nature, which the court could not enforce. Be- April 25 and 26. virtue of the policy out of the funds of the society should be payable to the executors, administrators, or assigns, of the assured, at the office of the society in London, and that the receipt of the person or persons who, by the law of England, would have been competent to give a discharge for the same, if the policy had been issued by a company in England, should be a good discharge, notwithstanding it was issued by a society established in Scotland. The society had its principal office in Edinburgh and a branch office in London. Specific performance-Mistake-Lessor and lessee Young deposited this policy with the plain-Agent. tiffs, who made considerable advances on the secuTHIS was a suit for specific performance of an agreerity thereof. He died in July 1871, having, by his ment for a lease. On the 1st Sept. 1870, the plain-will, appointed John Young his executor, who tiff entered into an agreement to take a lease of a farm in Surrey, for seven, fourteen, or twenty-one years from the defendant, and the same was signed by Mr. England, as agent for the defendant. The plaintiff was let into possession on the 4th Oct. following, and expended considerable sums on the property. The defendant now refused to grant a lease for a longer term than seven years, alleging that it had always been his custom to make his leases determinable at the option of the lessor or lessee; that his agent had no authority to enter into an agreement for a longer period than seven years, and that the agreement as signed was a mistake on his part, it having been his intention to make the lease determinable at lessor or lessee. the expiration of seven years, at the option of the Southgate, Q.C. and Cozens Hardy for the plaintiff. Sir R. Baggallay, Q.C. and Phear for the defendant. Lord ROMILLY said there was sufficient evidence to prove Mr. England's authority; that this was not a case of mistake at all, cases of mistake being where there is a mistake as to the agreement entered into, where ambiguous words were used which might have been misunderstood by one party. Here there was no doubt as to the terms, the only uncertainty being the legal construction of the agreement, whether the lessor had the option of putting an end to the lease on the expiration of seven years, which it was quite clear he had not. His Lordship decreed specific performance of the agreement. Solicitors: May and Sykes; Taylor and Baxter. Saturday, April 27. Re THE LAND CREDIT COMPANY OF IRELAND, THIS was an adjourned summons on the part of informing him it was necessary, and that he would be under no liability. Mr. Lewis filled up the transfer with his own name as transferee; he subsequently became insolvent and died in 1867. The company was ordered to be wound-up in July 1865. Mr. North heard nothing further of the matter until recently, when he found his name was placed upon the B. list of contributories, and was served with a balance order. This summons was then taken out and supported on the ground that Mr. North executed the transfer, not for the purpose of accepting the shares, but as a step in repudiation of them, and that his execution of the documents was merely formal for repudiating the liability. Fry, Q.C. and Westlake in support of the sum mons. Southgate, Q.C. and H. M. Jackson for the official liquidator, were not called upon.j Lord ROMILLY held the transaction was good as regarded third persons, and dismissed the summons with costs. Solicitors: Elmslie, Forsyth, and Sedgwick; H. Gover. COOK V. THE SCOTTISH EQUITABLE LIFE ASSURANCE SOCIETY. Policy issued by company established in Scotland -Indorsement of agreement to pay policy money at branch office in England · Jurisdiction of English courts. FRANCIS YOUNG on the 18th Feb. 1836, effected an insurance in his own name on his own life with the Scottish Equitable Life Assurance Society for the sum of £999 19s., and on the policy was indorsed a memorandum signed by three of the directors and the manager of the society, and the assured, that the moneys to become payable by caused notices to be served upon the society dis- Scotland. Southgate, Q.C. and B. B. Swann, for the plain tiffs. Sir R. Bagallay, Q.C. and M. Cookson, for the order the plaintiffs to indemnify the society, and - -- the term of his life, or for any shorter period, as she should, notwithstanding coverture, by her will appoint, and subject thereto in trust for such child or children of the said Mary Hartley Atkinson, as had attained or should thereafter attain the age of twenty-one years. She also appointed another share upon similar trusts for the benefit of her daughter, Ann Hartley Pearson, her husband, and children. The question to be decided was whether the gift of a power of appointment in favour of the husband, a stranger, which was clearly bad, rendered the appointment to the children, who were objects of the power, void, or whether the power of appointment to the husband should be struck out, and the will read as though it had not been inserted. Fry, Q.C. and W. Barber for the plaintiff. dren of Hannah Carr taking in default of apSouthgate, Q.C., and Mozley for one of the chilpointment. Welby King for the representatives of two deceased children. Cecil Russell for the children of Mrs. Atkinson and Mrs. Pearson. a Lord ROMILLY said that this was not a gift to person not an object of the power, but an endea vour to create a power in favour of a stranger which power could not be created, and held that the will ought to be read as though the power in favour of the husband formed no part of it, and that the appointment to the children which followed, was a valid execution of the power. Solicitors: Edwards, Layton and Jaques; Elmslie, Forsyth, and Sedgwick. Vendor and purchaser - Delay in delivering abstract-Interest on purchase-money. THE Mercers' Company were the owners of three several properties in the city of London, which Re THE PROGRESS ASSURANCE COMPANY had been taken by the Metropolitan Board of (TOBIN'S CASE). Works. The contracts were dated the 10th Nov. Directors 1865, but negotiations had been going on for some Company. Qualification Paid up time previously, and they had, in fact, been sealed shares-Arrangement to evade liability. THIS was an adjourned summons on the part of by the Board of Works on the 28th Sept. 1865, and the official liquidator for an order for payment of should be delivered on the 24th Oct. next, and that in consequence it was stipulated that the abstracts £500 by the Hon. James Tobin as the price of 100 the contracts should be completed on the 25th shares in the company standing in his name in the Dec. 1865, and if not then completed that the books as fully paid-up shares. There was also a summons by Mr. Tobin that his name might be completion, from whatever cause the delay arose, purchaser should pay interest from that time until taken off the list of shareholders, he being the although the contracts were not exchanged until the holder of fully paid-up shares. The company was 18th Dec. 1865. The abstracts of title were delivered, formed with a nominal capital of £25,000, and by one in March 1866, and the others in Dec. 1866, the 109th section of the articles of association, the several applications having been made for them in directors were empowered to expend £15,000 out the mean time by the Board of Works. The pur. of the assets of the company for preliminary ex-chase-money was paid into court on the 23rd Oct. allotted to Mr. Tobin, who had been appointed penses. On the 19th June 1868, 100 shares were one of the directors of the company. On the 19th Sept. following, a cheque for 2500 was drawn by the directors and handed by the secretary to Mr. Tobin, who, on the 21st Sept., Sunday intervening, paid £500 into the bank in respect of the shares allotted to him. The official liquidator alleged that this was a transaction for the purpose of qualifying for director, and that the shares were in fact paid for out of the assets of the company. Mr. Tobin stated that the sum of £500 was due to him for services rendered prior to the formation of the company, and that he had invested it in the company; that the necessary qualification for a director was that he should hold but 10 shares. Sir R. Baggallay, Q.C., and W. F. Robinson, for the official liquidator. Mr. Tobi: appeared in person. Lord ROMILLY held it was a mere colourable made an order directing the payment of £500 by transaction for the purpose of qualifying, and Mr. Tobin. Solicitor, H. M. Mackreth. April 25 and 29. CARR v. ATKIKSON. Power of appointment Gift to an object of a 11th June 1868. The Mercers' Company filed this 1867, and the purchases were completed on the bill, claiming interest on the purchase-money from the 25th Dec. 1865 to the 11th June 1868. It was contended on the part of the defendants that the date when the abstracts were to be delivered, which was previous to the date of the contracts, remained in the agreements by mistake, and that where there is wilful neglect and default on the part of the vendor to deliver the abstract, the purchaser is not bound to pay interest from the time stipulated. Sir R. Baggallay, Q.C., Macnaghten, and Blakesley for the plaintiffs. Roxburgh, Q.C. (C. Hall with him) for the defendants. Lord ROMILLY said that the contract expressly stipulated that interest was to be paid before the abstract was to be delivered, and although it was probably a mistake, it was allowed to remain alter the agreement; that there was no such until the contract was completed, and he could not wilful default as to disentitle the vendors to interest from the time stipulated, and declared them entitled to interest from the 25th Dec. 1865, until the 23rd Oct. 1867, when the purchase-money was paid into court. Solicitors: J. Watney, jun.; W. W. Smith. V.C. MALINS' COURT. Re THORNE'S SETTLED ESTATES. Solomon now applied that the separate examination required by sect. 37 of the above Act might be dispensed with, He referred to Re Halliday's Trusts (L. Rep. 12 Eq. 199). The Registrar referred to a recent case of Re Broadwood's Settled Estates (L. T. "Weekly Notes," 23 March 1872), where the Lords Justices had refused to dispense with a separate examination. Warmington, and offered them the usual under taking in respect of the documents, but they refused to allow any access to them until their Relien was discharged, which the plaintiff, not having the means, was unable to do. The VICE CHANCELLOR held, following Halliday's Trusts, that the separate examination might be dispensed with. Solicitor: J. M. Salaman. V.C BACON'S COURT. Thursday, April 25. Re THE TEIGNMOUTH AND GENERAL MUTUAL SHIPPING ASSURANCE ASSOCIATION (MARTIN'S CLAIM). Mutual Assurance Association-Unstamped policy -Loss of ship-Minute book of associationWinding-up. THIS was a claim on behalf of Jane Martin to be allowed to rank as a creditor against the assets of the above-named association for the sum of £150, due on a policy of assurance in June 1863. Edwin Martin applied to insure a ship in the above-named association, and in accordance with their practice an unstamped policy was issued and sent to Martin with an intimation that if he required a stamped policy he might obtain it by applying and paying the expense thereof. The policy was never stamped, but was renewed annually down to the year 1867, the last renewal covering the year ending 20th March 1868. The ship was totally lost on the 10th Feb. 1868, and at the quarterly meeting of the committee of the association in June 1868, a claim being made upon the policy, was allowed, and the amount ordered to be drawn for, and an entry to that effect was made in the minute book of the association. Subsequently, but before the money due on the policy was paid, owing to Edwin Martin having been lost with the ship, and his wife being unable until Dec. 1871 to obtain letters of administration to his estate, the association was ordered to be wound-up. The liquidator refused to admit the claims on the ground that the policy was unstamped. Ince appeared in support of the summons. A. G. Marten for the official liquidator. The VICE-CHANCELLOR was of opinion that the acknowledgment in the books of the company was quite sufficient to establish the relation of debtor and creditor, and that the administratrix must be allowed to prove in the winding-up for the amount due upon the policy. Solicitors for the applicant, Clarke, Woodcock, and Ryland. Solicitors for the official liquidator, James, Curtis, and James. April 25 and 26. KETTLEWELL v. BARSTOw. Practice-Insufficiency of affidavit-Identification of documents-Sealing of part of pedigree. THIS was a summons by the plaintiff to consider the sufficiency of the defendant's affidavit of documents. The defendant had in his affidavit put in under the head of documents protected, as relating to his own title exclusively, (1) a bundle of letters between his country solicitors and their town agents, but had not otherwise identified them; (2) a pedigree that related both to his own family and that of the defendant, which was all on the same sheet of paper, but of which he had sealed up that part which related exclusively to his own family, and left open only that part which related to the plaintiff's and the common pedigree; and (3) certain ancient muniments of title, accounts, &c., which he alleged related to matters of consequential relief, and were not material to the issues to be decided at the hearing, but which were among certain other docu, ments admitted to be material. Kay, Q. C., and Cottrell were for the plaintiff. Eddis, Q. C., and Russell Roberts for the defendant. The VICE-CHANCELLOR held, as to the first exception, that the letters must be numbered or otherwise identified; as to the pedigree, that the paper constituted but one document relating to one subject matter, and that the whole must be unsealed; and, as to the last objection, that the documents were not separable, but must be produced along with the others. Solicitor for the plaintiff, Alfred Nicholson. Solicitors for the defendant, Johnson and Wetheralls; Richard and W. B. Smith. Eddis, Q.C. and Russell Roberts were in support of the application. Kay, Q.C. and Cottrell were for the plaintiff. The VICE-CHANCELLOR was of opinion that the former solicitor was not the agent of the plaintiff, so that his possession was the possession of the principal, and therefore refused the application, with costs. Solicitor for the plaintiff, Alfred Nicholson. Wetheralls, Richard and W. B. Smith. Solicitors for the defendants, Johnson and MACDONALD v. MACDONALD. Will-Charitable gift-Indian Succession Act 1865, ss. 5 and 105. KENNETH MACLEOD by his will, dated the 6th March 1869, gave all his real and personal estate in India to trustees upon trust to sell and convert the same, and out of the proceeds to pay certain legacies, and to apply £10,000 in the erection of an hospital in the Isle of Skye. The testator, who was a domiciled Scotchman, died on the 15th March 1869. By the Indian Succession Act 1865 it is provided (sect. 5) that the succession to immov. able property in British India is regulated by the law of British India, and the succession to movable property is regulated by the law of domicil. By sect. 105 it is enacted that no man having a nephew or neice or any nearer relation shall have power to bequeath any property to religious or charitable uses, except the will is executed not less than twelve months before his death and deposited within six months from its execution in some place provided by law for the safe custody of the wills of living persons. The personal estate of the testator in India was more than sufficient to pay the legacy. The question now before the court was whether the bequest was wholly good, wholly bad, or abated in the proportion that the real estate in India bore to the personal. Kay, Q. C. and W. Barber appeared for the plaintiff. Cracknall for the residuary legatee. Amphlett, Q.C., Eddis, Q. C., Everitt, G. W. Bell, and Kekewich, for other parties interested. The VICE-CHANCELLOR said that the English law by which the gift would abate was purely local, and there being sufficient personal estate the whole gift of £10,000 would be payable thereout. Solicitors: Freshfield; Williams and James; Clarke, Son, and Rawlins; R. T. Latley. V.C. WICKENS' COURT. Wednesday, April 24. BURT v. HELLYAR. Will-Construction-Residuary gift-Joint THE testator in this suit left the residue of his Tenancy. property as follows:-"As to the rest, residue, and remainder of my estates and effects, whether freehold lands, tenements, hereditaments, goods, chattels, credits, and effects, whatsoever and wheresoever situate, of which I may die seised or possessed, subject to the said legacies and annuities, I give, devise, and bequeath the same to my son Charles, after his mother's decease, and to his heirs. In case he shall die without leaving any issue, then my freehold estates shall be equally divided between my surviving children or their families." The testator left several children. Charles died without issue. Some of the testator's other children died, leaving families, and some without issue. contract. The defendant was to receive as wages for his sevices, 18s. per week, and he agreed that he would well and faithfully serve the plaintiff or his successors in the same business, and would not during the continuance of such service, nor within the space of twenty-four calendar months after having quitted or been discharged from the same, commence, carry on, or be concerned in any way whatsoever, either as servant or master, in the trade or business of a cowkeeper, milkman, milk-seller, or milk-carrier, within the distance of two miles from the Brixton Dairy; and as further security for the due performance of the agreement, the defendant agreed that if at any time during the service, or within twenty-four calendar months after the determination thereof, he should commence or carry on, or be concerned in, such trade or business in the manner stated, he should pay unto the plaintiff the sum of 10s. for each and every day that he should act contrary to his agreement, and it was declared taken as liquidated and ascertained damages, that every such of money should be and be recoverable by action at law by the plaintiff without his being obliged to quitted the plaintiff's service in April 1872, prove for special damages. and shortly after his departure the plaintiff discovered that he had commenced business as a and that he had called on many of the plaintiff's milk-seller within two miles of the Brixton Dairy, customers and served them with milk. The plaintiff had required the defendant to desist from the plaintiff instituted this suit to enforce it. He violating the contract, and on his refusal to do so sum The defendant dant was a minor at the date of the execution of now moved as above. It appeared that the defenthe contract, although he had represented himself to be of full age. had attained his majority. Since that time, however, he Greene, Q.C. and Cecil Russell supported the motion. E. P. Wood and F. J. Barnard (both of the Common Law Bar) resisted it. The VICE-CHANCELLOR said that the defendant remaining in the plaintiff's service after attaining had shown his acquiesence in the contract by his majority. The evidence showed that the conquestion. The defendant had had the full benefit tract was the one usually adopted in the trade in of the contract, and could not be now permitted in the terms asked. to retract from it. There would be an injunction Solicitors: Hood and Hare; T. W. Bilton. Friday, April 26. Ex parte THE EAST LONDON WATER WORKS COMPANY. Practice-Land taken by Company-Petition for payment of disposit out of court-Appearance of landowner-Costs. THIS was a petition presented by the above company, under the 85th section of the Lands Clauses deposit money. The company had taken land Consolidation Act, for payment out of court of belonging to a landowner for the purposes of their Act, and had paid the usual deposit into court. The purchase money had been paid, and the land had been duly conveyed to the company. The company now presented this petition for the above purpose. The petition had been served on the landowner with an indorsement to the effect that inasmuch as he was not now interested in the fund in court, he was not required to appear on the hearing of the petition, and that if he did so it would be at his own risk, as the company would oppose any application that might be made by him for the costs of such application. Notwithstanding this notice, the landowner put in an appearance. Greene, Q.C. and Langworthy for the plaintiffs. Chaloner Chute appeared in support of the Lindley, Q.C. and W. E. Forster for the defen-petition, and submitted, upon the authorities of dants. Noble v. Stow (30 Beav. 272), and Re The Totten(14 W. R. 669), that the landowner was not entitled ham and Hampstead Junction Railway Company to his costs. residue was a joint tenancy; that the children of The VICE-CHANCELLOR held that the gift of the testator, in the events which had happened, took one share each, and that the children of those who had died, represented their parents. His Honour made an order for a partition of the property. Solicitors: Coode, Kingdon, and Cotton, for George Browne Collins; Emmett and Co. Thursday, April 25. CORNWALL V. HAWKINS. Contract-Breach of-Injunction. THIS was a motion in the above suit for an injunction to restrain defendant from carrying on the business of a cowkeeper within a certain specified distance, for damages, and for accounts. The facts were these: In April 1870, the defendant entered into an agreement with the plaintiff, a cowkeeper and milk-seller to serve him, his executors, &c., and his successors in his business at Brixton Dairy, as he might direct or require, for one year certain, and until the expiration of a week's notice, to be given by either party to the other, in writing, of his intention to determine the W. G. Robinson, for the landowner, contended that the decisions in Er parte London and South Western Railway Company (38 L. J. 527, Ch. and Wood v. Boucher, L. Rep. 6 Ch. 77; 23 L. T. Rep. N. S. 522, 723), fully justified his appear ance. The VICE-CHANCELLOR said he could not see any distinction between the present case, and that of Wood v. Boucher (sup.), and that the landowner must therefore have his costs. Solicitors, Bircham and Co.; J. W. Johnson. COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH. Tuesday, April 23. Moss v. THE MERSEY DOCKS AND HARBOUR COMPANY. Measurement of registered tonnage-MistakePayment under compulsion. THIS was a special case stated by consent er without pleadings, in an action to recover £143 4s., being the amount paid by plaintiffs to the defendants under the following circumstances: the plaintiffs, owners of steam vessels trading between Liverpool and the Mediterranean, had been charged certain rates upon the registered tonnage of their vessels for the use of the defendants' docks under various Acts of Parliament. By the Merchant Shipping Act 1854, s. 23, a deduction for the space occupied by the propelling power was to be made from the gross tonnage of every ship for the estimation of the registered tonnage. By sect. 29 the commissioners of customs were empowered to make regulations for the admeasurement of registered tonnage. On the 23rd Oct. 1860, the commissioners of customs made certain regulations, the consequence of which was that the registered tonnage of the plaintiffs' ships was greater than it would have been under the plan of computation laid down by the Act of 1854. These regulations were held by the Exchequer Chamber, in the City of Dublin Steam Packet Company v. Thompson (L. Rep. 1 C. P. 355), to be invalid, in the year 1865. During the years theso invalid regulations were in force, the plaintiffs had paid to the defendants upon demand, tonnage rates in excess of their proper claim to the amount now sued for. Butt, Q.C. (with him Baylis), argued for the plaintiffs, that although this excessive payment had been made in mistake of law, the fact of its having been made under compulsion was sufficient to give them a right to recover the amount. Gully, for the defendants, contended that these charges were made rightly, although the measurements were erroneous; and further, that they could not be recovered unless some false pretence were established. The COURT (Cockburn, C.J., Blackburn and Lush, JJ.) held that the plaintiffs' claim could not be recovered. Judgment for defendants. Attorneys for plaintiffs, Walker and Sons. Attorneys for defendants, Gregory and Co., for A. T. Squarey, Liverpool. Wednesday, April 24. SECOND COURT. Cook (app.) v. MONTAGU (resp.) Order concerning a nuisance-Person liable-18 & 19 Vict. c. 121, ss. 2, 12, 13-29 & 30 Vict. c. 90, s. 21. THIS was an appeal from an order made at petty sessions under the Nuisances Removal Act 1855 (ss. 12, 13), for the alteration of a privy into a water closet. By the Sanitary Act 1866 (s. 21) "The nuisance authority or chief officer of police shall, previous to taking proceedings before a justice under the 12th section of the Nuisance Removal Act 1855, serve a notice on the person by whose act, default, or sufferance the nuisance arises or continues, or if such person cannot be found or ascertained, on the owner or occupier of the premises on which the nuisance arises, to abate the same, and for that purpose to execute such works and to do all such things as may be necessary within a time to be specified in the notice." By the interpretation clause, sect. 2 of the Act of 1855, "the word 'owner' includes any person receiving the rents of the property in respect of which that word is used from the occupier of such property on his own account, or as trustee or agent for any other person, or as receiver or sequestrator appointed by the Court of Chancery or under any order thereof, or who would receive the same if such property were let to a tenant." The appellant was receiver of rents for the ground landlord, who had let the whole house upon a lease to one Hancock. Hancock had sublet the part of the house in which this privy was situated to one Kingston. Bailey for appellant. H. James, Q.C. (with Murch) for respondent. The COURT (Blackburn, Hannen, and Quain, JJ.) held that the nuisance authority had gone against the wrong person. Judgment for appellant. Attorneys for appellant, White and Son, for G. H. Cook, Bath. Attorneys for respondent, Dobinson and Geare, for F. H. Moger, of Bath. Friday, April 26. MERCER v. GRAVES. Attorney's lien on judgment-Set-off-Cross debt. ACTION upon an order of an Irish court having the effect of a judgment for the costs of a nonsuit. Plea, a set-off of a judgment debt of greater amount due from the plaintiff. Replication upon equitable grounds that the plaintiff sued for the benefit of, and as trustee for his attorney, who had incurred costs in obtaining the judgment upon which the action was brought. Demurrer. O'Malley, Q. C. (with him Lumley Smith), for the plaintiff. J. Brown, Q. C. (with him Beresford), for the defendant. The COURT (Cockburn, C.J., Blackburn, Lush and Quain, JJ.) held that the so-called lien of an attorney on a judgment is merely a claim to the moval Act 1860, upon complaint before a justice, equitable interference of the court for his protec-he "shall issue a summons requiring the person by tion but does not operate as a charge on, or as- whose act, default, permission, or sufferance the signment of, the judgment, so as to be an interest nuisance arises, or if such person cannot be found which a court of equity would enforce in opposi- or ascertained, the owner or occupier of the tion to the statute allowing a set-off, and that, premises on which the nuisance arises, to appear consequently, the replication was bad. before two justices," &c. The justices in this case found that the respondents' chimney sent forth black smoke in such quantity as to be a nuisance, but that as the person who caused the smoke might be found or ascertained, the respondents could not be convicted. Judgment for the defendant. CHRISTOFFERSEN v. HANSEN. Charter-party-Agent-Cesser of liability clause DECLARATION that the plaintiff and defendant agreed by charter-party that the plaintiff's ship should go to Sunderland, there load a cargo of coals, and thence proceed to Kiel, and deliver the same to the freighter or his assigns on being paid freight, and that the said charterparty being concluded by the defendant on behalf of another person residing abroad, all liability of the defendant should cease as soon as he had shipped the said cargo. Averment of performance of conditions precedent. Breach, that defendant wholly neglected to load the said ship, and delayed the loading nineteen days in proceeding on her voyage to Kiel, whereby the plaintiff was put to great expense. Plea (3rd), that the said charter was in fact concluded by defendant on behalf of another party resident abroad, and that the defendant before this suit shipped the agreed cargo under the said charter-party, whereupon and whereby, according to the terms of the charter-party, all liability of the defendants ceased. Demurrer on the ground that the clause of the charter-party relied on in the plea did not apply to liabilities accruing prior to or during shipment of cargo, but that it applied to liabilities accruing subsequently to the said shipment. Holker, Q. C. (Lewers with him), in support of the demurrer, relied on Pederson v. Lotinga (28 L. T. Rep. 267). Gainsford Bruce (Watkin Williams with him), contra. The COURT (Cockburn C. J., Blackburn and Lush JJ.) held that upon the authority of the above-named case, and upon the true construction of the clause pleaded, the defendant was liable for breaches of contract prior to the shipment of the cargo, although absolved from subsequent liability. Demurrer overruled. Attorneys for the plaintiff, Graham and Graham. Attorneys for the defendant, John Scott. Saturday, April 27. SECOND COURT. REG. v. MUSSETT. Certiorari - Conviction for malicious injuryRight to do act complained of-24 & 25 Vict. c. 97, s. 52. A RULE for a writ of certiorari had been obtained to bring up a conviction by justices at petty sessions under the Malicious Injuries to Property Act, 24 & 25 Vict. c. 97, on the ground that their jurisdiction was ousted by the 52nd section of that Act, which provides "that nothing herein contained shall extend to any case where the party acted under a fair and reasonable supposition that he had a right to do the act complained of." The defendant was convicted of doing injury by playing cricket on a piece of ground, which he proved had been used for that purpose for sixty years. Denman, Q.C. and R. E. Turner appeared to show cause against the rule; but the court called upon Brown, Q.C. and Purcell, for the defendant, to show that this was a cause for certiorari. They cited Reg. v. Nunneley (8 B. & E. 852), in which, although the justices found that they did not believe the defendant's objection to the validity of a church rate, for the payment of which he was summoned, was bona fide; yet the court upon certiorari quashed the order for payment upon affidavits showing that the justices had no reasonable ground for disbelieving the bona fides. The COURT (Blackburn and Mellor, JJ.) held that the words of this enactment imposed upon justices a different duty from the common law in other cases of a bond fide claim of right; and although the conviction might be questioned upon a case stated, it could not be brought up by certiorari: (White v. Feast, 20 W. R. 382.) Rule discharged. Attorneys for prosecution, Kingsford and Dorman. Attorney for defence, J. Keiley. BARNES (app.) v. ACKROYD (resps.) Black smoke-Person causing nuisance-23 & 24 Vict. c. 77 s. 13-29 & 30 Vict. c. 90, s. 19. THE respondents, the occupiers of Copley Mill, had been charged under The Sanitary Act 1866, for committing a nuisance. By sect. 19, "The word nuisances under the Nuisance Removal Acts shall include (inter alia) any chimney (not being the chimney of a private dwelling-house) sending forth black smoke in such quantity as to be a nuisance." By sect. 13 of The Nuisances Re McIntyre, Q.C., for appellant. The COURT held th it the master who desired a servant to light the fire which made the nuisance was the person to be convicted rather than the servant. Judgment for appellant. Attorneys for appellant, Chester and Urquhart. Attorneys for respondents, Bower and Cotton. REG. v. AYLESFORD UNION. Rating value-Profits of actual tenant—6 § 7 Will. 4, c. 96, s. 1. CASE reserved from quarter sessions upon a rating appeal. Messrs. Knight and Bevan, the appellants, were owners of cement works, and also of a chalk pit in the neighbourhood. They were assessed separately for their cement works, and at a higher amount than they otherwise would have been in conseqence of the proximity of their chalk pit. At the hearing the quarter sessions refused to allow the respondent's counsel to ask questions, the object of which was to prove that the works were more valuable to the appellants by reason of their chalk pit, but reserved this case on the point. Poland appeared to support the order of the sessions. Barrow (with Biron), contra. The COURT considered that the neighbourhood of the chalk pit had nothing to do with the amount a tenant would pay for the cement works, and gave judgment for the appellants. Order of sessions affirmed. Attorneys for appellants, Nickinson, Prall, and Nickinson, for Richard irall, Rochester. Attorneys for respondents, T. Sismey, for Essell, Knight, and Arnold, Rochester. DANN (app). MANBY (resp.) Metropolitan Police-County justices-District not assigned to police court-21 & 22 Vict. c. 73, s. 6. THE respondent was charged before justices of the county of Kent, sitting out of the metropolitan district, with using threatening words with intent to provoke a breach of the peace, under 2 & 3 Vict. c. 47. s. 54, sub-sect. 13, at Bexley, which is a place within the metropolitan district, to which no stipendiary magistrate has been assigned. The respondent also lived at Bexley. By sect. 76 of that Act power was given to these justices to try under these circumstances; but by sect. 18 of 2 & 3 Vict. c. 71, passed a week later, "Every summons or warrant which, after the passing of this Act, shall be issued by any justice of the peace of the counties of Middlesex, Surrey, Kent, Essex, or Hertfordshire respectively, requiring any person residing within the metropolitan police district to appear at any place without the said district to answer any information or complaint touching any matter arising within the said district, shall be utterly void, except as to rates or taxes. 3 & 4 Vict. c. 84, s. 6, gives power to two justices having jurisdiction within the metropolitan police district, while sitting together publicly in the court or room used for sessions in any part of the said district, to act for a stipendiary magistrate. 21 & 22 Vict. c. 73, s. 6, enacts that the part of sect. 18 of 2 & 3 Vict. c. 71, above set out, "shall not apply to any such summons or warrant in respect of any matter arising within any part of the said district not assigned for the time being to any of the police courts of the metropolis." The justices considered the respondent guilty, but held that they had no jurisdiction. " Beresford (with Glyn) for the appellant. The respondent appeared in person. The COURT agreed with the decision of the jus. tices. Judgment for respondent. Attorneys for appellant, Makinson and Carpen. ter, for Gibson, Dartford. Excise SIMPKIN (app.) v. THE JUSTICES OF BIRMINGHAM (resps.) licence-Special sessions-New tenant9 Geo. 4, c. 61, s. 14. CASE stated under 12 & 13 Vict. c. 45, s. 11. One Woodin occupied a house in the borough of Birmingham, and was licensed by the Commissioners of Inland Revenue to sell excisable liquors by retail to be drunk upon the premises, under 9 Geo. 4, c. 61. His last licence was dated 10th Oct. 1870 for one year; on the 25th Aug. 1871 he applied at the general annual licensing meeting to renew his which were devoted to the proceedings at to shall remove from or yield up the possession of the house specified in such licence it shall be lawful for the justices assembled at a special session . . grant to any new tenant or occupier of any house so become unoccupied. a licence.. until the 5th April or the 10th Oct. then next ensuing, as the case may be." ... H. Matthews, Q.C., for the appellant, relied upon Reg. v. Justices of Middlesex (L. Rep. 6 Q. B. 781; 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 41). Field, Q.C., for the respondents, contended that the " person so licensed" must have his licence at the time of removal. the Act. The COURT considered that the appellant did not come either within the words or the spirit of Judgment for respondents. Attorneys for appellant, Robinson and Preston. Attorneys for respondents, Williams and Blyth. Wednesday, May 1. Railway company Authority to servants to H. Matthews, Q.C., in support of the rule, was not called upon to argue. The COURT (Cockburn, C.J., Hannen and Lush, JJ.) held that there was evidence to go to the jury that Lock had authority to render the defendants liable for the necessaries supplied by pledging their credit with the plaintiff. and Co. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS. April 29 and 30. The Attorney-General (Archibald and Poland Attorney for appellant, Ellerton. COURT OF EXCHEQUER. TAUBMAN . THE PACIFIC STEAM NAVIGATION Carrier by sea, from abroad-Liability for wilful DECLARATION charging the defendants with a able for loss of luggage on the voyage "under any Garth, Q.C., with him Morgan Howard, for the Cohen, for the defendant, was not called on. liable. Martin v. Great Indian Peninsular Railway Com. WHITECHURCH AND OTHERS v. THE EAST rates consequent on taking of lands. STEEL v. BRANNEN. Obscene book-Report of a trial-20 & 21 Vict. c. 83. CASE stated by a metropolitan police magistrate under 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43, s. 2. The case alleged that one Mackey had been indicted under Lord Campbell's Act (20 & 21 Vict. c. 83), for publishing an obscene book called, "The Confessional Unmasked." Thereupon the appellant published a report of the trial of the said Mackey, in which he set out almost the whole of the book which Mackey had been indicted for publishing. The book was composed of 116 pages, fifteen of action, occurred, the part of the railway in the parish of St. Mary, Rotherhithe was finished, and was worked by the London, Brighton, and South Coast Railway Company, to whom it was leased by the defendants. The remainder of the line was unfinished. The question for the court was, has the company to make good the deficiency till the whole line is completed, or till the whole line in the parish is completed? Prentice, Q.C. (Morgan Howard with him), for the plaintiffs, relied on Reg. v. Metropolitan District Railway Company (L. Rep. 6 Q. B. 698; 40 L. J. 113, M. C.) and Wheeler v. Metropolitan Board of Works (L. Rep. 4 Ex. 303; 38 L. J., N. S., 165 Ex.; 20 L. T. Rep. N. S. 984.) Sir J. Karslake, Q.C. (Poland with him), for the defendants, distinguished Wheeler v. Metropolitan Board of Works, for there the whole railway in the parish was not completed; parochiality is the true principle. As soon as there is a practical working railway in the parish, the company have provided a substitute for the previous buildings capable of assessment, and the assessment should take place accordingly. KELLY, C.B., BRAMWELL, and CLEASBY were of opinion that the provision for making up the deficiency in the rates was to fill up an interval during which the lands would be incapable of being assessed, and that when the difficulty in the way of such assessment was removed, by the railway being completed in the parish, the obligation to make up the deficiency also ceased. MARTIN, B. was of opinion that Reg. v. Metrogovern the present case. politan District Railway Company ought to Judgment for defendants. Stokes, 101, High-street, Southwark, and 61, ParaAttorneys for plaintiffs, Hawks, Willmott, and dise-row, Rotherhithe, S.E. Attorneys for defendant, Wilson, Bristows, and Carpmael, 1, Copthall-buildings, E.C., and 22, Parliament-street, S.W. Tuesday, April 23. THE LIVER ALKALI WORKS COMPANY way defendant let a barge to the plaintiffs to pro- com The COURT (Kelly, C.B., Martin, Bramwell, and Cleasby, BB.), were of opinion thatthe facts of the case showed the defendant to be "a common carrier," he being a person who was holding himself out to carry the goods of any person who chose to hire his vessel for the purpose, and therefore that he was liable in this action for the loss. Rule discharged. Attorneys for the plaintiff, Wright and Venn, for J. and W. Quinn, Liverpool. Attorneys for the defendant, Field and Roscoe. Wednesday, April 24. COBBOLD (Executor, &c.) v. PETO (Bart.). Pleading-Action for not accepting transfer of shares-Readiness and willingness-Averment of in declaration-Notice to defendant of plaintiff's readiness to transfer-Plea of want of-Tender of transfer-Demurrer. THIS was a demurrer to a plea. It was an action by R. T. Cobbold, the plaintiff, as surviving executor of the last will and testament of R. K. Cobbold deceased, and the declaration set forth an agreement dated 6th April 1859, between the fendant of the one part, and C. Shorting, dec and the plaintiff, as executors of the said R. K. Cobbold of the other part, whereby, after reciting that the said R. K. Cobbold was the proprietor of 400 £10 shares in the Lowestofft Water, Gas, and Market Company, upon which shares he had paid up the full amount of £1,000, and that the said company had promoted a Bill in Parliament for (amongst other objects) the grant of a lease of the company's undertaking to the above named defendant and to C. T. Lucas and T. Lucas, and that the said R. K. Cobbold objected to certain provisions in the Bill, and was prepared to vote against the same at the meeting of the company, in the then month of June last, and that the said Bill passed into an Act, and reciting that, in pursuance of the powers of the said Act, the undertaking of the company had been leased to the said defendant, and the said C. T. Lucas and T. Lucas, for a term of ten years. It was declared and agreed between the parties that, within one month afer the expiration of the said lease, the said R. K. Cobbold, his executors, or adminstrators would, in consideration of £3000 then paid to him or them, transfer to the said defendant, his executors, administrators, or nominees, the said 400 shares, and the said defendant, his executors, administrators or nominees, would accept the transfer of the same shares, and pay for the same the said sum of of £3000. Provided that, unless the said transfer should be made, the said C. Shorting and the plaintiff, as executors of the said R. K. Cobbold, should enjoy all advantages, and exercise all rights and privileges attaching to such shares. Averment, that though the said R. K. Cobbold and his said executors, have always been ready and willing to do all things, and all things have happened, and all times elapsed, and all conditions been fulfilled necessary to entitle the plaintiff to the performance by the defendant of his said agreement, yet the defendant has wholly refused and neglected to accept for himself or nominees, a transfer of the said 400 shares, and to pay the said £3000, and the same still remains unpaid. Plea 2, that the defendant had not, within the said month after the expiration of the said lease, notice that the plaintiff was, or that the plaintiff and the said C. Shorting were, ready and willing to transfer the said shares to the defendant or his nominees as agreed. Demurrer and joinder in demurrer to the said plea. The plaintiff's points were, that notice was not a condition precedent to his right to recover, and that, on the true construction of the agreement, it was the defendant's duty to pay or tender the £3000 within the month of the expiration of the said lease, and tender a transfer to the plaintiff; and that it was not incumbent on the plaintiff first, within the said month, to give notice to defendant or to make him aware that the plaintiff was, or that the plaintiff and the said C. Shorting were, ready and willing to transfer the said shares. The defendant's point was that it was a condition precedent that the plaintiff should give notice within the said month that he was, or that he and the said C. Shorting were, ready and willing to transfer the shares to the defendant or his nominees. Field Q. C. (with him was Sills), argued for the plaintiff in support of the demurrer, and cited Poole v. Hill (6 M. & W. 835; 10 L. J. N. S. 81); Vyse v. Wakefield (6 M. & W. 442; 9 L. J. N. S. 274, Ex.); Makin v. Wilkinson (23 L. T. Rep. N. S. 592; L. Rep. 6 Ex. 25; 40 L. J. 33, Ex.); Stephens v. De Medina (4 Q. B. 422; 12 L. J. N. S. 120, Q. B). R. Vaughan Williams, for the defendant, contra, in support of the plea, cited Doogood v. Rose (9 C. B. 132; 19 L. J. 246, C. P., judgment of Maule J.); Callonel v. Briggs (1 Salk. 113, per Holt C. J.); Pordage v. Cole (1 Wms. Saunders 320e, note 5 by Serjt. Williams); Blackwell v. Nash (1 Stra. 535; Jones and another v. Barkley, per Buller J., 2 Doug. 694); Goodisson v. Nunn (4 T. Rep. 761); and Paynter and others v. James (15 L. T. Rep. N. S. 660; L. Rep. 2 C. P. 318) The COURT (Kelly C. B. and Martin, Bramwell and Cleasby BB.) gave judgment for the plaintiff, holding that the plea alleging want of notice to the defendant that the plaintiff was ready and willing to transfer the shares was a bad plea, and no answer to the action. Judgment for the plaintiff. Attorney for the plaintiff, W. J. Mitton, 2, Gray's-inn-square, W.C., agent for Wood and Killick, Bradford, Yorkshire. Attorneys for the defendant Markby and Tarry, 57, Coleman-street, E.C. Friday, April 26. JACKSON v. FLEEMAN. Bills of Exchange Act (18 & 19 Vict. c. 67) -Separate actions against same defendant on different bills-Judgments in each action-Taxa tion of costs-Refusal of master to allow costs of separate writs-Practice. THIS was a motion on the part of the plaintiff calling on the defendant to show cause why a rule should not be obtained calling on the master to W. G. Harrison, for the plaintiff, now moved The COURT (Kelly, C. B., and Martin, Bramwell, and Cleasby, BB.), refused to grant the rule, and were unanimous in opinion that the master had exercised a sound discretion in holding that one writ and not two should have been issued. Rule refused Attorneys for the plaintiff, Brooksbank and Galland, 14, Gray's-inn-square, W.C. Tuesday, April 30. HARRIS V. VENABLES AND ANOTHER. Guarantee-Condition, the withdrawal of a peti- before a reasonable time had elapsed, and within the said eighteen months, did present another petition to the said Court of Chancery for the compulsory winding-up of the said company by the said court, and that the presentation of the said last-mentioned petition did prevent and retard the collection of the assets of the said company, and the defendants have thereby been discharged from their said promise upon which the said breach has been so assigned. The defendants also demurred to the declaration. The plaintiff took issue upon the defendants' pleas, and demurred to the third plea. At the trial, before Martin, B., it appeared that, in pursuance of the guarantee, the plaintiff stopped all further proceedings upon the petition in Chancery for a compulsory winding-up, but fifteen months afterwards, only having received 2s. 6d. in the pound upon his debt, with no prospect of receiving any further dividend, he presented another petition in Chancery for a compulsory winding-up. The learned judge left all the facts to the jury, and in answer to a question put to them by him, they returned, that the plaintiff had allowed a reasonable interval to elapse before he presented his petition, and that the presentation of that petition did not retard the company in collecting their debts. Thereupon he directed a verdict to be entered for the plaintiff for £361 8s. 6d. A rule nisi was subsequently obtained, calling upon the plaintiff to show cause why the verdict should not be set aside and a new trial had on the ground that the judge misdirectd the jury on the second and third pleas as to what constituted the consideration for the guarantee, and as to the necessity for proving the whole of the allegations in the third plea, and also that the material parts of the third plea were proved at the trial, and the jury should have been so directed. It was ordered that this motion should come on with the demurrers. Denman, Q. C. and Benjamin showed cause. Rule discharged-Judgment for the plaintiff COURT OP PROBATE. Tuesday, April 30. (Before Lord PENZANCE.) In the Goods of ELIZABETH L. LADY HASTINGS. Five testamentary papers-Will and codicil referred to as deeds-Incorporation-Revocation of codicil in subsequent codicil disposing of residue in a different manner. LOUISA ELIZABETH LADY HASTINGS, late of No. 7, Seymour-street, Westminister, in the county of Middlesex, died 23rd Feb. 1872, leaving five testamentary papers, viz., a will and codicil bearing date respectively 11th July 1818 and 14th Feb. 1858; a last will and testament bearing date THIS was an action on a guarantee signed by the 25th Nov. 1871, a paper purporting to be a codicil two defendants as follows:- To Mr. Henry Wil- to this will 3rd Jan. 1872, and a codicil dated liam Harris. Sir.-In consideration of your with- 16th Jan. 1872. The will of 1818, and the codicil drawing the petition you have presented for of 1858, purported to be made in execution of a winding-up the company called John King and power of appointment which the testatrix derived Co. (Limited), we agree to pay all the costs you from her marriage settlement, and the last will and have incurred of and in relation to such petition, testament began by reciting that the testatrix had, and to indemnify you against all costs, if any, you by certain deeds and indentures dated 11th July may be liable to pay to the company or to any 1818, and 14th Feb. 1858, disposed of certain proother parties appearing upon or in reference to the perty over which she had a power of appointment, petition. We further agree to guarantee the pay- and went on to confirm those deeds. The codicil ment to you within eighteen months from this of 3rd Jan. 1872, and 11th Jan. 1872, dealt prindate by the company or the liquidator thereof of cipally with bequests to servants, but the second the principal of your debt of £722 17s. (say seven codicil contained the following residuary bequest: hundred and twenty-two pounds seventeen shil-"I give, devise, and bequeath, unto my niece Laura lings), provided that in case the said debt is not Harriet Turner, wife of Rev. G. Turner, and to paid in full by the company or the liquidator, our my nephew Vice-Admiral Lowe, to be equally liability upon this guarantee shall not exceed divided between them, all the residue of my real £361 8s. 6d. Any sum paid by the company in and personal estate, whatsoever and wheresoever respect of or for interest on such debt shall not be undisposed of by my said will or this codicil taken into account as against the guarantee. This thereto." agreement and guarantee is to be construed as binding us severally as well as jointly. Dated 21st April 1870.-CHAS. JNO. VENABLES, H. J. TURNER." The defendants pleaded, first, that they did not promise; secondly, that the consideration for their promise was not performed; and thirdly, that before and at the time of the presentation by the plaintiffs of the petition in the declaration mentioned, the said company was being voluntarily wound-up, and that the petition of the plaintiff was a petition for the compulsory winding-up of the said company, under and by virtue of an order of the Court of Chancery, and that the plaintiff, after the making of the said promise, and after the alleged withdrawal of the said petition, and Bauford now moved for probate of four of the papers, excluding the codicil of 3rd Jan. 1872, which he contended was revoked by the subsequent codicil of 11th Jan. 1872. The residuary bequest in that codicil disposed of all the property not otherwise disposed of by it or by the will, and the intermediary codicil therefore was revoked. With regard to the two testamentary papers anterior to the will of 1871, he submitted that they should be incorporated with the probate of that will, for the two deeds mentioned in the will were evidently the two testamentary papers of that date. The attorney who prepared the will of 1871 made an affidavit to the effect that when he took the instructions of |