Here lies the ftrefs of the Diffi Since therefore Man might bring the greateft plea- III. This feems to be the hardest point, the main stress of the Difficulty, viz. Whence come Moral Evils; i. e. thofe that are not neceffary? If they be i.e. culty, viz. faid to be neceffary, how are they free? If they be why did not neceffary, why does God permit them? The God per latter feems repugnant to the Goodness of God, the mit those former to the Nature of a free Agent. Evils which are nor useful? We don't IV. It must be confeffed, that we are lefs prepar neither ed for a Solution of this Difficulty than the former; neceffary for the Nature and Systems of the Intellectual World are lefs known to us than thofe of the purely Material one: Material Objects furround us, and ocknow fo cupy all the Inlets to Knowledge, and are the only much of things that immediately affect our Senfes. They inthe Nature trude upon us with an infinite Variety, and produce of think- many and various Senfations in us. But of intellecing Beings as of ma tual Beings, of their Operations, or of the mutual terialones, connection between them, we have but very few, and there- and thofe very obfcure Notions, viz. fuch as arife fore are only from the reflection of our Understanding upon pared for itself, or are collected by the use of Reafon deduc an An- ing one thing from another: For, of all intellectual fwer to Beings, our own Mind alone is immediately perthis Diffi- ceived by us; nor can we (as in Bodies) compare the culty. Notions arifing from it, with thofe that proceed from other Sources: all our Knowledge therefore of Spirits or thinking Beings is derived from this alone. lefs pre 'Tis 'Tis no wonder then if we be very much in the dark in our Reasonings about thefe and their Operations; and do not fo clearly perceive the neceffity of allowing Free-Will to them, as contrariety in the Motitions of Matter; nor fo eafily apprehend what Inconvenience would follow from reftraining the exercife of Liberty, as we fee the confequence of taking away the motion of Matter. We know that without Motion the whole Mafs of Matter would prove entirely useless, and that there would be no room for fo many Animals as now we find receive their Origin and Subfistence from it; which is justly esteemed a greater Evil, and more intolerable than all the natúral Evils arifing from Matter and Motion: and we should find the fame thing in the prevention of the use of Free-Will, if we understood the System of the Intellectual as well as that of the Material World. But if we can fhew that more Evils neceffarily arise from withdrawing or reftraining the use of Free-Will, than from permitting the abuse of it, it must be evident that God is obliged to fuffer either these or greater Evils. And fince the least of these neceffary Evils is chofen, even infinite Goodness could not poffibly do better. V. Let us try then whether the abufe of Free-Will The abufe could be prohibited with lefs detriment to the whole of FreeWill may System, than what arifes from the permiffion of it. be conThere are three Ways whereby God may be con- ceived to ceived able to have prevented bad Elections; firft, have been If he had created no Free Being at all. Secondly, three ways prevented If his Omnipotence interpofe, and occafionally re- which are ftrain the Will, which is naturally free, from any confider'd wrong Election. Thirdly, If he fhould change the in the folprefent state of things, and tranflate Man into an- Subfectiother, where the occafions of Error and incitements ons. to Evil being cut off, he should meet with nothing that could tempt him to choofe amifs. lowing God might have pre vented SUBSECT. II. Why God has created Free Agents. S to the first, 'Tis certain that God was not compelled by any neceffity to create any thing at all, he might therefore have prevented all Moral Evils, if he had not endowed any Being with Free Choice: for fo there would have been had refuf- nothing that could fin. But fuch a monftrous Deed to cre- fect and Hiatus would have been left in Nature by moral E vils, if he ate any free Being. But without these would this means, viz. by taking away all Free Agents, as would have put the World into a worfe Condition than that which it is in at present, with all the Moral Evils that distress it, though they were multiply'd to a much greater number. II. For in the first place, if we fet afide Free Athe World gents, i. e. thofe which have the Principle of Action within themselves, there is properly nothing at have been all Self-active, for all other Beings are merely paffive: a mere there is indeed fome kind of Action in Matter, viz. Machine Motion; but we know that it is paffive even with and every regard to that; 'tis therefore the Action of God up thing paffive. on Matter, rather than of Matter itself; which does not move itself, but is moved. Without Free Agents then the whole World would be a mere Machine, capable of being turned any Way by the Finger or Will of God, but able to effect nothing of itself. Nay the whole Work of God could not of itself exert one fingle Act or Thought, but would be totally brute and ftupid, as much as a Wheel or a Stone: it would continue fluggish and incapable of Action, unless actuated by external force. Second Caufes could therefore effect nothing which might be imputed to them, but all would be done entirely by the first. We need not fay, how much a World thus conftituted would be be inferior to the prefent, nor how incommodious and unworthy of its Divine Author. clare that III. Man, you'll fay, neceffarily affents to this Objection Propofition, twice two make four; but though his from thofe Mind is neceffarily driven to this Affent, and con- who defequently is not free, yet he is active: for it can the Unfcarce be faid that a Man is paffive in giving his derftandAffent.* The fame may be affirmed of God, who ing is acttho' we suppose him to be abfolutely free in his pri- ive, tho' mary Elections, yet when these are once fixed, he neceffary, muft neceffarily execute what he had decreed: ne- God himvertheless he is properly Self-active in all Cafes, con- felf. sequently there may be fomething active in Nature, though there were nothing free. as alfo Objection. IV. As to the former Part of the Objection, 'tis Answer to not very clear what may be the efficient Čaufe of in- the former part of the tellectual Affent; if the Object, then the Mind is merely paffive in the Act of Understanding: nor is Affent imputable to it any more than Descent to a Stone; but if the Object be esteemed only a Condition upon which the Understanding acts, we shall want a Cause to determine the Understanding; which cannot be supposed to determine itself, any more than the Fire determines itself to burn combuftible Matter. For no body judges the combuftible Matter to be active when it is fet on Fire, or that the Fire burns of itself without being kindled by fomething else. The World then without Liberty will be a piece of Mechanism, where nothing moves itself, but every thing is moved by an external Cause, and that by another, and fo on till we come at the firft, namely God; who will be the only Self-active Being, and must be esteemed the real Cause of all things; neither can any thing, whether well or ill done, be ascribed to others. V. As to the latter part of the Objection, That Answer to Being must be denominated Free, who is held by the latter. no other tie than his own Election: But God is no other * See Note 42. 1 and if no in them which is most a to the Deity. otherwife obliged to execute his Decrees, therefore he is free, if he did but make his Decrees freely; and is purely active in every Operation wherein he executes them. For he fuffers nothing by neceffity, nor from any other befide himself, and is determined to act by his own Liberty. God has a VI. Secondly, We believe that God created the compla- World in order to exercise the Powers he is poffeffcency in ed of for the Good of the Universe; the Divine his Works, Goodness therefore delights and applauds itself in its thing were Works, and the more any thing refembles God, free, that and the more 'tis Self-fufficient, it is to be esteemed would be fo much the more agreeable to its Author. But wanting any one may understand how much a Work which moves itself, pleases itself, and is capable of receiving and returning a Favour, is preferable to one greeable that does nothing, feels nothing, makes no return, unless by the force of fome external Impulse: any Perfon, I fay, may apprehend this, who remembers what a Difference there is between a Child careffing his Father, and a Machine turned about by the hand of the Artificer. There is a kind of Commerce between God, and fuch of his Works as are endowed with Freedom; there's room for Covenant and mutual Love. For there is fome fort of Action on both Sides, whereby the Creature may in fome measure return the benefits of the Creator, at least make an acknowledgment for them; and if any thing in the Divine Works can be conceived to be agreeable to God, this must certainly be fo*. One fuch Action as this is preferable to all the Sportings of Matter, or the Labyrinths of Motion: if there had been no free Creatures, God must have been deprived of this Complacency, which is almoft the only one worthy of him that he could receive from the Creation. 'Tis therefore as much agreeable to God that he should have made fuch Beings, as it is to the World that they fhould *See Paradife Loft, B.3. 1.100, &'c. |