The dif conceiv a power to action is its own reafon of Action, and determines itfelf freely. Nay fo great is the Power of God, that whatever he shall choose out of infinite Possibilities, that will be the best; 'tis all one therefore which he prefers. X. Sixthly, But you urge that you are still unficulty of fatisfy'd how a Power can determine itself, i. e. ing how you are ignorant of the Modus; but a thing must not be denyed because we do not know the manner can deter- how it is done: we are entirely ignorant how the mine itself Rays of the Sun produce the Idea of Light in the ought not Mind by moving the optic Nerves; nor is it betto hinder ter understood how the Members of the Body can our affent be moved by a Thought of the Mind, and at the Direction of the Will. Yet no body denies these the propo- things, because he knows not the manner in which they are performed. If therefore it be manifeft that the divine Will does determine itself, we fhall not trouble ourselves much in enquiring how it can be done. to the truth of fition. "Tis as difficult to conceive how a thing can be moved * XI. But to confefs the truth, 'tis no lefs difficult to conceive a thing to be moved or determined by another, than by itself; but as we are accustomed to material Agents, all which are paffive in their Operations, we are certain of the Fact, and not at by anoall folicitous about the manner of it: whereas if ther, as by itfelf: we we confider the thing thoroughly, we fhall find are preju- ourselves as far from apprehending how Motion is diced by communicated from one Body to another, as how being ac: the Will can move itself: but there seems to be nothing wonderful in the one, because is is observed to happen at all times, and in every Action; whereas the other is looked upon as incre cuftomed to materi al, i. e. paflive Agents. NOTES. dible, which is the only Defign of all that has been advanced on this Head. If any Miftakes appear in it (as probably there may} I fhall be obliged to this judicious Author for pointing them out, and promise freely to give up them or any others in the Book as foon as I can be made fenfible of them. * See Note 43. dible, fince it is feldom performed, viz. by the Will alone. And tho' both Reafon and Experience prove that it is done, yet we fufpect ourselves to be impofed upon, becaufe we know not the manner of it. The ground of the mistake is this, that fince the Will is the only active Power which we are acquainted with, the rest being all paffive, we are not eafily induced to believe it to be really fuch, but form our Judgment of it from a Comparison with other Agents, which fince they don't move but as they are moved, we require a Mover alfo in the Will of God: which is very abfurd; fince it is evident that if there were no active Power in Nature, there could not be a paffive one; and if nothing could move without a Mover, there would have been no Motion or Action at all.+ For we cannot conceive how it fhould begin. Now it is much harder to conceive how Motion can be without a Beginning, than how an Agent can move itself. Since then here are Difficulties on both Sides, neither ought to be denied because the manner of it is above human Understanding. indiffe of God, XII. It is to be observed, that what we have What is faid about faid concerning this Indifference of things in regard to the Divine Will, takes place chiefly in rence, thofe Elections which we apprehend to be the with rePrimary, but not always in the fubfequent ones. fpect to For fuppofing God to will any thing, while that the Will Election continues, he cannot reject either the fame takes or any thing neceffarily connected with it, for that place in would be to contradict himself. In order to aphis primaprehend my Meaning the better, we must remember that the Divine Power can effect innumerable things equal in Nature and Perfections. For inftance, we may conceive numberless Men equal to one another in all refpects; and alfo numberlefs Species + See Dr. Clarke's Demonftrat. of the D. Attributes. pag. 82, 87, &c. or S. Fancourt's Efay concerning Liberty, &c. p. 28, 29. or Note 43. ry Elec tions. 4. have all Species of rational Beings equally perfect: nothing but the Will of God could determine which of these God may he fhould create firft. But when it was determin'd things at to create Man fuch as he now is, i. e. with the Faonce in his culties, Appetites, and integral Parts which he conview fifts of at prefent, it is impoffible that God should which are will or choose any thing repugnant to human Nawith the ture, while that Election continues. connected will or re fimple A&t. thing XIII. For when we conceive any thing propochofen, fed to the Knowledge of God as fit to be done, and either he must also neceffarily have under his Eye, as it fufe them were at the fame Glance, all thofe things that are by one neceffarily connected with it, or confequent there-upon to all Eternity; and nuft will or reject them ́all by one fimple Act. If therefore he determin'd As he is to create Man, he must also be supposed to will that of infinite he fhould confist of a Soul and Body, that he should Goodness, be furnish'd with Reafon and Senfes, and that his wills the Body should be fubject to the general Laws of Matgood of all ter: for all these things are evidently included in things the Choice to create Man. which he he alfo has determin'd to When the XIV. Nay, this primary Act of Volition muft be fuppofed to contain not only those things which create, as have a neceffary connection with what is chofen, far as is but fuch things alfo as tend to promote its benefit poffible. and happiness, as far as they can be made confiftent with the benefit of the whole. For fince God is infinitely Good, 'tis certain that he wills that his therefore Creatures fhould exift commodioufly as much as that they should exift at all. He therefore will'd impoffible fuch things as are agreeable to the Natures, and that thofe tend to preferve the Conftitutions of his Creatures things in the fame Election whereby he determin'd to crefhould ate them. please him which is once made, it is tend to XV. We have faid before, that there is a double Goodness in things, the first and principal is the confu- that which renders them well-pleafing to God, as fion, &c. they are conformable to his Will: the other is that whereby they agree with one another, where of his Work. 2 by by they afford each other mutual Affistance, whereby they promote the Convenience, Prefervation and Perfection of the whole: but both these proceed from the Choice and Will of God. For when the Deity had once determin'd to please himself in the Creation and Prefervation of the World, he must be fuppofed at the fame time to have willed all fuch things as contribute to the Benefit and Perfection of his Work, otherwise he would have contradicted himself, and thereby been the cause of fruftrating his own Election. For he is now supposed to have chofen that there fhould be a World, that it should continue as long as he himself had determin'd, that every Being fhould attain the End affign'd to it, and all things act according to the Nature he had given them, and confpire together to preserve and perfect the whole. It is impoffible therefore that he should will the reverse of all this, or that fuch things should please him as tend to the disordering, maiming or destruction of his Work. For 'tis impoffible to conceive that he should choose the Exifftence of things, and yet refuse the Means neceffary thereto. XVI. When therefore Man was made what he When is, by that very Act of conftituting him of fuch Man is a Nature and Condition, 'tis plain, that God alfo made of willed that he should be pious, fober, juft and fuch a nachafte. (R.) Thefe and the like Laws of Nature quires him then to be juft, fober, &c. NOTES. ture as re these (R.) Against this 'tis objected, First, That it makes God God is not require thofe Virtues from Men, not because they are morally at Liberty good, but because of the Advantages which they bring by not to will preventing fuch things as may trouble civil Society or hurt a Man's felf. To this I anfwer that the Author has fhew'd in things. his Book that Moral Evil is founded on Natural, and that in the state of Nature, before Revelation, Men had no way to know what free acts were good or pleafing to God, but by obferving what was advantageous to particular Men, or to Society. Obferve all the Laws of Nature, and you will find them difco ver'd then are immutable, viz. conformable to the Will of God, and contain'd in the very first Act of Elec NO TES. tion ver'd and proved from this fole Principle: As is manifeft from all the Books that treat of them. To pretend therefore that the natural Mischiefs arising from Vice do not prove them to be morally Evil, is an uncommon way of thinking; fince the very Argument whereby we prove them morally Evil is because they are pernicious. But zdly, From hence, fay fome, it follows that the Turpitude of Vices is not to be estimated from their own Nature, but from the Evils which attend them: as if effects did not flow from their Caufe, and those things which lead us into fuch Evils as might have been avoided by abftaining from them were not properly Evil; or that we ought to judge of the nature of any thing otherwife than from the Properties and operations that neceffarily attend it. As to the Turpitude of things, we give that Appellation to fuch as feem contrary to the Dignity and Honour of a rational Nature, which cannot be feen or heard without fome naufeous abhorrence and reluctance of the Senfes. We attribute it to Vices by a kind of Analogy, fince they proceed from fuch Principles as are unworthy of human Nature, as leffen the value and efteem of him who has imbibed them, and make him as it were unclean and fordid, and the averfion of all good and modeft Perfons. But fuch Turpitude as this does not arife from the Nature of the Things themselves, but from fome fordid Qualities that adhere to them and offend the Senfes. In like manner the Turpitude of Vices does not arife from the fimple Nature of Actions, but from fome adventitious Circumftances, which bring Evil on them, and as they are undue and heterogeneous, they as it were defile those Actions to which they adhere. 'Tis to be obferv'd farther, that God can difpenfe with fome Actions which feem contrary to the Law of Nature, but not with others. For Inflance, he commands Abraham to kill his innocent Son, who prepares to obey, and if he had executed the Divine Command he had done nothing amifs. And yet it seems contrary to the Law of Nature for a Father to kill his innocent Son. But as God is the Giver and Lord of Life, Reason tells us that he may take it away by whom he pleases. But no Man in his Wits can believe that God may require any reasonable Creature to hate him or disobey his Commands, to be rebellious or perjur'd; or that any fhould take these for Duties owing to God, tho' an Angel from Heaven fhould declare them to be fo. What is the Reason therefore why God com |