been given with their privity or connivance a vote might be struck off from the aggregate votes of that candidate for the bad vote so traced home."

It is not necessary to follow the noble and learned lord in his observations to make it perfectly clear that the provisoes here named are nullities. All legislation should tend to secure against the violation of law, not to repair the damage after it is done. By making personation easy to commit, and difficult to detect, we invite a breach of the law, and as regards the election, the effect of this breach of the law would be irreparable, save on a scrutiny under a petition.

The first amendment of the DUKE of RICHMOND was taken by the LORD CHANCELLOR and the MARQUIS of RIPON to import into the Bill the principles of optional secrecy, and the LORD CHANCELLOR admitted that the machinery for detecting personation had been omitted from the Bill because it was found that perfect secrecy could not be maintained in conjunction with it. The DUKE of RICHMOND, in bringing forward his next amendment, distinctly declared his wish to introduce the principle of optional secrecy into the Bill. This second amendment provided that the voter shall place a cross or other mark in the figure of a square printed opposite the name of a candidate or each candidate for whom he votes, and, having thus marked on the ballot paper the candidate or candidates for whom he votes, shall fold up the ballot paper so as to show the official mark on its back, and shall exhibit to the presiding officer such mark, and then in the presence of the presiding officer put the ballot paper into the ballot box. This, of course, is not secret voting, but the duke contended that no Bill could be called a Bill for secret voting which enabled illiterate voters to call in the assistance of one of the presiding officers when recording their votes. In discussing this amendment Lord CAIRNS brought forward one of the strongest arguments yet adduced against the principle of the Government measure. He referred to the recent Galway election; he pointed out that there it was known before-hand which way the great body of electors would vote; that on coming to the poll every species of intimidation was employed against them: and, judging from this experience it is to be concluded that a ballot will simply transfer the intimidation from the polling booth to the home of the elector or to the highway. On this question, however, the two Houses of Parliament are antagonistic; the Commons say that absolutely secret voting must be secured at any price; the Lords say that secrecy should be granted to those who desire the protection which it gives, subject to some means of detecting and punishing personation. All that can be said in support of each of these views has been said.

Another important matter was the proposal to omit or alter certain words in the Bill which prevent the agent during the progress of the election from communicating to any person information obtained in any polling booth. The object of the Government is declared to be to prevent candidates from buying the corrupt voters who hang back. It appears to be assumed that the only means of becoming acquainted with the fact of such voters not having voted is by keeping a record of the voters who do apply at the booths for ballot papers. We venture to say that long before the day of election it is perfectly well known what voters will have to be bought if they are to vote at all. In Norwich, for example, at the election which was upset by Baron MARTIN in 1869, the state of affairs is thus referred to by that learned Judge in his judgment (19 L. T. Rep. N. S. 618): "It is further proved that in three public-houses at least, and it may be in many more, there was a number of men of the lowest class of voters waiting, or on the look-out, according to the expression of one of them. I have not the slightest doubt that these men were collected in these public-houses waiting to be bribed. I have not the slighest doubt that they were bribed, and that the great proportion of that low class of voters who voted in the afternoon of that day between half-past three and four were bribed voters." And to a greater or less extent this is the condition of things in every borough. Is it to be supposed for a moment that the existence of these corrupt voters assembled at the famous Woolpack and elsewhere would not have been known wholly apart from the condition of the poll? The notorious Hardiment, as chairman of a ward committee, knew every voter, and it was sufficient for him to know that a particular voter had gone to the booth to be sure as to his having voted, and of the way in which he voted. If the Government rely upon this provision against candidates agents being in the booths to check bribery, they lean upon a reed which will give way on the first pressure. These remarks are altogether apart from the question whether, as Lord CAIRNS said, it is not perfectly fair and right that candidates or their agents should be enabled, in the course of an election, to ascertain who had not voted, in order that their support might be solicited. The amendment was carried as a matter of course. An amendment of Lord SHAFTESBURY that the poll should be kept open from 8 a.m. to 8 p.m. was carried, and here the important work of the committee stopped.

The issue is now a very simple one, but it is not one which will be decided by anything short of practical experience. As our leading contemporary puts it, "The Ballot is directed against the alleged practice of intimidation, and unless it be efficient against

that practice there can be no reason for its adoption." The Galway case has shown that intimidation is usually brought to bear before the voter enters the polling-booth, and it is vain to say that intimidation will not have its effect because it is not possible to give positive evidence of the act of the voter. Nobody can deny that the Government is quite right, whilst making this experiment, to give it every possible chance of success, by giving every possible security to the voter. The evils to be entailed must be endured for the sake of the experiment, and the House of Commons having made up its mind to try it, the amendments of the Lords must be rejected. We see no course short of this if the integrity of the Bill is to be preserved.

A SCHEME FOR THE REGISTRATION OF VOTERS. AN experienced correspondent sends us the following proposals:1. A registrar to be appointed for every two, three, or four counties, according to population.

2. Assistant overseers to furnish materials for register, and act generally in all registration matters under direction of registrar.

3. Claims to be placed upon the register and objections to voters and claimants to be sent to the registrar at any period of the

year.

4. Each parish to have a competent assistant overseer.

5. A poor-rate to be made by the overseers upon their appointment in April in each year. Alphabetical index to rate-book.

6. Ratepayers not upon the register, who are assessed in one or more amounts sufficient to give vote, to have a distinctive mark placed against their names on the rate book, and date of commencing occupation to be given in the case of new occupants since April rate of previous year.

7. The house duty to be collected with the poor-rate.

8. The assistant overseer to send by post to each ratepayer a demand note for rate with form somewhat similar to house duty return, giving in addition the date of change in occupancy or ownership (if any) since 31st March in previous year.

9. The assistant overseer in collecting rate to collect return, and if the latter not made, or made imperfectly, fill it up from inquiry made from occupier. If the assistant overseer has grounds for believing that information given him is incorrect, or if the required information is not obtainable from the occupier, he is to make a note to that effect upon the return, and suggest sources of information.

10. The rate-book to be corrected from the above returns in a different coloured ink to that in which rate originally written.

11. The April rate to be collected before the 24th June, and rate book, with the returns as above, to be delivered to registrar not later than 1st July, and the assistant overseer at the same time to send register then in force with note of voters who have parted with their qualifications, or who do not possess sufficient qualification, and any other information of service in preparing register.

12. Extract from rate book to be evidence in proceedings for recovery of poor rates after 1st July.

13. The assistant overseer to answer registrar's inquiries made by letter or otherwise, and generally furnish information, and attend registrar, if and when required, being allowed a fair remuneration for time and expenses.

14. A copy of the register to be deposited as soon as published with overseers, and kept at assistant overseer's office, with local authorities, and kept at their offices, at free libraries, established under the Free Libraries Act, and at any other place, upon the requisition of a majority of voters, if less than 200, in the parish or place, and if more than that number, upon the requisition of 100 voters. Registers so deposited to be open to the inspection of all persons, without charge.

15. Registrar advertise from 1st June to 20th July that the latter date the last day for sending in claims to registrar. The advertisement to state the particulars required to be given upon sending

in claims.

16. Claims may be in any form, provided the necessary information be given.

17. Any voter may send information to the registrar of persons entitled to vote, provided he gives his name and address. If required by registrar, such voter to deposit a sum of money to meet any costs that may be awarded against him as after mentioned.

18. Claims made after 20th July to stand over.

19. The registrar to prepare a draft register from existing register with the aid of rate books and returns as above, and valuation lists, voters objected to, and new claimants, being distinguished. Such draft register to be deposited by 20th Aug., as paragraph 14.

20. Advertisements to issue that draft register deposited, and that 20th Sept. last day for making objections.

21. Objections to state in a manner to be commonly understood, ground of objection, and not be invalid on point of form, necessary information being given. The nature of the objection to be communicated by the registrar to voter or claimant objected to, who

to be asked whether objection admitted or the ground of objection denied. The reply of the voter or claimant objected to to be communicated to the objector.

22. If new claimant not objected to, he to prove his vote by declaration to be sent to him by the registrar by post.

23. The registrar to hold courts to settle draft register and decide on claims and objections. All claimants, voters objected to, and objectors, to receive notice by post from registrar of date and place of holding court. If new claimant has by declaration satisfied the registrar that he has a good qualification his attendance may be waived.

24. A person objecting failing in his objection, or objecting to a voter or claimant already objected to by overseers, to pay a fine.

25. Claimants and voters objected to not admitting objection, and failing to establish their qualification, to pay a fine.

26. The registrar may receive evidence of a different qualification to that in respect of which the voter appears on the register, or has claimed, but in that case strict legal evidence upon oath shall be required in support of such qualification.

27. Appeal from registrar upon his notes to the revising barrister. Further appeal to the Court of Common Pleas. 28. Register to be printed and in force 1st January.

29. Assistant overseer wilfully doing any act, the effect of which is to prevent qualified person appearing on the register, or to cause disqualified person to be there, a penalty of £5.

30. The registrars may make general orders subject to the approval of the Court of Common Pleas.

DISCLAIMER OF LEASE BY THE TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY-LANDLORD HOW FAR AFFECTED. IN our 50th volume at p. 373, we called attention at some length to the effect of the acceptance or disclaimer of onerous property by the trustee in bankruptcy, with especial reference to the question whether the bankruptcy of the assignee of a lease, followed by the disclaimer of the trustee, operated to discharge the lessee from liability under his covenants with the landlord. We then pointed out that if, as the language of sect. 23 of the Act of 1869 apparently implied, "the disclaimer of the trustee is to work a surrender, which the landlord, nolens volens, is bound to accept, it seems impossible to escape from the conclusion that all sureties for the payment of rent and performance of covenants by the bankrupt, including a lessee whose position is to some extent that of a surety (Moule v. Garrett 22 L. T. Rep. N. S. 343, since affirmed (26 L. T. Rep. N. S. 367) must be released." We at the same time expressed an opinion that the courts would do their best to escape from a construction of the Act which would lead to a consequence so absurd and unjust. Much light has now been thrown on this subject by the recent decision of the Court of Exchequer in Smyth v. North (L. Rep. 7 Ex. 242), where in an action by the lessor against a lessee on his covenant for payment of rent, the lessee pleaded, on equitable grounds, that the assignee having been adjudicated bankrupt, the trustee in bankruptcy had disclaimed the lease before the commencement of the action, and that the rent sued for accrued after the adjudication and before the disclaimer. The court, consisting of Martin, Bramwell, and Pigott, BB., held the plea a bad one, being unanimously of opinion that in regard to rents accrued due before the disclaimer, and as to which there was a vested cause of action, there were no words in the Act of 1869 sufficient to divest the right of action. This was the sole ground on which Baron Bramwell concurred in the judgment, which was rested by Barons Martin and Pigott, on the broader ground-a ground which would apply as well to rent accruing, or breaches of covenant taking place after as well as before the disclaimer, that the only part of the 23rd section which applied, was the clause which enacts that any person injured by the operation of the section, shall be deemed a creditor of the bankrupt to the extent of such injury, so entitling the lessee to prove against the bankrupt to the extent of the injury sustained by the defendant in being deprived of his right to be indemnified by the bankrupt against the rent and covenants in the lease, and that it was not intended by the section to let the original covenantor go scot free. Perhaps we cannot do better than make the following extract from the judgment of Baron Pigott, who says: "I agree with my brother Martin. I cannot think it was intended by ex post facto legislation to annul people's contracts in such a way as would be the effect of giving the word 'surrender' a strictly technical meaning. I do not think that it has that meaning except as between a lessor and a bankrupt lessee, the meaning of the Legislature being that the rights of property and liabilities of the bankrupt at the time of his bankruptcy, shall be wiped out altogether; but where the bankrupt is an assignee only, and there are covenants subsisting between the original parties to the lease, it would be the most unjust thing in the world to annul those covenants. I think the section may be read as using the word 'surrendered' in a technical sense where the bankrupt is the lessee; but in other cases, so far as the section affects the liabilities of parties other than the bankrupt, the section must be read as using the words in a popular sense, that the lease shall be given up by the bank.

rupt as from the adjudication. In that case it would be open to the Court of Bankruptcy to make an order in reference to the pos session under the clause which enacts that any person having any interest in the disclaimed property, may apply to the court, and the court may make such order as may be just. If the lessor chose to resume possession, there would be an end of the matter, if not, it would be competent for the lessee to go to the court and get possession again if he thought proper."

A DIGEST OF PATENT LAW CASES.
(By CLEMENT HIGGINS, Esq., B.A., F.C.S., Barrister-at-Law.)
SUBJECT-MATTER OF A PATENTABLE INVENTION.
Manufacture.

Crane v. Price, et als. 1842.-Patent for "an improvement in the manufacture of iron." The invention consisted in the application of anthracite, or stone coal, combined with a hot air blast, in the smelting or manufacture of iron from ironstone, mine, or ore. The patentee in his claim said: "I do not claim the using of a hot air blast separately in the smelting and manufacture of iron as of my invention, when uncombined with the application of anthracite, or stone coal, and culm; nor do I claim the application of anthracite, or stone coal, in the manufacture or smelting of iron, when uncombined with the using of hot air blast. But what I do claim as my invention is, the application of anthracite, or stone coal, and culm, combined with the using of hot air blast in the smelting and manufacture of iron, from ironstone, mine, or ore, as above described." The application of a hot blast to the smelting of iron had previously been patented by Neilson. Tindal, C.J., in delivering the judgment of the court said, the question is "whether, admitting the using of the hot air blast to have been known before in the manufacture of iron with bituminous coal, and the use of anthracite, or stone coal, to have been known before in the manufacture of iron with cold blast, but that the combination of the two together (the hot blast and the anthracite) were not known to be combined before in the manufacture of iron, whether such combination can be the subject of a patent.

We are of opinion, that if the result produced by such a combination is either a new article, or a better article, or a cheaper article to the public than that produced before by the old method, that such combination is an invention or manufacture intended by the statute, and may well become the subject of a patent. Such an assumed state of facts falls clearly within the principle exemplified by Abbott, C. J., where he is determining what is or what is not the subject of a patent, namely, it may, perhaps, extend to a new process to be carried on by known implements or elements acting upon known substances, and ultimately producing some other known substance, but producing it in a cheaper or more expeditious manner, or a better or more useful kind. And it falls also within the doctrine laid down by Lord Eldon, that there may be a valid patent for a new combination of materials previously in use for the same purpose, or even for a new method of applying such materials. But the specification must clearly express that it is in respect of such new combination or application.

gas

to

There are numerous instances of patents which have been granted, where the invention consisted in no more than in the use of things already known, and acting with them in a manner already known, and producing effects already known, but producing those effects so as to be more economically or beneficially enjoyed by the public. It will be sufficient to refer to a few instances, some of which patents have failed on other grounds, but none on the ground that the invention itself was not the subject of a patent. We may first instance Hall's patent, for applying the flame of singe off the superfluous fibres of lace, where a flame of oil had been used be fore for that same purpose. Derosne's patent, in which the invention consis ted in filtering the syrup of sugar through a filter, to act with animal charcoal, and charcoal from bituminous schistus, where charcoal had been used before in the filtering of almost every other liquor except the syrup of sugar. Hills patent, above referred to, for improvements in the smelting and working of iron; there the invention consisted only in the use and application of the slags or cinders thrown off by the operation of smelting, which had been previously considered useless for the production of good and serviceable metal, by the admixture of mine rubbish. Again, Daniell's patent was taken out for improvements in dressing woollen cloth, where the invention consisted in immersing a roll of cloth, manufactured in the usual manner, into hot water. . .

It was objected, in the course of the argument, that the quality of degree of invention was so small, that it could not become the subject matter of a patent; and that a person who could procure a licence to use the hot air blast under Neilson's patent, had a full right to apply that blast to coal of any nature whatever, whether bituminous or stone coal. But we think, if it were necessary to consider the labour, pains, and expense, incurred by the plaintiff, in bringing his discovery to per fection, that there is evidence in this cause, that the expense was considerable, and the experiments numerous. But in point of law, the labour of thought, or experiment, and the expenditure of money, are not the essential grounds of consideration on which the question, whether the invention is or is not the subject matter of a patent, ought to depend. For if the invention be new and useful to the public, it is not material whether it be the result of long experiments and profound research, or whether by some sudden and lucky thought, or mere accidental discovery." Referring to the validity of a patent for an improvement on a prior patent his Lordship said, the defendants contend" that the taking out of a patent for an invention, which invention cannot be used or enjoyed by the public except by means of the former invention of another person, which former invention is itself the subject-matter of a patent still in force, is void by law. Undoubtedly, if the second patent claims, as part of the invention described in it, that which had been the subject matter of a patent then in force, it would be void, on the double ground that it claimed that which was not new (which indeed would equally be the case if the former patent had expired), and also that it would be an infringement of, and inconsistent with, a former grant of the King still in force, which latter consideration alone would make a new grant void. But in this case there is an express disclaimer of any part of the invention extending to the use of the hot air blast which was covered by Neilson's patent, the specification describing, that the application of the hot air blast was well understood and extensively applied in many places where ordinary fuel is employed. The validity, therefore, of the plaintiff's patent cannot be impeached on either of the grounds above adverted to Now it is further argued, that in point of law, no patent can be taken out which includes the subject matter of a

patent still running or in force. No authority was cited to support this proposition. . . . And upon reason and principle there appears to be no objection. The new patent, after the expiration of the old one, will be free from every objection, and whilst the former exists, the new patent can be legally used by the public by procuring a licence from Neilson, or by purchasing the apparatus from him or some of his agents; and the probability of the refusal of a licence to anyone applying for it, is so extremely remote, that it cannot enter into consideration as a ground of legal objection." The patent was held to be good. (4 M. & G. 580; 5 Scott, N. R. 333; 1 Web. P. C. 393: 2 Carp. P. C. 611; 18 Rep. Arts, 4th S., 102.)

The Electric Telegraph Company v. Brett. 1851.-Patent "for improvements in giving signals and sounding alarums in distant places by means of electric currents transmitted through metallic circuits." Subsequently to the patent, it was discovered that the return current could be conducted back to the battery through the earth as effectually as through a continuous metallic circuit, and this was the method used by the defendants. The defendants contended that the patent would protect the improvements of the patentee only when such improvements were applied to circuits that were metallic throughout, and therefore that they were entitled to employ the patentees' improvements. Cresswell, J., delivering the judgment of the court said "It appears to us reason. able to hold, that a claim for a patent for improvements in the mode of doing something by a known process, is sufficient to entitle the claimants to a patent for his improvements, when applied either to the process as known at the time of the claim, or to the same process altered and improved by discoveries not known at the time of the claim, so long as it remains identical with regard to the improvements claimed and their application." One of the claims of the patentee was an improvement" whereby a set of combined conducting wires, as aforesaid, having a voltaic battery and a set of buttons or finger keys, and also a dial with magnetic needles for giving signals, as well as an apparatus for sounding alarums at each end of the set, may also have duplicates of such dials, with needles and apparatus for alarums at intermediate places between the two ends; all such duplicates operating simultaneously with each other, and with the two end dials and alarums, to give like signals, and to sound like alarums." The jury found " that the sending of signals to intermediate stations was new to the plaintiffs." The defendants contended that this was a claim to the invention of a principle, and therefore that it was not the subject-matter of a patent. Cresswell, J. said: "We think that the patentees not only communicated the idea or principle that duplicate signals might be given, but showed how it might be done, i. e., by duplicate apparatus at each station, and that this is a fit subject of a patent. It was, indeed, contended that it was obvious and self evident that a circuit having a distant coil could have intermediate ones also, which would operate in the same manner; but it appears to us, that though it might be probable à priori that such would be the case, it was matter of experiment that it could practically be done, and that the invention of the patentees, though simple, was one for which a patent might be granted." (10 Com. B. Rep. 838; 20 L. J., N. S., 123, C. P.; 15 Jur. 579.)

Newton v. Vaucher 1852.-The defendant has obtained a patent for an improvement in packing hydraulic and other machines by means of a lining of soft metal, the effect of which was to make certain parts of the machine air and fluid tight. Subsequently to this the plaintiff discovered that soft metal had the effect of diminishing friction, and of preventing the evolution of heat when applied to the surfaces in contact of machines in rapid motion, and subject to pressure. And he accordingly obtained a patent for certain improvements in the construction of boxes for the axles or axletrees of locomotive engines, &c., and also for improvements in oiling or lubricating the same.' The plaintiff claimed, as his invention, the making or constructing the boxes, within which the journals or axles of machinery are to run, or within which the rods of slides, &c., are to slide, by providing them with rims or fillets along their edges, &c., and the lining such boxes with soft metal. Held, that the plaintiff's application of the soft metal differed essentially fom that of the defendant, and that the plaintiff's patent was new. Parke, B. said: "Upon looking at his (the plaintiff's) specification, which embodies a new principle in a new machine, it differs materially from the defendant's, which is for the purpose merely of packing, for in the plaintiff's invention it is essential that there should be not only the intervention of soft metal, but that there should also be a hard rim covered in part with that soft metal, or some other means to prevent the soft metal from expanding, and getting out of its place. But any other hard rim, covered with soft metal, or substances covered with soft metal, are part of that machine. That is no part of the defendant's invention. Therefore, I think the discovery of the person under whom the plaintiff claims, is not merely a discovery of a new principle, but a new principle embodied in a new machine. Then, that being so, if the plaintiff claims a patent for that new principle embodied in a new machine, and that only for the purpose of diminishing friction, and the application of it, is only to cases where there is pressure as well as motion, that patent is perfectly good." (6 Exch. Rep. 859; 21 L. J., N. S. 305, Ex)

LAW LIBRARY.

The Prevention of Crimes Act 1871, &c. By JAMES A. FOOT, M.A., Barrister-at-Law, London: Shaw and Sons.

THIS little work deals with the two Acts, 34 & 35 Vict. c. 112, and 34 & 35 Vict. c. 32, the latter being the Act to amend the criminal law relating to violence, threats, and molestation. The Prevention of Crimes Act is the Habitual Criminals Act extended and amended, whilst the Criminal Law Amendment Act was originally part of the Bill, which when passed, became known as the Trades Union Act 1871 (34 & 35 Vict. c. 31.) With reference to the Prevention of Crimes Act, Mr. Foot remarks that it is to be regretted that the Bill was introduced so late in the session as to prevent its receiving that amount of consideration which would otherwise have been bestowed upon it, which necessitates a good deal of adverse criticism to be found in Mr. Foot's notes. criticism is very intelligent and to the point. Such authorities as there are, are noted up, and the work being a small one, and cheap (half-a-crown), we will simply say that it has merits, and leave our readers to find them out for themselves.

This

THE STOCK MARKETS.

CITY, THURSDAY, JUNE 20.

THE deliberations of the arbitrators at Geneva having been adjourned for a week, it is only natural that the hopes of a satisfactory settlement being arrived at, which up to yesterday had been almost abandoned, should to some extent revive, however slender may be the basis of merely a week's adjournment upon which such hopes rest. This circumstance has for the present rendered unnecessary the extreme caution which operators had manifested for some days up to the close of business yesterday, and at the opening of the markets this morning some return of confidence was observable. The improved position was also materially strengthened by the further reduction from 3 to 3 per cent. in the Bankate, upon which announcement the outside rates fell to 24 to 2 for three months' bills. The position of the bank is again fairly strong, and at the moment there is a prospect of a further influx of gold, while the general demand for money is small. In forecasting the future, however, it is necessary to keep in view the contingency of a new large French loan, which circumstance has engaged more attention recently through the fall in Rentes, and the renewal of negotiations for the evacuation of French territory by the Germans. It is inferred from these features that the operation cannot be very far distant, more particularly as there will be less chance of a complete success if it be postponed till the autumn.

The British Funds are better for the week; and India 5 Stock and Metropolitan 3 per Cents. have also risen .

In the American Market the 5-20 Bonds of 1862, the 10-40s, and the Funded Loan have fallen ; Atlantic and Great Western Bonds, and ditto Debentures 1; and Eries 4. In the last named the fluctuations have been at times violent, and the lowest point touched has been 394.

The changes in British Railway stocks have been mostly adverse for the week, there having been on two or three occasions a pressure of sales to realise, London and South-Western, North British, and South-Eastern are 1 lower; Caledonian, London and North-Western, Manchester and Sheffield, Midland, and North-Eastern .

In the Foreign Market, Argentine, Brazilian Paraguay, and Spanish have been in demand, and are to higher; but Egyptian, Turkish, and French Stocks have declined. In Honduras there has been a panic on unfavourable news regarding the political state of that Republic, and the Stock fell at one time as much as 25 per cent., but has since partly recovered.

The banks and discount houses have lowered their deposit rates at call from 2 to 2; and at notice from 2 to 21.

At the forty-seventh annual meeting of the Crown Life Assurance Company, held on 14th June 1872, a dividend of 32s. per share was declared, and it was reported that 778 policies for the sum of £389,445 had been issued during the past year, yielding £12,537 of new annual premiums, that the net funds were £1,205,414, the assurances in force £4,762,106, the annual income £188,633, and that the total claims paid now amounted to £2,269,000. The latest quotations for British Funds are as follows: Consols, for money, 923 to 92 ex. div.; ditto 4th July account, 92 to 925 ex. div.; Reduced, and New Three per Cents., 92 to 923; Exchequer Bills, 18. dis. to 3s. pm.; India Five per Cent. Stock, 109 to 110; ditto Four per Cent., 1043 to 105; ditto Enfaced Paper Four per Cent., 961 to 963; ditto Five and a Half per Cent., 107 to 108; Bank of England Stock, 243 to 245; Metropolitan Three and a Half per Cent., 961 to 971; and French Rentes in this market, 53 to 53.

The latest quotation for French Rentes received from Paris was 54fr. 40c. In the market for American Securities, the United States 5-20 Bonds of 1882 are marked 90 to 907; do. 10-40 Bonds, 89 to 891; Atlantic and Great Western Bonds, 37 to 38): ditto Debentures, 47 to 481; ditto Reorganisation Stock, 98 to 100; Eries, 42 to 43; Illinois, 109 to 110; and United States Funded Loan, 893 to 893.

In the Railway Market the prices are:-Caledonians, 114 to 114; Great Eastern, 52 to 52; Great Northern, 140 to 141; ditto, A, 1634 to 164}; Great Western, 115 to 115; Lancashire and Yorkshire, 157 to 158}; London and Brighton, 81 to 81; London, Chatham, and Dover, 26 to 261; ditto 4 per cent. preference, 661 to 66; London and North-Western, 151 to 151: London and South-Western, 107 to 108; Manchester and Sheffield, 771 to 78; Metropolitan, 64 to 64; ditto District, 314 to 32; Midland, 1193 to 150: North British, 65 to 66; North Eastern Consols 170 to 170; South Eastern, 101 to 101; ditto deferred, 81 to 821; Grand Trunk of Canada, 20 to 21; Great Western of Canada, 21 to 221; Antwerp and Rotterdam, 18 to 191 Great Luxembourg, 16% to 171; Lombardo Venetian, 18 to 18.

The prices of the principal Foreign Stocks are as follows: Argentine, 1868, 99 to 100; do., 6 per cent., 1871, 941 to 941; Brazilian, 5 per cent., 1865, 981 to 98: do., 5 per cent., 1871, 981 to 982; Egyptian, 7 per cent., 1868, 90 to 91; do., Viceroy Loan, 921 to 931; do., Khedive Mortgage Bonds, 78 to 79; French Morgan 6 per cent. Loan, 973 to 981; do. National 5 per cent. Loan, 3 to 3 pm.; Greek 5 per cent. 16 to 18; Honduras, 64 to 68; Italian of 1861, 683 to 687; Mexican, 14 to 15! Paraguay 8 per cent. 1871, 87 to 88; do. 1872 Serip, 3 to 34 pm.; Peruvian, 5 per cent. 1865, 1014 to 102; do. 6 per cent. 1870, 821 to 823; do. 6 per cent. 1872, Scrip, topm.; Spanish, 30 to 303; do. 3 per cent. 1871, 30% to 30%; Turkish, 5 per cent. 1865, 51 to 543; do. 6 per cent. 1865, 711 to 72: do. 6 per cent. 1869, 62 to 624; and do. 6 per cent. 1871, 72 to 73. In the Telegraph Market, Anglo-American Stock is quo'ed at 119 to 121; Anglo-Mediterranean, 177 to 180; British Australian, 7 to 8; British Indian Extension, 11 to 12; ditto Submarine, 10% to 10%; Chinas, 8 to 8; Cubas, 6 to 7; Falmouths, 10 to 11; Great Northern, 14 to 15; Marseilles, Algiers, and Malta, 8 to 91; Mediterranean Extension, 6 to 6; Reuter's, 10 to 11; French Cables, 21 to 22; and West India and Panama, 51 to 5.

In miscellaneous shares the prices are as follows:-Crystal Palace 24 to 26; Credit Foncier of England, 5 to 6; General Credit and Discount, 2 to 2 pm.; International Finance, dis. to par; Hooper's. Telegraph Works, 2 to 2 pm.; Hudson's Bay, 11 to 11; India Rubber and Gutta Percha, 43 to 44; National Discount, 13 to 13; Telegraph Construction, 33 to 34; Native Guano, 17 to 19; Phosphate Sewage, 13 to 14; New Sombrero Phosphate, 6 to 6; Phospho Guano, 11 to 114; and Royal Mail Steam, 87 to 89.

NOTES OF THE WEEK.

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS. Tuesday June 18.

GRIMWOOD v. Moss.

Landlord and tenant-Ejectment-Subsequent distress-Affirmance of tenancy. THIS was an action of ejectment by a landlord against his tenant for forfeiture incurred through breaches of covenants in the lease. The writ was dated on the 21st July 1870. On the 15th Sept. following the landlord levied a distress for rent due up to the 25th June 1870. No particulars in the action of ejectment were delivered by the plaintiff or asked for by the defendant, nor was any notice given to the defendant before action of the breaches, in respect of which the plaintiff claimed to re-enter. At the trial before Hannen, J., the plaintiff proved a breach of covenant committed by the defendant before the 25th June 1870, by carting off straw from the farm. The defendant's counsel contended that the plaintiff, by levying the distress for rent due up to the 25th June, had affirmed the tenancy up to that date, and had waived his right to re-enter in respect of a previous breach of covenant. The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff, leave being reserved to the defendant to move to enter a verdict for him on the above point.

Denman, Q.C. (Diron with him), showed cause. Garth, Q.C. (Shaw with him), replied. The COURT (Willes, Byles, and Keating, JJ.) held that the action of ejectment must be taken to have been brought in respect of any breaches of covenant for which the landlord had a right to re-enter. Until the delivery of particulars, which the tenant might have had if he had wished, even before appearance, the plaintiff was at liberty to proceed for any breach he chose to select. The subsequent distress might or might not be valid, but if valid it was valid only by virtue of the statute 8 Anne, c. 14, which authorises a distress to be levied within six months after the determination of the tenancy, and did not amount to an affirmance of the tenancy up to the 25th

June.

c. 54.

THIS was an action to recover a sum of money due for the keep of a lunatic. The lunatic in question in the year 1856 murdered her three children, but was found, on her arraignment, to be of unsound mind, and unable to plead. She was accordingly ordered to be kept in confinement during Her Majesty's pleasure, and shortly afterwards she was removed to the plaintiff's private asylum, and from that date up to Dec. 1869, the sum of 168. a week had been paid for her maintenance by the defendants. The defendants gave the plaintiff notice on 19th Oct. 1869, that they would no longer pay more than the sum paid by them for lunatics at the county asylum, viz., 11. 1d.; and in Feb. of the year following they gave another notice that they should not pay. The keeper of the lunatic asylum is bound to keep the lunatic in safe custody unless he obtains an order of the Home Secretary permitting him to discharge her. By the 3 & 4 Vict. c. 54, s. 7, it is lawful for two justices to direct the overseers of the parish to which they shall adjudge such insane person to be settled, to pay such sum for the maintenance of such person as they shall by writing, under their hands, direct. The defendants paid into court a sum of money equal to 11s. 1d. per week. A verdict having been found for the defendants, a rule was obtained on the ground that there was evidence of a contract to pay 168. per week. Kingdon, Q.C., with whom was Kinglake, showed

cause.

Henry James, Q.C., with whom was Pinder, in support of the rule.

The COURT (Willes, Byles, and Keating, JJ.) held that the contract was to pay 16s. a week, and that they would infer from the fact of the payment having been made for fifteen years, that an

order of justices had been obtained, and they also held that the order of the guardians must not necessarily be under seal.

COURT OF EXCHEQUER.

April 29; May 1 and 2; and June 6. ALLGOOD AND OTHERS v. FREDERICK BLAKE; ROACH V. THE SAME; CLENNELL V. THE SAME; REED V. THE SAME; ALLGOOD AND OTHERS v. FRANCIS D. BLAKE.

Will-Limitations of estates tail-Ultimate limitation-"For default of such issue"-"To all and every other the issue of my body lawfully begotten "-Construction.

"and

THESE were five special cases, stated to determine five actions of ejectment brought by the various plaintiffs claiming to be entitled under the will of the late Sir Francis Blake, first baronet of Twisdel Castle in the county of Durham, to the estates in question situate in Northumberland and elsewhere in the north of England. By his will, executed in Jan. 1780, the testator, Sir Francis Blake, devised all his real estates to his eldest son Francis for life, remainder to Francis, the eldest son of his said son Francis for life; remainder to the first and other sons of Francis the grandson successively in tail male; and for default of such issue to Robert Dudley Blake, the second son of Francis, the son, for life; remainder to his first and other sons successively in tail male, and for default of such issue to the third, fourth, and other sons of the son Francis thereafter to be born successively in tail male; and in default of such issue, to the testator's daughter Isabella for life, remainder to her first and other sons in tail male; and for default of such issue to his granddaughter Elizabeth Blake for life, remainder to her first and other sons in tail male; and for default of such issue to his granddaughter, Isabella Blake for life remainder to her first and other sons successively in tail male; and for default of such issue to his granddaughter, Sarah Blake, for life, remainder to her first and other sons successively in tail male; and for default of such issue to the fourth, fifth, and other after born daughter and daughters of his sn Fancis successively, and in remainder one after another, and the heirs male of their bodies. And then came the following limitation (called the penultimate limitation), upon which the question in these actions arises for default of such issue, To the use and behoof of all and every other the issue of my body lawfully to be begotten." And then came the ultimate limitation -"And for default of such issue, To the use and behoof of my own right heirs for ever." There was also a clause in the will that the females in the lines of descent, and the husbands and issuemale of such of them as should marry, if taking under the limitations of the will, should, as soon as they came into possession of the estates, assume and use the surnaname and arms of Blake only; and in other parts of his will the testator expressed a desire that the estates, name, and family should be kept up in one person. The plaintiffs in the first of the above actions (Allgood and others v. Frederick Blake) children and great grandchildren of the testator, being children and grandchildren of Sarah, the only one of the testator's daughters who married, and who died in her father's lifetime, subsequetly to the date of the said will, leaving issue. The plaintiff in the second action (Roach v. Blake) is Eleanor Ann Roach, the great grand-daughter of the testator, and daughter of Eleanor Ann Blake, the youngest daughter of the testator's son Francis, the second baronet. The plaintiff in the third action (Clennell v. Blake) is Percival F. Clennell, the testator's great grandson, and son of Sarah, the youngest daughter of the testator's before-mentioned daughter Sarah. The plainiff in the fourth action (Reed v. Blake) is Francis Reed, a great grandson of the tes tator, and eldest surviving son of John Reed, the eldest son of the testator's said daughter Sarah. The defendant in all the above four actions is Frederick Blake, an illegitimate son of Sir Francis Blake, the testator's grandson and third baronet, and he claims the portion of the estates sought to be recovered in these four actions, as devisee for life under his father's will, who, during his possession as tenant for life under the above limitations, executed a disentailing deed of the whole property, and devised this portion of it to the defendant. The plaintiffs in the fifth action (Allgood and others v. Francis Blake) are the same as the plaintiffs in the first, but the property in dispute i different. The defendant in the fifth action is Francis Douglas Blake, the eldest son of Francis Blake deceased, another illegitimate son of the said third baronet, and he claimed, as devisee for life under the last mentioned will, another portion of the said property, which the said third baronet had, previously to devising it, disentailed as abovementioned. The question turned on the construction of the penultimate limitation in the will of the testator, the first baronet, and the five cases were consolidated, and came on for argument together.

are

Chancery Bar, and Gainsford Bruce), for the plaintiffs in the first and fifth actions.

The Solicitor-General (Sir G. Jessel, Q.C.) (with Bagshawe, Chancery Bar, and Wallis) for the plaintiffs in the second action.

H. F. Bristowe, Q.C. (with H. Dalton, Chancery Bar) for the plaintiff in the third action. Pollock, Q.C. (with Day, Q.C.) for the plaintiff in the fourth action.

Sir J. B. Karslake, Q.C. (with Kemplay, Q.C. and C. Hall Equity Bar), for the defendant in the first four actions.

Joshua Williams, Q.C. (with C. Browne, Equity Bar and Trevelyan) for the defendant in the fifth action. Cur. adv. vult.

June 6.-CLEASBY B. delivered the unanimous judgment of Kelly, C.B. Martin, B. and himself in favour of the defendants in the first four, and the fifth actions respectively, holding in the result that, by virtue of the penultimate limitation, there was, at the testator's death, a vested remainder in the heirs of his body in tail general, to which the second baronet then became entitled; that this remainder descended to the third baronet, the grandson, and that as he was also tenant for life in possession he was qualified to execute a disen. tailing deed, so as to bar any claim of the plaintiffs (if without such deed they would have had any) and to acquire the absolute disposition of the property subject to all the estates preceding the penultimate limitation.

BRAMWELL B. concurred in the above judgment, and its general reasoning, but took a different view of the meaning of the word "other," in the pen. ultimate limitation.

Judgment for the defendant in each action. Attorney for the plaintiffs in the first three and the fifth actions, W. G. Jennings, 18, Bennett's Hill, Doctor's Commons, E.C., agent for Arnold, Gravesend.

Nicholls, Burnett, and Newman, 8, Howard-street, Attorneys for the plaintiff in the fourth action, Strand, W.C.

actions, Gray, Johnston, and Mounsey, 5, Raymond Attorneys for the defendant in the first four Buildings, Gray's Inn, W.C.

Attorney for the defendant in the fith action, G. Knox, 3, Bloomsbury-square, W.C., agent for Sanderson, Berwick-on-Tweed.

Saturday, June 8.

BROWN v. MULLER.

Before the arri

Vendor and purchaser-Contract to deliver goods at a future time - Delivery by instalments at different rates-Breach of contract by vendorFailure to deliver-Measure of damages. THIS was an action for breach of contract by the defendant in not delivering 500 tons of foundry iron. The defendant agreed to sell, and the plaintiff to purchase of him, 500 tons of foundry iron, to be delivered to the plaintiff in about equal grand-proportion in three several instalments in the months of September, October, and November 1871, at a certain price per ton. val of the time for the delivery of the first instal ment of the iron in September, namely, in the month of August 1871, the defendant gave notice to the plaintiff that he considered there had been no bind ing contract entered into between them, and that, therefore, he should not fulfil his contract by deli vering to the plaintiff any of the iron. It appeared that the price of iron had, subsequently to the date of the contract between the parties, risen considerably in price during the months of Sep tember, October, and November, and that the highest price was attained in the month of November last. The present action was brought by the plaintiff in the month of December last, and he therein claimed, as damages from the defendant for such non-delivery of the iron as per the alleged contract as aforesaid, the difference in amount on the 30th Nov. last between the contract price of the 500 tons of iron and the market price of the Nov.), when the last instalment of iron ought, same quantity and quality of iron on that day (30th according to the contract, to have been delivered. At the trial, before Lush, J., at the last spring assizes at Liverpool, a verdict was found for the plaintiff for that amount, and leave was reserved rule was afterwards accordingly obtained on the to the defendant to move to reduce the damages. part of the defendant to that effect, on the ground that the damages were assessed on a wrong prin ciple,and ought to have been assessed with reference to the amount of difference between the contract and the market price of the iron at the time when the defendant gave notice to the plaintiff of his intention not to fulfil his contract, and to delive no iron; or, at all events, that they ought to be assessed with reference to the amount difference between the two prices on the 30th Sept. when there had been an unqualified breach of contract. In either view of the matter the ver dict, it was alleged, required to be reduced.

Sir R. Palmer, Q.C. (with Manisty, Q.C. Waley,

the

Aspinall, Q.C., and Hugh Shield for the plaintiff, showed cause against; and Herschell, Q.C., for

the defendant, supported his rule, contending that the notice by the plaintiff to the defendant constituted a breach of contract for which an action might at once have been brought by the plaintiff, and that the true measure of damages was the difference in amount between the contract price and the market price on the day when such notice was given.

The COURT (Kelly C.B., and Martin and Channell, B.B.) were of opinion that the proper measure of damages was the aggregate of the differences between the contract price and the market price, of one-third of the iron on the 30th Sept., when the first instalment was due; of another third on the 31st Oct., when the second instalment should have been delivered; and of the remaining third of it on the 30th Nov., when the last instalment was due, and ought to have been delivered, and the verdict was directed to be reduced in accordance with that view.

Rule absolute to reduce the damages accordingly. Attorneys for the plaintiff, Emmets, Watson and Emmet, 14, Bloomsbury-square, W.C.

Attorneys for the defendant, Pritchard and Englefield, Painters'-hall, Little Trinity-lane, E.C.

EXCHEQUER CHAMBER.

ERRORS FROM THE QUEEN'S BENCH. Friday, June 14.

FOWLER v. HOLLINS.

Conversion-Cotton broker's liability - Cotton bought from fraudulent holder. THIS was an action for conversion of certaim bales of cotton tried at Liverpool before Willes J. who upon the findings of the jury entered a verdict for the defendants, and reserved leave to the plaintiffs to move. Accordingly the plaintiffs obtained a rule nisi, which was afterwards made absolute by the Court of Queen's Bench, to enter a verdict for them. The appeal was argued on the 14th, 15th, and 16th, of Feb. last. Plaintiffs were the true owners of the cotton :

defendants were cotton brokers who bought the cotton from one Bailey, who had obtained it by fraud from the plaintiffs. When defendants bought from Bailey, they were not expressly authorised to do so by any principal, but they knew some of their customers required cotton of the kind, and they bought it, thinking that if the firm for whom they intended it would not take it, some one else would. They sold the cotton within half an hour of buying it; and to the customers who they expected would take it. It was contended on their behalf that, and the point reserved was whether, this did not amount to a conversion of the cotton by them.

Holker, Q. C. (with Herschell Q. C.) for the appellants, the defendants.

Kaye, Q. C. (with C. Russell Q. C.) for the respondents, the plaintiffs.

Cur. adv. vult.

June 14.-KELLY C. B., BYLES and BRETT JJ., considered the facts did not constitute a conversion. MARTIN CHANNELL and CLEASBY BB. agreed with the Court of Q. B., that the verdict should be entered for the plaintiffs. The court being equally divided, the judgment of the court

below was ordered to stand.

Attorney for plaintiffs W. W. Wynne, for T, and T. Martin, Liverpool. Attorneys for defendants: Chester and Urquhart,

for Lace, Banner, and Co., Liverpool.

BROWN v. NUGENT. Licence for entertainments-Music without dancing-Action for penalty-25 Geo. 2, c. 36. THIS was an appeal from a decision of the Court of Queen's Bench, by which a rule to set aside the defendant's verdict at the trial, in pursuance of leave reserved by the Judge, was made absolute: L. Rep. 6 Q. B. 693.

The action was by a common informer to obtain a penalty alleged to have been incurred by the defendant in allowing dancing in the Cambridge Musichall, Commercial-road, of which he was proprie tor; the licence under 25 Geo. 2 c. 36, being only for public music.

By sect. 2 of the Act, "any house, room, garden, or other place kept for public dancing, music, or other public entertainment of a like kind, in the cities of London and Westminster, or within twenty miles thereof, without a licence had for that purpose from the last preceding Michaelmas quarter sesssions of the peace, to be holden for the county, city, &c., in which such house, room, garden, or other place is situate (who are hereby authorised and empowered to grant such licences as they in their discretion shall think proper), signified under the hands and seals of four or more of the justices there assembled, shall be deemed a disorderly house or place. and it shall, and may be lawful for any constable . . authorised by warrant. . . . to enter such house or place, and to seize every person who shall be found therein, in order that they may be dealt with according to law; and every person'

keeping such house, . . . . without such licence as aforesaid, shall forfeit the sum of £100." Day, Q.C. (with R. D. Bennett) for the defendant, contended that the licence having been granted to the house, the defendant was not restricted as to the kind of entertainment which he provided; and that the words for public music " in the licence could have no effect. Cole, Q.C. (with E. Thomas) argued for the plaintiff.

The COURT (Kelly, C.B., Martin, B., Willes, Byles, Keating, and Brett, JJ.) held that the Justices had jurisdiction to limit a licence under this section to one of the kirds of entertainment mentioned; and further, that if they had not that power, the consequence would be that in this case the whole licence would be void.

Judgment affirmed. Attorneys for plaintiff, Webster and Graham. Attorney for defendant, Thomas Beard.

ERRORS FROM COMMON PLEAS.

Tuesday, June 18.

PAPPA v. ROSE.

Broker-Goods to be of fair quality in opinion of the selling broker-Broker not liable for want of skill in forming opinion. PLAINTIFF had employed defendant as his broker to sell some raisins on the terms of the following note: "Sold by order and for account of Mr. D. Pappa to arrive to my principals, Messrs. Hanson and Son, 500 tons of black Smyrna raisins, 1869 growth, fair average quality in the opinion of the selling broker." This was signed by the defendant. When the raisins arrived, Hanson and Son objected to their quality, and defendant accordingly went and examined them, and declared that they were not of the quality mentioned in the sale note. Hanson and Son accordingly refused to accept them. Plaintiff thereupon brought this action, charging the defendant with want of skill in forming his opinion of the raisins, whereby Hanson and Son refused to accept them, and plaintiff lost the benefit of the sale. A verdict was found for the defendant, the plaintiff having leave to move. Plaintiff obtained a rule accordingly, but it was subsequently discharged. Hence this appeal.

Sir John Karslake, Q.C. (Sir Geo. Honyman, QC., and Watkin Williams with him) for the plaintiff, contended that the words of the note meant fair average quality of the growth of the particular year, and not generally; and further, that the defendant was responsible for want of skill in forming his opinion on the raisins.

H. Giffard, Q.C. (Murphy and Howard Smith with him) for the defendant, was not called upon. The COURT (Kelly, C.B., Martin, B., Blackburn, Mellor, and Lush, JJ.) affirmed the decision of the court below on both points.

Judgment for the defendant.
Thomas and Hollams for plaintiff.
Stibbard and Beck for defendant.

Wednesday, June 19.
BRINSMEAD v. HARRISON.

Tort-Recovery against one tort-feasor without

satisfaction or bar to an action against the other.

THE question involved in this case was whether a judgment against one of two tort feasors, but without satisfaction, could be pleaded in bar of

an action brought for the same wrong against the other tort feasor. The court below held that it could, mainly on the authority of King v. Hoare (13 M. & W. 494), and Brown v. Wootton (Cro. Jac. 73). This was on appeal from that decision. Lucius Kelly for the plaintiff.

Fullerton for the defendant.

and Lush, JJ., and Cleasby, B.) affirmed the deThe COURT (Kelly, C.B., Blackburn, Mellor cision of the court below.

Judgment for defendant. Attorney for plaintiff, Isaac Berridge. Attorneys for defendant, Blackford and Riches.

fifty in number, in different stocks, and unless the probate were so amended a declaration of identity would be needed in every case.

Lord PENZANCE.-What you ask is contrary to the usual practice, but I don't see any reason why it should not be done. The court is always jealous of interfering with the probate, or with anything that has been done under it; but here you do not ask to change anything that appears on the face of the probate, but simply to add something to the description of the testator by inserting another place of residence. I think the application ought to be granted.

Attorneys: Sharpe, Parker, Pritchard, and Sharpe.

In the Goods of DURANCE. Will-Letter containing directions to burn the will -Revocation-Intestacy. THOMAS JOHN DURANCE formerly of Orchardlane, Lincoln, and late of Toronto, Canada, died 17th Sept. 1871, at Toronto, a bachelor, without parent, leaving Joseph Durance his natural and lawful brother and one of his next of kin. On the 14th March 1871, deceased then being resident at Orchard-lane, duly executed a will, of which he appointed Thomas Joseph Plant executor, and shortly afterwards he went to Toronto and died there. During his last illness he wrote these two letters :-"Western Canada - Toronto General Hospital, Sept. 13, 1871. I, Thomas John Durance authorise Mr. Denman, of the firm of Messrs. S. Ince, Denman, and Co., of Nottingham, to deliver up in full to my brother Mr. Joseph Durance, jun., of No. 29, The Park, in the City of Lincoln, England, the will completed by me at his residence on Tuesday evening the 14th March last, together with the copy of the will of my late grandfather Mr. Joseph Durance, sen.-THOMAS JOHN DURANCE, -Witness to the signature of Thomas J. Durance. John Greenshield, La Chute, Province of Quebec; John Herbert, 10, Elizabeth-street, Toronto.""Toronto General Hospital, 13th Sept. 1871.-My dear Joe,-Inclosed I hand you an order to get my will from Mr. Denman, which please burn as soon as you receive it, without reading it. I will leave you my share as a deed of gift, leaving it to your honour to pay out of it £100 to each of my sisters and £100 to Thomas Plant. I am very ill, so good bye, God bless you. Your affectionate brother, Thomas John Durance. - Witnesses, John Greenchild, Frank Booth, Toronto General Hospital, Sept. 13th, 1871."

Inderwick moved for probate of the two papers. Lord PENZANCE.-The direction in the letter to burn the will is clearly a revocation. The proper course will be for the brother to take out administration.

Attorneys: Swain and Co.

COURT FOR DIVORCE AND MATRIMONIAL CAUSES.

June 6 and 18.

(Before Lord PENZANCE, J.O.)
CORELL V. CORELL.

Judicial separation-Permanent alimony may be granted though no order for alimony pendente lite has been made.

THIS was a wife's suit for a dissolution of her

marriage on the ground of her husband's adultery
and cruelty. The adultery was proved, but
decreed a judicial separation.
the allegation of cruelty failed, and the court
No order for
alimony pendente lite had been made, but after
the decree the wife presented a petition for the
allotment of permanent alimony. The husband
did not answer, but appeared under protest, and
the matter was now argued.

G. Browne for the petitioner.
Dr. Tristram for the respondent.

Cur, adv vult. June 18.-Lord PENZANCE, J.O.-This was a suit between husband and wife, in which the wife obtained a decree of judicial separation. Pending suit, no order for alimony was made or applied for; neither was there any application made when the decree of separation was pronounced. But since that time a petition has been filed by the wife for an allotment of permanent alimony. The husband has not answered, but has appeared under protest, and contends that the court has no power to decree permanent alimony under such circumstances, after the decree of judicial separation. The court looked for some authority for this contention, and some passages were referred to in Burns' Ecclesiastical Law, which had nothing to do with the point. A general proposition is stated there that the court had power to allot alimony to wife after a decree of judicial separation; but no distinction is made as to the time when the court is to exercise that power. It was further argued that the court has not the power by analogy with the power conferred on the court by the 32nd section. The words of that section are something to the effect that upon 'making the decree for a dissolution of the mar