and the Objects of Senfe) nor by the Understanding, fince many things must be chofen in which the Understanding can perceive no manner of Good, except that they are capable of being chofen, and when chofen please, because they exercife the Faculty. And tho' the Objects of Election are not Infinite, yet in a finite number there are infinite refpects in which Good or Evil may be produced: There is need then of infinite Wisdom and Goodness to direct the Choice, left it deviate into Evil. Since therefore a Creature endowed with Wisdom is finite, it is impoffible but that it fhou'd have a natural Power of fometimes choofing wrong.

fome

to be al

ways foli

XVI. Fifthly, If the Will was confined to the 'Tis betChoice of thofe things only which the Understand- ter to be ing declares to be good, or was reftrained from times dechoosing till the Goodness of the Objects were ceived apparent, we muft of neceffity hefitate in many with Pleathings and be anxious and folicitous in all. For fince fure, than things are connected together by a long chain of Consequences, it is impoffible for us to form a right citous. Judgment of the abfolute Goodness of them, without a foreknowledge of thefe Confequences, we muft therefore have been obliged to use all poffible Difquifition before every Election, and fufpend the Choice where any Sufpicion of Error or Ground of Doubt fhould appear: but fuch a Difquifition and continual Solicitude would be a greater Bar to Happiness than many Errors and natural Inconveniencies. For if the Will can produce Good to itfelf by choofing, the Errors and Inconveniencies to which it is expofed by a bad Choice, may be compensated by the Pleasure which arifes from the Senfe of Liberty. But if we were obliged to all poffible Enquiry, more inconvenience would be felt from that Obligation, than from fome Errors in Elections; nor would all of them be by this means avoided; for after all poffible Examination, a finite Understanding may be deceived. Evil Elections

23

'Tis better to be in danger of Sin

ning, than to ceafe

from Election.

tions are to be avoided on account of the Uneafiness confequent upon them, if therefore fuch a Difquifition as is neceffary to discover the Good, and a Sufpenfion of the Elective Faculty till that Good be discovered, would bring greater Uneafiness than fome wrong Elections, a Man will be more happy with a Power of doing amifs, than if he were obliged to wait for the determination of the Underftanding in every Cafe. For it is better that fome Perfons fhould fometimes do amifs, and fuffer Uneasiness from the Confcience of having done fo, than that all Men fhould in every Cafe be always afraid, uncertain, and folicitous, nay generally cease from all manner of Action.

XVII. Such is the nature of our Will that it can please itself in Election, and by its own Power make the things chofen agreeable, though in themfelves difagreeable to the Appetites. And though this cannot be done at all times, and in every Object, yet it is better to run the hazard, than to be deprived of fo useful a Faculty, or to be restrained from Election till an imperfect Understanding, such as that of Man neceffarily is, were clearly convinced of that Impoffibility. It is therefore convenient for us to derive our peculiar and chief Happiness from the Will itfelf; for if it depended on the Understanding it would come with difficulty, Pains and Anxiety, and we could feldom enjoy it pure and unmixed. 'Tis better therefore for us to be able to please ourselves without a long Speculation of Antecedents and Confequences, tho' with a danger of Sinning, than to cease from Election, and be reftrained from the Exercife of our Faculties till a whole train of these were perfectly apparent, which if it could be at all, yet would not be without Pain and Anxiety, as any one will find that tries. (66.)

NOTES.

SUB

(66.) All that Bayle objects to this [c,] is taken from the Nature of Good Angels, and Glorified Souls, who, according to

SUBSECT. III.

Why God does not interpofe his Omnipotence, and occafionally reftrain the Will from depraved Elections.

IT IS IS evident from what has been faid, that it More and was agreeable to the Divine Goodness to greater Ehave created Free Agents, for without these the vils would System of Nature would have been imperfect: nor thence,

NOTES.

arife from could than from

the abufe

him, are no lefs happy in themselves, nor perform a lefs ac- of Freeceptable Service to the Deity, for the want of it; and why Will. therefore might not we? To what was observed about the Inconclufiveness of all fuch Arguments as are drawn from Beings of a different Order in Note H we fhall here add, first, That it is more than we are obliged to grant, that either Angels or Saints in Heaven are abfolutely devoid of Liberty. They may have more clear Impreffions of Good and Evil on their Minds, more enlarged Understandings, fewer and lefs Temptations, &c. without being lefs free [d]; nay they must be in one sense more free, the more they are fo qualified. [e.] This way of reasoning therefore proceeds upon a false, or at least uncertain Hypothefis.

Secondly, Though it should be granted that these glorious Beings, fuppofing them all neceffary, might have as ample Knowledge, as ardent Love of the Divine Perfections, and confequently be as happy in the Enjoyment of God and themselves, as if they were all free; though they might have no occafion to fee or experience Vice, in order to their being fully acquainted with the Excellence of Virtue, and made fenfible of the infinite Wisdom, Power and Goodness of the Deity, fhewn in the Government and Suppreffion of the former, and in the Production and Improvement of the latter; Tho', I fay, these exalted Beings could be fuppofed to have a thorough Intuition of all the Attributes of God without any fuch manifestation of them in his Works; (against which Notion fee D'Oyly's First Differtation, C. 8. and Conclufion, p. 123.) yet it does not

Z4 4

feem

[c] See his Anfwer to the Queries of a Provincial, and Crit. Dia. Article Marchionites, Remark F. &c.

[d.] See ABp. Dawes's 5th Serm. p. 73, 74, and the latter end of Note T.

[e] See the beginning of Note 72.

It would

be as much Violence

could their Actions have been determined to Good by any natural Propenfity or Limitation, in the fame manner as the Senfes are limited by Objects: But yet it is certain that they depend upon God for their Actions, and if he should fufpend his Influence, they would not act at all. Since therefore he could fo eafily hinder the abuse of Liberty, why does he fuffer it? Why does he not reftrain Elections when they tend to Vice and Abfurdity? We grant that this Objection cannot be fatisfactorily anfwered otherwife than by fhewing that more and greater Evils would befal the Universe from fuch an Interpofition, than from the abufe of Free-Will. In order to which it is to be confidered,

II. In the first place, That this cannot be effected without Violence done to Nature. 'Tis allowed that Elections ought to be free, and that thinking to prevent Beings cannot otherwise be happy: God himself in the Action creating them has determined, as it were by aLaw, of Free- that they fhould be free. For by giving them a the Moti- Nature endowed with Choice, he allowed them on of the to make ufe of it. They cannot therefore be hindered without Violence done to the Laws of the Creation. I grant that God can dispense with the Laws

Will, as

Sun,

NOTES.

feem poffible for fuch imperfect Creatures as we are, to attain unto this excellent Knowledge, and enjoy the happy Effects of it on any other Terms than the prefent. We could not fure have had fo lively an Idea of the Mercy of God, if there had never been any proper Objects of it. We could not have been fo thoroughly confcious of our Dependency or Danger; nor had fo grateful a fenfe of our conftant Support, our frequent Deliverances; nor confequently have arrived to fo great a degree either of Virtue or Happinefs in this Life or the next, by any other Method; as will be further shewn in Notes 79 and 82. Either then thefe Happy Beings are ftill perfectly free, which Freedom conftitutes the greateft part of their Happiness; and let any Man try to prove the contrary; or at least they once were fo, in order to their greater Perfection, and are now only altered by being translated into another State, and put out of farther Trial; and confequently they belong to our Author's third Expedient, which will be examined in Subfect. 5.

Laws of Nature; but who will require or allow this to be done frequently? The bounds of this World, and the number of thinking Beings are unknown to us, but we believe that the System of Nature will endure for ever. Now as all things depend upon the Will of God, we cannot have any other Security of our Happiness, and of the Duration of the World, than the Divine Conftancy and Immutability: the Univerfal Laws of Nature are the Affurances of this Conftancy, and upon them does the Security and Happiness of the whole Work depend. It is not therefore to be expected that God fhould lightly difpenfe with thefe Laws, much lefs alter them by his Omnipotence every Moment. Since then it is provided by an Universal Law, that Free Agents fhould procure to themselves Happi-÷ nefs by the use of Election, and it is impoffible but that these, being left to themselves, fhould fometimes fall into depraved Elections; would it not be an Infringement and a Violation of this Law, if God fhould interpofe and hinder the use of that Faculty which by the Law of Nature he had established? We don't expect that the Situation of the Earth, or Course of the Sun, fhould be altered on our account, because these seem to be things of great Importance, and we apprehend it to be unreasonable, that for our private Advantage the Order and Harmony of things fhould be changed, to the detriment of fo many Beings. But to alter the Will, to stop Election, is no lefs a Violation of the Laws of Nature, than to interrupt the Course of the Sun. For a Free Agent is a more noble Being than the Sun, the Laws of its Nature are to be esteemed more facred, and not to be changed without a greater Miracle. There would then be a kind of Shock and Violence done to Nature, if God should interfere and hinder the Actions of FreeWill; and perhaps it would prove no less pernicious to the Intellectual Syftem, than the Sun's ftand

ing