own |