whatever, not only was the sanction of the Rigsdag required by the constitution but the Danish Government would also insist on the consent of the people of the islands as well.1

To this Seward sent an answer on May 27 that the United States must have all the islands and at a price not exceeding seven and one-half million and that a plebiscite would be wholly unnecessary in view of the inclusion of a two year option clause in the treaty draft which he was forwarding.2 On the receipt of a telegram from Washington, Yeaman submitted, on May 28, to Count Frijs, the Danish Foreign Minister, the terms proposed by Mr. Seward, with the condition that the treaty must be ratified by Denmark before August 4th or the negotiations would be considered at an end.

3

Mr. Seward had expressly withheld his consent that the ratification of the treaty should await or depend upon a vote of the people of the islands. The exact source of this objection of Mr. Seward's to a vote in the islands is not clear. There are three explanations, first, that he feared that the influence of Great Britain, France, and Spain would be excited to cause an adverse vote; secondly, that if the islanders were allowed to vote on the question they would then demand statehood; third, that haste was imperative owing to the early adjournment of Congress. Whatever the cause of his objection he adhered to it for many months, after all the other difficulties of price and time of ratification were removed. The Danish Cabinet, on their side, was equally insistent that a vote was imperative. For this they gave two reasons, as stated by Yeaman in his dispatch of June 17. The first was that the modern custom of Europe upon the subject was so uniform as to amount to a rule of public law, and that any departure from it would cause comment and discontent, and, the second, that Denmark, especially, could not afford to disregard the rule as she would thereby infinitely weaken her claim to a plebiscite in Northern Schleswig. To Yeaman's arguments that the plebiscite would offer opportunity for intrigue from without as well as tend to weaken the authority of the State over the subject, the Danish Cabinet, though doubtless sympathetic, again dwelt on the Schleswig situation, whose force as an argument Yeaman was compelled to admit.

On June 17, Yeaman had forwarded Denmark's proposal to sell the two islands of St. Thomas and St. John for seven and a half million dollars, and

West India Company should engage and obligate itself in a formal and authentic manner, neither to sell nor to cede the island on any terms to any other nation without the approval and consent of the King of France. See John Bassett Moore, Digest of International Law, vol. 1, p. 603, note a.

1 Documents, post. p. 946.

2 Documents, post, p. 948. Article 3.

3 Cf. Frederic Bancroft, Life of William H. Seward, vol. 2, p. 483, and Waldemar Westergaard, The Danish West Indies, p. 259.

to make St. Croix the subject of separate negotiations. Seward, early in July, cabled to close with the offer, but with no indication that he yielded on the matter of the vote. Finding the Danes still insistent on the vote, Yeaman cabled for instructions and received the answer "Do not agree to submit the question." Congress being about to adjourn, the immediate need for haste would appear to have passed, but there was another reason which still made Seward insistent against delay. The return of peace had gradually eliminated the importance of a coaling station in the West Indies from the public mind whose demand for expansion had been gratified by the acquisition of Alaska. For these reasons the negotiations for St. Croix were eventually abandoned.

Despite the diplomatic concern of the Danish Government not only that the vote should be held but that it should be stipulated in the treaty, Count Frijs, in order to meet Mr. Seward's objection, after the other points of difference had been disposed of, on August 17 signified his willingness to yield the demand for a conditional clause in the treaty, if, instead, there should be inserted an allusion to the intention of the Danish Government to take the vote. This Yeaman refused at first, but finally took ad referendum, and, on September 27, forwarded the text of the clause as drawn up by the Danish negotiators. Convinced at last by the repeated advices of his Minister that Denmark would not yield and that if there were no vote there would be no cession, Seward, early in October, yielded to the Danish insistence for a plebiscite so far as to cable the withdrawal of his objection to the vote, if the condition of the vote were not mentioned in the treaty. In yielding this Seward was doubtless influenced by Yeaman's account of sentiment in the islands, the word received in Copenhagen being that the people were well disposed for union and would give it a good majority, and by the warning that, news of the negotiations having leaked out, France was already protesting and similar protests were expected from Great Britain. On receipt of Seward's telegram Yeaman informed Count Frijs that a clause would be inserted simply stating the fact that the King would afford the people an opportunity of freely expressing their approbation of the cession.

The treaty draft was signed at Copenhagen on October 24. Article 1 contained the clause that the King of Denmark would not exercise any constraint over the people and would, therefore, as soon as practicable, give them an opportunity to express freely their wishes in regard to the cession. In addition to this the option clause was retained.3

It now remained to take the vote. On October 1, before the treaty had

1 Documents, post, p. 959.

2 Documents, post, p. 959.

8 Documents, post, p. 960.

"1

been signed, General Raasloff, now the Danish Prime Minister, had suggested to Mr. Yeaman that as an agreement seemed probable, the American Government should send to the islands both ships of war and agents, "properly provided with instructions and all that may be useful to assist the Danish commissioner in his work and to do whatever else circumstances may require." Rear Admiral Palmer was accordingly ordered to St. Thomas with the Susquehannah, and the Reverend Charles Hawley of Auburn, New York, was appointed by Secretary Seward to act as confidential representative to help secure a favorable decision. His instructions were to present to the inhabitants the advantages of the change of sovereignty, and, especially, the great market that they would gain for their products as well as the further prosperity which would result from the proposed naval station. In all things, however, he was to cooperate with the Danish commissioner, deferring to his judgment. Hawley, accompanied by two assistants, arrived at the islands on November 12. The Danish Commissioner arrived some ten days later, and at once invited the American agents to confer with the Danish officials. The Danish government was as eager for a favorable vote as was the American government. Chamberlain Carstensen, the Danish commissioner, was frankly unwilling to order an election until reasonably assured that the vote would be favorable. The agents of both governments were convinced that the mass of the inhabitants were for the cession, but that the mercantile interests of St. Thomas would be a unit against it unless they should receive some assurance from the United States that the status of St. Thomas as a free port would be preserved, at least for a certain period, and thus the trade with the other islands, which was the chief source of their income, remain unhampered. This demand of the merchants was presented to the American representatives at a formal conference convened by the Governor at the request of the Danish Commissioner. It was a demand to which the American agents could only answer that it was a matter for Congressional action, but that no doubt such action would be generous. The Danish Commissioner, however, was unwilling to chance a vote on such a vague declaration and decided to take advantage of the disorganization due to a recent great earthquake and tidal wave, and to go himself to Washington hoping to obtain some more definite promise which would insure a favorable vote. Hawley went with him on the journey. Before their departure the royal proclamation of the King of Denmark was read, acquainting the islanders with the provisions of the treaty. Dissatisfied with its contents the merchants of St. Thomas at once forwarded to the Commissioner a set of additional articles containing the stipulations as to trade and other matters which they desired.2 The memorial and articles were duly laid

1 Documents, post, p. 957. 2 Documents, post, p. 971.

conformity with our sentiment and with the rules of our public law for us to make any objections." Such, indeed, may have been its parentage, and yet the thought suggests itself that the vote of 1878 in St. Bartholomew, like the vote of 1868, in the Danish Islands, probably signifies the desire of a Power, recently bereft of its territory by Prussian aggression, to point out the weakness of the victor's title by insisting upon the validity of the principle of selfdetermination in international law.

It had been agreed that while the terms of the protocol which was to settle the several details of the transfer were being discussed the vote should be taken. This was done under universal manhood suffrage of the Swedish citizens of the island.1 Although they had been under Swedish sovereignty for a century, there had been practically no colonization and the people had retained their French customs and language. The result of the plebiscite, which gave three hundred and fifty votes for union and only one against, occasioned no surprise. The protocol, which was not concluded until after the plebiscite, contained a generous provision allowing those wishing to retain their Swedish citizenship to do so without leaving the island, unless they should become a menace to public order.

On January 22, 1878, the resolution approving the treaty was adopted by the French Chamber of Deputies. Deputy Lacascade in seconding it referred to the original autocratic cession to Sweden with the comment, "today, thank God, public European law is greatly changed in this respect; the retrocession

has not been submitted to you until after a solemn and free vote, a real plebiscite of the inhabitants." Another deputy, from his place, added, “We shall vote for it the more willingly as it recognizes the right of plebiscite in its full extent," and with a vote of 425 to 8, the Chamber adopted the resolution.

THE TACNA-ARICA QUESTION, 1883

The Tacna-Arica question dates from the War of the Pacific, which began in 1879, between Chile on the one part, and Bolivia and Peru on the other, and was terminated by the Treaty of Ancon, in 1883.

During the war Chile had occupied not only all the Bolivian littoral, but also the three southern Peruvian littoral provinces of Tarapacà, rich in nitrates

1 Victor M. Maurtua, The Question of the Pacific, translated by F. A. Pezet, p. 242, quotes extracts from correspondence between the Swedish and French Governments, showing that the latter had raised the question whether foreign residents might vote and that the Swedish Government had answered unequivocally in the negative.

2 The table given in Documents, post, p. 983, note, gives the number of males over 15 years of age as 617.

3 Translation from Annales du Sénat et de la Chambre des Députés, Session ordinaire de 1878, vol. 1, p. 151.