Imágenes de página

stinction of Good into Pleasant, Profitable, and Honest: Except that it refers Honest to the Duty which a Mans owes to God, himself, and other Men, as a Member of an intelligent Society, rather

than NOTES comprehend, as he says it does, moft cases in Life, yet still it is not of the least Importance. For what does it fignifiy to me that I muft neceffarily take one fide or the other, right or wrong, so long as I can choose either of them indefferently ? If I can will or choose either of the two, here's full room for the exercise of Liberty ; and whether I can or no, ought to have been Mr. Locke's next Question. The Answer to which seems pretty easy, tho' perhaps not so reconcileable with his Hypothesis. However, inftead of meddling with it, he flips this absurd Query into its Room, wiz. Whether a Man be ac Liberty to will which of the two be pleafes ? or which is the fame, Whether he can Will what he Wills ? Sect, 25.. And then, instead of thewing whether the Will be naturally determind to one side, in any or all cafes, or whether the Man be always free to will this way or that ; (as might have been expected) he tells us something very different, viz. that we can't always al in that Manner, or that Liberty of acting does not require that a Man fhou'd be able to do any Action or its contrary: then he goes on to give us another Explanation of the word Liberty, which is fill confined to Action, and confequently foreign to the prefent Question.

In the next place he defines the Will over again. || Which

(says he) is nothing but a power in the Mind to direct the s operative Faculties of a Man to Motion or Reft, as far as they

depend on such direction'. By which Words if he mean, that this power of directing the operative Faculties, is properly active (in the sense abovemention?d) or Phyfically indifferent to any particular manner of direding them, i.e. is an ability to direct them either to Motion or Rest, without any natural Byass to determine it (or to determine the mind to de. termine it) toward one side always rather than the other. If, I say, he intends to imply thus much in this definition of Will, then may Freedom be juftly predicated of that same Will, (or of the Mind in the exercise of it,) not indeed his kind of Freedom, i. e. that of afling, which belongs to another Faculty ; but Freedom in our sense of the Word, i.e. a certain Indifference, or Indeterminateness in its own exercise; which is what most Men underland by Liberum Arbitrium; and whether there be such a Liberty as this in human Nature, would here bave been

a pro+ See Strutt's Remarks on Locke's Chapter of Power, p. 38. &c.

| Sect. 29.

than to the natural Appetites; and thinks that we are to judge of the Agreeableness of things from that, rather than from these. As to the Election which the Will makes on account of these, it asserts

that NOTES. a proper Question. For if there be, then we have got an absolutely felf-moving Principle, which does not want any thing out of itself to determine it; which has no physical connection with, and of consequence, no necessary occation for that grand Determiner Anxiety, which he has afterwards taken so much pains to settle and explain, and which shall be confider'd by and by. But here he flies off again, and instead of determining this, which is the main point of the controversy, and wherein Liberty must be found or no where (as we observ'd in Note 42.) I say, instead of stating and determining this great Question, Whether the Will or Mind be absolutely independent upon, and physically indifferent to all particular Aets, Objects, Motions, c. or necessarily require some foreign Mover; he seems to take the latter for granted, and immediately proceeds to the following Question, W bat determines the Will? The Meaning of which, says he *, is this, " What moves the Mind • in every particular instance to determine its general power

of directing to this or that particular Motion or Rett: This Mr. Locke calls, for shortness fake, determining the Will; and declares that what thus determines it either firit to continue in the same state or action, is only the present Satisfaction in it: or secondly to change, is always some Uneafinefst. By which Words if he only meant that chese Perceptions are the common Motives, Inducements, or Occafions whereupon the Mind in fact : exerts its power of willing in this or that particular Manner ; though in reality it always can, and often does the contrary, as he seems to intimate by speaking of a Will contrary to Defire of raising Desires by due Consideration and forming Ap. petites t, of a Power to fufpend any Defires, to moderate and reftrain the Passions, and hinder either of them from determining the Will and engaging us in Action : Then, as we said before, he is only talking of another Question, and what he has advanced on this head may readily be granted, at least without any prejudice to human Liberty. For in this sense to affirm that the Will or Mind is determin'd by something without it, is only saying that it generally has fome Motives from without, according to which it determines the abovemention'd Powers, which no Man in his Senses can dispute.



+ Ibid.

. Sect. 29.

+ Sect. 53.

Sect. 46.

| Sect. 30. [ Sect. 47, 50, 53:


that this proceeds from the Will itself, and that a free Agent cannot be determin'd like natural Bodies by external Impulses, or like Brutes by Objects. For this is the very difference betwixt

Man NOTES. But if he intended that these Motives should be understood to rule and direct the Will absolutely and irresistibly in certain Cases:- That they have such a necessary influence on the Mind, that it can never be determind without or against them ; - in sort, that the Soul of Man has not a physical Power of willing independent of, and consequently indifferent to all Perceptions, Reasons and Motives whatsoever ; - which the general drift of his Discourse seems to affert, particularly $.47, 48, 49, 50. where he confounds the Determination of the judgment with the exertion of the self-moving Power through

As also g. 52. where he asserts, That all the Liberty we have, or are capable of, lies in this, that we can suspend

our Desires, and hold our Wills undetermin'd, till we have

examin'd the Good and Evil of what we desire; what fol. • lows after that follows in a Chain of Consequences link'd

one to another, all depending on the last Determination of • the Judgment. And when he speaks of Causes not in our Power, operating for the most part forcibly on the Will, $. 57, &c.

If from these and the like Expressions, I say, we may conclude this to have been his Opinion, viz. that all the Liberty of the Mind consists solely in directing the Determination of the Judgment, (though if the Mind be always determin'd from without, we must have a Motive also for this Direction, and consequently shall find no more freedom here than any where else) after which Determination all our Adions (if they can be called such *) follow necessarily : then I believe it will appear, that at the same time that he opposed the true Notion of Free-Will, he contradicted common Sense and Experience, as well as himself. For in the first place, is it not self-evident, that we often do not follow our own present Judgment, buc run counter to the clear conviction of our Understandings ; which A&tions accordingly appear vicious, and fill us immeditately with regret and the stings of Conscience ? This he als lows, [$. 35, 38.) to make Room for his Anxiety. But, upon the foregoing Hypothesis, How can any Aation appear to be irregular? How can any thing that is consequent upon the final Result of Judgment, (if this Word be used in its pxoper Sense) be against Conscience, which is nothing else but


* Se Note 42.

Man and the Brutes, that these are determin’d according to their bodily Appetites, whence all their Actions are necessary, but Man has a different Principle in him, and determines himself to Action.

II. This NOTES. that final Judgment?* Nay, upon the supposition of our be ing inviolably determind in willing by our Judgment (and, according to Mr. Locke, our Conftitution puts us under a necessity of being so, §. 48.) it would be really impossible for us to will amiss or immorally, let our Judgments be ever so erroneous; • The Causes of which (as he also observes, §. 64.) • proceed from the weak and narrow constitution of our Minds,

and are most of them out of our Power.' Either therefore we can will without and against a present Judgment, and therefore are not necessarily i.e. physically) determin’d by it; or we cannot be guilty of a wrong Volition : whatever proves the one, by neceffary consequence establishes the other. Farther, there are innumerable indifferent Actions which occur daily, both with respect to absolute choosing or refusing, or to choosing among things absolutely equal, equal both in themselves, and to the Mind, on which we evidently pass no manner of Judgment, and consequently cannot be said to follow its Determination in them. To will the eating or not eating of an Egg is a Proof of the former ; to choose one out of two or more Eggs apparently alike, is a proverbial Inttance of the latter; both which are demonstrations of an active or self-moving Power ; either way we determine and act when the Motives are entirely equal, which is the same as to act without any Motive at all. In the former Case I perceive no previous Inclination to direct my Will in general, in the latter no Motive to influence its Determination in particular; and in the present Case, not to perceive a Motive is to have none; (except we could be said to have an Idea without being conscious of it, to be anxious and yet insensible of that Anxiety, or sway'd by a Reason which we do not at all apprehend.) Neither is it necessary to a true Equality or Indifference here, that I be supposed to have no Will to use any Eggs at all as the Author of the Philosophical Enquiry absurdly puts the Case.) For granting in the first place, that I have not a will to use any Eggs at all, 'tis indeed nonsense to suppose

after* See Limborch. Theol. Christ. L. 2. C. 23. Sect. 16. and for an Answer to the latter part of Locke's 48th Sect. see the same Chap. Sect. the last.


That the II. This Principle whereby Man excells the chief

Brutes is thus explain'd by the Defenders of the Good is neceffari- following Opinion, if I take their Meaning right : ly desir'd, In the first place, they declare that there is some but others Chief Good, the Enjoyment of which would make are not,

a Man compleatly happy; this he naturally and because they may necessarily desires, and cannot reject it when duly be repre- represented by the Understanding. That other fented by things which offer themselves have a Relation to the Un

this Good, or some Connection with it, and are to derstand ing in

be esteem’d Good or Evil, as they help or hinder our different obtaining it; and since there is nothing in Nature respects.

but NOTES. afterwards that I should choose any one; but let me have never so great an Inclination to eat Eggs in general, yet that general Inclination will not in the leait oblige me to choose or prefer one Egg in particular *, which is the only point in Question. Numberless Instances might easily be given to where we often approve, prefer, desire and choose ; and ali we know not why: where we either choose such things as have no manner of Good or Evil in them, excepting what arises purely from that Choice; or prefer some to others, when both are equal Means to the same End: in which Cafes the Judgment is not in the least concernd; and he that undertakes to oppose the Principle by which our Author accounts for them, muft either deny all such Equality and Indifference, or grant the Question. Not that this Principle is confined to fuch Cases as these ; nor are they produced as the most important, but as the most evident Instances of its exertion; where no Motives can be supposed to determine the Will, because there are none. To urge, that such Elections as these are made on purpose to try my Liberty, which End, fay some becomes the Motive; is in effect granting the very thing we contend for, viz. that the Pleasure attending the exercise of the Will is often the sole reason of Volition. Besides, that Motive is one of the Mind's own making; and to be able to produce the Motive for A&ion, is the same thing, with regard to Liberty, as to be able to act without one. If by trying our Liberty be meant an Experiment to assure us that we have really such a Power ; there can be no reason for trying it in this sense, because we are sufficiently conscious of it before any such Trial.

The * See Leibnitz's fifth Paper to Dr. Clarke, No. 17, and 66. + See Dr. Cheyne's Phil. Principles, Chap. 2. Sect. 13.

[ocr errors]
« AnteriorContinuar »