The principal question is whether contemplated damage to reputation or property is a sufficient reason for restraining the publication of an alleged libel. On this point the case of the Springhead Spinning Compang is, as Sir J. Wickens said, peculiar, and indeed can hardly be called an authority. Actual damage to property had been inflicted and there was every reason to expect that the placards would operate to intimidate workmen and prevent their continuing in the service of the plaintiffs. But anticipated injury to reputation is a different head of damage. Properly to estimate such damage beforehand, or, indeed, to say whether any damage at all will result from a particular publication, must be a matter of great difficulty. The doctrine laid down in the Springhead case was extended to this class of damage by the same learned judge in the case of Dixon v. Holden. In the course of his judgment he said, "I am told that a court of equity has no jurisdiction in such a case as this, though it is admitted it has jurisdiction where property is likely to be affected. What is property? One man has property in lands, another in a business, another in goods, another in skill, another in reputation; and whatever may have the effect of destroying property in any one of these things (even in a man's good name) is, in my opinion, destroying property of a most valuable description."

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A decision which has been extensively criticised in all these cases is that of Clark v. Freeman (11 Beav. 561), in which Lord Langdale refused to grant Sir James Clark junction to restrain the advertisement of certain pills said to have been made from his prescription. The eminent physician was not engaged in making pills, nor was he preparing to give his name to such a commodity, and the damage sustained by him, therefore, was confined to the improper user of his name. In Maxwell v. Hogg (16 L. T. Rep. N. S. 130; L. Rep. 2 Ch. 310) Lord Justice Lord Cairns said he thought that Clark v. Freeman might have been decided in favour of the plaintiff, on the ground that he had a property in his own name. Another case would seem to favour this suggestion, that, namely, of Routh v. Webster (10 Beav. 561). In that case a joint stock company was established for carrying passengers by omnibus and steamboat at a cheap rate. The defendants, the provisional directors, had published prospectuses, in which the name of the plaintiff was used without his authority, as a trustee of the company. The plaintiff, conceiving that he might be subjected to responsibility by the unauthorised use of his name, filed his bill against the directors, and moved for an injunction to restrain them from using his name in connection with the company. Lord Langdale granted the injunction, and observed that it would be a warning to the defendants not to use the names of other persons without their authority. "The defendants were not to be allowed to use the names of any persons they pleased, representing them as responsible in their speculations and involving them in all sorts of liabilities." That case, however, will be seen to be stronger than Clark v. Freeman, where the plaintiff could only have suffered somewhat in his reputation if the pills had been bad, whereas in Routh v. Webster the plaintiff was held out as a responsible member of the company, and was therefore made subject to attempts at any rate to fix him with liability.

We will now return to Mulkern v. Ward, and it is noticeable that the Vice-Chancellor there drew a distinction as to the nature of the property to be injured. He pointed out that the association in the case before him had for its object simply the bringing together of borrowers and lenders, and was, therefore, not precisely analogous to a trade association; and this leads to the conclusion that to found an injunction in equity to restrain libellous publications, the individual or association whose injury is contemplated, must possess a reputation of marketable value, and the threatened libel must be the statement of a fact, and not a mere literary criticism. "The statements," the Vice-Chancellor observed, “are only made as deductions." Finding, therefore, that the association was not analogous to a trade association, that the defendant had not been proved to have acted maliciously, and that he had made no actual statement that was proved to be false, but simply deductions which, if shown to be untrue, would be injurious to the society, the injunction was refused, the Vice-Chancellor saying, Surely, if I granted the injunction, I should do more against the liberty of unlicensed printing, or as it is commonly called, the liberty of the press, that has ever been done in any decided case, or than properly can be done in this country and in this century."

The case of A'Beckett v. Mortimer suggested these observations, but it is hardly necessary to observe that the application in that case was not in the nature of an injunction to restrain the publication of a libel, but it was an application to commit for contempt of court in the publication of articles tending to prevent the plaintiffs in certain actions against the publisher from proceeding with them, and, therefore, an attempted interference with the duc course and action of the law. Had these articles constituted a libel and stood alone, we need scarcely say that the publication of similar articles would not have been restrained in equity. But, following on proceedings in respect of prior libels, the case was a very proper one for the interference of a court of common law by the process of attachment.

THE RIGHT OF SET-OFF-ATTORNEY'S LIEN. Ir will immediately appear to our readers that the decision in the case of Mercer v. Graves (26 L. T. Rep. N. S. 551) is important as affecting the lien of an attorney for costs upon a judgment. The short point was this: An order in the nature of a judgment had been obtained on a nonsuit in Ireland. Upon that order the then defendant, as trustee for his attorney, brought an action against the then plaintiff, to recover the attorney's costs, and in answer to this action a plea of set-off was pleaded, such set-off being amounts due from the present plaintiff to the present defendant, on judgments recovered in Ireland. The court held that the relation between the client and the attorney was not that of trustee and cestui que trust, and that the so-called lien of the attorney was but a claim to the equitable interference of the court, which could not be raised against the statutory right of the defendant to set-off the cross-debts due to him by the plaintiff.

The form of action adopted was the only means by which the attorney could recover his costs, and on the face of it there is a hardship in permitting a plaintiff to defeat the right of the defendant's attorney to his costs on a judgment of nonsuit, if such a right exists. This is the question, What is an attorney's lien on a judgment, and how can it be enforced?

In the first place we will quote the extract from Chitty's Archbold's Practice (12th edit., p. 139), in which the Lord Chief Justice says the law is correctly laid down. That learned author says: An attorney has also, it is said, a lien for his costs upon a judgment recovered by his client, or upon money or costs awarded or ordered to be paid to him in a cause in which the attorney was employed; and this even though the client had previously become bankrupt." So far as regards the lien. Then, how can it be enforced. "This lien, however, is in truth merely a claim to the equitable interference of the court, who may order the judgment &c. to stand as a security for his costs, and that payment of the amount of it, or such an amount of it as will cover them, be made to the attorney in the first instance; and in clear cases of collusion they might allow the attorney to proceed in the action for the recovery of them. The court will exercise this equitable interference where the attorney has given the opposite party, or his attorney or bail, notice of his lien, and that he claims the amount payable to his client, to be paid to him in the first instance; in which case the opposite party or his bail will, at his peril, pay or release the client the claim, or compromise it without the consent of the attorney. So the court will exercise it, though no such notice has been given, in cases where it is clearly made out that there has been some collusion or fraudulent conspiracy between the parties to cheat the attorney of his costs." • The attorney also has no power over an execution on a judgment, so as to carry it into effect against the orders of his client, even though the latter and the opposite party collude to deprive him of his lien; nor has he any power to prevent his client from discharging the opposite party out of custody; or from entering satisfaction on the roll; or from entering a stet processus, or the like." That, said the Lord Chief Justice, just shows clearly the distinction between what is termed an attorney's lien and a lien by operation of law. The plaintiff's counsel relied upon R. 63 of H. T. 1853, "No set-off of damages or costs between parties shall be allowed to the prejudice of the attorney's lien for costs in the particular suit against which the set-off is sought," but the reply was that this is a mere rule of court, and cannot effect an alteration in the statutes of set-off.

The point can hardly be said to be new, but the case under consideration so clearly defines what are the powers of an attorney in enforcing his lien for costs, that the express words of the Judges ought to be stated. The Lord Chief Justice is particularly clear: "If no notice is given of the lien," he said, "and the judgment creditor arranges with the debtor, it is clear on the authorities, that the attorney has no remedy. The liability is not between the judgment debtor and the attorney of the judgment creditor, but between the judgment creditor and the attorney whose client he is, and it cannot be said that if an action is brought to recover the amount of his judgment, it is an action brought on behalf of his attorney. It is one by which the principal seeks to obtain the means of satisfying his own liability to his agent, and therefore he cannot prevent the defendant meeting his claim with a set-off." Mr. Justice Blackburn, referring to the alleged relation between the client and attorney of trustee and cestui que trust said, "I do not deny that where the action is really that of the person beneficially interested, and the other side attempt to set up a plea of set-off of a debt due from the person actually suing, a court of equity would say it is inequitable to do so, and there would be great injustice if it were allowed; and consequently I think that if the replication showed that there was the relationship of trustee and cestui que trust between the plaintiff and his attorney, then the setting up the plea of set-off would be inequitable unless there was something to alter the case." Mr. Justice Lush put the point as he always does, very shortly and well. It is not," he said "a matter in which we have any discretion at all, and the question is whether there is any authority for saying that an attorney can file a bill in equity against a judgment debtor to restrain a judgment debtor exercising his legal

rights in respect of such judgment. There is no authority for such a proposition."

The only case which in the opinion of the Court seemed to be in any way analogous is that of Ex parte Cleland (16 L. T. Rep. N. S. 403; L. Rep. 2 Ch. 808). That case, as described by Mr. Justice Blackburn, was this: "There an adjudication of bankruptcy had been set aside, and the petitioning creditor ordered to pay £159 as costs to Cleland, against whom the petition had been filed, and it was ordered that the latter should be at liberty to enforce the order by issuing execution if they were not paid. But there was a set-off of the creditor's claim for a larger sum; and Lord Justice Cairns points out that there was no reason why the order should not be executed for the £159 unless the debt was one that could be set-off against the costs; and he held that it was not such a debt. The Registrar of the Court of Bankruptcy at Liverpool had refused leave to issue execution, on the ground that the creditor's claim ought to be set-off against the costs, and that decision was reversed." Phrases, his Lordship remarked, were used in the judgment which to some extent seemed to be in favour of the argument for the plaintiff in Mercer v. Graves; but all that was meant was that Chancery would not (any more than a court of law) interfere to prevent issuing execution, except subject to the attorney's lien being discharged. There is, however, he concluded, no authority for saying that a judgment creditor is trustee for his attorney, and to say that he is so, would introduce such mischief, and be so contradictory to the decided cases, that the Court should avoid it. In the absence of previous express authority the case of Mercer V. Graves must rank as a leading decision.

THE SATISFACTION OF DEBTS BY LEGACIES. WE take the following observations on this subject from the first part of Mr. Edward Romilly's Notes of Cases extracted from the MSS. of Sir Samuel Romilly:

It is a rule that if a debtor make his will, and give the creditor a legacy equal to or exceeding the amount of the debt, and say nothing about the debt, the legacy will be presumed to have been given in satisfaction of the debt. The rule has been frequently disapproved of by various judges, and has been limited in its application by a number of distinctions frequently very fine, and which have been in several cases introduced, or at least applied, merely with the object of getting rid of an inconvenient rule. It has thus been held not to apply to debts contracted after the date of the will: (Cranmer's Case, 1 Salk. 508; Cuthbert v. Peacock, 1 Salk. 155; Thomas v. Bennet, 2 P. Wm. 341; Fowler v. Fowler, 3 P. Will. 353; Mascal v. Mascal, 1 Ves. 323; Chichester v. Coventry, L. Rep. 2 H. L. 71.)

Nor, according to most of the earlier cases, to debts due on an open account, or the amount of which was undetermined, at the date of the will: (Rawlings v. Powell,1P. Will. 144.) But in Fowler v. Fowler (3 P. Will. 353) a legacy was held to be a satisfaction of arrears of an annuity accrued before the date of the will, although further arrears had subsequently accrued. The last of course were unsatisfied. In Edmunds v. Lowe (3 K. & J. 318) the legatee had given her father, the testator, certain sums before her marriage, part of which after her marriage he repaid from time to time as she applied to him. It was contended that this was an open account, and that a legacy was no satisfaction of the debt; but Wood, V.-C., held that there was no open account, and that the presumption in favour of satisfaction applied. No payment in this case was made after the date of the gift of the legacy.

According to Chancey's Case (1 P. Wms. 408); Richardson v. Greese (3 Atk. 64) a legacy is no satisfaction of money due for arrears of wages, whether they accrued before or after the date of the will; but this doctrine was not approved of in Wallace v. Pomfret (11 Ves. 542), where, however, it was held that the legacy was no satisfaction of the debt. The legacy must be of at least equal amount as the debt, otherwise there can be no satisfaction even in part: (Atkinson v. Webb, 2 Vern. 478; and see Eastwood v. Vincke, 2 P. Will. 613; Minuel v. Sarazine, Mos. 295; Richardson v. Elphinstone, 2 Ves. Jr. 463.) Thus, an annuity bequeathed, subject to taxes, is no satisfaction of an annuity of equal amount, which ought to be paid free from taxes. And a condition attached to a legacy, or any slight difference in the mode of enjoyment, will prevent the debt being satisfied. Thus a bond conditioned that the executors of the obligor should pay his natural son £5000 at twenty-one is not satisfied by a bequest of £15,000 on trust to pay £200 till the son attained twenty-five, and then to pay him the principal, with gifts over, in case he died under twenty-five, or married between twenty-two and twenty-five: (Peacock v. Falkener, 1 B. C. C. 295; and see Perry v. Perry, 2 Vern. 505; 1 Eq. Ca. Ab. 204; Compton v. Sale, 2 P. Will. 553; Devese v. Pontet, 1 Cox, 188; Lang v. Lang, 8 Sim. 461; Tolson v. Collins, 4 Ves. 483.) So, if the legacy be left to the separate use of a married woman, while the debt be due to her generally, or conversely, if the legacy be general, but the money secured by the debt be due to her for her separate use, the presumption in favour of satisfaction is rebutted, and this apparently whether the woman be actually covert or not when the gift takes effect: (Bartlett v. Gillard, 3 Russ. 156; Fourdrin v. Cowdey, 3 M. & K. 409; Rowe v. Rowe, 2 De G. & Sm. 294; Edmunds v. Lowe, 3 K. & J. 318.) From Edmunds v. Lowe it would seem that the presumption may even be rebutted by the fact of the legacy being and the debt not being subject to the wife's equity to a settlement. So, again, if a bill or negotiable instrument have been given for the debt, a legacy will not be a satisfaction: (Carr v. Eastabrooke, 3 Ves. 561.) A legacy on condition or subject to a contingency is no satisfaction of a debt: (Talbot v. Shrewsbury, Prec. Cha. 394; Spinks v. Robins, 2 Atk. 490; Compton v. Sale, 2 P. Will. 553.) Where, however, the condition became impossible to be performed through the act of the testator, it has been held that the legacy was a satisfaction of the debt: (Matthews v. Matthews, 2 Ves. Sen. 635.) The decision seems, however, opposed to the principle laid down in Deacon v. Smith (3 Atk. 323), and Peacock v. Falkener (1 B. C. C. 295), that satisfaction depends on the intention of the testator at the time of making the will.

Small differences in the natures of the thing given by the will and that which is due (Hassell v. Hawkins, 4 Drew. 468; Goodfellow v. Burchett, 2 Vern. 298; Barret v. Beckford, 1 Ves. 519; Eastwood v. Vincke, 2 P. Will. 613; Garret v. Evers, Mos. 364; Alleyn v. Alleyn, 2 Ves. 37; Richardson v. Elphinstone, 2 Ves. Jr. 463; Compton v. Sale, 2 P. Will. 341; Hales v.

Darrel, 3 Beav. 324; 10 L. J. 10 Ch.); or even in the securities for the pay. ment of the legacy and debt (Cuthbert v. Peacock, 1 Salk. 155; Atkinson v. Webb, 2 Vern. 478; Duffield v. Smith, 2 Vern. 258; Compton v. Sale; Bartlett v. Gillard, 3 Russ. 149; Wood v. Wood, 7 B. 173; Smith v. Lyne, 2 Y. & C. C. C. 345; Stocken v. Stocken, 4 Sim. 152; Clarke v. Sewell, 3 Atk. 96; Carr v. Eastabrooke, 3 Ves. 561), or in the times appointed for payment (Pullen v. Creasy, 3 Anstr. 831; Bellasis v. Uthwaite, 1 Atk. 426; Clarke v. Sewell, 3 Atk. 96), unless the legacy is directed to be paid before the time appointed for payment of the debt (Wathen v. Smith, 4 Mad. 325), prevent satisfaction. On the other hand a legacy has been held to be a satisfaction of a bond debt (Gaynon v. Wood, 1 Dick. 331), and in Graham v. Graham (1 Ves. Sr. 262), an annuity of £10 charged by will on real and personal estate was held a satisfaction of an annuity of £6 secured by bond.

A direction to pay debts and legacies, or a charge of debts and legacies on a particular fund, has in many cases been held sufficient to rebut the presumption (Fields v. Mostyn, 2 Dick. 543, cited 3 Anstr. 831; Chancey's Case, 1 P. Will. 408; Richardson v. Greese, 3 Atk. 65; Wood v. Wood, 7 Beav. 183; Hassell v. Hawkins, 4 Drew. 468; Jefferies v. Michell, 20 B. 15; Pinchin v. Sims, 30 B. 119); but such a direction was disregarded in Wathen v. Smith, l. c., and Bensusan v. Nehemias (4 De G. & Sim. 381). In Rowe v. Rowe (2 De G. & S. 294), a simple direction to pay debts was relied on in order to rebut the presumption; but in Edmunds v. Lowe (3 K. & J. 318) Wood, V. C., considered such a direction insufficient. Rowe v. Rowe is, however, supported by several decisions of Langdale, M. R., and Romilly, M. R.: (Hales v. Darrel, 3 Beav. 324; 10 L. J. 10, Ch.; Cole v. Willard, 25 B. 568; Glover v. Hartop, 34 B. 74; Paget v. Greedfell, L. Rep. 6 Eq. 7; and see Dawson v. Dawson, L. Rep. 4 Eq. 504, 514.) A bequest of the residue will not in general act as a satisfaction of the debt: (Devese v. Pontet, 1 Cox, 188; Forsyth v. Grant, 1 Ves. Jr. 293; 3 B. C. C. 242; Linguen v. Souvey, Prec. Ch. 400; Barrett v. Beckford, 1 Ves. Sen. 519; Alleyn v. Alleyn, 2 Ves. Sen. 37.) The contrary obtains with respect to the presumption against double portions, for it is now well settled that a residuary bequest may be a satisfaction of a portion: (Thynne v. Glengall, 2 H. L. C. 131, 153.)

A debt due to children does not stand on a different footing from one due to any other person, so long as it is not a portion proceeding from the parent: (Tolson v. Collins, 4 Ves. 483; Pullen v. Creasy, 3 Anstr. 831; Stocken v. Stocken, 4 Sim. 152.) Nor even then if, from there being but one child, or from any other cause, the presumption against double portions does not arise: Bellasis v. Uthwaite (1 Atk. 426.)

If, however, the rule against double portions does apply, the determina. tion of the question, whether or not the legacy acts as a satisfaction, is governed by a quite distinct set of rules and precedents from those appli cable to ordinary debts. The difference is well pointed out by Cottenham, C., in his judgment in the House of Lords in Thynne v. Glengall (2 H. of L. Cas. 153).

Before I consider the authorities as applicable to the facts of this case, I think it expedient to throw out of consideration all the cases which have been cited in which questions have arisen as to legacies being or not being held to be in satisfaction of debt; for, however similar the two cases may at first sight appear to be, the rules of equity as applicable to each are absolutely opposed the one to the other. Equity leans against legacies being taken in satisfaction of debt, but leans in favour of a provision by will being in satisfaction of a portion by contract, feeling the great impro bability of a parent intending a double portion for one child to the prejudice generally, as in the present case, of other children. In the case of debt, therefore, small circumstances of difference between the debt and the legacy are held to negative any presumption of satisfaction, whereas in the case of portions small circumstances are disregarded. So in the case of debt, a smaller legacy is not held to be in satisfaction of part of a larger debt, but in the case of portions it may be satisfaction pro tanto. It has been decided that in the case of a debt a gift of the whole or part of the residue cannot be considered as satisfaction, because it is said that the amount being uncertain it may prove to be less than the debt."

By some one or other of the circumstances already mentioned, the pre sumption in favour of satisfaction has in most of the reported cases been rebutted. It has, however, been held to apply in the cases of Brown T Dawson (2 Vern. 498; Pres. Ch. 240; 1 Eq. Ca. Ab. 203); Graham T. Graham (1 Ves. Sen. 262); Matthews v. Matthews (2 Ves. Sen. 636); Mascal v. Mascal (1 Ves. Sen. 323); Gaynon v. Wood (1 Dick. 331); Moulson v. Moulson (1 B. C. C. 82); Wallace v. Pomfret (11 Ves. 542); Wathen v. Smith (4 Mad. 325); Fourdrin v. Gowdey (3 M. & K. 409); Edmunds v. Lowe; Bensusan v. Nehemias (4 De G. & S. 381). A debt may be satisfied not only by a legacy, but by any voluntary gift bestowed by the debtor on the creditor. Thus in Chave v. Farrant (18 Ves. 8), a sum of 1000, settled by a father on his daughter's marriage, was held to be a satisfaction of a sum of £150 due to her from him as the executor of her grandfather; and similar decisions were made in Wood v. Briant (2 Atk. 521), and Seed v. Bradford (1 Ves. Sen. 501), overruling the case of Chidley v. Lee (Prec. Ch. 226); in all these cases, however, great delay had taken place, and a long time suffered to elapse before it was attempted to recover the debt. An appointment, however, made in exercise of a naked power cannot satisfy a debt. Thus in Graham v. Wickham (31 B. 447), the Master of the Rolls decided that a covenant to give and bequeath a sum of £2500 to the son of the covenantor was not satisfied or performed by an appointment in the will of the covenantor, whereby he purported in satis faction of his covenant to give to the son £2500 out of a fund over which he had a power of appointment among his children, and which in default of appointment went to them in equal shares. This decision was affirmed by the Justices of Appeal (1 D. J. & S. 474; 31 L. J. 639, Ch.).

The case of satisfaction of debts by legacies cannot generally be distin guished from cases of satisfaction or performance of covenants by legacies; but where there is intestacy there may arise important differences between the principles applicable to debts and executory covenants or obligations.

9 Ves.

413; Lang v. Lang, 8 Sim. 451.) But a covenant to leave a sum of money to a wife or child may be performed by the covenantor dying intestate and leaving assets, of which the wife or child becomes entitled under the Statute of Distributions to a portion exceeding the sum mentioned in the covenant, or may be partly performed where the distributive share is less than such sum: (Garthshore v. Chalie, 10 Ves. 1.). A covenant may also be substantially performed by an intestacy, if the persons interested under the covenant had been actually performed; so that, in fact, they could obtain no substantial damages by an action at law for the breach of it. And the same principle applies to powers. Thus in Thacker v. Key (8 Eq. 408), there was a power given to a man to appoint by will a fund among his children, who in default were to take it in equal shares. The donee on the marriage of his

daughter covenanted to appoint in exercise of the power a fifth part of the fund to her, and afterwards died without having made any appointment. The daughter's trustees claimed to be entitled to both to one-fifth of the whole fund, and also to an equal share with the other children of the remaining four-fifths; but James, V.C., held, that as the daughter would be entitled to a fourth share of the whole fund, as in default of appointment, the covenant was substantially performed or satisfied. A death intestate leaving assets to be distributed among the persons entitled to the benefit of a covenant has been held a satisfaction of it in Wilcox v. Wilcox (2 Vern. 558); Blandy v. Widmore (1 P. Will. 324; 2 Vern. 707); Lee v. D'Arunda (1 Ves. Sen. 1; 3 Atk. 419); Deacon v. Smith (3 Atk. 323); Sowden v. Sowden (1 B. C. C. 582); Garthshore v. Chalie (10 Ves. 1, 8); Goldsmid v. Goldsmid (1 Swanst. 211; Lechmere v. Carlisle (3 P. Will. 228). The terms of the covenant must of course be looked at, and it must also be seen that the property goes under the intestacy in substantially the same manner as under the covenant, before it can be determined that a case of satisfaction has arisen. A covenant to leave an annuity to the separate use of a wife, or to settle property on her and her issue, has in several cases been held not to have been satisfied by a death intestate: (Couch v. Stratton, 4 Ves. 391; Devese v. Pontet, 1 Cox, 188; Salisbury v. Salisbury, 6 H. 526; Lang v. Lang, 8 Sim. 451); Twisden v. Twisden, 9 Ves. 413.) So again a covenant that jointure lands are of a given value has been held not to be satisfied by a devise to the wife: (Prince v. Stebbing, 2 Ves. 409.)

A DIGEST OF PATENT LAW CASES.
(By CLEMENT HIGGINS, Esq., B.A., F.C.S., Barrister-at-Law.)
SUBJECT-MATTER OF A PATENTABLE INVENTION.
Manufacture.

Jones v. Pearce. 1832. N. P. -The plaintiff's patent was for "a certain improvement or improvements on wheels for carriages.' The patentee, in his specification, said, "I hereby claim as my invention, and declare that my improvement or improvements on wheels for carriages consist in substituting suspending rods made of iron or other suitable metal in lieu of spokes, by which suspending rods I hang or suspend the weight or load from that part of the wheel which happens to be uppermost, and prevent any support being given to the said weight or load by the rods which happen to be immediately under the axletree." At the trial the defendant's counsel contended that the specification did not confine the claim to any particular mode of constructing wheels on the suspension principle, but expressly claimed the invention of the principle itself. Patteson, J., was of opinion that, on the specification taken as a whole, the claim was for the invention of a method of making wheels on the principle of suspension, which method was described in the specification. (1 Web. P. C. 122; 1 Carp. P. C. 524; 14 Rep. Arts. N. S. 106.)

Minter v. Wells. 1834.-The patentee claimed "the application of a self-adjusting leverage to the back and seat of a chair, whereby the weight on the seat acts as a counter-balance to the pressure against the back of such chair, as above described." Held, that the patent was good, as the claim was, not for a principle, but for the application of a principle so as to produce a specified effect in a specified manner. (5 Tyr. 163; 1 C. M. & R. 505; 1 Web. P. C. 126; 1 Carp. P. C. 622; 2 Rep. Arts., N.S., 80, 352.) Russell v. Cowley. 1835.-Before the patent, for the infringement of which the plaintiff sued, iron tubes were made by drawing them through rollers, a mandril being placed inside the tube so as to form an internal support. The patent in question was granted for a process of manufac turing iron tubes by drawing them through fixed dies or holes without the use of a mandril. The tubes made by this process were of greater length, were more uniform, and could be manufactured at a cheaper rate than by the old process. The court held this to be a good subject-matter for a patent. (1 C. M. & R. 861; 1 Web. P. C. 463; 1 Carp. P. C. 531; 16 Rep. Arts. N.S. 116.

Minter v. Mower. 1835.-This was an action for the infringement of the same patent as the above. But this additional fact was proved in evidence, namely, that a chair had been made before the date of the patent, which would have acted by a self-adjusting leverage if it had not been encumbered by bad machinery. Lord Denman, C.J., said: "It seems to me, if that principle (self-adjustment) might have been deduced from the machinery of the chair that was made, but that it was so encumbered and connected with other machinery that nobody did make that discovery or even found out that they could have a chair with a self-adjusting leverage, by reason of that or any other defect in the chair actually made; I confess it seems to me that does not prevent this from being a new invention, when the plaintiff says, I have discovered, throwing aside everything but this self-adjusting leverage itself, that will produce an effect, which I think a very beneficial one." This was subsequently overruled by the Court of King's Bench. (1) Web. P. C. 133; 6 A. & E. 735 ; 1 Carp. P. C. 650 ; 4 Bop. Arts. N. S. 83.)

Cornish v. Keene, 1836.-The patent was "for an improvement or improvements in the making or manufacturing of elastic goods or fabrics applicable to various useful purposes." The patentee in his specification said: "The third object is to produce cloth from cotton, flax, or other suitable material, not capable of felting, in which shall be interwoven elastic cords or strands of indiarubber, coated or wound round with a filamentous material." To produce such a cloth the patentee introduced into the fabric threads or strands of indiarubber which had been previously covered by winding filaments tightly round them; they were then applied as warp or weft, or as both, according to the direction of the elasticity required. The strands of indiarubber were, in the first instance, stretched to their utmost tension, and rendered non-elastic, and being in that state introduced in the fabric, they acquired their elasticity by the application of heat after the fabric was made. Tindal, C.J., in delivering the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas, said: "Now the first objection made to the patent so described is that the invention is not the subject matter of a patent. That it is neither a new manufacture, nor an improvement of any old manufacture, but is merely the application of a known material in a known manner, to a purpose known before. The question, therefore, as to this point is, does it come under the description of any manner of new manufacture' which are the terms employed in the statute of James? That it is a manufacture, can admit of no doubt; it is a vendible article produced by the art and hand of man, and of all the instances that would occur to the mind when inquiring into the meaning of the terms employed in the statute, perhaps the very readliest would be that of some fabric or texture of cloth. Whether it is new or not, or whether it is an improvement of an old manufacture, was one of the questions for the jury, upon the evidence before them; but that it came within the description of a manufacture, and so far is an invention which may be protected

by a patent, we feel no doubt whatever. The materials indeed are old and have been used before; but the combination is alleged to be, and if the jury are right in their finding, is, new; and the result or production is equally so. The use of elastic threads or strands of Indian rubber, previously covered by filaments wound round them, was known before; the use of yarns of cotton, or other non-elastic material, was also known before; but the placing them alternately side by side together as a warp, and combining them by the means of a weft when in extreme tension, and deprived of their elasticity, appears to be new; and the result, viz., a cloth in which the non-elastic threads form a limit up to which the elastic threads may be stretched, but beyond which they cannot, and therefore cannot easily be broken, appears a production altogether new. It is a manufacture at once ingenious and simple." (3 Bing. N. C. 570; 6 L. J. Rep. N. S. C. P. 225; 4 Scott, 337; 2 Hodges, 281; 1 Web. P. C. 497; 2 Carp. P. C. 314; 6 Rep. Arts, 4th S., 102.)

Neilson v. Harford. 1841.-Patent for an invention "for the improved application of air to produce heat in fires, forges, and furnaces, where bellows and other blowing apparatus are required." The patentee, in his specification, described his invention thus:-"A blast or current of air must be produced by bellows or other blowing apparatus in the ordinary way, to which mode of producing the blast or current of air this patent is not intended to extend. The blast or current of air so produced, is to be passed from the bellows or blowing apparatus into an air vessel or receptacle made sufficiently strong to endure the blast, and through or from that vessel or receptacle by means of a tube, pipe, or aperture, into the fire, forge, or furnace. The air vessel or receptacle must be air tight, or nearly so, except the apertures for the admission and emission of the air; and at the commencement and during the continuance of the blast, it must be kept artificially heated to a considerable temperature." Parke, B., in delivering the judgment of the court, said: "It is very difficult to distinguish it (the patentee's specification) from the specification of a patent for a principle, and this, at first, created in the minds of some of the court much difficulty, but, after full consideration, we think that the plaintiff does not merely claim a principle, but a machine embodying a principle, and a very valuable one. We think the case must be considered as if, the principle being well known, the plaintiff had first invented a mode of applying it, by a mechanical apparatus, to furnaces; and his invention then consists in this, by interposing a receptacle for heated air between the blowing apparatus and the furnace. In this receptacle he directs the air to be heated by the application of heat externally to the receptacle, and thus he accomplishes the object of applying the blast, which before was of cold air, in a heated state to the furnace."' (8 M. & W. 806; 10 L. J. Rep. N. S. 20, Ex.; 1 Web. P. C. 273.) Walton v. Bateman, N. P. 1842.-Action for the infringement of a patent for "improvements in cards for carding wool, cotton, silk, and other fibrous substances, and for raising the pile of woollen and other cloth." After describing the manner in which the invention was to be carried out, the patentee continued: "And I do hereby confine my claim of invention to the application and adaptation of caoutchouc or indiarubber as the fillet or sheet, or medium in which the dents or teeth are to be set together in the manufacture of cards, and thereby obtaining a superior elasticity and durability to cards as above described." Cresswell, J., in summing up to the jury said, "there is sufficient of a new manufacture in this case to justify and maintain the patent that has been granted. I think that there is a new principle developed, carried out, and embodied in the mode of using that principle." (1 Web. P.C. 613.)

Gibson v. Brand. 1842.-Tindal, C. J. “On the present occasion it is not necessary to go into the question whether a patent can be granted for a process, in the strict and proper sense of that term, or not. Undoubtedly there is a very strong reason to suppose, if the specification is carefully and properly prepared, so as to point out, with great distinctness and minuteness, what the process is, that such a patent may be good in law."-Erskine, J. "Although it may be true, that a party may have a patent for an improved process, under circumstances which would show that the improvement in the process really amounted to a new invention, and a new manufacture, within the terms of the Act of Parliament, I think the evidence in this case does not show, that here there has been such an improvement." (4 G. & M. 179: 4 Scott. N. R. 844; 1 Web. P. C. 637.)

LAW LIBRARY.

The Law of Injunctions. By WILLIAM JOYCE, of Lincoln's-inn, Barrister-at-Law. London: Stevens and Haynes, 2 vols.

Ir is very easy to write a bad book on law. The temptation to build up chapters by means of cases, setting out the facts and bringing in the principles somehow or other, or leaving the reader to get at them how he can, is occasionally too great to be successfully resisted. A lawyer by name may say to himself that he knows there are a great many decisions upon a branch of law unexhausted by any existing text book, and thereupon may proceed to devote all his leisure hours not to writing on the cases, or by the light of the cases, but to copying them; and it may occasionally happen that having few ideas of his own and no grasp of principles, no capacity as a jurist or as a commentator, he finds his load of cases too much for him, and in despair sends them in their awkward nakedness to the printer. We are quite prepared to learn that there are many individuals ready to defend this process. Nothing delights a court practitioner who has little time to look up authorities so much as a laboriously written text book which gives him the cases fully, and leaves him to argue upon them. And we have before now expressed our opinion that there are few text writers whose criticisms on cases are worth having.

But assuming that a text book built up of cases is a good thing, everyone will admit that we ought to be led on to the cases by steps. It is generally more agreeable and instructive to receive at the hands of an author a little general information before being introduced to the facts of some case which illustrates the law. Pursuing our usual practice, and looking through Mr. Joyce's book before reading it, or endeavouring to do so, we were struck with the crudity of his style, the grotesqueness of some of his chapter-openings, and the clumsy statement of the cases. Let us

at once support these charges. The subject of "patents," with reference to injunctions, might well bear a little introduction, but this is how it is introduced to us: "Hoops of whalebone, cane, and other substances suspended from the waist, and forming a petticoat, having long prior to the suit been used by ladies," and at the end of eleven lines, without a full point, we come to (1), which refers to Thompson v. James (32 Beav. 570). Now, by a very simple process Mr. Joyce might have improved most materially his treatise in this place by taking out part of page 251, and putting it at the head of his chapter, for at that page Lord Langdale is cited as giving the principles upon which a court of equity will act where an injunction is asked to restrain the infringement of a patent. It is difficult to suppose that Mr. Joyce was blind to the advantages of such an arrangement, and we have come to the conclusion that he must have thought it advisable, for some unintelligible reason, to depart from it and adopt that which must startle any person having the slightest veneration for method. Another curious commencement is to be found at sect. 10 of chapter 2-"Where an old woman had been induced, without consideration, to transfer her stock into the name of another person," &c., &c. It has occurred to us whether our author does not pride himself upon his statement of cases which might account for his haste to put them before the reader, but an example selected at random hardly bears out this supposition. At page 496 we find a case thus put: "Where the defendant, on becoming the servant of the plaintiff, a coachbuilder, executed a bond for the payment of £500 to the plaintiff if he should, on leaving the plaintiff's service, be engaged in a similar business within a circle of forty miles in diameter, and five months after the defendant left the plaintiff's service; and W., a coachbuilder within the prescribed distance, wrote to the plaintiff for the defendant's character, and the plaintiff in reply, only said 'The defendant will be of no use to you as foreman,' and W. engaged the defendant; and the plaintiff, after some delay, commenced an action against the defendant on the bond, but subsequently abandoned it, and (the defendant having continued in the service of W., to the knowledge of the plaintiff, for upwards of nine months) the plaintiff filed a bill for an injunction." The decision is then given, with the observations of Lord Langdale on the letter, and at the end of the paragraph we get a principle extracted from another case.

We should not have dwelt at such length upon this feature of Mr. Joyce's work had we not considered it to be the clue by which to ascertain the structure, and, consequently, the value of the book. We cannot resist the conviction that Mr. Joyce did not start with any settled design, but did as we have described,gathered up the cases, arranged them under their proper headings, divided the work into chapters, and, subsequently, filled up the crevices. This is all the more to be regretted, because, in dealing with such parts of the subject as could not be disposed of by bare references to cases, he has written well. Taking, for example, his chapter on "jurisdiction," the law is stated with sufficient skill. Even here, however, he does not attempt to go an inch beyond that for which he has express written authority; he allows the cases to speak, and does not speak for them.

a

Having said this much we shall leave our readers to find out any faults which may exist in the citation of cases, and remark, in conclusion, that the work is something more than a treatise on the law of injunctions. It gives us the general law on almost every subject to which the process of injunction is applicable. We are told what amounts to nuisance, what is the subject matter of a patent, and so on. A good deal of this might have been dispensed with; but there it is, and to practitioners who like quantity the treatise is all that could be desired. Not only English, but American decisions are cited, the aggregate number being 3500, and the statutes cited 160, whilst the index is, we think, the most elaborate we have ever seen-occupying nearly 200 pages. In short, the work is a compilation of cases and statutes, with a good index. It is, probably, entirely exhaustive. As such--and not as a work showing any originality of design, or any capacity in the author for dealing scientifically with a great subject-we can recommend it.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

Forsyth's History of Ancient Manuscripts. London: John Murray. Amos's Systematic View of the Science of Jurisprudence. London: Longmans.

Romilly's Notes of Cases, extracted from the MSS. of Sir S. Romilly. Part I. London: Maxwell and Son.

THE STOCK MARKETS.

CITY, THURSDAY, JUNE 13. A FURTHER reduction in the value of money has taken place to-day by the directors of the Bank of England lowering their rate to 31. This movement has been generally anticipated by those who watch the market outside, while it has been easy to all to form an

opinion as to the probable effect upon the Bank itself of the con tinuous influx of gold of late, over half a million having been purchased since the last return was made up.

The Bank has done next to no discount business since its terms were reduced to 4 per cent., as would obviously be the case when 33 and 34 have been the ruling rates for more than a week out. side. The favourable effect of this one important circumstance upon the markets has been wholly counteracted by the chronic state of uncertainty, and even of apprehension, that has prevailed as to the issue of the tangled and discreditable state of the negotia tions with the United States. The high range of values proves of itself that no serious issue will be the result of the irritation caused on both sides, yet the tide of investment is materially arrested, while speculation and enterprise are out of the question as matters are at the present moment. Inactivity has also been caused by the Ascot races, and the Stock Exchange settlement which occupies on this occasion four days. There is no very material alteration in the general level of values since we last

wrote.

The British Funds are lower for the week. India Five per Cent Stock higher, and the ditto Four per Cent..

is There has been rather more excitement again in Erie Railway shares, on account of the continued decline in the price, as large numbers of shares have been held on speculation for the rise for some weeks past, and the sales which were expected to follow the registration by holders at New York, have been added to by the forced sales of weak "bulls." To-day the price touched 46 on the failure of a jobber who was a bull, it is under stood, of forty seven thousand shares at high figures. The price, how. ever, rapidly recovered to 47, The price is 24 lower for the week.

The movements in British railway stocks are mostly downwards for the week, those changes calling for notice more particularly being a decline of 2 in Midland; of 1 in Great Northern, London and Brighton, North British, North Eastern; of 14 in Caledonian; of 1 in Great Northern A, Lancashire and Yorkshire, &c.

In the Foreign Market the principal rise in prices has been 1 in the Paraguay 1871 Loan. In other respects Turkish, Argentine, and Brazilian have been in demand at better prices; but Spanish are lower, Egyptian 68s., and Peruvian .

In the market for Telegraph Shares, Anglo-Mediterranean is 14 lower for the week; and British Australian, .

In Miscellaneous, Phosphate Sewage are 2 lower; and Native Guano, 1. The deposit rates allowed by the banks and discount houses have been reduced from 3 at call to 24; at 7 to 14 days, from 34 to 23.

The sum of £60,000 has been sent into the Bank this day. Discount demand a little better owing to preparations for to-morrow's Stock Ex change settlement.

The latest quotations for British Funds are as follows: Consols, for money, 92 to 924 ex. div.; ditto 4th July account, 924 to 92 ex. div.; Reduced, and New Three per Cents., 913 to 913; Exchequer Bills, 2s. dis. to 2s. pm.; India Five per Cent. Stock, 1091 to 1093; ditto Four per Cent., 104 to 105: ditto Enfaced Paper Four per Cent., 96 to 97; ditto Five and a Half per Cent., 107 to 108; Bank of England Stock, 243 to 245; Metropolitan Three and a Half per Cent., 96 to 97; and French Rentes in this market, 53 to 544.

The last quotation for French Rentes received from Paris was

55fr. 70c.

In the market for American Securities, the United States 5-20 Bonds of 1882 are marked 90 to 903; do. 10-40 Bonds, 891 to 893; Atlantic and Great Western Bonds, 38 to 39; ditto Debentures, 481 to 49; ditto Reorganisation Stock, 99 to 101; Eries, 47 to 47; Illinois, 109) 3 110; and United States Funded Loan, 895 to 894.

In the Railway Market the prices are:-Caledonians, 115 to 115; Great Eastern, 524 to 52; Great Northern, 139 to 141; ditto, A, 163 to 165; Great Western, 115 to 1151; Lancashire and Yorkshire, 158 to 155 London and Brighton, 81 to 81; London, Chatham, and Dover, 26 to 2 ditto 4 per cent. preference, 66 to 67; London and North-Western, 15 to 1524 London and South-Western, 108 to 109; Manchester and Sheffield, 78 to 78; Metropolitan, 62 to 63; ditto District, 31 to 32; Midland, 1501 to 151; North British, 64 to 65; North Eastern Consols 1704 to 171; South-Eastern, 1021 to 102; ditto deferred, 82 to 4 Great Luxembourg, 17 to 173; Lombardo Venetian, 18 to 18: Grand Trunk of Canada, 21 to 214; and Great Western of Canada, 22 to 221.

The prices of the principal Foreign Stocks are as follows: Argen tine, 1868, 99 to 100; do., 6 per cent., 1871, 94 to 944; Brazilian, 5 per cent., 1865, 97 to 981; do., 5 per cent., 1871, 97 to 98; Egyptian, 7 per cent., 1868, 90 to 91: do., Viceroy Loan, 93 to 94; do., Khedive Mortgage Bonds, 79 to 803; French Morgan per cent. Loan, 97 to 981; do National 5 per cent. Loan, 3 to 4 pm.; Italian of 1861, 683 to 6 Mexican, 14 to 15; Paraguay 8 per cent. Loan, 1871, 901 to 901; do 1872, 2 to 23 pm.; Peruvian, 5 per cent. 1865, 101 to 102; do. 6 pr cent. 1870, 82 to 821; Spanish, 30 to 30; do. 3 per cent. 1871, 30 to 30 Turkish, 5 per cent. 1865, 54 to 54; do. 6 per cent. 1865, 724 to 72; do. 6 per cent. 1869, 623 to 625; and do. 6 per cent. 1871, 733 to 73. In the Telegraph Market, Anglo-American Stock is quoted at 119 to 121; Anglo-Mediterranean, 175 to 180; British Australian, 8 to 83; British Indian Extension, 12 to 124; ditto Submarine, 11 to 114; Chinas, 83 to Cubas, 7 to 8; Falmouths, 11 to 113; Great Northern, 144 to 14; Marseilles, Algiers, and Malta, 8 to 91; Mediterranean Extension, 6 to Reuter's, 10 to 10; French Cables, 21 to 224; and West India and Panama, 5 to 53.

In miscellaneous shares the prices are as follows:-Crystal Palace 24 to 26; Credit Foncier of England, 5 to 6; General Credit and Discount, to 2 pm.; International Finance, dis. to par; Hooper's Telegrafa Works, 2 to 2 pm.; Hudson's Bay, 11 to 114; India Rubber and Guts Percha, 43 to 443; National Discount, 134 to 13; Telegraph Construction 32 to 334; Native Guano, 18 to 20; Phosphate Sewage, 15 to 16; New Sombrero Phosphate, 6 to 7; Phospho Guano, 11 to 111; and Royal Ma Steam, 87 to 89.

NOTES OF THE WEEK.

COURT OF APPEAL IN CHANCERY. Wednesday, June 5.

Contract.

(Before the LORD CHANCELLOR.) LARIVIERE v. MORGAN. Jurisdiction-Foreign State-StakeholderTHIS was an appeal from Malins, V.C. In Nov. 1870, during the late war between France and Germany, the plaintiff entered into a contract with M. Gambetta and others, then conducting the Government of France, for the supply of a large number of cartridges, to be delivered at latest before 10th Jan. 1871, and to be paid for at a certain rate. The contract stipulated that the cartridges should be tried by a French delegate, who would deliver a certificate that they were efficient, and that time should be the essence of the contract. The plaintiff required a deposit to be made with some firm in England as security for due payment. Accordingly, a letter was written to the plaintiff by Messrs. Morgan and Gooch, of London, dated Dec. 1860, in which they stated that a special credit for the sum of £10,000 had been opened with them by M. Joulin, the agent of the French Government, in favour of the plaintiff, and that it would be paid to him rateably as the goods were delivered upon receipt of certificates of reception issued by the French Ambassador, or by M. Joulin. The plaintiff accordingly made arrangements for the manufacture of the cartridges. Some cartridges were delivered and paid for, but a great number of additional cartridges had been made, which the French Government had refused to accept or to pay for, and with respect to which no certificates had been given by the agents for the French Government. It was admitted that the cartridges were not ready to be delivered by the time specified in the contract, but the plaintiff's case was that this delay was caused by no fault of his, but was the result of various alterations in the manufacture, &c., of the cartridges, made by the direction of the agents of the French Government, and that he was therefore entitled to be paid. The bill was against Morgan and Gooch, the French Republic, and others, and sought relief against Morgan and Gooch by a declaration that they held the fund in their hands upon trust to pay the plaintiff what should become due upon the contract. The French Government did not appear. The Vice-Chancellor held that Morgan and Gooch were stakeholders, and that the court had jurisdiction as against them, though not against the French Government; and decreed that Morgan and Gooch must be ordered to pay the money in their hands into court, and an inquiry made as to what, if anything, was due to the plaintiff on the contract. The defendants appealed, contending that no relief could be given in the absence of the French Government; and that no claim could be made against them except upon production of the proper certificates of approbation by the agents of the French Government. The remedy of the plaintiff, if any, was by suit in the French courts.

Pearson, Q.C. and Charles Hall, for the appel

Thursday, June 6. (Before the LORDS JUSTICES.) Ex parte BERRY; Re EVANS. Bankruptcy Act 1861, s. 159- Misdemeanor. Criminal prosecution-Compromise-Costs. THIS was an appeal from a decision of the Registrar of the Leeds County Court. A criminal prosecution had been instituted against the bankrupt, Benjamin Hill Evans, of Huddersfield, for various offences which he had committed against the bankrupt law, such as falsifying his accounts. This prosecution was afterwards abandoned, and a compromise was made before the magistrate, with the consent of the creditors, but without the knowledge or consent of the registrar of the court where the bankruptcy proceedings had been instituted, some friends of the bankrupt having agreed to give up certain claims which they had against the estate of the bankrupt. An application was then made to the registrar for taxation of the costs of the prosecution, with a view to getting an order, that when taxed they should be paid either out of the bankrupt's estate, or out of the chief registrar's fund. The registrar having

refused this application on the ground that the compromise had been entered into without the sanction of the court, and that such a compromise was not regarded with favour by the court, the assignees of the bankrupt appealed from his decision. De Gex, Q.C. and Bagley, in support of the application, which was made ex parte.

Lord Justice MELLISH said that it very much concerned public justice that such a compromise should not be made without the previous consent of the Court of Bankruptcy. In the case of Ex parte Dobson, Re Wilson (32 L. J., N. S., 1, Bank.) Lords Justices Knight Bruce, and Turner sanctioned a similar compromise, and therefore it could not be said that in no case of this kind should a prosecution be compromised. But such compromises ought not to be favoured. There was a great risk that threats of prosecution might be used to compel the friends of the bankrupt to make some payment to the creditors, and it was not right that the provisions of the criminal law should be used for such a purpose. The court therefore, would not sanction what had been done in this case, and the registrar's order must be

affirmed.

Lord Justice JAMES was entirely of the same opinion. Appeal accordingly dismissed with costs. Solicitors, Edwards, Layton, and Jaques, for Hesp, Huddersfield.

May 22, 23, 27, 28, and June 11.
FORD . FOSTER.

Trademark-Infringement-Use of word forming part of trademark-Misrepresentation by owner of trademark.

and the bill

THIS was an appeal from a decision of Bacon V.C; The suit was instituted in Feb. 1870, by Richard Ford, shirtmaker, of 38, Poultry, against Foster, Porter, and Co., wholesale hosiers, of 47, Woodstreet, alleging that the plaintiff in 1819 brought out and sold a shirt of a particular make to which gave the name of the Eureka;" that he had recently ascertained that the defendants were making and selling shirts under the mark or title of "The Eureka Shirt;" that purchasers from the defendants had been misled into the belief that they were buying the plaintiff's shirts, that the plaintiff had always marked his shirts with the words "R. Ford's Eureka Shirt, London," within the neckband; that the defendants marked their shirts with the words "The Eureka Shirt," in the same place where the plaintiff marked his shirts, and issued trade cards advertising themselves as sellers of "The Eureka Shirt; prayed that the defendants might be restrained from applying the mark or title of "Eureka' to any shirts manufactured by them, or to any shirts sold by them, unless manufactured by the plaintiff; and from selling, or advertising for sale any shirts so marked, unless marked by the plaintiff; it also prayed for an account. The defence was, first, that the term "Eureka" had become publici juris and was of common use in the trade to designate a shirt of a particular make and shape, without reference to the manufacturer; secondly, that the plaintiff had disentitled himself to relief in equity by falsely describing himself in advertisements, &c., as "patentee" of the "Eureka" shirt; and thirdly, that he had acquiesced in the use of the term by other manufac turers. The Vice-Chancellor having dismissed the bill, with costs, on the three grounds set up by the defendants, the plaintiff appealed.

term

Little, Q.C. and Caldecott for the appellant. Kay, Q.C. and H. A. Gifford for the respondents. Their LORDSHIPS, in delivering judgment on the 11th June, said that they had come to the conclusion, after considering the evidence, that the Eureka" was not publici juris. The test whether it was so or not was whether the public or any part of it would be deceived by the use of the term. The use of it was calculated to deceive private buyers of shirts, but not retail traders. The plaintiff had, therefore, made out a primâ facie case for an injunction. Had the plaintiff lost his right to relief by his false assertion that he was patentee of the shirt? In Pidding v. How (8 Sim. 477), and the other cases on that point, the court refused to grant an injunction till the plaintiff had established his title at law. Under the modern practice this court decided the question, and the test whether an injunction ought to be granted was whether the misrepresentation would be a defence to an action by the plaintiff at law. The misrepresentation not being in the trade mark itself, but being merely collateral, would, in their Lordships' opinion, be no defence to an action at law. There must, therefore, be an injunction in the terms of the prayer of the bill; but there must be an account only from the date of the filing of the bill, and not for six years, partly because of the plaintiff's misrepresentations, and partly because of his want of vigilance.

Solicitors for the appellant, Edmunds and Mayhew.

Solicitors for the respondents, Reed, Phelps, 'and Sidgwick.

June 7, 8, and 10. GILCHRIST v. HERBERT. Ante-nuptial promise by letter-Letter lost-Parol evidence-Specific performance. THIS was an appeal from a decision of the Master of the Rolls, enforcing an ante-nuptial promise by her husband to settle upon the plaintiff £10,000, and to leave her one-half of his property by will, although the husband was dead and the letters containing the promise had been lost. The hearing before the Master of the Rolls is reported in 26 L. T. Rep. N. S. 381, where the facts will be found fully stated in his Lordship's judgment. The husband's executors appealed, and after the case for the appellants had been argued at considerable length, it was stated that the parties had agreed to a compromise, by which the plaintiff was to receive a fourth part of the husband's property, in other words, about £30,000.

Sir Roundell Palmer, Q.C., Sir Richard Baggallay, Q.C., and Ince for the appellants.

The Solicitor-General (Sir G. Jessel, Q.C.), Bathurst, and Morgan Howard (of the Common Law Bar) for the plaintiff.

Their LORDSHIPS gave their sanction to the proposed compromise, on behalf of the infant daughter of the husband by a former marriage. Solicitors for the appellants, Clarke, Woodcock, and Kyland.

Solicitor for the plaintiff, John Rae.

June 10 and 11. LEMAN V. SAFFERY.

Settlement-Proviso for cesser on alienation or bankruptcy-Mortgage of life interest. THIS was an appeal from a decision of the Master of the Rolls. The suit was one by a mortgagee to enforce his security. By a settlement dated the 3rd June 1863, and executed in contemplation of the then intended marriage of Wilfrid Brougham, the property of the intended wife was settled upon trust, during the lives of the husband and wife, to pay the residue of the income, after making certain payments, to Wilfred Brougham, and after his decease upon trust for the wife, and the children of the marriage as therein mentioned. And the settlement contained a proviso that in case W. Brougham should "commit any act of bankruptcy, or do any act with a view to assign, anticipate, or encumber any interest to which he is entitled under or by virtue of these presents in the trust moneys and premises hereby settled, or any of them, or any part thereof, or of the income of the same," then the interest of the said W. Brougham in the trust moneys, funds, and

premises should cease. The settlement also com

prised a sum of 60601. belonging to the husband, which was settled upon trust for him for life, with remainder upon other trusts as therein mentioned. By an indenture dated the 17th Oct. 1861, W. Brougham mortgaged all his interest under the settlement to the plaintiff, and subsequently he became bankrupt. The question in the suit was whether the provisoffor cesser on bankruptcy extended to the 6000l., or was confined to the property of the wife. The Master of the Rolls having held that that the proviso extended to all the property comprised in the settlement, and having dismissed the bill with costs, the plaintiffs appealed.

Fry, Q.C. and F. O. Haynes for the appellant. G. W. Lawrance for the trustees in bankruptcy of W. Brougham.

Sir Richard Baggallay, Q.C. and Gardiner for Mrs. W. Brougham.

Freeling, for other parties.
Roxburgh, Q.C., Southgate, Q.C., Cookson, and

Their LORDSHIPS were clearly of opinion that the proviso for cesser on alienation or bankruptcy only extended to the wife's property, and that the plaintiff was entitled to enforce his security against W. Brougham's interest in the £6000. The order of the Master of the Rolls was therefore discharged.

Solicitors for the appellant, Leman, Groves, and Leman.

Solicitors for the respondents, Lawrance, Plews, Boyer, and Baker; Bowker, Peake, and Bird; Williams and James; M. and F. Davidson.

ROLLS COURT. Monday, June 10. CHAMBERLAYNE v. BROCKET. Charitable bequests-Lapse-Perpetuity. SARAH CHAMBERLAYNE by her will, dated the 13th Jan. 1858, bequeathed to a number of persons, some of whom died in her lifetime, the sum of £100 each, to be applied by each of them to such charitable purposes as each might deem most advisable, and she directed that when and as soon as land should at any time after her death be given for the purpose, a number of almshouses should be built in different parishes in the counties of Warwick and Essex, at the expense of her residuary personal estate. On behalf of the next of kin, it was contended that the legacies of £100